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Abstract 
Talal Hamad Hamdan Saqer Aladwani 
“A comparative study of the obligation of due diligence to provide a seaworthy 
vessel under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules” 
In the last 100 years, vast technological and communicational changes have 
occurred in all modes of transportation, with momentous changes to the 
carriage of cargo by sea. In response, the shipping industry has attempted 
to codify, at the international level, regulations and standards with the aim of 
providing a safe environment at sea. In turn, the shipping industry’s 
regulations impact upon the way sea carriage is performed. The obligation 
of seaworthiness is no exception. The requisite standard of seaworthiness is 
also, to a limited extent, governed by the shipping indsutry’s regulations.  
It is notable that the shipping industry’s regulations cannot keep pace with 
technological developments and they therefore lag behind the latest 
inventions. This creates an imbalance in the risk borne between the parties 
to the contract of carriage. Accordingly, the current law on seaworthiness 
requires modification in order to keep up with the technological evolution in 
the shipping industry. For such reasons, the Rotterdam Rules and its 
provisions on seaworthiness, were agreed.  
This thesis focuses on the scope of the provisions that relate to the 
obligation of seaworthiness in the Rotterdam Rules as compared to the 
parallel obligation in the existing regime under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. In order to ascertain whether the new convention provides a sound 
system to govern the law relating to seaworthiness, it is necessary to deal 
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with the carrier’s obligation of seaworthiness under the Rotterdam Rules as 
compared to the widely used regime of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.  
However, the Rotterdam Rules introduce additional changes to the regime 
governing the carriage of goods; for example, multimodal transport. These 
changes are also considered in this study. This thesis discusses the impact 
of multimodal carriage on the obligation and liability of seaworthiness. It 
proposes that a multimodality approach should not be used with particular 
types of sea carriage; for example, container carriage. 
Throughout the thesis, proposals for both regimes concerning changes to 
areas where the risk between the contracting parties is imbalanced are 
provided. This inevitably involves a detailed study on the provisions relating 
to the obligation of exercising due diligence (and related potential liabilities 
in case of breach) under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam 
Rules. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
“The vessels of the future must be able to meet clear goals and functional requirements to fulfil 
the safety and, increasingly, the environmental expectations of society – which are growing ever 
more demanding. The vessels of the future must provide a continuous response to the needs of 
society, industry and global trade and be operated within a framework that encourages a safety 
culture beyond mere compliance with statutory requirements. This is can be achieved by giving 
consideration to future regimes and regulatory systems over carriage of goods by sea and ship 
safety.”
1
 
 
The above statement highlights the fact that vessels must continuously respond 
to the needs of society, industry and global trade and be operated within a 
framework that encourages safe carriage and protection of the environment. 
This can be achieved in two ways. First, it is paramount to encourage a safety 
culture beyond mere compliance with statutory requirements by constantly 
assessing the potential of emerging new technologies and innovations that help 
to make vessels safer. Failure to do this may lead to tremendous consequences, 
e.g. oil pollution, cargo damage, etc. Second, it is important to devise a 
regulatory framework that will evaluate and amend the law of carriage of goods 
by sea to keep pace with the development of shipping and trade.      
 It is here that the importance of seaworthiness emerges. The ocean has a 
volatile nature and has the capacity to overwhelm any vessel. Therefore, vessels 
should be furnished to withstand this potential harm in order to protect  
 
                                               
1 Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-General, International Maritime Organization, Future Ship Safety and 
Regulations, 10-11 June 2013. 
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cargo, the environment, and the economic purpose of the contract. It is here that 
the law governing the seaworthiness of vessels arises. 
This Chapter seeks to provide some background to the development of 
seaworthiness and the different forms in which it can take. It also looks at the 
development of the Rotterdam Rules and the importance of how the relevant 
conventions are interpreted. Finally, it concludes by identifying the key 
questions relevant to carrying out the comparative study.  
1.1 Development of the legal concept of seaworthiness 
As far back as the fourteenth century,2 there was no need to establish the 
notion of seaworthiness. The court dealt with any loss or damage to cargo on 
the basis that the carrier needed to take proper care of the client’s cargo.3 
The nineteenth century4 was deemed a notorious era for its spate of massive 
losses to human life, ships and cargo at sea. Logic dictated in the mind of 
judges that those who placed their property on board a vessel for the purpose of 
a maritime adventure should be suitably protected by the legal requirement that 
the vessel be seaworthy.  
 
                                               
2
The Humber Ferryman case (1348) 22 YB 22 Liber Assisarum N041 f.94. A.D cited in 
http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/published/shipping/Seaworthiness.pdf, p.2; Hughes, Casebook on 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Oxford University Press, 1999), at p.4. 
3
 There was no pressing need for the concept of seaworthiness to protect the owner’s interest. 
As the law developed, the notion of the common carrier developed whereby, in the absence of 
an Act of God, King’s enemies and inherent vice in cargo, any liability for cargo damage was 
incurred by the shipowner. Forward v Pittard (1785) 1 TR 27; Coggs v Bernard (1703) Ld Raym 
909. 
4
 See Wong, S., ‘Seaworthiness: The influence of Maritime Law’ at p.24 cited in Fitness for Sea: 
An International Conference on Seaworthiness (Newcastle University, 9-10, 1980). 
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As a result of this reasoning, demands for, and the importance placed upon, a 
notion of ‘seaworthiness’ germinated and flourished. 5  An enormous body of 
common law established the importance of seaworthiness and implied a duty on 
the carrier to provide a seaworthy vessel. It was also developed by legislators 
who, for the general purpose of unifying the rules governing maritime law, 
expressly incorporated the term ‘seaworthiness’ into treaties, for example, the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels, 1924 
(The Hague Rules) and its Visby Amendment of 1968. 6  This replaced the 
obligation of absolute seaworthiness at common law with an obligation to 
exercise ‘due diligence’ to provide a seaworthy vessel. Furthermore, as there 
was a demand for amending the law in relation to the carriage of goods by sea, 
another convention, referred to as the United Nations Convention on the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (Hamburg Rules) was introduced. 
Subsequently, the Comité Maritime International (CMI) and the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has worked together to 
produce a new set of rules, namely the United Nations Convention on Contracts 
for International Carriage of Goods Wholly and Partly by Sea (Rotterdam 
Rules),7 to ensure that the law is in line with the development of the industry, i.e. 
with the rise of multimodal carriage and containerisation. One of the major 
changes regarding the obligation of seaworthiness is that the exercise of due 
diligence was extended to the entire voyage. Changes included the obligation to 
                                               
5
 See Lyon v Mells (1804) 102 E.R. 1134, where Lord Ellenborough stated that ‘in every 
contract for the carriage of goods [by sea], it is a term of the contract on the part of the 
carrier…implied by law, that his vessel is tight and fit for the purpose or employment for which 
he offers and holds forth…’ at p.1137.  
6  Hereinafter, the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The amendments do not change any of the 
obligations of seaworthiness; some of the amendments are related to the limit of liability and 
amount of compensation that the cargo-interest may receive. 
7
 Hereinafter, the Rotterdam Rules. 
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make and keep any containers supplied by the carrier fit and safe as well as 
some changes to the basis of liability and the burden of proving 
unseaworthiness with the deletion of the nautical fault exclusion.  
1.2  The importance and relevance of seaworthiness 
Every contract for the carriage of goods by sea or water8 is subject to either 
implied or express obligations, one of which is the obligation to provide a 
seaworthy ship.9 The obligation arises, under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, 
both before and at the beginning of the voyage and the carrier may be held 
liable if they fail to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy at this 
time. If the carrier can demonstrate either that the vessel was seaworthy or that 
due diligence was exercised to make the vessel seaworthy at the relevant time, 
he will be deemed to have discharged the obligation on him and will be able to 
benefit from the exceptions available to him. 
The cargo-interests must, in order to establish the liability of the carrier, prove 
that the vessel was unseaworthy at the beginning of the voyage10 and that the 
loss would not have arisen but for the unseaworthiness.11 
The codification of good seamanship practice and knowledge has created 
Shipping Industry Regulations12 in the form of conventions and codes such as 
                                               
8 Elof Hansson Agency v Victoria Co. (1938) 54 T.L.R. 666, Singleton J. held that a contract of 
lighterage with lighterage contractors who sub-contracted with a lighterage company for the 
collecting of cargo from a ship was a contract of affreightment, and that a warranty of 
seaworthiness was therefore to be implied.  
9
 See Wilson J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (2008, Pearson Education, 6
th
 ed.), at p.9.  
10
 See Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line [1951] 2 T.L.R. 1158. 
11
 The cargo-interests cannot recover for loss or damage without establishing that the 
unseaworthiness is the cause of loss or damage, per Lord Esher M.R. in Baumwoll v Gilchrist 
[1893] 1 Q.B. 253, at p.257 and 258, approved in Kish v Taylor [1912] A.C. 604, at p.617. It is 
immaterial that other causes contributed to occasion it per Lord Wright in Smith, Hogg and 
Company Limited v Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Company Limited [1940] A.C. 997. 
12
 Hereinafter, shipping industry. Shipping industry can be defined as the rules, regulations and 
guidance (e.g. conventions, codes, etc.) issued by official bodies at the international or national 
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SOLAS and STCW, which are constantly updated. Considering the fact that 
these Regulations may influence (directly and/or indirectly) factors considered 
by the court in determining whether the vessel is seaworthy,13 the legal question 
of what constitutes a seaworthy vessel, therefore, has changed over time and 
will continue to change in line with trends of the shipping industry.14  
Another matter that raises practical issues is the multiplicity and complexity of 
legal regimes governing the carriage of goods by sea specifically and by land 
generally; these have increased since the emergence of container carriage. 
Such complexity raises difficulties in relation to the imbalance between the 
carrier and the cargo-interests. Despite the trends that have occurred over the 
years in the law, originally in common law, then in the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules and now in the untested regime of the Rotterdam Rules, the latter regime 
has expanded the carrier’s responsibility to cover the land leg of the carriage.  
1.3 Definition of seaworthiness 
The broad nature of the concept of ‘seaworthiness’ makes it difficult to 
comprehensively define.15 
However, the definition of seaworthiness, despite the changes in the law that 
govern seaworthiness, has not been changed over the years and encapsulates 
                                                                                                                                          
level concerned with or interested in the safety of shipping such as the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO).  
13 See for instance, SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulation 14: Ships’ manning. It provides for the 
minimum sufficient and efficient manning of vessels. 
14 Per Lord Sumner in Bradley & Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Co. (1926) 24 Ll.L.Rep. 
446; (1927) 27 Ll.L.Rep. 397. He stated, prior to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules that ‘In the law 
of Carriage of Goods by Sea, neither seaworthiness nor due diligence is absolute, both are 
relative among other things to the state of knowledge and the standards of [industry] prevailing 
at the time.’ 
15
 The definition of seaworthiness is regarded by all scholars as unified in meaning between the 
carriage of goods by sea and the law of marine insurance.  
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 a number of different elements. It can be said that it is the fitness of the vessel 
that allows her to withstand the expected ordinary perils of the contemplated 
voyage. In Kopitoff v Wilson,16 the Court held that “the ship is good, and is in a 
condition to perform the voyage then about to be undertaken, or, in ordinary 
language, is seaworthy; that is, fit to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and 
other incidental risks to which she must of necessity be exposed in the course 
of the voyage.”17 Further, in Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v Norfolk and North 
American Steam Shipping Co., one of the iron armour plates, which formed the cargo, 
broke loose in rough weather and went through the side of the vessel, which in 
consequence sank. It was held that the vessel was not seaworthy in the sense of not 
being cargoworthy. The court stated that “There was in every contract with regard to 
carriage of goods by sea an absolute warranty that the carrying vessel must, at the 
time of sailing with the goods, have that degree of fitness as regards both the safety of 
the ship and also the safe carriage of the cargo in the ship which an ordinary careful 
and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of the 
voyage, having regard to the probable circumstances of that voyage and its nature…”18 
Indeed, the meaning of seaworthiness in practical terms differs from case to 
case; no vessel can at all times be fit to carry any cargo whatsoever to any part 
of the world. What is required of a carrier of timber in the North Atlantic in 
                                               
16 Kopitoff v Wilson (1867) 1 Q.B.D. 377. 
17 Kopitoff v Wilson (1867) 1 Q.B.D. 377 at p.380; McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697, 
cited in Carver, Carriage by Sea, which defined seaworthiness as “…that degree of fitness 
which an ordinary careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the 
commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of it,” at p.706, 
per Channel J. 
18
 Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v Norfolk and North American Steam Shipping Co. (1912) 1 
K.B. 229 (C.A.). at p.243 per Kennedy L.J. 
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 November, for instance, is quite different from the corresponding obligation 
facing the carrier of meat on a tropical voyage in the China Sea in June.19 
Carver has introduced a benchmark test that assists carriers to determine 
whether their vessel is seaworthy or not, namely, ‘Would a prudent owner have 
required that a defect should be made good before sending his ship to sea had 
he known of it? If he would, the ship was not seaworthy within the meaning of 
the undertaking.’20 
However, a standard of repair/preparation to make the vessel seaworthy differs 
depending on the contemplated voyage as well as the type of cargo. 21 
‘Seaworthiness is a word of which the importance varies with the place, the 
voyage, the class of the ship, or even the nature of the cargo.’22 A repair may be 
held good when encountering a peril of a particular voyage23 but it might not be 
held adequate for another voyage and the vessel may be regarded as 
unseaworthy.24 Additionally, the nature of the cargo is a factor to be considered 
                                               
19 Burges v Wickham (1863) 3 B & S 669; F. C. Bradley & Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation 
Co. (1926) 24 Ll. L. Rep. 446. 
20 The test was first introduced by Carver on Carriage of Goods, 18th ed. The test then was 
applied to many cases, e.g. McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697, at 703; M.D.C. Ltd v 
N.V. Zeevaart Maatschappij [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 180. 
21
 Stanton v Richardson (1875) L.R. 9 C.P. 390. “The implied undertaking is that the ship shall, 
when the voyage begins, be seaworthy for that particular voyage and for the cargo carried” at 
p.395; Ivamy, E. R., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Butterworth, 13
th 
ed, 1989) at p.21. 
22
 Foley v Tabor (1861) 2 F & F 663 at p.671, per Erle CJ.  
23
 Some particular voyages at a particular time of the year correspondingly require a higher 
standard of seaworthiness. In Virginia Carolina Chemical Co. v Norfolk and North American 
Steam Shipping Co. Kennedy (1912) 1 K.B. 229, Buckley LJ stated that ‘the carrying vessel 
must, at the time of sailing with the goods, have that degree of fitness as regards both the safety 
of the ship and also the safe carriage of the cargo in the ship which an ordinarily careful and 
prudent owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of the voyage, having 
regard to the probable circumstances of that voyage and its nature’ at pp.243-244.    
24
 For the purposes of clarity and simplicity, the term ‘seaworthy’ is used in this thesis to denote 
the condition of a vessel as being seaworthy. Seaworthiness is used to denote the legal 
requirement to furnish a seaworthy vessel. The term ‘unseaworthiness’ is used to denote a 
breach of the legal duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel and unseaworthy represents the condition 
of the vessel. 
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when assessing the seaworthiness of a vessel.25 The above demonstrates that 
there is no universal standard of seaworthiness. The standards defining 
seaworthiness are technical and complicated, hence they must be considered in 
this study to assist with the comparison of the duty under the different regimes.  
1.4  The facets of the vessel’s seaworthiness 
The vessel must be in such a state at the start of the voyage to perform the 
contract of carriage safely with emphasis on the vessel itself and the particular 
cargo to be carried on the voyage. Seaworthiness of the vessel encompasses 
two types of fitness: a) the fitness of the vessel to withstand the perils of the sea 
(meaning sea and port); and b) her capability to carry and deliver the cargo 
safely to its contemplated destination(s). 
1.4.1 Physical seaworthiness 
Seaworthiness refers to the good order of the hull of the vessel, which 
encompasses keeping the bulkheads, plating and masts in a condition that is fit 
                                               
25
 Daniels v Harris (1877) 2 App Cas 72, 77. The type of cargo loaded on board, for example, 
may restrict the vessel from loading other types of cargoes. In Stanton v Richardson (1871-1872) 
L.R. 7 C.P. 421. A cargo of wet sugar rendered the vessel unseaworthy. The carrier was given 
the choice to select between a range of cargoes. The carrier selected the wet sugar. The ship’s 
pump could not handle the amount of moisture in the sugar. See also The Benlawers [1989] 2 
Lloyd's Rep. 51. “The words ‘any permissible cargo’ are there as part of the contract and the 
onions were a permissible cargo. It is not part of the shipowner’s case that there was any 
breach of the charter-party on the part of the time charterers, nor is it a part of their case that the 
onions were anything other than a legitimate cargo. The position therefore is that if it is a 
permitted cargo then the shipowners must be prepared to do whatever is necessary to carry the 
cargo safely…. If the owners had wanted to make special provision for a cargo of onions or if 
they were to advance a case that it was exceptional or unusual cargo, then they might have 
done so. But the cargo of onions was not such a cargo and there was no special provision in 
this charter-party. If owners wish a different result, they must limit the cargoes which may be 
carried under the charter-party. If they expressly exclude such cargoes then there will be no risk 
of their having any liability to cargo-interests in respect of such cargoes and, indeed, shipping 
such a cargo will be a breach of the charter-party.” per Mr. Justice Hobhouse, pp.60-61. 
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 for the voyage taking into consideration the type of the vessel,26 the navigable 
water in which the vessel is sailing,27 the time of year28 and the knowledge 
available at the time of the voyage.29 The vessel’s structural integrity (hull) must 
be sufficiently strong to endure the likely weather.30 Her hull plating,31 hatches 
 
                                               
26
 See Burges v Wickham (1863) 3 B & S 669. A vessel built for use in a river carried out 
some modifications to strengthen and prepare the vessel for ordinary sea perils expected in 
her voyage from the United Kingdom to India. The insurers were made aware of the original 
construction and the modifications that had taken place. They accepted the additional risk 
of a river vessel carrying out an ocean voyage in exchange for an extra premium. She 
could not withstand the encountered expected perils of the ocean and consequently she 
was lost. The underwriters unsuccessfully sought to avoid liability when they contested that 
the vessel was unseaworthy. 
27
 See The Quebec Marine Insurance Company v The Commercial Bank of Canada (1869-
1871) L.R. 3 P.C. 234. The vessel was insured for a voyage of sea and river. Her boiler had 
a defect that was not apparent in the river leg, but once the vessel sailed at sea the defect 
became apparent and the vessel had to be put in for a repair. The court held that the vessel 
was unseaworthy to sail in salt water. The insurer was not liable to pay the assured 
shipowner because the shipowner breached its implied obligation by virtue of s.39 of the 
Marine Insurance Act. See also Moore v Lunn (1923) 15 Ll.L. Rep. 155 and Burges v 
Wicham (1863) 3 B & S 669. 
28
 The vessel may be seaworthy for a trip to be made in the summer but unseaworthy for a 
winter voyage: See Daniel v Harris (1874-1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 1, an insurance case where 
the vessel sailed in February with agreed deck cargo. The vessel encountered rough seas, 
which were not extraordinary conditions and should have been anticipated at that time of 
year. The vessel could not survive without jettisoning the deck cargo. The court held that 
the vessel was unseaworthy to carry deck cargo during that time of the year. See also 
Moore v Lunn (1923) 15 Ll.L.Rep. 155, where Lord Justice Bankes stated: ”That was the 
state in which this vessel started on a voyage in midwinter across the North Atlantic with an 
unlashed deck cargo of logs. In my opinion, the learned Judge was quite right in coming to 
the conclusion that at the time the vessel started she was in fact unseaworthy by reason of 
the state in which the captain and the first engineer were,” p.156. 
29
 The vessel is not required to be fitted with the latest technology as long as it is not 
compulsory by safety conventions, e.g. SOLAS. See M.D.C. v N. V. Zeevaart Maatschappij 
[1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180. A cargo of potatoes arrived damaged at the destination due to 
lack of ventilation. This resulted when the carrier had to close the hatches to protect the 
cargo from rain. The owner claimed that the vessel was unseaworthy as it did not have a 
ventilation system. The court held that the vessel was seaworthy and the damage suffered 
was not beyond what should be expected in such a voyage. See also Bradley v Federal 
Steam Navigation (1926) 24 Ll.L.Rep. 446. 
30
 In The Christel Vinnen [1924] P 208; (1924) 19 Ll.L. Rep. 272, where a missing rivet from 
the vessel’s hull allowed seawater to leak into the hull and damage the cargo, Lord 
Scrutton stated: “...the rivet was a defective rivet when the voyage started, and that, 
therefore, made the ship unseaworthy”, p.212. 
31
 A single crack in the hull plating rendered the vessel unseaworthy. See Huilever SA v 
The Otho [1943] A.M.C. 210. 
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and portholes,32 doors and skylights must be adequately watertight to protect 
the stability of the vessel from ingress of water. The carrier should ensure that 
his vessel is supplied with the necessary equipment; for example, radar and 
GPS required by the classification society and by safety conventions, i.e. 
SOLAS.33 
1.4.2 Supply of equipment 
It is also necessary for the vessel to have her engines, 34  documentation, 35 
navigation equipment,36 steering gear,37 anchors,38 boilers,39 generators,40 and 
                                               
32
 See Steel v State Line (1877) 3 App Cas 72, pp.90-91. The court found that the physical 
seaworthiness of the vessel was not fulfilled when one of the deck portholes was insufficiently 
fastened. During the voyage, water entered through the porthole and damaged the cargo of 
wheat. Portholes may be opened and closed in normal course depending on the practical need. 
Those are not practices that would render the hull to be physically unseaworthy. Gilroy v Price 
[1893] A.C. 56, p.64; also per Lord Blackburn in Steel v State Line (1877) 3 App Cas 72, p.90; 
International Packers v Ocean S.S. Co. [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 218. 
33
 See Bradley v Federal Steam Navigation (1926) 24 Ll.L. Rep. 446, pp.454-455; Virginia Co. v 
Norfolk Shipping Co., 17 Com Cas 277, p.278. 
34 See Eridania SpA & Others v Oetker & others (The Fjord Wind) [2000] 2 Lloyds Rep 191. The 
vessel had constant surveys by experts but she did not complete her voyage. The owners 
chose not to adduce evidence from the surveyor with regards to the investigations that had 
been carried out and due to a failure in machinery; the owner was liable for any loss caused by 
unseaworthiness. 
35 The courts have long recognised that a vessel must be provided with certain documentation 
and certification to enable her to perform her duty. This requirement is merely a constituent of a 
broader obligation that the vessel is ‘legally fit’ to perform her duty under the seaworthiness 
aspect. See Sea Glory Maritime Co., Swedish Management Co. SA v Al Sagr National 
Insurance Co. (The Nancy) [2013] EWHC 2116 (Comm), the court stated that the warranty in an 
insurance policy such as ‘Vessels ISM Compliant’ is a warranty of compliance with the ISM 
Code at the inception of the policy and throughout the period of the policy. However, it was 
indicated that a certificate of ISM compliance does not represent conclusive evidence of 
compliance, para.212 per Mr Justice Blair. Another good illustration is stated by Cook J in The 
Elli and The Frixos Golden Fleece Maritime Inc and Pontian Shipping SA v ST Shipping & 
Transport Inc [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 224, approving the authority of Alfred C Roepfer v Tossa 
Marine Co. Ltd (The Derby) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 325, p.331. He stated that: ‘A vessel which is 
“legally fit” to carry a permitted cargo… cannot properly be described as being “in every way fit” 
to do so. Nor can a vessel be “in every way fit for the service” if she is not legally fit to carry 
cargo… which is part of the specified service… the words “in every way”… cannot be restricted 
to the vessel’s physical state… legal fitness is just as important as physical fitness and the line 
between the two is not always easy to draw, especially where the legal incapacity results from 
the physical characteristics of the vessel,’ pp.272-273. For certification seaworthiness, see 
Cheikh Boutros Selim El-Khoury and Others v Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd (The Madeleine) [1967] 
2 Lloyd's Rep. 224, where the vessel did not carry a deratting certificate which was required by  
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auxiliaries41 in good working order before and at the beginning of the voyage.42 
Fire-fighting equipment is essential for the seaworthiness of the vessel; their 
deficiency to work constitutes unseaworthiness.43 The supply of sufficient spare 
parts and provisions is considered part of the due diligence requirement, which 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Port state control and, for that reason, the port authority refused entry to the vessel in order 
to discharge the cargo. The vessel arranged to be delivered to the charterer by May 10
th
, 
but the certificate of deratting would not be granted until May 12
th
. The charterer refused 
the charter because the vessel was not delivered ready prior to the cancellation date. The 
Court held that the carrier failed to deliver the vessel in a seaworthy condition by the 
delivery date. 
36
 The vessel’s compass has to be reliable: Paterson Steamships Ltd v Robin Hood Mills 
(1937) 58 Ll. L. R. Rep. 33; along with a fog whistle, The Niagara [1898] 84 Fed Rep 902; 
and navigation charts must be adequate, Rey Banano del Pacifico CA v Transportes 
Navieros Ecuatorianos SpA (The Isla Fernandina) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 15 (the vessel was 
found unseaworthy due to inadequate charts and navigational aids). Radio aids must also 
be adequate: The Eurasina [2002] EWCH 118 (comm); [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719. In this 
case, small hand-held communication equipment, which establishes communications 
between the master and the rest of the crew (e.g. a walkie-talkie) could be a factor 
rendering the ship unseaworthy. 
37
 The Assunzione (No.2) [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 468; Haracopos v Mountain (1934) 49 Ll.L. 
Rep. 267. 
38
 Lord Justice Upjohn in the Court of Appeal pointed out in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd 
v Kawasako Kisen Kaisha Ltd, that: ‘…if proper medical supplies or two anchors are not on 
board at the time of sailing, the owners are in breach of the seaworthiness stipulation.’ 
(1962) 2 Q.B. 26, p.62. 
39
 Quebec Marine Insurance Co. v Commercial Bank of Canada (1870) L.R. 3 P.C. 234. 
The owner was held liable for unseaworthiness as the vessel’s boilers were defective. If the 
boilers filled with muddy waters, which they will eventually, the result would be deposited 
mud, which would clog the steam pipes and render the vessel unseaworthy with defected 
boilers. 
40
 See Project Asia Line Inc of Delaware & United Shipping Services Ltd v Andrew Shone 
(The Pride of Donegal) [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 659, where generator failure might have left 
the vessel without power during the course of the voyage. Another reason in this case is 
that the main engine turbocharger was corroded which prevented power to be generated by 
the main engine. 
41
 Wilkie v Geddes (1815) 3 Dow 57. See also CHS Inc Iberica SL and Another v Far East 
Marine SA (The Devon) [2012] EWHC 3747 (QBD)(Comm). The vessel, after three hours 
of sailing, was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage by reason of the condition 
of the seawater cooling system. 
42
 See also Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 Q.B. 26. 
43
 Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co. Ltd (The Star Sea) [2001] UKHL 1; 
[2003] 1 A.C. 469; Asbestos Corp Ltd v Compagnie de Navigation Fraiissinet et Cypri en 
Fabre [1972] A.M.C. 2581; Papera Traders Co. Ltdv Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd 
(The Eurasian Dream) [2002] EWHC 118; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719. 
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 a carrier has to exercise to make his vessel seaworthy.44 As a result, the vessel 
will be rendered unseaworthy if she is supplied with unsuitable spare parts.45 
1.4.3 Crew seaworthiness46 
The seaworthiness of a vessel also embraces the satisfactoriness of manning 
levels in terms of competence, adequacy of number and their management.47 
For instance, the vessel is rendered unseaworthy if she sails without a 
competent crew,48 which is adequate in number for the voyage.49 
 
                                               
44
 Project Asia Line Inc v Shone (The Pride of Donegal) [2002] EWHC 24; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
659. 
45
 Guinomar of Conakry v Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd (The Kamsar Voyager) 
[2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. This aspect of seaworthiness is believed to be significant for two 
reasons. First, it is necessary as it contributes towards the seaworthiness of the vessel’s 
machinery. Some of the original spare parts come with the vessel from the building yard in case 
the running machinery needs to be replaced due to malfunctioning, especially if the vessel has 
not yet commenced her voyage, i.e. a default in a part of the generator which supplies the main 
engine with power. This will constitute unseaworthiness before and at the commencement of the 
voyage. Additionally, if the vessel’s engine breaks down en route to the discharge port, a 
replacement will be required to repair the defective part of the engine. Without essential spares, 
the vessel will be rendered as an unseaworthy one. Second, apart from mechanical failures, the 
need for maintenance is important. By using such spare parts, the ones normally in use can be 
maintained; without the necessary spare parts, the vessel would be rendered unseaworthy even 
at the commencement of the voyage. The obligation is not restricted to having a vessel fitted 
with sound working machineries. However, having an adequate number of spares to support 
everyday operations is imperative and not doing so would in turn make the vessel unseaworthy. 
46
 For further information on the subject, see White R., ’The Human Factor in Unseaworthiness 
Claims’ [1996] LMCLQ, p. 24. 
47
 Standard Oil Company v Line Steamers [1924] A.C. 100; (1923-24) 17 Ll. L. Rep. 120; 1924 
S.C. (H.L.) 1; 1924 S.L.T. 20. The owner had failed to communicate to the master the builder’s 
instructions in respect of the way in which the ballast tanks were to be filled. In his ignorance, 
the master ordered the crew to pump out the tanks shortly after leaving port with the result that 
the vessel capsized and sank. 
48 Shore v Bentall 172 E.R. 303; (1827) 3 Car & P. 16; Tait v Levi (1811) 14 East 81; In Robin 
Hood Flour Mills Ltd v N. M. Paterson & Sons Ltd (The Farrandoc) [1967] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 232 
(Quebec), the vessel was unseaworthy, inter alia, as the engineer was incompetent for not 
being familiar with this particular vessel; Manifest Shipping Co Ltd v Uni-Polaris Insurance Co 
Ltd (The Star Sea) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 651, Q.B., affirmed on this point [1997] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
360 (C.A.), where the court held in the context of s.39(5) of the Marine Insurance Act 1960 that 
the owner’s failure to ensure the master was familiar with the operation of the vessel’s CO2 
system rendered the vessel unseaworthy at the start of the voyage. 
49
 Burnard & Alger Ltd v Player & Co. (1928) 31 Ll.L. Rep. 281. ‘The vessel was rendered 
unseaworthy for the reason that a member of the crew had left the vessel and she had sailed 
without a substituted officer’; Clifford v Hunter (1827) Mood & M 103; Tait v Levi (1811) 14 East 
81; Forshaw v Chabert (1821) 3 Brod & Bing 158, that the vessel, in order for it to be seaworthy, 
must have a sufficient number of crew for the whole voyage at the commencement thereof. 
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1.4.4 Bunker seaworthiness 
The carrier also has the duty to supply the vessel with bunkers and other 
necessary fuels. In older vessels, i.e. steamships, coal was used as bunkers 
whereas today vessels use heavy diesel oil instead. Bunkers have to be 
sufficient in quantity so that a vessel can reach the chartered port of destination 
and also have a suitable reserve margin. Should this not be the case, the carrier 
would be considered in breach of his duty to provide a seaworthy vessel.50 The 
quality of the supplied bunkers should be in accordance with the recommended 
type of fuel by the engine manufacturer. The vessel may be unseaworthy and 
the owner liable if he provides bunkers that will cause the engine to malfunction, 
which may in turn cause damage, e.g., to perishable, cargo.51  
 
                                               
50
 Thin v Richards & Co. [1892] 2 Q.B. 141. See Northumbrian Shipping Co. Ltd v E. Timm and 
Son Ltd [1939] A.C. 397, where the vessel had sailed with insufficient bunkers from Vancouver 
to reach The Virgin Islands. She could have taken bunkers at Colon on her transit of the 
Panama Canal; however, she did not do so and was forced to deviate to Jamaica for refuelling. 
The House of Lords held that the vessel was unseaworthy on leaving Vancouver because of the 
fact that she sailed from there with no attention to bunkering in Colon; see also A Turtle 
Offshore SA v Superior Trading Inc (The A Turtle) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 177. The Mighty Deliver 
tug was contracted to tow a drilling rig across the South Atlantic. The tug ran out of fuel, 
whereupon the tow was released and the rig drifted away from the tug. Total damage occurred 
to the rig. The owner of the tug was found to be in breach of his duty to exercise due diligence 
to tender the tug at the commencement of the voyage in a seaworthy condition and in all 
aspects ready to perform the voyage. However, the tug owner was protected from liability by 
cl.18 of MOA (exemption clause). 
51  Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Alltrans (20 Feb. 1984, unreported). The carrier was liable for 
unseaworthiness on the ground that he failed to exercise due diligence in not supplying proper 
bunker quality. Cited in Terence C. et al., Time Charters, (LLP, 6
th
 ed., 2008), para.12.8. Some 
charterparties expressly require the carrier/charterer to supply bunkers of a quality suitable for 
the ship’s engines and auxiliaries that conform to to agreed specifications, failing which the 
owners may claim for damage to the engines or auxiliaries and will be protected against claims 
for reduced speed, increased consumption, loss of time or any other consequences. See, for 
example, Clause 9(b) of the 1993 revision of the New York Produce Exchange form. Owners of 
Cargo Lately Laden on Board The Makedonia v Owners of The Makedonia (The Makedonia) 
[1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, bunker fuel for the voyage became contaminated despite the 
adequate quantity loaded. Some of the cargo needed to be used as fuel, while other cargo was 
to be jettisoned as she became unable to continue her voyage under her own power. The court 
held that the contamination was due to the lack of proper plans for bunkering and the absence 
of a competent crew which resulted in the unseaworthiness of the vessel. In The Kriti Rex [1996] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171, the poor quality lubricant engine oil has rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
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It is worth mentioning that the duty of seaworthiness operates at different points 
in the contract of carriage (doctrine of stages),52 which is not applicable under 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.53 Yet, for long voyages, the vessel will need to 
bunker at an intermediate port as part of exercising due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel. Therefore, bunkering in stages is admissible under the 
current law.54 
1.4.5 Cargoworthiness  
The carrier is required to, along with providing a physically fit vessel, crew and 
correct documentation, provide a vessel fit to receive the intended cargo and 
deliver it to the discharge port safely.55 This amounts to a warranty “that at the 
time the goods are put on board [the vessel] is fit to receive them and to 
encounter the ordinary perils that are likely to arise during the loading stage”.56 
Therefore, the carrier, in addition to providing a seaworthy vessel in regard to its 
hull, crew, equipment, bunker and documentation, should provide a 
cargoworthy vessel. In other words, it is the capability of the vessel in being 
‘suitable to carry the contract cargo’, 57  and to deliver it safely to the final 
                                               
52
 Further discussion on this point will follow; see para. 2.14.1, ‘The effect of the extension of the 
obligation and the application of the duty to “make” the vessel seaworthy “before and at the 
beginning of the voyage”.’ 
53
 In The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316, Hewson J referred to the word ‘voyage’ in the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules stating that: “I see no obligation to read into the word "voyage" a 
doctrine of stages, but a necessity to define the word itself. The word does not appear in the 
earlier Canadian Act of 1910. "Voyage" in this context means what it has always meant: the 
contractual voyage from the port of loading to the port of discharge as declared in the 
appropriate bill of lading”, at p. 329-330. Lord Justice Aikens, Richard Lord, Michael Bools, Bills 
of Lading (2006, 1
st
 ed.), state that: “This doctrine [of stages] is largely of historical interest only. 
It is generally irrelevant where the Hague Rules apply,” para. 10.93; Julian C. et al., Voyage 
Charters, (2007, 3
rd
 ed.), para. 85.99.  
54
 First, the carrier must have adequate and sufficient bunkers to reach the intermediate port. 
Secondly, the carrier must also have arranged for the same to reach its destination of the 
discharge port, pursuant to the contractual destination. See The Makedonia [1962] P 190. 
55
 Elder, Dempster and Company Limited, and Others Appellants v Paterson, Zochonis and 
Company, Limited and Others [1924] A.C. 522, Viscount Cave, at p.530. 
56
 McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697. Channell J, at p.704. 
57 The Aquacharm [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7 at p.11, by Griffiths LJ. 
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destination. In doing so, the vessel should be adequately fitted with equipment 
and tackle,58 which should be properly maintained in order to prevent damage 
to the cargo. 59  Further, cargo holds should be, before receiving cargo, 
fumigated and clean and free from any dirt or substances that could 
contaminate and damage the cargo.60 This is required under common law and 
under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules where the carrier must exercise due 
diligence to make the holds of the vessel fit and safe for receipt and 
preservation of cargo.61 The duty to provide a vessel fit to carry the cargo (i.e. 
‘cargoworthy’) is part of the duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. It is not, 
therefore, necessary to expressly include the duty to provide a cargoworthy 
vessel in the contract.62  
 
                                               
58
 Stanton v Richardson [1895] L.R.9 C.P. 390. It was held that the ship was unseaworthy 
because the carrier failed to install a sufficient number of pumps in order to drain the surplus 
water from the wet sugar. Some cargoes require special arrangement, which if not carried out 
would render the vessel uncargoworthy. For instance, in Queensland National Bank Limited v 
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company [1898] 1 Q.B. 567, the carrier contracted to 
carry gold. The vessel was delivered without the special arrangement in a way to be 
‘constructed as reasonably fit to resist thieves’. Theft of gold rendered the vessel uncargoworthy. 
59
 In Maori King v Hughes [1895] 2 Q.B. 550, a defect in the refrigeration system rendered the 
vessel unseaworthy. 
60
 The Tres Flores [1973] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 247; Cheikh Boutros Selim El-Khoury and Others v 
Ceylon Shipping Lines, Ltd. (The Madeleine) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 224; Tattersall v National 
Steamship Co. (1884) 12 QBD 297. 
61
 Owners of the Cargo on the ships Maori King v Hughes (1895) 2 Q.B. 550 (C.A.). The ship 
was carrying frozen mutton when the refrigeration system broken down. Cargo had to be sold at 
different ports at a loss. The defendant relied on a clause in the bill of lading when the plaintiffs 
argued that there was an implied warranty of fitness of the refrigeration system at the 
commencement of the voyage. The court ruled in favour of the claimant finding the vessel 
unseaworthy. In Queensland National Bank v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. 
(1898) 1 Q.B. 567 (C.A.), a valuable cargo was stolen from the vessel. The vessel was found 
unseaworthy because the vessel was not fitted with bullion rooms for safe carriage. Empresa 
Cubana Importadora de Alimentos Alimport v Lasmos Shipping Co. SA (The Good Friend) 
[1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 586 (Hague/Hague-Visby Rules). 
62 Steel et al. v The State Line Steamship Company (1877-78) L.R. 3 App. Cas. 72. Lord 
Blackburn stated that: “I take it my Lords, to be quite clear, both in England and in Scotland, that 
where there is a contract to carry goods in a ship, whether that contract is in the shape of a bill 
of lading, or any other form, there is a duty on the part of the person who furnishes or supplies 
that ship, or that ship’s room, is generally expressed by saying that it shall be seaworthy…” 
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It is important to bear in mind that the ability of a vessel to carry cargo and 
deliver it safely to the port of destination is a facet of seaworthiness. A vessel 
may be rendered uncargoworthy63 even if the other aspects of seaworthiness 
(crew, documentation, equipment, bunker and hull) are fulfilled.64 
- Bad stowage and seaworthiness 
As mentioned above, uncargoworthiness can arise from the vessel’s inability to 
receive a particular cargo in the first place or, alternatively, from a defect in the 
cargo holds, e.g. an unfit refrigeration system or unclean cargo holds, which 
occurs before loading or before the beginning of the voyage, such that the 
cargo arrives at its destination damaged. On the other hand, bad stowage, in 
spite of the vessel being seaworthy with regards to its physical fitness, manning, 
documentation and its ability to receive the contracted cargo, e.g. cargoworthy, 
can render the vessel unseaworthy if the stowage is such that it endangers the 
safety of the vessel to carry out the intended voyage.65   
 
                                               
63 Read v Page [1927] 1 K.B. 743, Scrutton L.J. stated that: “A ship may be unfit to carry the 
contemplated cargo, because, for instance, she has insufficient means of ventilation, and yet be 
quite fit to make the contemplated voyage, as a ship”, at p.754; Madras Electric Supply 
Company v P. & O. Steam Navigation Company, (1923) 16 Ll. L. Rep. 240.  
64
 It has been concluded that: “A cargoworthy vessel can be unseaworthy, but an uncargoworthy 
vessel can never be seaworthy, as this is part of the requirement and one of the fundamentals 
in the concept of seaworthiness.” See Sofia Bengtsson, ‘The Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Conventions - A comparative study of seaworthiness and the list of exclusions’ (Master’s 
dissertation, Spring 2010, Lund University), cited in http://www.ebookszip.com/pdf/the-carriage-
of-goods-by-sea-conventions-lund-university-176887.pdf.    
65
 The court in Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 377 established a test for drawing a distinction 
between unseaworthiness and bad stowage. In this case, heavy armoured plates had not been 
adequately lashed. During bad weather, the vessel encountered heavy rolling which caused the 
lashing of the armoured plates to snap and caused them to break through the side of the vessel. 
The vessel, as a result, sank. Cf. The Thorsa [1916] P. 257, where a cargo of chocolate was 
carried adjacent to Gorgonzola cheese. The ventilation was closed to protect the cargo from 
heavy seas. The court found the vessel not to be unseaworthy for the reason that the bad 
stowage did not endanger the safety of the vessel and caused damage only to the cargo. As per 
Bankes LJ, the owner was protected as the loss fell within the exception which was 
unambiguous, p.266. 
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One should be aware of the distinction between bad stowage that endangers 
the safety of the vessel and bad stowage that will only cause damage to the 
cargo without endangering the safety of the vessel. The former would render 
the vessel unseaworthy but the latter would not.66 
In Elder, Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson Zochonis & Co. Ltd,67  a vessel was carrying 
palm oil casks stowed beneath palm kernel bags. As a result, the casks were crushed 
and the cargo was damaged on arrival because of the weight of the sacks on the casks 
stored directly above them without a ‘tween deck’. The House of Lords concluded that 
the ship was, at the time of shipment, structurally fit to receive and carry cargo without 
damage. Even without the presence of a tween deck the vessel was seaworthy. 
The House of Lords went on to differentiate between bad stowage that caused 
unseaworthiness and bad stowage that merely caused damaged to the cargo. Bad 
stowage amounts to unseaworthiness only when it affects the physical safety of the 
vessel. For example, in the Elder Dempster case, if the casks had been stored in a way 
that could break the cargo holds and affect the safety of the vessel thereby sinking the 
vessel, the vessel would have been rendered unseaworthy due to the bad stowage.68 
On the other hand, where bad stowage merely damages cargo without affecting the 
safety of the vessel, e.g. uncargoworthy, the vessel remains seaworthy.69  
                                               
66
 See Baughen, S. ‘Bad stowage or unseaworthiness?’, (2007) LMCLQ, 1, at p.5.  
67
 (1924) A.C. 522. 
68
 Elder, Dempster and Company, Limited, and Others Appellants v Paterson, Zochonis and 
Company, Limited [1924] A.C. 522. Lord Sumner stated that: “Bad stowage, which endangers 
the safety of the ship, may amount to unseaworthiness, of course, but bad stowage, which 
affects nothing but the cargo damaged by it, is bad stowage and nothing more, and still leaves 
the ship seaworthy for the adventure, even though the adventure be the carrying of that cargo”, 
at p.561-562. 
69
 Actis Co. Ltd v The Sanko Steamship Co. Ltd (The Aquacharm) [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 7. The 
vessel was refused passage through the Panama Canal and was delayed for 9 days due to 
being overloaded with a cargo of coal. The cargo owner claimed that the vessel was 
unseaworthy but the court ruled that the delay was due to the bad stowage of the cargo rather 
than unseaworthiness, as the vessel was able to sail safely in the open seas. 
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1.5  The CMI’s Work on the Rotterdam Rules70 
At the end of the twentieth century, the law governing the carriage of goods by 
sea, as applied and developed in conjunction with several international 
conventions and unique regional and natural laws, was widely criticised as 
being unsatisfactory. 71  The Hague-Visby Rules provided the dominant 
international legal regime but some major commercial nations (such as the 
United States and China) were not Parties to the Hague-Visby Rules. The 
Hamburg Rules, being the product of a political process in which a majority of 
those negotiating the convention were more concerned with achieving political 
goals rather than meeting the commercial industry’s needs, made the regime 
less modern and thus it never achieved widespread acceptance, because the 
liability regime and the general allocation of the burden of proof as set out in 
Article 5(1) requires the carrier to prove that he and his servant or agents took 
all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid occurrence and its 
consequences.72 The drafters of the Rotterdam Rules sought to extend and 
modernise the existing rules relating to contracts of carriage by sea.73 The aim 
of the Rotterdam Rules was to replace the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Hamburg Rules. The Rotterdam Rules were prepared over a 10-year period by 
                                               
70
 For further reading, see Chapter One of Michael Sturley, F., Fujita, T. and van der Ziel, G., 
The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), pp.1-21. 
71
 See Diamond, A., ‘The Hague-Visby Rules’ (1978) LMCLQ, 225, at p.255. 
72
 It is outside the scope of this study to discuss the Hamburg Rules. However, it is important to 
note that without any legislative guidance in respect of the obligations of the carrier and the 
standard of care required, the interpretation and application of this provision, insofar as the 
liability of the carrier is concerned, would be considerably difficult and international uniformity 
(which is one purpose of having an international regime) would never be achieved. 
73 The Commission (UNCITRAL/CMI) noted that the ”existing national laws and international 
conventions left significant gaps regarding issues such as the functioning of the bills of lading 
and seaway bills, the relation of those transport documents to the rights and obligations 
between the seller and the buyer of the goods and to the legal position of the entities that 
provided financing to a party to the contract of carriage.” See Report of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, 34
th
 Session, U.N. GAOR, 51
th
 Sess., Supp. No. 17, 
Annex I, U.N. doc. No. A/51/17 (1996). Reprinted in 1996 CMI Yearbook, p.354, para. 210. 
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intergovernmental parties,74  the CMI and UNCITRAL. Additional input75  was 
received from NGOs and INGOs.76 The primary work of the CMI was finished in 
November 2001 and the draft of a new convention was approved.77 The work 
was then handed over to UNCITRAL where the process of finalising the 
Rotterdam Rules was started.78 
The final session of the Working Group took place in Vienna, January 2008, 
where the draft was submitted to UNCITRAL.79  The Rotterdam Rules were 
adopted by the General Assembly of the UN by Resolution 3/122, which was 
passed on the 11th December 2008.  
It should be noted that this study does not cover the duty under the common 
law or any of the other obligations on the carrier imposed by such conventions. 
However, due to the door-to-door scope of the Rotterdam Rules, the effect of 
other inland transport conventions, for example CMNI80 and CMR81 with regard 
to the seaworthiness obligation may be considered.   
                                               
74
 Work was shared between the UNCITRAL Secretariat and the CMI in soliciting views of the 
sectors involved in the international carriage of goods and in analysing that information. All 
members of the CMI were invited as well as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the 
International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations (FIATA), the International Chamber 
of Shipping (ICS), the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), the International 
Union of Marine Insurance (IUMI), and the International Group of P&I Clubs. 
75
 They are: CMI, UNCTAD, UNECE, ICC, IUMI, FIATA, ICS, BIMCO, International Group of 
P&I Clubs, IAPH, European Commission, Association of American Railroads, OTIF, European 
Shipper’s Council, IRU, IMMTA, and the World Maritime University. 
76
 Bear, S., ‘Liability regimes: where we are, how we got there and where we are going.’ [2002] 
LMCLQ, 306, at p.306-307. 
77
 The CMI sent out questionnaires in May 1999 to be answered by their national associations. 
In this work, liability was asked to be included. Thus, issues of liability were included in the ICS 
terms of reference when it was established in November 1999 and UNCITRAL at its 34
th
 
Session in 2001. 
78
Important issues for UNCITRAL were that their work should take existing conventions into 
account and seek to establish a balance between the interests of carriers and shippers. See 
Lannan, K., Overview of the Convention: The UNCITRAL Perspective, CMI Yearbook 2009, 
p.274. 
79
 Sturley, M. F., ‘Transport law for the twenty-first century: an introduction to the preparation, 
philosophy, and potential impact of the Rotterdam rules’ (2008) 14 JIML, p.475. 
80 The Budapest Convention on the Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland Waterways 
(CMNI). 
81
 Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR) 1956. 
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Technological developments that promote safety at sea are now codified and 
governed by Shipping Industry Regulations and by the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO).82 Such regulations may have a direct and/or indirect effect 
on seaworthiness and thus should, at least to a limited extent, ascertain the 
standard of seaworthiness.  
English Law has had a big input on the development of the duty to exercise due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. In order to properly consider the nature 
of the duty under both the existing and new regimes, it is important to show the 
method of research in relation to the obligation of seaworthiness. 
1.6 The methodology of the thesis 
This is a study of the duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy 
vessel under English law. At the time of writing, the Hague-Visby Rules apply 
under English law and, therefore, this thesis proceeds on the basis that the 
relevant sections of these Rules, where applicable, represent the aspects of a 
contract of carriage by sea relating to unseaworthiness. Where the 
interpretation of the Rules is approached differently by other jurisdictions, the 
nature of the duty of seaworthiness can be weighted differently. For this reason, 
it is worth considering the application of foreign case law to the interpretation of 
the obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. This 
approach will similarly be used when examining the obligation of exercising due 
diligence, albeit with different parameters, under the Rotterdam Rules.  
                                               
82
 For further information regarding the development of IMO Conventions and their relevance to 
seaworthiness, see Aladwani, T., ‘The effect of shipping standards on the charterparty 
obligation of seaworthiness’, a paper presented at the 7th European Colloquium on Maritime 
Law Research, 'Contracts in Shipping: Flexibility, Foreseeability, Reasonableness', held in 
Palermo, Italy (27
th
-28
th
 September 2012), pp.1-2. Publishe in Marlus (2013) nr. 242, pp. 256-
298.. 
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Another main source of this thesis has been the travaux préparatoires of the 
Rotterdam Rules, the preparatory sessions of UNCITRAL Working Group III 
and sessions of the Commissions.83 
To this end, it would be important to point out how the English courts take into 
account the approach of other countries when interpreting the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules. This will also answer whether the court is ready to deliberate the 
use of the travaux préparatoires.   
 
1.6.1 Interpretation of the International Carriage Rules 
This study will analyse the obligation to exercise due diligence in the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules, both of which are 
international sea-carriage conventions. In order to achieve this purpose, it is 
essential to refer to the pre-convention English law authorities on this issue as 
well as the relatively new approach, 84  which includes the travaux, foreign 
decisions and commentaries, as adopted by the English courts to assist in 
understanding or addressing seaworthiness-related disputes. 
 
 
 
                                               
83
Related documents are available online at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/ 
uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_travaux.html. 
84
 Guenter T. and Reynolds F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), 
para.9-097. It stated in Carver that it is not so true to say that the English court has always paid 
attention to decisions of courts in other convention countries. In Gosse Millerd Ltd v Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1929] A.C. 223, Lord Sumner said: “Of foreign decisions of 
course, the legislature is not deemed to take a notice and, although the Conference was 
doubtless well acquainted with the United States cases, it has not yet been held that the 
Legislature of this country is deemed to know what those, whose reports or conventions it 
affirms, have been familiar with,” p.237. See also Daewoo Heavy Industries Ltd v Klipriver 
Shipping Ltd (The Kapitan Ptko Voivoda) [2003] 1 C.L.C. 1092, p.1114.  
71 
 
1.6.1.1 The use of international conventions 
English judges are conscious of the international nature of international carriage 
conventions (i.e. Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) and periodically seek uniformity in 
the laws of States adhering to the convention. The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
are silent as regards their interpretation.85 In the context of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules, a special attraction is usually stated to exist with the case law of 
the United States given that they are a principal sources of maritime law at the 
time of adoption of the Hague Rules (1924 Convention) as well as its 
participation both in the drafting of the Rules and in the methodology of the 
Harter Act. 86  For example, in The Muncaster Castle, 87  the House of Lords 
stressed the importance of United States law where the concepts in the 
                                               
85
 Stag Line Ltd v Foscola, Mango and Co. [1932] A.C. 328. Two main issues arose in respect 
of the Hague Rules: first, a departure from the contract route for the purpose of dropping two 
engineers ashore who had been on-board for the carrier’s interest; second, could the carrier 
who had deviated unprotected by Article IV(4) seek exclusion of liability under one of the causes 
listed in Article IV(2)? The House of Lords gave negative answers leaving the carrier open to 
liability at large. Lord Macmillan stated that: “As these rules must come under the consideration 
of foreign courts, it is desirable in the interests of uniformity that their interpretation should not 
be rigidly controlled by domestic precedents of antecedent date, but rather that the language of 
the rules be construed on broad principles of general acceptation,” p.350. See also Tilbury v 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund [2003] EWCA Civ 65; [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 327 
at [16]; [21] (Mance LJ); Anglo-Irish Beef Processors International v Federated Stevedores 
Geelong [1997] 2 V.R. 676, p.696 as per Phillips J; Shipping Corp of India Ltd v Gamlen 
Chemical Co. (A/Asia) Pty Ltd (1980) 147 C.L.R. 142, p.159 (Mason & Wilson JJ). For the 
carriage of goods by air, see The Warsaw Convention (1929) and Corocraft Ltd v Pan American 
Airways Inc [1969] 1 Q.B.616, where Lord Denning stated: ‘Even if I disagree, I would follow 
[decisions of other courts] in a manner which is of international concern. The courts of all 
countries should interpret [the Warsaw Convention] in the same way,’ p.655. 
86
 Generally, see Effort Shipping Co. Ltd v Linden Management SA, (The Giannis NK) [1998] 
A.C. 605; [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 337. Lord Steyn stated: ‘In the construction of an international 
convention, an English court does not easily differ from a crystallised body of judicial opinion in 
the United States,’ p.623. In the same case, Lord Lloyd of Berwick added a need for ‘prevailing 
harmony on the other side of the Atlantic,’ p.615. 
87 In Riverstone Meat Co. Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd (The Muncaster Castle) [1961] 
A.C. 807, the House of Lords stated that: “These are words which were found and no doubt are 
still found in the old bill of lading and charterparty exceptions, and they are words that are found 
in legislation which preceded this Act and upon which this Act was founded, and especially, it is 
to be noted, are to be found in the Harter Act, which was the forerunner of all Acts of this kind, 
in relation to the carriage of goods by sea. I think it is very important in commercial interests that 
there should be uniformity of construction adopted by the courts in dealing with words in statues 
dealing with the same subject-matter, and it is a matter of great satisfaction to me to find that 
the decisions of these courts seem to correspond with the decisions given by the courts of the 
highest authority in the United States.” 
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Hague/Hague-Visby Rules were taken from the Harter Act.88  However, such an 
approach seems to be followed only in the absence of clear wording.89 
1.6.1.2 The use of Travaux Préparatoires90  
In the case of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the travaux préparatoires have 
only been available since 199091 and one might expect to see a greater use 
being made of them. Nevertheless, as Carver 92  has noted, the use of the 
travaux préparatoires for interpretation matters might be limited because ‘as 
often occurs, the travaux préparatoires are rich in ambiguity.’93 They are often 
considered as merely throwing light on the general objectives and the trend of 
the discussions at the time. However, it has been said that ‘only a bull’s eye 
counts’. 94  Nonetheless, the general view was explained in writings by Lord 
McNair in 1961 and is believed to remain true today, if it is not even more valid 
                                               
88
 Regardless of the English court accepting a forward-thinking approach in respecting the 
international character of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, they are prone to being inconsistent 
with other jurisdictions in its interpretation, as the court seems to be influenced largely by pre-
convention English case law; the English court had held in The Ferro [1893] P 28, that such a 
clause did not exclude liability for bad stowage. Viscount Sumner stated that the Rules did not 
alter the position at p.103. This divergence of views originates from the interpretation of the 
Rules that might emerge due to the way that the Rules were drafted on the basis of one 
(common law) legal system. Thus, they cannot receive a uniform application in other legal 
systems, i.e. civil law country.  
89
 The Hague Rules did not explicitly state whether or not a carrier is guilty of unjustifiable 
deviation and could exclude its liability through the list of exclusions contained in Article IV(2) of 
the Rules. In Stag Line Ltd v Foscolo, Mango & Co. Ltd [1932] A.C. 328, the House of Lords 
insisted that, regarding the effects of deviation, the courts should follow the domestic rules 
which pre-dated the Hague Rules. It was stated that “if it had been the intention of the 
legislature to make so drastic a change in the law relating to contracts of carriage of goods by 
sea, the change should and would have been enacted in clear terms,” p.347.  
90
 The locus classicus on this point is given in the leading air-carriage case by the House of 
Lords in Fothergill v Monarch Airlines Ltd [1981] A.C. 251, where Lord Wilberforce’s statement 
was cited with approval (see Jindal Iron & Steel Co. Ltd v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. Jordan 
Inc (The Jordan II) [2004] 1 W.L.R. 1363, p.1372, per Lord Steyn.) that: ‘I think that it would be 
proper for us…to recognise that there may be cases where such travaux préparatoires can 
profitably be used,’ p.278.   
91
 Sturley, M. F., The Legislative History of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux 
Préparatoires of the Hague Rules, (Fred Rothman, 1990). 
92
 Also see Guenter, T., and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 
2011), para.9-098. 
93 JI MacWilliam Co. Inc v Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA (The Rafaela S) [2003] EWCA Civ 
556; [2004] Q.B. 702, p.725; [2003] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.113, per Rix LJ. 
94 The Giannis NK [1998] A.C. 605, 623, per Lord Steyn. 
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given the spread of the available travaux préparatoires; ‘It would hardly be an 
exaggeration to say that in almost every case involving the interpretation of a 
treaty, one or both parties seeks to invoke the preparatory work.’95 
In examining the concept of seaworthiness, therefore, it is also essential to 
consider the arguments of legal scholars and experts relating to seaworthiness 
based on the travaux préparatoires.96 
 
1.6.2 The special aspects of interpretation of the Rotterdam Rules 
The style of drafting of the Rotterdam Rules has received some criticism97 on 
the basis98 of the Rules being of an unfamiliar form.99 This aspect makes it 
necessary for this study to consider references and approaches to the 
Rotterdam Rules, along with the views of legal scholars and experts on 
seaworthiness.  
                                               
95
 Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties, (2
nd
 ed., 1961), p.412. 
96
 Furthermore, one must bear in mind that the sea-carriage conventions are each an 
international convention with the status of a ‘treaty’ for the purpose of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969. Article 2(a) provides: ‘treaty’ means an international law, whether 
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its 
particular designation. 
97
 Thomas, R., ‘And then there were the Rotterdam Rules’ (2008) 14 JIML 189. ‘The drafting on 
occasion is tortuous and whereas it is quite clear that those who drafted the convention were 
seeking clarity and certainty…the abiding impression is that the very opposite is being achieved. 
There arises a spectre of a new and endless stream of contested litigation and arbitration which 
will, of course, not disappoint all interested parties,’ p.189. 
98
 One should not turn away from a similar reaction of disquiet by the maritime lawyers in 
relation to drafting at the time of adopting the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, when they were 
regarded as riddled with uncertainty, unfamiliar in drafting technique and bound to endless 
litigation. See Rainey S. QC, ‘Interpreting the international sea-carriage conventions: old and 
new’ cited as Chapter Three in Thomas, R. (ed.), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the 
Rotterdam Rules, (Lloyd’s List, 2010), p.69. 
99
 Tetley, W., ‘Summary of Some General Criticisms of the UNCITRAL Convention (the 
Rotterdam Rules)’ cited as Chapter 16 of Gutierrez, N. M.  (ed.), International Maritime Law: 
Essays in Honour of Professor David Joseph Attard, (Routledge, 2009). “In general, the 
Rotterdam Rules are in content, terms, style and drafting in an unfamiliar form. This not only 
erases years of practice and custom but sets aside 100 years of established jurisprudence,” 
p.253. 
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It is worth mentioning that Article 2 of the Rotterdam Rules refers to the 
‘Interpretation of this Convention’ and provides ‘in the interpretation of this 
Convention, regard is to be had to its international character and to the need to 
promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade.’ 100  Commentators 101  suggest that this would demand an 
English court to consider the systems of other jurisdictions on this subject 
matter and to borrow from them, as necessary. 
Finally,102 and most recently in a non-marine case, In re Deep Vein Thrombosis 
and Air Travel Group Litigation,103 Lord Mance, in the context of air carriage, 
stated that ‘the legislative history and travaux préparatoires may be considered 
to resolve ambiguities or obscurities, when the material is publicly available.’ 
In the case of the Rotterdam Rules, the Internet now permits the widest and 
most publicly available collection of travaux préparatoires that there ever has 
been after it was proclaimed that they can hardly be available to the public or 
even specialist lawyers. 104  It is possible to search through and access the 
negotiations as they were conducted in minute detail. There is no doubt that this 
is the source of information for many researching these rules.105 Some of the 
drafters of the Rotterdam Rules had concluded that ‘courts and arbitrators 
                                               
100 Furthermore, under Articles 18, 26 and 31 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties 
1969, the obligation of an English court would commence from the minute of signature; that a 
court (i.e. an English court) must be refrained from pursuing any action that would defeat ‘the 
object and purpose of international treaties (i.e. the Rotterdam Rules).’ 
101
 See Harakis, M., ‘From treaty to trial: the implementation of the Rotterdam Rules’ cited as 
Chapter Two of Thomas, R., The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules (Lloyd’s 
List, 2010), p.30.  
102
 Fothergill v Monarch Airlines [1981] A.C. at 281. Lord Scarman stated that: ‘an agreed 
conference minute of the understanding upon the basis which the draft of an article of the 
convention was accepted may well be a great clue.’ 
103
 In Re Deep Vein Thrombosis and Air Travel Group Litigation [2006] 1 A.C. 495, at p.513. 
104
 This might be a reason why some judges are reluctant to use the drafting history. See 
Thomas, R., ‘The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules’, (2010, Lloyd’s List), 
para. 3.83. 
105
 See the information which is accessible: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
transport goods/rotterdam_travaux.html. 
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should respect interpretation results as a whole and not just look into sources 
connected with applicable national law’.106 However, the travaux préparatoires 
are silent on some complexities of the rules. It is likely that States would 
interpret rules differently 107  and the liability regime may become more 
complicated than it is at present.108  
 
1.7 Conclusion 
Under the current law the duty to exercise due diligence to make a vessel 
seaworthy is limited to the time before or at the beginning of the voyage. 
However, due to extensive developments in the shipping industry and changes 
in merchants’ practices, in general, the current law (and seaworthiness 
provisions in particular) requires modification in order to cope with those 
changes. These changes are acknowledged in the Rotterdam Rules.  
There are a number of examples of how this has been done under the 
Rotterdam Rules; one is the sphere of application of the Rotterdam Rules 
covering the carriage of goods by sea, as well as multimodal/door-to-door 
transport operations involving at least one sea leg. However, this thesis seeks 
to concentrate solely on seaworthiness under the two regimes and to carry out 
a comparative study. The aspects of seaworthiness that this thesis discusses 
are set out below.  
                                               
106
 See Alexander von Ziegler, Johan Schelin and Stefano Zunarelli who have explained briefly 
the way that the Rules must be interpreted in their edited book The Rotterdam Rules 2008: 
Commentary to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of 
Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), p.32.  
107
 See f.n. 89, at p.72. 
108
 See the discussion in para. 3.9.3.3, at p.225. Also, see para. 3.9.3.4, at p. 230, suggesting 
different interpretations for the word ‘probably’. 
76 
 
The first to be considered is the nature and meaning of ‘due diligence’ under 
both regimes. This includes looking at the extension of the duty to exercise due 
diligence under the Rotterdam Rules to provide a seaworthy vessel during the 
entire voyage.  
The next area to be considered is the liability regime under both sets of Rules 
and the burden of proof in relation to the duty. This Chapter has noted that 
Industry Regulations influence both directly and indirectly the seaworthiness of 
the vessel. This raises the question ‘would the non-compliance of the carrier 
with Industry Regulations, which are not part of the Hague-Visby or Rotterdam 
Rules, have an impact on the obligation of seaworthiness?’ This is considered 
in Chapter Four, which considers the ability of the old and new regimes to 
accommodate changes to the industry and Industry Regulations. This will 
include assessing how the development of the shipping industry affects the 
seaworthiness of a vessel and whether the Rotterdam Rules support such 
changes and, if necessary, cover any gaps. 
The third area for consideration is the effect of the multimodality of the 
Rotterdam Rules on the nature of the Duty and how it affects the Duty in 
comparison with the current regime.  
The rise in containerisation has been one of the largest changes to the shipping 
of goods by sea since the drafting of the Hague-Visby Rules. The inclusion of a 
container as part of the seaworthiness requirement will be considered in 
Chapter Six. This will include looking at the different effects of implying, under 
the current law, the supply of a fit container as part of the seaworthiness 
obligation in different jurisdictions under both sets of Rules.  
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Finally, examining the changes in the Rotterdam Rules will provide a solution to 
the basic question of whether the Rotterdam Rules are a better choice to 
govern the obligation of seaworthiness. In order to answer this question, 
consideration will be given to the sections of the travaux préparatoires that 
relate to seaworthiness. It follows that if, in the case of ambiguity, the courts are 
turning to these materials for assistance, well drafted, comprehensive and 
helpful travaux préparatoires will help to avoid a rise in expensive litigation. 
Such usage will also aid a more harmonised interpretation of the Rules 
throughout the different States that adopt them.  
This thesis will also consider whether the Rotterdam Rules provide a better 
system in light of the liability of seaworthiness and thus whether they should 
replace the current regime.   
One may say that the extension of the scope of the seaworthiness obligation 
would balance the relationship between the parties to the carriage contract. The 
differences in the Rotterdam Rules, in the current eyes of the law, need to be 
taken into account in order to decide whether the Rotterdam Rules constitute a 
sound regime in a way that considers the changes required.109 
This work has confined the study to the effect of seaworthiness under both the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the potential effect of implementing the 
Rotterdam Rules into the legislation of the United Kingdom, United States and 
on a smaller scale, other jurisdictions. Thus, it does not cover the effect of 
seaworthiness under the common law. However, the fruitful experience of the 
precedents of the courts in this field (common law) will be used. Due 
                                               
109 The standard ‘demanded of a reasonable and prudent shipowner is, of course, likely to 
change over years.’ The Garden City [1982] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 382, p.395. 
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consideration shall be given to the practice and concerns of the maritime 
industry; i.e. masters, seafarers, ship operators, cargo-owners, etc. Because of 
this, the research is written in such a way that it will not only benefit people who 
possess a legal background but also the laymen within the maritime industry 
who are affected by the latest changes, as it will aid understanding of the 
changes and their impact on the obligation of seaworthiness when deciding to 
which regime they should adhere. Furthermore, solutions and recommendations 
are given throughout this study to support an alternative and better approach to 
the law of seaworthiness.    
To achieve the purpose of this study, the thesis is divided as follows:  
Chapter Two: The concept of ‘due diligence’ under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules and Rotterdam Rules. This Chapter is divided into two parts: the first will 
predominantly discuss the provision related to the obligation of seaworthiness, 
i.e. Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The second part will, in the 
main, discuss Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules.  
Chapter Three: Burden of proof and commercial risk allocation under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the Rotterdam Rules. This Chapter is also 
divided into two parts: the first will mainly discuss Article IV, 1 and part of r.2 of 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The second part will focus on Article 17(1)-(6) of 
the Rotterdam Rules. 
Chapter Four: Effects of shipping standards on seaworthiness. 
Chapter Five: The implication of the multimodal aspect of the Rotterdam Rules 
on the seaworthiness obligation and the consequent liability. This Chapter will 
primarily discuss the effect of the multimodality provisions of the Rotterdam 
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Rules, e.g. Articles 26 and 82, on the obligation of seaworthiness and the 
consequent liability.  
Chapter Six: Supply of containers and ‘seaworthiness’ - The Rotterdam Rules 
perspective. This Chapter is divided into two parts; the first will discuss the 
aspect of container cargoworthiness under the current law, e.g. the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The second part will discuss the new obligation of 
container cargoworthiness that is included in Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam 
Rules.  
Chapter Seven: Conclusion and recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPT OF ‘DUE DILIGENCE’ UNDER THE 
HAGUE/HAGUE-VISBY RULES AND ROTTERDAM 
RULES 
 
 
- Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, the concept of seaworthiness was explained and its 
scope defined and described in relation to both the vessel’s fitness and her 
cargoworthiness. This Chapter deals with the concept of the 
carrier’s/shipowner’s obligation to exercise ‘due diligence’ to provide a 
seaworthy vessel. This is necessary in order to understand and explain whether 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are sufficiently sound with regard to the nature of 
the seaworthiness duty and whether the obligation under the Rotterdam Rules 
provides a better basis of law; i.e. does it close any of the gaps that have been 
identified in practice over the years and is it attuned to today’s commercial 
needs, modern transport and international trade practices?  
Therefore, this Chapter will be split into two parts. Part One briefly explains the 
nature of the due diligence obligation (or duty) under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. Part Two covers the changes introduced by the Rotterdam Rules. It 
deals, in particular, with the extension of the ‘due diligence’ obligation and 
analyses whether it is practically possible to be fulfilled.  
The issues that will be explored include: (i) the duty before and at the 
commencement of the voyage; (ii) whether the duty differs in any respect after 
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the commencement of the voyage; and (iii) how strict the remedying of 
unseaworthiness is expected to be. 
 
 
Part I: The Obligation under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules 
 
2.1 The Nature of the Duty 
The seaworthiness obligation under the common law is absolute. However, in 
the majority of cases, this absolute obligation is modified in the contract of 
carriage either by some contractual provision,1 such as those found in standard 
form terms, 2  or by the application of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules can apply either by express contractual 
incorporation or be mandatorily implied into the contract by statute or the Rules 
themselves. In the case of the latter, the Hague/Hague-Visby will be applied to 
the contract of carriage as a matter of the law applicable to the contract of 
carriage.  
Regardless of which, the duty is the same; the carrier’s absolute obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel is compromised and is substituted by his obligation 
to exercise ‘due diligence’ before and at the beginning of the voyage to provide 
a seaworthy vessel. It is important to explore the nature of the duty in the 
                                               
1
 For instance, under the Gencon form charterparty, when this is the governing contract of 
carriage and not the Bill of Lading, if any, the absolute duty is modified by virtue of Clause 2.   
2
 See Todd, P., Contracts for the Carriage of Goods by Sea, (BSP Professional Books, 1988), 
pp.51-54. 
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context of Article III, rule 1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and in the context 
of the regime proposed under the Rotterdam Rules.  
 
2.2 The Obligation to Exercise Due Diligence to Make the Vessel 
Seaworthy 
As noted above, the former absolute obligation of seaworthiness on the 
shipowner/carrier was replaced by a less stringent obligation to exercise due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 3  The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
themselves do not provide any definition or guidance in this respect. It was not 
until 1961 when the House of Lords in the case of The Muncaster Castle4 
changed the status quo and provided guidance.  
 
2.3  The Origin of ‘Due Diligence’ 
The principle that a vessel must be seaworthy upon the commencement of her 
voyage has long been recognised in maritime law, which has implied a warranty 
of seaworthiness 5  into contracts for the carriage of goods by sea. The 
introduction of the duty to exercise due diligence has changed the nature and 
extent of the obligation.  
The concept of due diligence was first introduced in the Liverpool Conference 
Form of 1882 where it contained a reference to the “want of due diligence by 
                                               
3
 See Diamond A., QC, ‘Responsibility for Loss of, or Damage to, Cargo on a Sea Transit: The 
Hague or Hamburg Conventions?’ A paper cited in Koh Soon Kwang (ed.), Carriage of Goods 
by Sea, (Butterworths, 1986), p.110. 
4
The Muncaster Castle [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. Some guidance was given on the content of 
the duty by ruling that, in matters of seaworthiness, the owner may be found liable for his own 
fault and for the faults of his employees, as well as for the faults of independent contractors, 
such as the dockyard workers. This point is explained in detail below. See para. 2.4, at p.85 for 
the definition of due diligence. 
5
 Carver, T. G., Carriage by Sea, (1982, Stevens & Sons), Part one, para. 140a. 
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the owners of the ship”.6  In the late nineteenth century, in order to tip the 
balance in favour of the carrier, the USA Harter Act of 1893 7  adopted the 
‘exercise of due diligence concept’.8 It was then adopted in the Hague Rules9 
(later amended), which were enacted into English law by the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea Act 1924 and later amended by the Visby Protocol, which became part 
of English law by enactment of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971. These 
are known as the Hague-Visby Rules. The relevant provisions are Article III, 
rule 1 and Article IV, rule 1. These provide as follows: 
Article III, rule 1 
“The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to 
exercise due diligence to:  
(a) make the ship seaworthy;  
(b) properly man, equip and supply the ship;  
(c) make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the 
ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation.” 
 
Article IV, rule 1 
                                               
6
 Cadwallader, F. J., ‘Seaworthiness - An Exercise of Due Diligence’ presented at Bill of Lading 
Conventions Conference, New York, November 29/30 (1978, Lloyd’s of London Press), p.2. 
7
 Under the Harter Act, the phrase ‘due diligence’ was merely used as a minimum required 
standard to ensure that the vessel was seaworthy. Section 2 of the Harter Act states: “It shall 
not be lawful for any vessel transporting merchandise or property from or between ports of the 
United States of America and foreign ports, her owner, master, agent or manager, to insert in 
any bill of lading or shipping document any covenant or agreement whereby the obligation of the 
owner or owners of said vessel to exercise due diligence…” The carrier would not be able to 
limit his liability if he failed to exercise this minimum requirement.  
8
 See Wilson, J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (7
th
 ed., Pearson Longman, 2010), p.188; also see 
Astle, W., Shipping and the Law, (Fairplay Publications, 1997), p.16; Gold, E., Gard Handbook 
on P&I Insurance, (5
th
 ed., 2002, Royle Corporate), p.332. 
9
 See Girvin, S., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Oxford University Press, 2
nd
 ed., 2011), para. 
27.25. 
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“Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the 
part of the carrier to make the ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is 
properly manned, equipped and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating 
and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried fit 
and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever loss or damage has resulted 
from unseaworthiness the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall 
be on the carrier or the person claiming exemption under this article.” 
The common law absolute warranty of seaworthiness must not be implied into 
contracts to which the Rules apply. Section 3 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1971 reads that “There shall not be implied in any contract for the carriage 
of goods by sea to which the Rules apply by virtue of this Act any absolute 
undertaking by the carrier of the goods to provide a seaworthy ship.” 
The carrier is entitled to the protection of the exemptions listed in Article IV, r.2 
where he can prove that he exercised due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy. The common law obligation10 is rarely implied by the courts today 
due to one of the following reasons: i) contracts of carriage under bills of lading 
are subject to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules; ii) the rules are incorporated in 
charterparties; or, iii) charterparties contain similar express ‘due diligence’ 
provisions.11 
                                               
10
 See Lyon v Mells (1804) 5 East 428, p.437 (102 E.R. 1134, 1137), per Lord Ellenborough. 
11
 Most of these clauses are construed to change the absolute obligation. For example, see 
Yates, D., (ed.), Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Land, Sea and Air, (Lloyd’s London 
Press, 1993), para.1.6.9.3. The position under Article III, r.1 of the Rules is reinforced by s.3 of 
the UK Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971. For similar provisions in other jurisdictions, see s.2 
of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1986 (South Africa); s.17 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act 1991 (Australia); s.5 of the Hong Kong Ordinance No. 104 of 1994; and, s.4 of the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act 1978 (Singapore). 
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Therefore, it can be seen that the obligation to only exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy, as described in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, is 
less onerous than the common law obligation.   
The substantial change to the carrier’s obligation can be easily understood by 
comparing, for instance, the liability of the carrier in cases where damage is 
caused by latent defect. In The Glenfruin,12 a case decided under the common 
law regime, the shipowner was held liable by reason of the ship’s 
unseaworthiness even though this was due to latent defects, which would have 
been impossible to discover. By contrast, in The Australian Star, 13  a case 
decided under the regime introduced by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the 
shipowner was not held liable for damage arising from the unseaworthiness of 
the vessel by reason of a certain defect existing at the commencement of the 
voyage, which could not have been discovered by the exercise of due care. 
 
2.4  ‘Due Diligence’ Defined  
The term ‘due diligence’ is not defined by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
themselves, or indeed by any other rule.14 It has, however, been considered in a 
number of cases, in particular, The Muncaster Castle.15 In this case, Willmer LJ 
said that “[a]n obligation to exercise due diligence is to my mind 
indistinguishable from an obligation to exercise reasonable care - a concept not 
unfamiliar in English Law…” 
                                               
12
 The Glenfruin (1885) 10 P.D. 103. 
13
 The Australian Star [1940] 67 Ll. L. R. 110. 
14
 The Harter Act and the Hamburg Rules also do not define ‘due diligence’. 
15
 The Muncaster Castle [1960] 1 Q.B. 536 at p.581 per Willmer LJ; see also The Amstelslot 
[1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 539, p.553 per McNair J; [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223, p.235 per Lord 
Devlin; The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] C.L.C. 933, pp.947-948, per Auld LJ; Wilson & Clyde Coal 
Co. v English [1938] A.C. 57, p.80, per Lord Wright; Davie v New Merton Board Mills [1959] A.C. 
604, pp.651-652; Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass [1972] A.C. 153, at p.199, per Lord Diplock.   
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Similarly, in other Common Law countries, it has been stated that due diligence 
was “not merely a praiseworthy or sincere, though unsuccessful, effort, but such 
an intelligent and efficient attempt as shall make it [seaworthy] as far as 
diligence can secure it.” 16  Referring to American and English authorities, 17 
Tetley18 defines due diligence as “an appropriate, competent and reasonable 
effort by the carrier to fulfil the obligations stated in Article III r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.” 
However, reference to the ordinary meaning of the words ‘due diligence’ may 
assist in finding the exact meaning. ‘Due’19 means “all that which is proper” and 
‘diligence’ is referred to as “paying attention and being careful to duties.”20 One 
may therefore, say that a carrier exercises due diligence when he pays “all that 
                                               
16
 Grain Growers Export Co. v Canada Steamship Lines Ltd (1918) 43 O.L.R. 330, at pp.344-
345 (Ont. S.C. App. Div.), upheld (1919) 59 S.C.R. 643 (Supr. C. of Can.) cited in Tetley, W., 
Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 2008), at p.876.    
17
 Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4th ed., 2008), pp.876-877, refers to F.C. Bradley & 
Sons v Federal Steam Navigation Co. (1926) 24 Ll. L. Rep. 446 (C.A.), at p.454, per Scrutton 
LJ, “The ship must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary owner would require his vessel 
to have at the commencement of the voyage having regard to all probable circumstances of it,” 
cited with approval in The Fjord Wind [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (C.A.), p.197, per Clarke LJ; 
The Lendoudis Evangelos [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 304, at p.306, per Cresswell J, and The 
Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, at p.736, per Cresswell J who enumerated the 
following aspects of seaworthiness: physical condition of the vessel and equipment; 
competent/efficient crew and master; adequacy of stores, bunkers and documentations; and, 
cargoworthiness. The last three cases were cited in the 4
th
 edition of Tetley, W., Marine Cargo 
Claims. 
18
 Tetley defined it as: “genuine, competent and reasonable effort of the carrier to fulfil the 
obligations set out in subparagraph (a), (b) and (c) of Art III (1) of the Hague or Hague-Visby 
Rules.” Tetley W., Marine Cargo Claims, (4
th
 ed., 2008), pp. 876-877. Tetley’s definition is 
referred to by Cadwallader, F. J., ‘Seaworthiness - An Exercise of Due Diligence’, presented at 
Bill of Lading Conventions Conference, New York, November 29/30 (1978, Lloyd’s of London 
Press), at p.3. 
19
 Cadwallader, F. J., ‘Seaworthiness - An Exercise of Due Diligence’, presented at Bill of 
Lading Conventions Conference, New York, November 29/30 (1978, Lloyd’s of London Press), 
at p.3. See The Foulkes Case (1880) 5 CPD 157, p.171, per Thesiger LJ (‘due and reasonable 
care’); British Road Services v Arthur v Crutchley Ltd [1968] 1 All ER 811, p.820, per Lord 
Pearson, p.824, per Sachs LJ (‘proper care’); Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v Malaysian 
International Shipping Corp Bhd (The Bunga Seroja) (1998) 72 ALRJR 1592, p.1637, per 
Callinan J (‘appropriate care’). 
20
 Cambridge Advanced Learners’ Dictionary, (3
rd
 ed., 2008). 
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attention to his duties to provide a seaworthy vessel as is properly to be 
expected of a carrier of goods by sea.”21  
From the above definitions, one can say that the elasticity of the obligation 
imposed by the phrase ‘due diligence’ requires the court to “rely on common 
sense, expert information, and domestic and foreign case law”,22 in order to 
ascertain whether the carrier has discharged his obligation as to seaworthiness. 
It is to be noted that expert information embraces the development of the 
shipping industry’s standards, which effectively might increase or reduce the 
standard of due diligence required by a carrier.  
It should be noted, however, that, in the context of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules, the carrier’s due diligence obligation is, insofar as independent sub-
contractors are concerned, rather higher, demanding and uncompromising 
compared to the common law position in the tort of negligence. 23  This is 
because, to a certain extent, bar only cases of a latent defect, it might impose a 
heavier burden on the carrier. The standard of care imposed by the duty to 
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is different from the 
common law obligation of care in that it is a personal obligation that cannot be 
delegated. 24  For instance, the carrier is not relieved from liability for 
                                               
21
 Cadwallader, F. J., ‘Seaworthiness - An Exercise of Due Diligence’, presented at Bill of 
Lading Conventions Conference, New York, November 29/30 (1978, Lloyd’s of London Press), 
at p.3. 
22
 See Delebecque, P., ‘Obligation of the Carrier’ cited as Chapter 4 in Alexander von Ziegler, 
Johan Schelin and Stefano Zunarelli (eds.) The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly 
by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), p.88. 
23
 Margetson N. J., The system of liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Paris 
Legal Publisher, 2008), p.47. 
24
 Paterson S.S. Ltd v Aluminum Co. of Can. (The Hamildoc) 1950 CarswellQue 269 (Can. Que. 
K.B.)(WL), 1950 AMC 1973, The Muncaster Castle [1961] AC 807 (HL); The Eurasian Dream 
(No.1) [2002] EHWC (Comm) 118, at [155], [2002] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 719 (Q. B.), at 744; Union of 
India v N.V. Reederij Amsterdam (The Amstelslot) [1963] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 223 (H.L.), at 235. See 
also, Nikaki, T., ‘The Carrier’s Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil you Know? ’ 
(2010) 35 Tul. Mar. LJ., p.18. 
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unseaworthiness caused by the negligence of subcontractors and repairers.25 
This is because “what is required [by] due diligence is the work itself”,26 which is 
imposed on the carrier and not merely due diligence in selecting a reputable 
subcontractor or agent. Failure, therefore, of the carrier to discover bad 
craftsmanship entails liability on him. He has no choice but to take care and 
diligently supervise the work entrusted to the repairer. This effectively means 
that the carrier needs either to discover any negligent work entrusted to the 
repairer or to make sure that “servants, agents or independent contractors, had 
exercised all reasonable skill and care to ensure that the vessel was seaworthy 
at the commencement of its voyage, namely, reasonably fit to encounter the 
ordinary incidents of the voyage.”27 The position has been re-confirmed in two 
fairly recent cases: The Kapitan Sakharov28 and The Happy Ranger.29 In the 
                                               
25
 The Happy Ranger [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57; W. Angliss and Company (Australia) Proprietary 
Ltd v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company [1927] 2 K.B. 456. 
26
 The Muncaster Castle [1961] A.C. 807, p. 850, per Lord Merriman. 
27
 Northern Shipping Co. v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH & Ors (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 
C.L.C. 933, p.946. 
28
 Northern Shipping Co. v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH & Ors (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 
C.L.C. 933. In deciding whether or not the required due diligence was effectively exercised by 
the carrier, the test should be applied to the facts of the case and the court will need to make 
reference to shipping industry standards and recommendations at the material time, such as the 
tests required by SOLAS etc. This includes shipping practices and requirements of the shipping 
industry that directly or indirectly governs the obligation of seaworthiness, e.g. rules of 
classification societies; see Western Canada S.S. Co. v Canadian Commercial Corp. [1960] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 313, p.321, where the Canadian Supreme Court referred to “the fact that the 
requirements of “sound commercial practice” are considered by many shipowners to be met by 
maintaining the Lloyd’s Register of Shipping classifications requirements”. See also Corporacion 
Argentina de Productores de Carnes v Royal Mail Lines (1939) 64 Ll. L. R.188, at p.190; The 
Australian Star (1940) 67 Ll.L. R.110 at p.117; The Amstelslot [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 539 at 
p.555. For a case in which this was so, even though the view of Lloyd’s was controversial, see 
the decision of the US District Court in Peter Paul Inc. v M.S. Christer Salen 152 F. Supp, 410. 
In the Netherlands, the Supreme Court in The NDS Provider drew an analogy between the 
holds of the vessel and the containers and held that the duty contained in Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules applied to the container. See Nile Dutch Africa Line B.V. Delta Lloyd 
Schadeverzekering (The “NDS Provider”) C06/082HR, 1 February 2008. For the carrier to 
satisfy the test, he must show that he himself personally and his “servants, agents or 
independent contractors, had exercised all reasonable skill and care to ensure that the vessel 
was seaworthy at the commencement of its voyage; namely, reasonably fit to encounter the 
ordinary incidents of the voyage.” 
29
 The Happy Ranger [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57; W. Angliss and Company (Australia) Proprietary 
Ltd v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company [1927] 2 K.B. 456. 
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latter case, the carrier was found liable for a faulty hook of a crane aboard his 
brand new vessel which had recently come under the carrier’s ‘orbit’.30 
Accordingly, the author suggests that ‘due diligence’ may be defined as: 
The effort of a competent and reasonable carrier or any person working for 
him to provide a seaworthy vessel to fulfil the requirements set out in Article 
III, Rule 1.31   
Having outlined above how ‘due diligence’ has been or could be defined, I will 
now turn to the duration of the obligation and the problems associated with it.       
 
2.5  Duration of the Obligation: The Time When the Carrier Must Begin 
to Exercise Due Diligence 
Under the common law, the obligation of seaworthiness for a voyage charter 
attaches at the time of sailing.32  Otherwise, if the voyage is divided into a 
number of stages, then the requirement must be fulfilled at the beginning of 
each of those stages.33 In the case of time charterparties and in the absence of 
any express provision, the obligation attaches at the time of delivery of the 
vessel by the owner to the charterer.34 
Insofar as the time the obligation attaches, the position under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules (the “Rules”) is different from that under the common 
                                               
30
 In The Muncaster Castle, the term ‘orbit’ is used co-extensively with ownership or service or 
control. 
31
 Cadwallader, F. J., ‘Seaworthiness - An Exercise of Due Diligence’, presented at Bill of 
Lading Conventions Conference, New York, November 29/30 (1978, Lloyd’s of London Press), 
it is stated that: “Thus to exercise due diligence, it is required that the carrier makes a genuine, 
competent and reasonable effort to ensure this state” at p.3. 
32
 Bermon v Woodbridge (1781) 2 Dougl. 788; Kiptoff v Wilson and Others (1875-76) L.R. 1 
Q.B.D. 377. 
33
 Cohn v Davidson (1877) 2 Q.B.D. 455, based on Annen v Woodman (1810) 3 Taunt. 299, 
Moore and Another v Lunn and Others (1922) 11 Ll.L. Rep. 86, p.92. See also Wilh. Svenssons 
Travaruaktiebolag v Cliffe Steamship Company [1932] 1 K.B. 490, p.493, per Wright J. 
34
 Giertsen v Turnbull (1908) SC 1101. 
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law. Article III, r.1 requires that the carrier must exercise due diligence to 
provide a seaworthy vessel ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage.’ The 
phrase has been interpreted as ‘the period from at least the [beginning of the 
voyage] [the loading] until the vessel starts on her voyage…’35 This means that, 
for the purpose of fulfilling the obligation under the Rules, the carrier’s obligation 
to exercise due diligence is likely to be required even during the period running 
up to that voyage (i.e. the preliminary voyage under ballast). Hence, one may 
reasonably ask when the obligation precisely starts and ends. In so far as the 
case law is concerned, such a query has not been raised. Even so, it is 
essential to attempt to answer this query and it is necessary to separately deal 
with two distinct points in time: ‘before’ and ‘at the beginning of the voyage’. 
However, before dealing with these two points it is necessary to explain what is 
meant by the word ‘voyage’ under the Rules.36 
 
2.6 What is meant by ‘Voyage’? 
For the purposes of the Rules, there are two important issues to be noted. First, 
voyage means the contractual voyage from the port of loading to the port of 
discharge. This is so even when a vessel has to call at a series of different 
loading ports to collect different cargoes for delivery to a series of different 
                                               
35
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589, p.603, 
per Lord Somervell. The appellant was the consignees of a cargo loaded in Halifax for carriage 
to Kingston. The contract was under the Canadian WOGBS. Shortly before the vessel was due 
to sail, an attempt was made to thaw the frozen scupper pipes with acetylene torch and a fire 
started. The appellant’s cargo was lost. The court held that the carrier failed to exercise due 
diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage. The vessel, as a result, was unseaworthy. 
36
 This question was raised on many occasions: e.g. see the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, ‘The Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of 
the Hamburg Rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention’, Report by the UNCTAD 
secretariat, 31 December 1987 (TD/B/C.4/315 (part 1)), p.38, “The provision in Art. III r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules have led to many uncertainties in interpretation; for example, as to 
when the voyage begins.” 
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discharge ports.37 Indeed, it is true that in many jurisdictions the term ‘voyage’ is, 
perhaps quite unsurprisingly, termed as ‘the bill of lading voyage’. 38  
Consequently, the carrier is obliged merely to exercise due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy at the very first contractual loading port for a particular 
cargo. This is the case irrespective of calls at intermediary loading ports.39 By 
way of example, if a vessel loaded cargo A at the port of Felixstowe and then 
sailed to load cargo B at the port of Rotterdam, the carrier, at the port of 
Rotterdam, is under an obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel before and at the beginning of the voyage with regard only to 
cargo B. There is no longer any obligation on the carrier to exercise due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy in respect of cargo A. It suffices for 
cargo A that the carrier exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy 
before and at the beginning of the voyage relating to the contractual port under 
the relevant bill(s) of lading, in our example, the port of Felixstowe.40 
The owners of cargo A, shipped at the port of Felixstowe, will be unable to 
recover for any loss or damage to their cargo on the basis of the carrier’s failure 
to exercise due diligence at the second port (Rotterdam). As the law now stands 
under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the effect is clear: two cargoes, loaded at 
two different ports, stowed adjacently to each other in the same or different 
                                               
37
 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, pp.329-330. Hewson J stated that: “I see no 
obligation to read into the word "voyage" a doctrine of stages, but a necessity to define the word 
itself. The word does not appear in the earlier Canadian Act of 1910. "Voyage" in this context 
means what it has always meant: the contractual voyage from the port of loading to the port of 
discharge as declared in the appropriate bill of lading.” 
38
 See Astle, W. E., The Hamburg Rules: An appreciation of the cause and effect of the 
amendments to the Hague Rules and the Hague-Visby Rules, (Fairplay Publications, 1981), 
p.98. 
39
 In Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193. Storm valve cover 
plates were stolen at an intermediate port. The Court of Appeal held that the vessel fulfilled the 
obligation required to provide a seaworthy vessel at the beginning of the voyage. 
40
 E.g. Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193. See 
also, Sir Guenter Treitel, F. M. Reynolds, Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 
2011), para.9-134. See also, Wilson J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Longman-Pearson, 7
th
 ed., 
2010), p.188. 
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cargo holds suffering the same physical damage inflicted by the same cause, 
would have a different finding on the question of the carrier’s liability depending 
on each cargo’s port of loading.41 It seems that extending the obligation of due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy during the whole voyage would be a 
solution that would certainly remove such an apparently unjust discrepancy on 
the issue of the carrier’s liability and would improve the position of the cargo-
interests vis-à-vis the carrier/shipowner.42 It is debatable whether this would be 
a fair solution between the carrier/cargo-owner, and policy considerations would 
need to be considered by the legislature. In the Rotterdam Rules, however, this 
position has been adopted.43 It might be the case that any change removing 
such uncertainties and making all parties aware of their respective duties and 
risks and, therefore, their potential rights and liabilities, would be welcomed. 
The second point is that, unlike the position under the common law and the 
doctrine of stages,44 the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not oblige the carrier to 
provide a seaworthy vessel at the beginning of each stage nor do they allow the 
carrier to split a voyage into a series of voyages.45 As regards charterparties, 
                                               
41
 Nicholas, A., ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seaworthiness’ cited as 
Chapter 6 in Thomas, R. (ed.) The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules 
(Informa, 2010), p.117. 
42
 The wording of Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules is likely to be a solution to such a problem.  
43
 The duty under the Rotterdam Rules is not restricted until the time before the beginning of the 
voyage. It is also extended to the entire voyage. This point will be covered below. 
44
 For a detailed explanation on the effect of Article III, r.1 on the doctrine of stages, see Clarke, 
M., Aspects of the Hague Rules; A comparative study in English and French law, (Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1976), at p.230-233. See Treitel, G., Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), para.9-021. 
45
 See Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193. See 
Wilson J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Pearson, 2010), p.188. Also, see Sir Eder, B., Foxton 
QC, D., Berry QC, S., Smith QC, C. and Bennett, H., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills 
of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 22
nd
 ed., 2011), para.20-045. See also Tetley, W., Marine Cargo 
Claims, (Blais, 2008, 4
th
 ed.), p.895. The author is of the opinion that if a vessel has loaded part 
of the cargo alongside a jetty, then, for the purposes of draft restriction, has moved to anchor to 
load the rest of the cargo by lighters barges, it is not to be constituted as a stage within a 
voyage due to the fact that in such a case the voyage must not be understood to have 
commenced. See the below sections. 
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the doctrine of stages does not apply to a cargo claim under the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules.46   
2.6.1 ‘Before’ the Voyage – The Time When the Carrier Must Begin 
to Exercise Due Diligence47 
The period of ‘before’ was illustrated by Lord Somervell when he stated that 
“The word “before” cannot … be read as meaning “at the commencement of the 
loading”. If this had been intended, it would have been said”.48 Despite the fact 
that the standard of the duty in exercising due diligence is increased during and 
at the end of the loading and the final preparation of the loading, 49  the 
aforementioned quotation is obviously enough to indicate that the obligation 
attaches earlier. The obligation may attach during the time prior to the vessel’s 
arrival to the loading port, while she is still at sea,50 having begun maybe at the 
time the vessel was delivered,51 rather than merely at the time when she is 
loaded or departing from the loading port. Arguably, this is the period when the 
carrier has the opportunity and time to carry out a proper investigation and 
ascertain and restore any malfunction or damage that may cause 
                                               
46
 See The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, per Hewson J, “The voyage was, where 
necessary to the shipowner, divided into a series of stages, but that was in relation to the 
warranty of seaworthiness; it did not alter the definition of ‘voyage’. There may have been 
several stages, but there was only one voyage,” p.329. 
47
 As shown previously, the terms of the contract may alter the time at which the obligation of 
due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy starts. So that it attaches at the time of the 
approach of the vessel; see The Kriti Rex [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171; The Fjord Wind [1999] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 307, affirmed [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191.  
48
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589, p.603, 
per Lord Somervell (P.C). See Zaphirou, ‘Seaworthiness’, (1963) J.B.L. 221, p.225; Clarke, M., 
Aspects of The Hague Rules: a comparative study in English and French Law, (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1976), p.234. 
49
 Clarke, M., ‘The Carrier’s Duty of Seaworthiness under the Hague Rules’ cited as Chapter 6 
in Rose, F., (ed.), Lex Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of 
Francis Reynolds, (LLP, 2000), p.121. 
50
 See e.g. The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, p.338, per Hewson J; The Kriti Rex 
[1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171, p.185, per Moore-Bick J. 
51
 Clarke, M., ‘The Carrier’s Duty of Seaworthiness under the Hague Rules’ cited as Chapter 6 
in Rose, F., (ed.), Lex Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of 
Francis Reynolds, (LLP, 2000), p.120. See Antigoni [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 309. 
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unseaworthiness, not just at the loading port but also before commencement of 
loading.52 One view is that this is a cogent argument, perhaps because it is not 
possible to inspect, ascertain and repair all damages during such a limited time 
when the vessel is alongside the jetty. Indeed, upon loading, the vessel usually 
has very limited time and manpower to be engaged with lengthy thorough 
inspections in ascertaining and rectifying defects or deficiencies.53 Whilst in port, 
the crew are usually undertaking other tasks, which, if improperly attended, may 
render the vessel unseaworthy. Such tasks are the loading, trimming and cargo 
securing operations etc. Time allowing, the crew may also be engaged in some 
basic maintenance. Lifting equipment, e.g. the ship’s tackle, when used for 
loading of cargo, must be examined at intervals not exceeding one year.54 For 
commercial purposes, such examinations are usually carried out en route prior 
to arrival at the loading port. If, for some reason, the tests were not carried out 
and, as a consequence, the cargo was lost or damaged, the carrier would be 
liable for breach of his due diligence obligation.55 In The Happy Ranger,56 the 
shipowner had taken delivery of the vessel from the builder on 16 February 
1998. On 11 March 1998, the vessel started its first cargo operation. During the 
lifting of the cargo, the hook of the crane broke and the cargo suffered serious 
damage. The cranes and hooks were certified by the vessel’s Classification 
                                               
52
 See e.g. The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 40 at p.50, per Clarke J. 
53
 According to ISM, each vessel must perform inspections, checks and maintenance repairs at 
regular intervals in accordance with manufacturing manuals and procedures. 
54
 Lloyd’s Register / P&I Club, ‘Survey and Examination of Ships’ Lifting Appliances’, (2011) 
cited in http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/LP%20Documents/Survey%20and%20 
Examination%20of%20Ships'%20Lifting%20Appliances.pdf (accessed 5.10.2014) 
55
 See O.C.I.M.F., I.C.S., The International Safety Guide for Oil Tankers and Terminals 
(ISGOTT) (Witherby Publisher, 5
th
 ed., 2006), para. 8.3. 
56
 Parsons Corporation & 6 ORS v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy Ranger (The Happy 
Ranger) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649. Also see Kuo International v Daisy Shipping (The 
Yamatogawa) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 39, where the investigation went back to the vessel’s 
previous Special Survey. See, Maxine Footwear Co. v Canadian Government Merchant Marine 
[1959] A.C. 589. An acetylene torch was used to defrost scuppers in the cargo holds, which 
caught fire and damaged the cargo. The owner denied that they were in breach of Article III, r.1 
on the ground that due diligence arose only at the beginning of loading and the voyage.  
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Society57 but the shipowner failed to carry out the load tests required to ensure 
that the hooks were in order before the vessel’s first loading. The court found 
that the shipowner had failed to exercise due diligence in inspecting and 
carrying out the tests despite such tests having been carried out one month 
prior to the time of loading.  
One might be tempted to argue that as long as, according to Articles I(e)58 and 
II,59 the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules apply from tackle to tackle,60 then the period 
‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’ does not impose any rights or duties 
on the carrier at any time before loading begins. This matter is outside the 
scope of this study, however, it suffices to say that this conclusion is contrary to 
common sense. If the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules was restricted to 
the ‘tackle to tackle’ period, it would mean that the carrier should be under no 
obligation to exercise due diligence to prepare the holds for cargo until the 
cargo is lifted off the jetty by the tackle of the vessel.61  
It is, therefore, noteworthy to mention that first, in all of the cases governed by 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and earlier considerations, the courts have 
clearly indicated that the carrier’s exercise of due diligence is determined by his 
conduct days or months prior to the manifestation of the matter at issue in the 
                                               
57
 The ship’s cranes were certified by Lloyd’s register. However, both cranes were not load 
tested to their maximum (SWL), and class certificates are not enough to prove the 
seaworthiness of the vessel. Testing the cranes as part of a risk assessment is an important 
part of the due diligence obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. Risk assessments will be 
dealt with at a later stage. 
58
 Article I(e) provides that “‘[c]arriage of goods’ covers the period from the time when the goods 
are loaded on to the time when they are discharged from the ship.” 
59
 Article II provides that the Convention shall only apply to “the loading, stowing, custody, care 
and discharge of … goods.” 
60
 From the time when the goods are loaded to the time when they are discharged from the 
vessel. In Pyrene Co. v Scindia Steam Navigation Co. [1954] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 321. Cargo was 
attached to the ship's tackle and was being loaded on board when the cargo fell outside the ship. 
It was held that the Rules applied although the goods had not crossed the ship's rail. The 
decision was correct, as the ship's tackle had been hooked on. 
61
 A similar notion is believed to be applicable under the container seaworthiness obligation of 
the Rotterdam Rules. For a general discussion on containers, see Chapter Six. 
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case. Secondly and alternatively, the period that covers the time ‘before the 
voyage’ depends on the circumstances of each case. Therefore, the standard of 
fitness required to be fulfilled by a prudent and careful carrier/shipowner might 
extend to the period well before the vessel’s arrival.62  
In turn, this may mean that the exercise of due diligence by the carrier could be 
examined by reference to a point earlier in time, which may be as far back as, 
or even before, the relevant contract of carriage was made. 63  A common 
example where the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence may attach well 
before the vessel’s arrival at the loading port is the carriage of perishable 
cargoes. For instance, grain cargoes are usually harvested in advance and 
obviously before the vessel’s arrival to the loading port; their forwarding and 
storage at the port sheds depends on the vessel’s estimated time of arrival 
notice. If the vessel, however, breaks down during the preliminary approaching 
voyage and, as a result of the ensuing delay, the cargo is damaged or lost, it is 
arguable that the obligation under Article III, r.1 attaches before the arrival of the 
vessel.64  The aforementioned position is more applicable to charterparties 65 
where the carrier is under an obligation to exercise due diligence to make the 
                                               
62
 See Margetson, N. J., ‘Duties of the Carrier’ cited as Chapter 4 in Hendrikse, L.  Margetson, N. 
J.  Margetson, N. J. (eds), Aspects of Maritime Law: Claims under Bills of Lading, (Kluwer Law 
International, 2008). Margetson reported that “the knowledge concerning the condition of the 
vessel over a series of voyages can lead to the conclusion that the carrier failed to exercise due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy before a specific voyage,” p.62. 
63
 Cooke, J. et al., Voyage Charters, (LLP, 3
rd
 ed., 2007), para. 85.100. 
64
 Eridania SpA v Rudolf A. Oetker (The Fjord Wind) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191; The Kriti Rex 
[1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171. A case of the Hague Rules being incorporated into a contract of 
affreightment not for a specific vessel but for vessels to be nominated, as to which see The 
Lloyd Pacifico [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 54. 
65
 Wilson, J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Pearson, 2008). Wilson at p.13 reiterated the point 
raised by Mustill J in The Hermosa [1980] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 638, who stated that “there are in most 
time charters express terms as regards initial seaworthiness and subsequent maintenance 
which are not easily reconciled with the scheme of the Hague Rules, which create an obligation 
as to due diligence attaching voyage by voyage. It cannot be taken for granted that the 
interpretation adopted in [The Adamastos case] in relation to voyage charters applies in all 
respects to time charters incorporating the Hague Rules”, at p. 647. 
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vessel seaworthy while she is on her way to the loading port.66 However, this 
position could, at least as a matter of practical legal sense, be extended to bills 
of lading, as this gives ample time to the owner to assess and correct, in 
advance, defects that may render him liable for unseaworthiness. Yet, it is not 
always the case, especially under liner voyage (e.g. carriage under a bill of 
lading) where the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are applicable.67 Thus, the carrier 
is obliged to supply a seaworthy ship from the commencement of loading the 
goods until the beginning of the voyage.68 In Maxine Footwear Co. v Canadian 
Government Merchant Marine,69 the vessel loaded cargo under a bill of lading 
incorporating the Hague Rules. Before sailing and after completion of loading, 
scupper pipes were found frozen and they were defrosted by means of an 
acetylene torch. As a result of negligent use of the acetylene torch, the 
insulation of the piping caught fire which spread to the entire ship, which 
subsequently sank. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled that the 
owner was liable because ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’ included 
                                               
66
 See Adamastos Shipping v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum [1959] A.C. 133. (incorporating the 1936 
US COGSA) tanker to make consecutive voyages carrying cargo to different ports. The 
engineer employed was incompetent and, as a result, the vessel broke down in her first voyage 
to the loading port with further problems arising later. The House of Lords considered that, 
during the ballasting voyage to the loading port, the owner is under an obligation to exercise due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy ship, at pp.179-180. 
67
 Adamastos Shipping v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum [1959] A.C. 133. Lord Ketth of Avonholm 
stated that: “Taking section 3 (1) and section 4 (1) and (2) (a) by themselves, no difficulty would 
arise in giving them a literal and effective interpretation as between owner and charterer. Two 
points, however, are taken, that these provisions do not apply to ballast, or non-cargo carrying, 
voyages, and apply only to a voyage to or from a United States port. On the first point, of course, 
the Act as drawn applied only to cargo voyages because it dealt wholly with contracts of 
carriage under bills of lading. But ex hypothesi that limitation has gone. The Act is now being 
applied to a charterparty. A charterparty is a contract for the purpose of the carriage of goods by 
sea, and I see no difficulty in saying that a voyage in ballast is all part and parcel of and 
incidental to that purpose. If a chartered ship proceeds to its port of loading, it is, in my opinion, 
engaged in a voyage relating to the carriage of goods though it is not actually carrying goods at 
the time.” 
68
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v Canadian Government Merch. Marine Ltd. [1959] A.C. 589, at 
p.603. 
69
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. v Canadian Government Merch. Marine Ltd. [1959] A.C. 589. 
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the obligation to exercise due diligence during the period from the beginning of 
loading until the vessel sank.70 
It was explained by Carver that “many of the cases relate to voyage charters 
and simply require the ship to be sea and cargoworthy for the voyage in respect 
of which the ship is chartered. Bills of lading issued in the liner trade may be 
issued at any port on the voyage and may relate to any part of the voyage the 
liner is performing. In such situations the duty relates only to the cargo covered 
by the particular bill and the voyage between the ports at which that cargo is 
loaded and that at which it is to be discharged. The requirement of 
seaworthiness as regards any particular vessel may therefore vary in respect of 
each of the consignments loaded on it.”71   
One can see the logic behind the application of the phrase ‘before the voyage’ 
in liner voyage, as being the time of actual commencement of loading. Take for 
an example, a refrigerated liner ship carrying cargo from port A, which must be 
carried at a temperature of 16oC inside the cargo holds, that is destined to port 
B. At port B, a different type of cargo is to be loaded and discharged at port C. 
However, the cargo-holds are not fit to take the new cargo from port B. The new 
cargo (at port B) requires an adjustment to the temperature in order to make the 
cargo-hold cargoworthy72 and thus ready to receive the cargo. This however is 
                                               
70
 The ruling of the court stated that ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’ means the 
period from at least the beginning of the loading until the vessel starts on her voyage. Lord 
Somervell of Harrow, who delivered the opinion of the Committee, made plain the words “at 
least” were used because the matter of precisely when the period began did not arise on the 
facts of the case, at p.603. See Margetson, N. J., The system of liability of articles III and IV of 
the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Paris Legal Publisher, 2008), pursuant to this decision the phrase 
‘before the voyage’ relates to at least the time of actual commencement of loading, at p.39.  
71
 Guenter, H. and Reynolds, F. M. B., Carver on Bills of Lading, (2011) para 9.018. 
72
 According to Article III, r.1(c), the carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the 
voyage to exercise due diligence to “make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all 
other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation.”  
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not possible until the first cargo (loaded at port A) is discharged at port B. In 
such a case, one can see that it is not always possible under liner voyage to 
exercise due diligence during the preliminary voyage, as due diligence in 
preparing for the second cargo is only exercisable after discharging the first 
cargo. In other words, the carrier is not obliged to make sure that the vessel is 
seaworthy while she is on her way to the loading port, as it is considered to be 
on its way to the discharging port for another cargo. Further, as there is no 
ballast voyage, it is impossible to prepare for the consequent cargo and thus the 
obligation does not attach before the beginning of the voyage for that particular 
cargo. 
However, in case of a vessel chartered to make consecutive voyages, in the 
approach/ballast voyage the carrier might be obliged to make arrangements 
during the voyage to make the vessel fit. The carrier, therefore, would not be 
relieved from any delay in loading the cargo or in sailing as a result of failing to 
make these arrangements. This is to say that under consecutive voyages under 
a charterparty, the carrier is also under an obligation to “ensure at the beginning 
of each successive voyage contemplated by the charter that the vessel was in a 
seaworthy condition.”73  
One may, therefore, reasonably conclude that the shipowner’s inspections, 
maintenance and repairs that are carried out as scheduled according to 
requirements and standards set by the manufacturers of the various equipment 
and instruments on-board the ship and the regulations of the shipping industry, 
such as the ISM Code, SOLAS Convention, etc. form part of his duty to 
exercise due diligence. The diligent completion, or lack thereof, may be traced 
                                               
73
 Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. v Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Cp. Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 233 (CA), at 
p.235. 
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back to a time well before the vessel proceeds to her loading port. In addition to 
whether the carriage is under a bill of lading or charterparty, the extent of the 
period ‘before the voyage’ should depend on the type of cargo, length of the 
ballast and laden voyage, and the type of vessel.74  
 
2.6.2 ‘At the beginning of the voyage’ - Termination of the 
Obligation 
In any voyage, the period of the duty ends, according to Article III, r.1, ‘at the 
beginning of the voyage’.75 It should be noted that not only does the obligation 
of exercising due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy terminate at the 
‘beginning of the voyage’ but also, the vessel’s unseaworthy condition under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is determined on the basis of whether the causal 
unseaworthiness occurred before or after the commencement of the voyage. 
Therefore, the question of when exactly the voyage starts is crucial. 
Article III, r.1 probably reflects the common law rule that the carrier’s obligation 
concludes automatically when the voyage begins. This focus on the 
commencement of the voyage requires parties to the contract of carriage to 
know the exact time the voyage starts. In a practical sense, before ‘the 
beginning of the voyage’, the carrier is required to carry out some necessary 
preparations related to the vessel’s seaworthiness, which may, in combination 
or separately, be considered by the court to determine whether the obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel has been fulfilled and subsequently, whether the 
vessel has commenced her voyage. This would be the case if a vessel, leaving 
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 Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 2008), at p.898-899. See also Carver, at p.564. 
75
 Maxine Footwear v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589. 
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her jetty (cast off), sailed to the location of an anchorage within the port limit.76 
Such an event is not unlikely to occur particularly in circumstances where the 
vessel is expected to encounter a hurricane; where the harbour control requests 
the vessel to vacate her loading jetty for another vessel; or, where the vessel 
casts anchor with the aim of receiving Customs’ clearance77 after leaving the 
berth whereas her loading, perhaps, has not been completed and will be 
completed whilst at anchor or at a different point within the port. 78  Alternatively, 
it might be the case that the vessel shifts79 from the loading jetty to the loading 
buoy intending to continue loading or for other purposes, but with no intention to 
proceed with the voyage at sea.80 The court will take into consideration the 
practicality of the preparations required before commencing the voyage and 
may decide that the vessel has not commenced her voyage. In circumstances 
where the voyage has not yet commenced, shipowners remain under a 
continuing duty to exercise due diligence. If damage is caused at this time, 
shipowners will be unable to avail themselves of the defences that would have 
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 Elements such as the type of vessel and her characteristics (size, type, ability to navigate 
through shallow water, manoeuvrability, etc.); the port of loading (the depth of the channel to 
navigate through, location of the port if river or sea port); the activity of the vessel (if at anchor, 
fast to the jetty or loading ship to ship, the need for harbour, or river or sea pilot); and, the 
matter affecting seaworthiness of the vessel (matter arising prior to sailing, such as stowage 
and lashing) will determine when the vessel is beginning her voyage. For example, if a vessel is 
at anchor outside the port limit, her voyage starts when her anchor is on board. On the other 
hand, if the vessel is fastened to the jetty, her voyage might start either when her lines are on 
board or if her pilot is away.  
77
 Under the Public Health (Ships) Regulations 1979 (SI 1979/1435) (regulations 21 to 29), a 
vessel might be sent to anchorage for further inspections, i.e. deratting certificates. 
78
 Due to draft restrictions (shallow depth of water) in some ports around the world, it is normal 
practice for vessels, particularly bulk carriers, to load part of the cargo alongside the jetty and 
the rest of the cargo when the vessel is at anchor. Furthermore, vessels are likely to change 
their jetty from one to another within the same port of loading for the same reason; e.g. many 
vessels have to carry out their loading in terminals situated off-shore due to draft restrictions. 
Cited in Branch, E., Elements of Shipping 8
th 
ed., (Routledge Publisher, 2007), p. 204.  
79
 The definition of the word ‘shift’ when “said of a ship, to move from one place to another, for 
example from one berth to another within the same port or from anchorage to berth [or from 
berth to anchorage or buoy]. In a voyage charter, provision should be made as to whether the 
time taken to shift counts as laytime”. See Peter, R., Dictionary of Shipping Terms, (Informa, 6
th
 
ed., 2013). 
80
 The Willowpool [1936] AMC 1852 (2 Cir. 1936), under the UK COGSA 1924. 
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been available had the voyage commenced. In The Newport,81 whilst the vessel 
was casting off her loading jetty, engineering staff had been instructed to open 
the steam valve for the use of the capstan in handling the mooring lines astern. 
Instead, the engineer opened the wrong steam valve and poured steam into the 
cargo hold damaging the cargo. The Ninth Circuit held that, under the Harter 
Act, the voyage had not yet commenced as “the feeding of steam to the capstan 
for the purpose of casting off lines was an act of preparation for the voyage.”82 
As a result, the vessel was unseaworthy due to a failure to exercise due 
diligence. Thus, the carrier could not rely on the exception of error in 
management because “If the negligent act of the third assistant engineer had 
been committed an hour later, and after the vessel was under way, it would 
have been a ‘fault or error in the management of the vessel,’ for which the 
owner would be relieved of liability under the Harter Act… The negligent act of 
the third assistant engineer was committed while he was endeavoring to obey 
an order looking to the beginning of the voyage, but the voyage had not 
begun.”83  
Common sense dictates that in each case the issue as to whether the 
‘beginning of the voyage’ has come to an end, depends on all of the facets of 
seaworthiness being fulfilled. The decision on when the vessel began her 
voyage will vary from case to case depending on whether all the matters that 
affect seaworthiness have been carried out.84 This may explain why there is no 
English authority defining the moment of the ending of the ‘beginning of the 
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 G. Amsinck & Co. v Pacific Mail S.S. Co. (The Newport), 7 F.2d 452 (9
th
 Cir. 1925). 
82
 G. Amsinck & Co. v Pacific Mail S.S. Co. (The Newport), 7 F.2d 452 (9
th
 Cir. 1925), at p.454. 
83
 G. Amsinck & Co. v Pacific Mail S.S. Co. (The Newport), 7 F.2d 452 (9
th
 Cir. 1925), at pp. 
453-454. 
84
 For instance, in The Willowpool, it was held that the vessel is not deemed to have begun her 
voyage, “until when the vessel breaks ground or leaves her moorings in complete readiness for 
sailing and proceeding to sea.”12 F. Supp. 96, 1935 AMC, at p.1298. 
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voyage’ but rather a mere indication as to the time of sailing, which cannot be 
used as a general criterion to determine the termination point of the due 
diligence obligation.85   
 
All preparations that can be considered as an act of preparing the vessel for 
open sea might be considered necessary to make the vessel seaworthy and as 
long as any of those preparations have not been completed, then the voyage 
should not be considered to have begun.86 
The common law provides some guidance as to the time of exercising due 
diligence until the termination of the due diligence obligation, namely, “the 
period from at least the beginning of the loading until the vessel starts on her 
voyage.”87 Nevertheless, case law on seaworthiness did not precisely turn on 
when the obligation ended.88 Therefore, insurance cases and freight payable on 
‘sailing’ provides some guidance on when the voyage should start.89 It would be 
                                               
85
 It makes it very difficult to decide on one definition especially when one has to consider other 
normal trade practices that are carried out at sea and after the beginning of the voyage in order 
to make a vessel seaworthy, which would not render her unseaworthy. For example, see Orient 
Ins. Co v United S.S. Co. 1961 AMC 1228 (S.D. N.Y. 1961), “where a vessel may be seaworthy 
although ballasting is not complete at the time of sailing, if ballasting is planned to be done at 
sea” as stated by Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 2008), at f.n. 79, at p.895. 
86
 In Gilchrist Transportation Co. v. Boston Insurance Co., 223 F. 716, 139 (C. C. A. 1915), the 
vessel had been fully loaded and then shifted to a place in Duluth harbor seven miles distant. 
An inspection of the vessel had not been carried out and the navigation season had not opened. 
It was held for these reasons that the voyage had not begun and the exclusion under the Harter 
Act was unavailable to the owner.  
87
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589, p.603. 
88
 See in Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589. 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the obligation to exercise due diligence 
continued over the whole of the period from the beginning of loading until the vessel sank. Also, 
in The Thorsa [1916] p.257, Phillimore LJ stated that: “the moment when seaworthiness is to be 
tested is the moment when the ship leaves the harbour,” p.263; See also McFadden v Blue Star 
Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697, “It takes effect at the time of sailing, and at the time of sailing alone,” 
p.704, per Channel J. 
89
 Tetley, W., and Cleven, B., ‘Prosecuting the Voyage, in Carriage of Goods by Water: A 
Symposium’ (1971) 45 Tul. Rev. 807, where it was stated that there is “little clear judicial 
authority for a definition of the commencement of the voyage,” p.807. 
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prudent to discuss the authorities to give an indication of the factors used by 
courts to determine the commencement of the voyage.  
 
2.7  Factors which Determine the Commencement of the Voyage - When 
Does the Obligation Come to an End? 
In discussing this matter, it is convenient to separate the authorities on 
operational and legal requirements. Tetley explains that the authorities consist 
of two schools of thought; operational and legal requirements.90 This does not 
mean that one, e.g. operational, could substitute the other in each single case.91 
However, I am of the opinion that both operational and legal requirements are 
(at least in most cases) together necessary and the voyage cannot commence if 
one of them is not fulfilled. One can imagine that it would be unrealistic for a 
voyage to commence if one type of requirement has not been fulfilled, i.e. legal 
requirements but not operational.    
2.7.1  Operational Requirements 
The practical requirements for the commencement of the voyage were 
explained in The S.S. Del Sud,92 where the majority93 held that “[t]he lines to the 
dock were fast [to the manoeuvring tug boats] not to keep her there, or to 
continue her stay at the wharf. They were there solely as an essential step in 
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 Tetley, W., and Cleven, B., ‘Prosecuting the Voyage, in Carriage of Goods by Water: A 
Symposium’ (1971) 45 Tul. Rev. 807, p.809.  
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 This can be understood from Tetley’s statement that: “Absence of potential control of shore 
personnel means that the vessel must be in all legal and practical respects ready to pursue the 
voyage,” Tetley, W. and Cleven, B., ‘Prosecuting the Voyage, in Carriage of Goods by Water: A 
Symposium’ (1971) 45 Tul. Rev. 807, p.809. This means that even if one of the requirements is 
fulfilled, the other must still be fulfilled before the voyage can commence. 
92
 Mississippi Shipping Co. v Zander & Co. (S.S. Del Sud) 270 F.2d 345, 1959 AMC 2143 (5 Cir. 
1959). 
93
 Mississippi Shipping Co. v Zander & Co. (S.S. Del Sud), 270 F.2d 345, 1959 AMC 2143 (5 Cir. 
1959), para.34, per Hutcheson, Circuit Judge. 
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her navigational manoeuvring. The ship’s engine was actively manoeuvring to 
accomplish the swing and officers and men were stationed for simultaneous 
undocking and departure. The ship was literally and figuratively in the sole 
command of the master on the bridge…” This quotation embraces two 
operational/practical requirements and/or preparations, which are important to 
be fulfilled in combination or separately depending on each case in order to 
determine whether the vessel is ready to commence her voyage. These are 
referred to below.  
2.7.1.1 The Physical Process of Casting the Vessel Off 
(Undocking) 
As part of a vessel’s physical fitness and complete readiness to commence her 
voyage, a number of operational requirements need to be pursued to decide on 
commencement of the voyage.  
a- Unmooring (undocking)  
The vessel is not considered to have commenced her voyage if she is still fast 
at a dock,94 jetty or mooring buoys or if her anchor is still touching the bottom of 
the sea. Once those lines or mooring ropes have been released from the jetty 
and tug boats are made fast, an operational requirement consisting of part of 
the voyage preparation process has been fulfilled. As a result, the voyage would 
be considered as commenced provided that all other preparation requirements 
                                               
94
 See 2.7.1.1, at p.106. The Physical Process of Casting the Vessel Off (Undocking), sub-para. 
‘b- breaking ground and manoeuvrability’, which explains that the court in The Del Sud decided 
that the vessel had commenced her voyage despite the fact that her lines were still connected 
to the jetty for the purpose of pivoting the vessel. In that case, the lines of the ship were 
connected to the shore during manoeuvring in order to assist the vessel to swing quickly (with 
the assistance of the tug) in a small turning radius.   
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have been fulfilled.95 The test for the physical process of casting off is whether 
all lines of the vessel (again, not those lines which assist the vessel to 
manoeuvre and turn around) are taken on board. For instance, in The 
Willowpool96 the vessel departed from a loading jetty in order to moor at a buoy 
in the harbour when another vessel collided with her. Later, she left the mooring 
point with the damage caused by the collision. The court held that when the 
collision occurred the vessel was moored to the buoy, thus, the voyage had not 
commenced until the time the vessel had taken her lines on board and left her 
buoys; accordingly, the vessel was held to be unseaworthy. The consequence 
of the finding in this case is twofold. The first is that the vessel had not 
commenced her voyage when she shifted from the loading dock to the buoy for 
further loading or customs clearance. 97  The second, is that as the 
carrier/shipowner had still not fulfilled all the obligations required to provide a 
seaworthy vessel before the beginning of the voyage and as the master had 
ignored the damage to his vessel prior to the commencement of the voyage, the 
carrier/shipowner had failed to exercise due diligence. As a result, the carrier 
could not use the exclusions under Article IV, r.2. 
b- Breaking Ground and Manoeuvrability  
In order for the voyage to be regarded as commenced, the vessel must be said 
to ‘break ground’, be able to ‘manoeuvre’ and ‘swing around with her own power 
and/or by the assistance of the tug boats’.98 If a vessel’s movement is restricted, 
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 See further below for the rest of the discussed points.  
96
 The Willowpool 12 F. Supp. 96, 1935 A.M.C. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), affirmed, 86 F.2d 1002 (2 
Cir. 1936). 
97
 The court in The Willowpool decided that “a voyage commences only when the vessel breaks 
ground or leaves her moorings in complete readiness for sailing and proceeding to sea.” The 
Willowpool 12 F. Supp at 100, 1935 AMC at 1928. 
98
 See Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 2008), p.879. The S.S. Del Sud 270 
F.2d 345, 1959 AMC 2143 (5 Cir. 1959). 
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i.e. due to draft restrictions,99 or if she cannot swing around or is unable to 
manoeuvre while she is at the port of loading, the vessel is considered not to 
have ‘broken ground’ and thus cannot commence her voyage even if she has 
cast-off her mooring ropes. In The Del Sud,100 the vessel struck the jetty while 
she was being swung around with the assistance of a tug and her lines ashore. 
Despite the impact resulting in damage to her side hull and water rushing into 
the cargo hold and damaging the cargo, the master failed to inspect the hull and 
sailed. The question of whether this was an error in navigation and 
management or failure to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy 
led to another question of whether or not the vessel had commenced her 
voyage at the time of the incident. The majority of the court ruled that the 
voyage had commenced at the time of impact. Their decision was in conformity 
with the observation of Storey J that “the voyage commences when the ships 
breaks ground for the purpose of departure…”101 The court explained the good 
seamanship pre-departure preparation to break ground and manoeuver. The 
vessel could not break ground and manoeuver “until the ship had no further 
purpose at the dock. She was made ready for sea. She was being turned 
around for the purpose of leaving…The ship’s engines were actively 
manoeuvring to accomplish the swing and officers and men were stationed for 
simultaneous undocking and departure … what we decide is consisting with 
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 Vessels in confined water, i.e. the Suez Canal, are restricted to navigate at certain times with 
certain orders in a convoy. The master has no control in the manoeuvre of his vessel 
whatsoever.  
100
 The S.S. Del Sud 270 F.2d 345, 1959 AMC 2143 (5 Cir. 1959). 
101
 The S.S. Del Sud 270 F.2d 345, 1959 AMC 2143, at 2148, quoting The Brutus, 4 F. Cas. 490, 
“The general rule of our law, like that of the civil law … is that the voyage commences, when the 
ship breaks ground for the purpose of departure; and the parties have here expressly fixed it to 
the time of sailing,” at p.495 (No. 2060) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). 
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ancient observation of judge Story that ‘…the voyage commences, when the 
ship breaks ground for the purpose of departure…’”102  
One might argue that the ruling in The Del Sud contradicts the ruling in The 
Willowpool.103 In the former, the court regarded the voyage as commenced 
despite her lines still being ashore while in the latter case the court held that the 
voyage had not commenced as the vessel was still moored to a buoy. In The 
Del Sud, during the swinging of the vessel and while fastening the vessel to a 
tug to assist her undocking she had commenced her voyage. Having two lines 
during undocking still at the jetty is part of good seamanship practice to swing 
the vessel around quickly with the assistance of the tug and is very likely to 
happen when the vessel’s manoeuvring room is confined by shallow water or a 
narrow jetty. Swinging the vessel around is not possible unless some of the 
lines are fastened ashore. If there is no need to carry out this type of 
manoeuvre, there would be no need to have the lines ashore.104 Accordingly, 
the conclusion of the trial judge that “when the damage occurred to the Del Sud 
[she] had not left her moorings at Santos in complete readiness for sailing and 
proceeding to sea once her stern line and spring line and breast line were still 
made fast to the mooring facilities of the dock at Santos”105 shows that the 
practical matter of undocking the vessel was not considered and that due 
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 The S.S. Del Sud 270 F.2d 345, 1959 AMC 2143 (5 Cir. 1959). 
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 The Willowpool 12 F. Supp. 96, 1935 A.M.C. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), affirmed, 86 F.2d 1002 
(2 Cir. 1936). 
104
 Zander & Co v Mississippi Shipping Co. (The S.S. Del Sud), 171 F. Supp. 184, 192, 1959 
AMC 653, 661 (E.D. La.) reversed, 270 F.2d 345 (5 Cir.), vacated, 361 U.S. 115 (1959). The 
court held that “The lines to the dock were fast not to keep her there, or to continue her stay at 
the wharf. They were there solely as an essential step in her navigational manoeuvring. They 
were no less vital than the hawser to the straining tug off the starboard quarter.” 
105
 Zander & Co v Mississippi Shipping Co. (The S.S. Del Sud), 171 F. Supp. 184, 192, 1959 
AMC 653, 661 (E.D. La.) reversed, 270 F.2d 345 (5 Cir.), vacated, 361 U.S. 115 (1959). 
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diligence had not been exercised to provide a seaworthy vessel.106 The Del Sud 
was distinguished by the majority from the previous decision of The Willowpool. 
Tetley provides a good summary of the basis on which the cases were 
distinguished: “the Del Sud was proceeding to sea while the Willowpool was 
merely shifting”,107 as the latter was prevented by the harbour authority to leave 
the port at night. Thus, the master did not have control over his vessel and 
remained under the control of the port authority. 
 
2.7.1.2 The Command or Control of the Vessel 
The vessel must be under the sole command of her master in order to be able 
to commence her voyage. It will not be enough that the vessel is ready in all 
other respects to commence her voyage should she not be under the complete 
control and command of her master and crew.108 In other words, if the vessel is, 
for instance, restricted by the instructions of the port state control and of the 
pilot, she will not be ready to navigate and get underway solely on the 
command of her master, despite maybe being partially under the command of 
the master. 109  The control of navigational matters, i.e. control by the port 
authority, will restrict, in effect, the master from being in command or control of 
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 Zander & Co v Mississippi Shipping Co. (The S.S. Del Sud), 270 F.2d 345, 349, 1959 AMC 
2143, 2147 (5 Cir.), vacated, 361 U.S. 115 (1959). The majority opined that the view of the trial 
court in deciding that the voyage had not commenced was highly artificial.   
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 Tetley, W., and Cleven, B., ‘Prosecuting the Voyage’, 45 Tul. L. Rev. (1970-1971). 807, 
p.808. 
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 Before the vessel’s lines are untied from the moorings, or the anchor leaves the bottom or 
under the command of the pilot, the carrier or jetty personnel still have potential authority over 
the vessel. See Hakan, K., The Carrier’s Liability Under International Maritime Conventions - 
The Hague, Hague-Visby Rules, and Hamburg Rules, (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), p.106. 
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 The trial judge (Hutcheson) in The S.S. Del Sud suggested that the vessel had not 
commenced her voyage as she was still under the control of the port authority and any negligent 
acts would still constitute an unseaworthiness event. See The S.S Del Sud, 270 F.2d at 355, 
1959 AMC pp.2156-2157. The majority concluded that: “The ship was literally and figuratively in 
the sole command of the master on the bridge.” The S.S. Del Sud, 171 F. Supp. 184, 192, 1959 
AMC 653, 661 (E.D. La.) reversed, 270 F.2d 345 (5 Cir.), vacated, 361 U.S. 115 (1959). 
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his vessel. Similarly, the voyage has not started if the ship has not sailed but 
instead is merely drifting off the loading jetty. If the master has returned to land 
to get the papers signed and completed, in such a case the voyage has not yet 
started owing to, inter alia, the vessel not yet being under the control of her 
master.110 
However, some ports impose restrictions on vessels as to the decision of when 
the sailing of the vessel takes place; it is not determined by the fact that the 
vessel has cast off from the loading jetty. This is true, even if all the 
requirements of exercising due diligence have been fulfilled; i.e. adequate in 
bunker, tackles and crew. For example, by a regulation of the port, vessels may 
not be permitted to go out to sea after darkness but merely to cast off the 
loading jetty and anchor within the port limit. The physical process of casting off 
would not be considered to be the beginning of the sailing/voyage nor would it 
give the master the full control to sail to the open sea. This gives the port 
authority some control over the vessel so that she is not under the full control of 
her master to commence the voyage. In an insurance policy case, Sea 
Insurance Co. v Blogg,111 the vessel left the loading jetty fit to encounter the 
perils of the sea with all means. However, due to a regulation that restricted the 
vessel from sailing at night, the master’s motive was to move the vessel away 
from the jetty to prevent the crew from going ashore and getting drunk. So, he 
took the vessel to anchor within the port limit with the intention of commencing 
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 See below, Hudson, Hudson and Forster v Bilton (1856) 6 E. & B. 565. 
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 Sea Insurance Co. v Blogg [1898] 2 Q. B. 398. This case must be contrasted with Price v 
Livingstone (1882) 9 QBD 679, where the vessel had cast off, in order to drop her anchor 
outside the ‘commercial limit’ of the port, with no intention to return. The Court of Appeal held 
that on the grounds that the vessel had dropped anchor outside the commercial port limit and 
had no intention to go back to the loading port, she must be taken to have finally sailed for the 
purpose of commencing her voyage from the loading port, affirming the decision of the lower 
court by Lopes J. 
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the voyage the following day. The vessel on the following day weighed anchor 
and proceeded to sea. She was subsequently lost in the course of her voyage. 
This raised the question of whether the loss was covered by a policy of 
insurance. Having regard to the terms of the policy, the question depended on 
whether the vessel had commenced sailing. The Court of Appeal held that the 
vessel did not commence her voyage until the following day after leaving the 
anchorage position and thus the insurance policy attached on that day rather 
than the day she left her jetty. This case suggests that even if the vessel has 
fulfilled all the requirements of seaworthiness and sailed from the loading jetty, 
as long as there is some control by the port authority over the vessel, the 
master does not have full control over the vessel, and therefore, the voyage 
must not be regarded as commenced. This is “[because] it must be a sailing 
which is a commencement of the voyage”112 equal to the situation “when she 
[the vessel] leaves the wharf without being ready for the voyage by reason of 
not having all her crew on-board or some other reasons, that may be evidence 
that she did not then commence her voyage.”113 
Applying this approach to a carriage of goods case, if a vessel collides or 
touches the sea bottom and water rushes in damaging the cargo, the carrier will 
be liable for failure to exercise due diligence for not making the vessel 
seaworthy and he cannot exclude liability by relying on the navigation and 
management exclusion. This is because at the time of shifting the vessel from 
the jetty to the anchorage, the vessel was still under the restriction of port 
regulations; not under the control of her master. Therefore, the voyage should 
not be considered as commenced. 
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2.7.2 Legal Requirements114 
Apart from her physical readiness, a vessel must be also legally able and ready 
to commence her voyage. A vessel may be ready from a physical perspective, 
namely she is under the control of her master and her lines have been or are 
about to be taken on-board, yet she may still not be fit or ready to pursue the 
voyage due to a legal impediment. For example, this may be the case when the 
vessel is unable to sail without firstly being granted port clearance, customs 
clearance,115 a certificate of health,116 a hatch sealing certificate,117 a certificate 
of fitness to proceed to sea,118 a shipper’s (cargo) declaration as required under 
the IMO BC Code,119 or indeed any permission of a similar type.       
The voyage does not commence until all legal requirements have been fulfilled. 
Furthermore, the carrier shall remain under the obligation to continuously 
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel if the vessel is detained 
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 Regulation 15 of the Merchant Shipping (Safe Manning, Hours of Work and Watchkeeping) 
Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/1320) provides that an authorised person may inspect any non UK-
flagged ship in UK waters. If he finds a seaman on-board a vessel who is not holding an 
appropriate certificate or if the master is unable to provide adequately rested persons for the 
first watch at the commencement of the voyage and for subsequent relieving watches, the 
vessel may be detained. 
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 Section 6 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 provides that a customs officer must not grant a 
clearance or transire for any ship until the master has declared to him the name of the nation to 
which he claims the ship belongs, i.e. the Flag State. Also, failure to carry valid statutory 
documentations, i.e. SOPEP, will cause difficulties in port clearance. See MacLachlan, M., The 
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 ed., 2004), p.271. 
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 Regulation 8 of the Public Health (Ships) Regulations 1979 (SI 1979/1435) gives power to a 
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 When carrying hazardous solid bulk cargo, e.g. coal, there are certain requirements that 
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(SF), actual sulphur content etc. In order to obtain the requisite information, samples of the 
cargo will need to be taken to the laboratory for testing, which might result in a delay as regards 
granting of the relevant certificates. 
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owing to a failure of the carrier to exercise due diligence in some other respect. 
For example, if a vessel is detained 120  due to a failure to comply with 
documentation relating to manning or proper crew certification, or a failure by 
the master to provide evidence of adequately rested crew for the first watch at 
the commencement of a voyage and for the subsequent relieving watches. The 
vessel will be set free only if the carrier/shipowner exercises due diligence by 
taking remedial action in respect of the above failures.  
In Thompson v Gillespy, 121  a contract of carriage (charterparty) was made 
between the plaintiff owner and the defendant charterer. The vessel was lost 
after casting off three miles from the loading jetty, while she was waiting for 
clearance papers from customs, bills of lading to be signed and preparation of 
the shrouds and cables for sailing. The defendant pleaded that the owner had 
sent the vessel to sea in an unseaworthy state. Given that the departure papers 
of the vessel had not been completed, the court held that the vessel had not 
sailed but merely gone into the roads awaiting the ship’s papers.     
It was said, regarding the importance of papers in determining the 
commencement of the voyage, that “the completeness of the [the clearing of the 
ship’s] papers is one of the most common tests of the commencement of 
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 If an authorised person finds one of the following deficiencies: a failure of any seaman, 
required to hold an appropriate certificate, to have a valid appropriate certificate or a valid 
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sailing.”122 This was said in Hudson v Bilton,123 where, after the vessel had cast 
off from port and was drifting waiting for custom-papers clearance, she struck 
ground and sustained damage, and was then put into a different port for repairs. 
Despite the fact that the vessel’s fitness was not discussed in relation to the 
awaited papers, the court came to the conclusion that, as long as the paper had 
not been received, the vessel was not to have commenced her sailing. Tetley 
has rightly indicated that as long as the vessel is under the control of the port 
authority, i.e. waiting for customs clearance, then the vessel is not in a legal 
respect ready to pursue the voyage.124   
 
Carver argues125 that the ‘beginning of the voyage’ is not a point in time but is 
instead a period of time encompassing the process of entering a new action. 
This notion arguably implies a voyage by stages. For example, the stage from 
laying at the port to the river stage, which is between the port of loading and the 
open sea, would be part of the beginning of voyage and thus part of the time in 
which the carrier/shipowner is obliged to exercise due diligence. The 
consequence of such an interpretation is the creation of the problem that the 
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 Hudson, Hudson and Foster v Belton (1856) 6 E. & B. 565, p.569, per Ellis. It was held that, 
even though the vessel had cast anchor, because the vessel’s papers had not been completed, 
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 Colinvaux, R., Carver: Carriage by Sea, (Steven & Sons, 13
th
 ed., 1982,), p.359-360. Cf. The 
President Monroe [1972] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 385, at p.386 (US District Court). 
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notion of doctrine of stages (as explained above) is applied even though it is not 
applicable under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.126 
Furthermore, it is not persuasive to say that the ‘the beginning of the voyage’ is 
determined by a period of time; i.e. the duration of the cast-off process127 when 
she “had no further purpose at the dock or port” so the vessel could be put to 
sea. Then, the voyage is no longer beginning but the vessel is underway. The 
commencement of sailing must be determined on the satisfaction of the 
condition of sailing of the vessel; namely, if she starts from her port of loading 
ready for sea and intending there and then to commence the voyage. This 
principle is explained by Parker B. in Roelandts v Harrison, 128  stating that 
“according to several cases on the insurance law, the sailing is determined to 
be that period of time when the vessel breaks ground, being at that time fully fit 
for sea, having the cargo on-board which she intends to carry, with a competent 
crew, and having permission to leave by having the Custom House clearance 
on-board.”129 However, the process of casting-off for the purpose of vacating 
the dock when, at the same time, there are potential outstanding operations,130 
which may restrict the vessel from completing her legal or contractual 
obligations, such as shifting to another dock or to the anchor or even still 
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 The doctrine of stages may no longer apply under Article III, r.1. The Makedonia [1962] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 316, 329-330. See, Cooke, J., Voyage Charters, (3
rd 
 ed.), 2007), at para.85.104. 
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preparing her engine and/or not even being under her master’s command,131 
should not be understood as the ending of the ‘beginning of the voyage’ and 
certainly not until such time as the completion of the process and the fulfilment 
of all the requirements.132 
In addition to that which has been previously explained with regard to the 
exercise of due diligence in respect of cargoworthiness preparation (e.g. 
trimming and securing of cargo), there may be other operational measures and 
requirements that have to be fulfilled that may directly or indirectly impact on the 
end of the termination of the obligation of the carrier in exercising due diligence 
to make the vessel seaworthy.133 In other words, the vessel needs to be fully 
under the control of her master and crew and ‘[a]bsence of potential control of 
shore personnel means that the vessel must be in all legal and practical 
respects ready to pursue the voyage.’134 Such “practical and legal requirements 
constitute the fitness of the vessel to render her able to proceed with the 
voyage.”135 Therefore, the voyage should not be considered to have begun 
when one of the requirements/preparations are incomplete and, consequently, 
she might not be considered to have completed her due diligence obligations. 
This can be understood from the language of Channel J in the McFadden v 
Blue Star Line,136 stating that, “There is, of course, no warranty at the time the 
goods are put on-board that the ship is then ready to start on her voyage; for 
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while she is still loading [and until she fulfils all her obligations connected with 
seaworthiness] there may be many things requiring to be done before she is 
ready to sail.”137  Especially if those things, arising prior to sailing such as 
trimming, stowage and lashing as long as they affect the seaworthiness of the 
vessel, are likely to be considered as matters connected in time to the period 
before or at the beginning of the voyage.138 
Finally, Clarke argues139 that the criterion by which the dividing line between the 
period in which the carrier is liable for negligence in matters of navigation and 
management of the vessel by virtue of Article III, r.1 and the period of the 
voyage in which he is not liable for negligence in such matters by virtue of 
Article IV, r.2(a) is to be the time that marks the end of the ‘beginning of the 
voyage’. This is true, however, his view that “once the vessel casts off, the 
carrier/shipowner will have no control over the action of his master and crew” 
does not justify that this period in time marks the end of the ‘beginning of the 
voyage’. His view might have been relevant in historical times prior to the latest 
technological and management developments in the shipping industry. In light 
of current technological advancements, including modern communications 
technology and the introduction of risk management techniques through the 
adoption of the ISM Code,140 vessels today are able to stay in contact with their 
owners through the Designated Person Ashore (DPA). The carrier/shipowner 
can engage in the day-to-day operation of the vessel by contacting the crew on 
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 Ibid. 
138
 See Exercise Shipping Co. Ltd v Bay Maritime Lines Ltd (The Fantasy) [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
235. A stowage (non-seaworthy) case; however, the court gave an indication that some matters, 
if they affect the vessel’s seaworthiness, are probably matters arising before or at the beginning 
of the voyage. See also Cooke, J., Voyage Charters, (3
rd
 ed., 2007), para. 85.104. 
139
 See Clarke, M., Aspects of The Hague Rules: A comparative study in English and French 
Law, (Martinus Nijhoff-The Hague, 1976), pp.234-235. 
140
 See Alexander von Ziegler, ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, (2009) 44, Texas Int. L. 
J., 329-348, p.338. 
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board his vessel at any time via the DPA for matters or decisions, which may 
affect the seaworthiness of the vessel. The application of such technology can 
be seen in the following example. Survey certificates are important for the 
operation of the ship, i.e. without them, the vessel may not be allowed to enter 
the discharge port.141 Due to the time limit for the vessel’s stay at the port of 
loading, certificates may be issued some time after the vessel has been 
surveyed. Therefore, vessels may leave dry-dock without certificates, knowing 
that those certificates, due to advanced technology, will be faxed or emailed to 
the ship prior to entering the port of discharge.  
 
In conclusion, from a contractual point of view, the duty to exercise due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel imposes on the carrier/shipowner a 
continuous alertness at the loading port until the vessel has fulfilled all the 
practical and legal requirements to commence her voyage ‘at the beginning of 
the voyage’.142 This may make the situation more complicated as the carrier’s/ 
shipowner’s attention for the purposes of the due diligence obligation is not 
restricted merely to the preparation and completion of the loading (legal and 
operational/practical) but also extends further. For instance, repairing a defect 
                                               
141
 Certificates, such as a class certificate, are required by SOLAS and are very important for 
the trading of ships. However, they are not certificates of seaworthiness but may be used as 
proof of seaworthiness. See Mandaraka-Sheppard, A. “In the absence of valid certificates or 
documents, or if there are clear for believing that the condition of a ship or of its equipment or its 
crew does not substantially meet the requirements of a relevant instrument, a more detailed 
inspection should be carried out.” Cartner, A. et al., International Law of the Shipmaster (2009), 
at para C 7.1, “Once a notice of arrival is sent by the master to the United States’ authorities, 
information on the vessel and its past behaviors and the persons aboard is evaluated and 
entered into a decisional formula purported to assess risk to the United States from the vessel in 
safety, environment and security,” at para. E7.1.  
142
 See Greenwood, E. C. V. ‘Problems of negligence in loading, stowage, custody, care, and 
delivery of cargo; errors in management and navigation; due diligence to make seaworthy, ’ 45 
Tul. L. Rev. (1970-1971), 790, at p.805. The same view was discussed in Tetley, W., and 
Cleven, B., ‘Prosecuting the Voyage’, 45 Tul. L. Rev. (1970-1971). 807, p.809. 
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before the commencement of the voyage even if it had emerged just before the 
beginning of the voyage. 
In light of the above-suggested indicating factors regarding whether the voyage 
is commenced and the obligation is terminated, one might rightly suggest that 
the common law would still influence the interpretation of the termination of the 
obligation. Authorities on the commencement of the voyage do not specifically 
limit the meaning of the ‘beginning’ to a particular point in time, such as the 
raising of the anchor or the time when the vessel sails from the loading port. In 
deciding whether the voyage is commenced, a court should consider the 
fulfilment of the last requirement (whether legal or operational) where it is said 
to be ‘the beginning of the voyage’.  
 
2.9  Conclusion 
The obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel should 
be carried out ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’. The carrier is only 
liable for unseaworthiness that relates to this period of time. The carrier could 
be responsible for unseaworthiness caused from not having exercised due 
diligence during an extensive period before the voyage or contract starts. 
However, the obligation terminates at the beginning of the voyage. Under the 
current law, this creates problems. There is no single definition that can be used 
as a benchmark to determine the commencement of the voyage. However, if all 
the authorities regarded above are taken into consideration, as at least a matter 
of practice than law, one can suggest that the operational and legal 
requirements must be fulfilled to decide on the starting of the voyage and thus 
the termination of the obligation of seaworthiness. Regardless of whether 
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navigational error exception should be removed, and whether the exercise of 
due diligence should continue, the line that should determine the 
commencement of the voyage should be the test of whether the carrier has 
fulfilled all his obligations to provide a seaworthy vessel, reflected by his 
exercise of due diligence and the master should have full control and command 
of his vessel. This would reflect the full readiness of the vessel to pursue the 
voyage, having fulfilled all of her legal and operational requirements.  
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Part II: The Obligation under the Rotterdam Rules143 
 
 
2.10 The Relevant Provisions in the Rotterdam Rules 
Since the adoption of the Hague and the Hague-Visby Rules and particularly 
during recent decades, there have been a number of legal and technological 
changes. First, trends and developments in the shipping industry concerning 
safety, quality, environmental or manning standards have all led to the adoption 
of new, or amended and strengthened, regulations and codes, such as SOLAS, 
MARPOL, STCW 95 and similar. Secondly, revolutions in marine and transport 
technology and modern communications have undoubtedly affected all sectors 
of the shipping industry, being either liner shipping through containerisation or 
tramp vessels and various specialised vessels, such as tankers. This has 
brought about changes to trade patterns, speeds, fitness requirements, cargo 
handling requirements and turnaround times at port. In this respect, much 
criticism has been voiced by the industry arguing that the existing legal 
framework is not attuned to the practical and commercial demands of our 
modern era.  
Through its working groups, UNCITRAL has established a new set of provisions 
in order to update and modernise the legal regime that currently governs the 
carriage of goods by sea; the Rotterdam Rules. Despite potentially differing 
implications as regards the provisions of the rules in various jurisdictions, the 
provisions contained in these Rules certainly have an impact on the carrier’s 
obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. Countries 
                                               
143
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that are likely to enjoy greater changes are those that will directly replace the 
regime of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules with the new regime of the Rotterdam 
Rules.144 
This Chapter will only address direct changes, whereas the following chapters 
will deal with indirect changes.   
Article 14 provides as follows: 
The carrier is bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by 
sea to exercise due diligence to: 
(a) Make and keep the ship seaworthy; 
(b) Properly crew, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so crewed, 
equipped and supplied throughout the voyage; and 
(c) Make and keep the holds and all other parts of the ship in which the goods 
are carried, and any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which 
the goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation. 
As previously explained, under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier is 
bound to exercise due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel only ‘before 
and at the beginning of the voyage’. 145  Although the rule does not identify 
exactly when the obligation commences and ceases, it has been interpreted to 
cover, “the period from at least the beginning of the loading until the vessel 
starts in her voyage.”146 The Rotterdam Rules, however, impose the additional 
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 See Sturley, M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.8. 
145
 Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
146
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589, p.603. 
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and more onerous obligation on the carrier to exercise due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy before and throughout the entire voyage.147 
 
2.11 The Language of Article 14 
Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules uses the same familiar language used in the 
corresponding provision of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.148 There has been a 
common understanding and consensus in the shipping industry for the 
language to be kept the same.149 However, non-substantive changes to the 
language have been used to describe the three elements of seaworthiness. For 
instance, while Article III, r.1(b) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules inclusively 
provides for the carrier’s duty to ‘man … the ship’, Article 14(b) of the Rotterdam 
Rules uses gender-neutral language to include the carrier’s duty to ‘crew … the 
ship’,150 which is effectively the same. However, words, such as ‘keep’ and 
‘container’151 appearing in Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules are likely to change 
the obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel compared 
to the obligation under the current regime. Changes are generally explained 
under paragraph 2.14 and its subsequent subparagraphs.  
Since Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules is based on Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, case law relating to the latter will assist in 
determining the extent of the due diligence obligation to provide a seaworthy 
vessel under the new regime. 
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 Because the carrier is now “…bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by 
sea to exercise due diligence to: (a) Make and keep the ship seaworthy…’ (emphasis added). 
148
 See Berlingieri, F., ‘Carrier’s Obligations and Liabilities’ (Part II - The Work of the CMI, 2008), 
an electronic resource available online: www.cmi2008athens.gr/sub3.5.pdf. 
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th
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session (Vienna, 6-17 October 2003), UN doc. No. A/CN.9/544 (2003), para.148. 
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 Container seaworthiness is discussed in detail in Chapter Six. 
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2.12 The Standard and Timing of the Obligation 
As with the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the seaworthiness obligation is not 
absolute; the carrier need only ‘exercise due diligence’ to provide a seaworthy 
vessel. This obligation must be exercised before and at the beginning of the 
voyage. Post-sailing, the carrier is under an obligation to exercise due care, in 
relation to the cargo, pursuant to Article III, r.2. The language of Article 14 of the 
Rotterdam Rules confirms that the obligation is not absolute and that the 
carrier’s due diligence obligation should be exercised before and at the 
beginning of the voyage, and continue to be exercised post-sailing.   
 
2.13 The End of the Obligation 
Article 14 does not define when the period during which the obligation must be 
exercised comes to an end. One approach is that the duty comes to an end 
when the voyage by sea is completed. However, when the voyage by sea 
comes to an end is also unclear and the Rotterdam Rules do not define this. 
This might give rise to different interpretations in respect of the term ‘voyage by 
sea’, which in turn determines the end of the obligation. One interpretation could 
be that the voyage is coming to an end when the vessel enters the limits of the 
discharge port. Another interpretation, however, might be that the voyage is 
regarded to have come to an end when the discharge of cargo has been 
completed. 152  Nikaki 153  concludes that the term ‘voyage by sea’ must be 
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 See the same concern as expressed by Berlingieri F., ‘Basis of Liability and Exclusions of 
Liability’ [2002] LMCLQ 336, p.339; Baatz, Y. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical 
Annotation (Informa, 2009), para.14.02. 
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 Nikaki, T., ‘The obligations of carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care’ cited as 
Chapter 4 in Thomas, R. (ed.), A new convention for the carriage of goods by sea - The 
Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), at p.107. 
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interpreted to include the discharge of cargo from the vessel. Supportive of such 
a conclusion, there is no reason for distinguishing between the loading of the 
cargo, which falls within the scope of Article 14, and its discharge. Nonetheless, 
this conclusion is not completely sound. The loading operation is by implication 
included in the exercise of due diligence because, by definition or necessity, it is 
performed at the stage ‘before’ the beginning of the voyage. It would be difficult 
to embrace the discharging operation within Article 14. It is obvious that the duty 
to discharge is being added to the ‘care of cargo’ Articles under both regimes.154 
Consequently, moving such operations to the seaworthiness obligation under 
Article 14 is unnecessary.155 The draftsmen have maintained a similar wording, 
i.e. ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’, but have added the words ‘and 
during’ as regards the voyage. Therefore, an inference could be drawn that the 
obligation terminates with the arrival of the ship at its destination and does not 
continue until the completion of the discharge.156 
Pursuant to paragraph (c) of Article 14, the obligation concerning the 
cargoworthiness will be fulfilled at the time of the “reception, carriage and 
preservation of the cargo”.157 Due to the multimodal scope of the Rotterdam 
Rules, i.e. door-to-door, the discharge operation of containerised goods, for 
example, might take place at a time and in a location beyond the carrier’s 
control.158 As a result, where a carrier supplies a container, his obligation to 
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 Article 13 of the Rotterdam Rules and Article III, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
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 The Rotterdam Rules acknowledge certain practices where the parties can agree on who is 
in charge of performing the loading, handling, stowing or unloading of the goods, i.e. the shipper 
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 Berlingieri, F., ‘Basis of liability and exclusions of liability’ [2002] LMCLQ 336, p.339. 
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 Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules. 
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 One might argue that the discharge of a container from the vessel is the time that the 
obligation comes to an end. This notion is true only when the container is not supplied by the 
carrier, as in this case, the container is regarded as ‘goods’. The discharge of a container from 
the vessel is considered as the discharge of the contractual cargo. On the contrary, if the 
container is supplied by the carrier, then the discharge of the container, pursuant to Article 1(26), 
126 
 
provide a cargoworthy container will be indirectly extended to the land leg of the 
journey.159 Such an interpretation would exceed the scope of Article 14, which 
imposes an obligation for the period before, at and during the ‘sea voyage’. The 
extension of the obligation to be exercised throughout the voyage removes the 
problem of identifying the point at which the voyage commences, which would 
otherwise bring the obligation to an end. However, the problem has shifted to 
the port of discharge, as one now needs to identify the point at which the sea 
voyage ends. The solutions,160 referred to above and adopted by courts to solve 
such problems under the current law, do not practically apply to the problem of 
determining the port of discharge under the Rotterdam Rules. A suggestion for 
avoiding the uncertainty of when the obligation ends is that the parties could 
contractually agree on this point. In practice, if not as a matter of law, the 
moment at which the termination of the due diligence obligation could be agreed 
upon in the contract. As the Rotterdam Rules acknowledge, some practices161 
are based on the parties contractually agreeing that cargo-interests (shipper or 
consignee)162 should be in charge of performing the loading, handling, stowing 
or unloading operations. The carrier, in such a case, is completely relieved of 
                                                                                                                                          
is not considered as discharge of cargo for this purpose, as this would be contrary to the 
definition provided by the Rotterdam Rules. See the introduction regarding the supply of the 
container at para. 5.1.1, at p.330  
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 As per the words of Lord Esher MR, the discharge operation might take place beyond the 
point of the ship’s rail. For example, around the area of port, warehouse or beyond. He stated 
that the shipowner: “has performed the principal part of his obligation when he has put the 
goods over the rail of his ship; but I think he must do something more - he must put the goods in 
such a position that the consignee can take delivery of them,” in Petersen v Freebody & Co. 
[1895] 2 Q.B. 294, p.297. 
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 See para. 2.7, at p. 104 for the indicated factors which determine the commencement of the 
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 I.e. Free In, Out Stowed (FIOS). See the UN Committee on International Trade Law 
[UNCITRAL], Working Group III on Transport Law, Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) 
on the Work of its 21
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 Session, para. 46, UN Doc. A/CN.9/645 (Jan. 14-25, 2008).  
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 The Rotterdam Rules, Article 13(2). 
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being involved with the discharge operation.163 The carrier, hence, is relieved of 
exercising his due diligence obligation under Article 14 should the end of the 
seaworthiness obligation be decided by the court to also be the end of the 
discharge operation.    
Finally, as mentioned above, on some occasions, the starting of the voyage (or 
sailing with the intention to commence the voyage) is ascertained by finding out 
whether the vessel has left the commercial limits of the loading port.164 Thus, it 
could be argued, by analogy, that the voyage comes to an end once the vessel 
has entered the ‘commercial limits’ of the port of discharge.  
 
2.14 Differences between Exercising Due Diligence Before and 
During the Voyage 
We have examined above the requirements of the obligation to exercise due 
diligence for the period ‘before and at the commencement of the voyage’ and 
the courts’ considerations in this respect. Insofar as the due diligence obligation 
‘during’ the voyage is concerned, it might be presumed that the period of the 
carrying voyage is another factor for the court to consider when assessing the 
required standard of due diligence by the carrier, in addition to those factors that 
relate to the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence before and at the 
beginning of the voyage. In other words, in determining whether reasonable 
measures of due diligence were pursued by the carrier in question, regard must 
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 To the extent that a similar agreement is actually agreed and expressed in the contract of 
carriage and not only indicated by way of negligence clauses introduced in the bills of lading. 
See von Ziegler, A., ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, (2009) 44 Texas Int. Law J., 329-
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p.173), as well as the advance freight payable upon sailing (see Price v Livingstone (1882) 9 
QBD. 678). This was an important matter to decide whether the vessel had commenced sailing.  
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be given to the location of the vessel, whether the unseaworthiness occurred in 
the port or at sea, and what application of care a diligent carrier, commonly 
referred to as the ‘prudent owner’, would exercise when rendering the vessel 
seaworthy. 165  However, the actions required and the application of due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel are arguably different when the vessel 
is navigating at sea from those when she is at port.166 The Working Group of the 
Rotterdam Rules did not consider to what extent the exercise of due diligence 
‘during’ the voyage would differ from the exercise of due diligence ‘before and at 
the beginning of the voyage’.167   
It is convenient to consider the duty to exercise due diligence to ‘keep’ the 
vessel seaworthy separately to the same duty during the voyage.   
 
2.14.1 The Effect of the Extension of the Obligation and the 
Application of the Duty to ‘make’ the Vessel Seaworthy 
‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’ 
The on-going obligation might have a bearing on the steps which a diligent 
carrier should take before his vessel commences its voyage. For instance, the 
history and records of the particular vessel may indicate that her machinery had 
frequently broken down during the preceding voyages.168 This might place an 
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 Mankabady, S., ‘Comments on the Hamburg Rules’ cited as Chapter 2 of Mankabaky, S., 
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(Blais, 4
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extra burden on the carrier before the commencement of the voyage to 
reasonably equip his vessel with the tools and spare parts necessary for the 
repair of such breakdowns should it occur during the sea passage. He may also 
need to take reasonable steps to avoid potential unseaworthiness during the 
voyage in relation to defects that would be impossible to repair due to a lack of 
experts and access to tools.169 Morris LJ, in The Muncaster Castle, said “[w]hen 
it is being considered whether due diligence to make a ship seaworthy has been 
exercised, it may be helpful to ascertain the history and the record of the ship 
and then proceed to consider (inter alia) whether there have been such steps 
and such procedures as a prudent and careful carrier would take and follow.”170 
Therefore, the obligation imposed on the carrier to exercise due diligence to 
provide a seaworthy vessel for the entire duration of the voyage will, most likely, 
increase the activities of the carrier whilst the vessel is in the port, in order for 
him to demonstrate that he has exercised due diligence.171 The increase of 
activities may affect the way the carrier has to plan his voyage bearing in mind 
the on-going obligation. For example, if the vessel requires spare parts 
necessary for repair or maintenance that might affect her seaworthiness and 
such spare parts are not available at the loading port, in order to discharge his 
obligation, the carrier must diligently make a plan at the loading port to arrange 
to call at the nearest port where such spare parts can be supplied. This principle 
is analogous to the requirement of the supply of bunkers before and at the 
beginning of the voyage. If the carrier, for any reason, cannot obtain bunkers at 
the port of loading, he is obliged to make proper arrangements to bunker his 
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 For a detailed discussion, see para. 2.16.4, at p. 158. 
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 Riverstone Meat Co. v Lancashire Shipping Co. (The Muncaster Castle) [1961] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 553, at p.561, per Morris L.J. 
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 Clarke, M., Apsects of the Hague Rules: A comparative study in English and French Law, 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.229. 
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vessel at another port or various ports along the planned route. For example, in 
The Makedonia,172 “… the obligation on the shipowner was to exercise due 
diligence before and at the beginning of sailing from the loading port to have the 
vessel adequately bunkered for the first stage to San Pedro and to arrange for 
adequate bunkers of a proper kind at San Pedro.”173 On the other hand, “the 
standard of care depends upon prudent practice in each case”.174 Thus, the on-
going duty, as extended beyond the commencement of the voyage, might 
impose extra activities for the fulfilment of the due diligence obligation, such as 
fitting extra equipment,175 supplying the vessel with a more experienced crew,176 
pursuing extra tests,177 or supplying the vessel with extra spare parts178 (lack of 
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 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316. 
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Shipping (Marine Equipment) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/1957) to implement Council Directive 
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which may necessitate the interruption of the voyage and the vessel calling at a 
repair port). Under the new regime, the court might consider the carrier’s failure 
to supply the vessel with extra spare parts (i.e. additional parts to those required 
to satisfy the obligation prior to sailing), as a failure to exercise due diligence, 
which renders the vessel unseaworthy if the carrier relies on the fact that the 
vessel could probably call at a repair port in case of a failure. In general, an 
inference can be drawn that the more likely a risk of unseaworthiness causing 
loss, the more the court would expect the carrier to exercise due diligence by 
taking preventative action before and at the beginning of the voyage,179 with 
regard at least to defects repairable only at port and defects that would need 
special expertise and spare parts which are not available on board during the 
voyage.180 On the other hand, given that the court allows the carrier to arrange 
for an intermediate port of call for bunkering purposes, one might argue that the 
on-going obligation would, by analogy, allow the carrier the flexibility of delaying 
the exercise of due diligence because this obligation has now been extended to 
include the period after the commencement of the voyage.  
                                                                                                                                          
96/98/EC on Marine Equipment (‘the Marine Equipment Directive’), (as amended by 
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after suing the carrier for his general average contribution. 
179
 The Assunzione [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 468, p.487, per Willmer J. Activities to safeguard the 
vessel and cargo from heavy seas. 
180
 This could be described as a relative notion, whereas in other situations, it would be easier to 
spot a defect at sea. For instance, the operation of the main engine. This type of situation has, 
though relative, an obvious impact on the extension of the seaworthiness obligation under the 
Rotterdam Rules. 
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It should be borne in mind that the extended obligation does not give the carrier 
the choice to postpone the exercise of due diligence or to exercise it sometime 
after the period ‘before and at the commencement of the voyage’. For instance, 
the carrier is not given, through the temporal extension of the duty, the luxury to 
postpone, until after the commencement of the voyage, activities to the vessel 
such as the supply of chart corrections or surveying works or activities relating 
to the preparation of cargo holds181 or securing the cargo.182 These are known to 
be customarily part of the obligations 183  to be complied with before the 
commencement of the voyage. The extension of the obligation merely means 
that the due diligence obligation that relates to the period before and at the 
commencement of the voyage will remain so (albeit with increased activities) 
and, in addition, will extend all relevant due diligence activities for the period 
after the commencement of, and for the entire, voyage. In the example given 
above relating to charts, the carrier might be required by the extended 
obligation imposed by the Rotterdam Rules to equip his vessel, before the 
beginning of the voyage, with the latest electronic chart technology and 
correction procedures that will provide the vessel with instant chart corrections 
even when the vessel is at sea.184 From another perspective, the workload on 
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 Tattersall v The National Steamship Co. Ltd, (1883-84) LR 12 Q.B.D. 297. Cheikh Boutros 
Selim El-Khoury and Others v Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd (The Madeleine) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
224. The Tres Flores [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 247. Mediterranean Freight Services Ltd v BP Oil 
International Ltd (The Fiona) [1994] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 506. 
182
 Jindal Iron and Steel Co. Ltd and Others v Islamic Solidarity Shipping Co. Jordan Inc. (The 
Jordan II) [2005] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 57. Renton (G.H.) & Co. v Palmyra Trading Corporation (The 
Caspiana) (H.L.) [1956] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 379; [1957] A.C. 149. 
183
 Gilroy, Sons & Co. v Price & Co. [1893] A.C. 56. Lord Herschell L.C., p.63. Hogarth v Walker 
[1899] 2 Q.B. 401. 
184
 See Nicholas, A., ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions; care and seaworthiness’ 
cited as Chapter 6 of Thomas, R. (ed.), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam 
Rules, (Lloyd’s List, 2010), para.6.14; See Eun Sup Lee, ‘The Changing Liability System of Sea 
Carrier and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules’, (2002) 15 
Translational Law, 241-255, “The extension of the obligation of seaworthiness provides a 
compromise between the historical considerations that ocean-going carriers have been afforded 
due to the high risks involved and the amount that those risks have been mitigated by 
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the ship’s officers caused by the extension of the obligation en route, which 
places the carrier under a constant obligation in terms of keeping the charts 
updated,185 may cause an increase in the carrier’s due diligence activities at the 
outset of the voyage.186 These increased activities may take the form of training 
the crew and familiarising them with the electronic chart corrections before the 
vessel commences her voyage.187 
On the contrary, if the unseaworthiness could be cured during the voyage 
without causing delay or damage to the vessel and/or the cargo, the carrier 
might be held to have discharged his obligation. This is true if it can be shown 
that in practice it is not necessary to carry out the relevant exercise of due 
diligence at the time before and at the beginning of the voyage. In Moore v 
Lunn,188 the vessel left the loading port with a cargo of wooden logs carried on 
deck and the crew had not secured the logs before leaving the berth, as the 
vessel had to sail for a period downriver before getting out to the open sea. Mr 
Justice Bailhache ruled that the vessel was not unseaworthy when she 
commenced her river leg but the vessel would be rendered unseaworthy on 
                                                                                                                                          
improvements in ocean technology, education and communications.”, at p.243; See Eun Sup 
Lee, ‘The Changing Liability System of Sea Carrier and Maritime Insurance: Focusing on the 
Enforcement of the Hamburg Rules’, (2002) 15 Translational Law, 241-255, p.247. 247.  
185
 The current practice, as explained in Grand Champion Tankers Ltd v Norpipe A/s and Others 
(The Marion) [1984] A.C. 563 (H.L.), p. 578, per Lord Diplock, is to “ensure that all charts and 
navigational publications are regularly corrected in accordance with the information contained in 
the Weekly Admiralty Notices to Mariners [which are received at the port of call].” However, the 
Rotterdam Rules, if adopted, might change such practices, so as to enforce the carrier to adopt 
the system of electronic chart corrections before it becomes compulsory. As a result, such a 
system will be required in order to allow the carrier to exercise due diligence in keeping up to 
date charts and publications even during the voyage. It will no longer be necessary to wait for 
the charts to be updated at the next port of call where the update is usually received.  
186
 See Spencer, C., ‘Keep careful watch’, Maritime Risk International, (11
th
 Nov. 2011). 
Spencer stated that: “The technology has to be implemented in a planned and structured way 
and there are considerable risks if it is not fully understood and not introduced systematically. 
Things must not be rushed, which means that training should begin well before the legal 
commencement date and allow officers to become familiar and confident with the equipment.” 
187
 This might be an argument against the above explained point that the Rotterdam Rules have 
solved the problem of when the voyage begins on which the obligation ends.  
188
 Moore and Another v Lunn and Others (1923) 15 Ll. L. Rep. 155. Hedley (Pauper) v The 
Pinkney & Sons Steamship Company Limited [1894] A.C. 222. 
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starting the ocean leg. It is also possible that a shipping practice, if reasonable, 
might influence a court when deciding on the issue of exercising due diligence. 
For example, in The Al Taha,189 a time-chartered vessel on her voyage from 
Portsmouth to Izmir diverted from her course to take bunkers and refit one of 
her cargo booms at Boston. She ran aground in the course of leaving the berth 
at Boston. The owners claimed for a general average contribution from the 
cargo-owner who contended that the vessel was not seaworthy at the 
commencement of the voyage and the deviation to refit the boom was 
unreasonable. Mr Justice Phillips190 held that  
“the boom was not necessary to render the vessel seaworthy at the 
commencement of the voyage. It was reasonable to plan to deviate to 
collect the boom en route rather than to wait for the weather conditions to 
permit delivery at Portsmouth. This mode of performance was, in my 
judgment, within the liberty afforded by Article IV r.4.” 
The court, in deciding whether the carrier had discharged his duty to exercise 
due diligence before and at the commencement of the voyage, bearing in mind 
the on-going obligation, will take into consideration the behaviour of a prudent 
carrier, in accordance with shipping practice at the time of the incident. This is 
so only if such practice is not unreasonable; does not cause unreasonable 
delay to the vessel; or, is not necessary for the loading port or voyage 
operations but merely necessary for the discharging port operations.191 
 
                                               
189
 Lyric Shipping Inc. v Intermetals Ltd. and Another (The Al Taha) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 117, 
per Phillips J.  
190
 Lyric Shipping Inc. v Intermetals Ltd and Another (The Al Taha) [1990] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 117, 
per Phillips J, p.128. 
191
 The Kamsar Voyager [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. 
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2.14.2 The Effect of the Duty to ‘keep’ the Vessel Seaworthy After 
the Commencement of, and During, the Voyage on the 
Required Activity and Standard of Due Diligence - Differences 
in the Due Diligence Obligation Between ‘before’ and ‘during’ 
the Voyage 
Although the duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel for 
the period of the sea passage is, in one way, similar to the present obligation 
relating to the period ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’, it nevertheless 
varies in a significant practical way. 192  The obligation of due diligence is 
arguably different when the vessel is at the port from when she is at sea. For 
instance, if there is a defect in the holds, it is obvious that repairs must be made 
when the vessel is at port, otherwise the carrier will be held to be in breach of 
the obligation of due diligence. At sea, however, whether a due diligence action 
is required of a reasonable carrier193 will depend upon several factors194: (i) the 
nature of the defect; (ii) the possibility of causing damage to the cargo; and, (iii) 
access to the necessary facility to remedy the defect. Factors on the basis of 
which cases were decided195 will be referred to in the discussion below. 
 
2.14.2.1 The Nature of the Defect 
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 Sturley, M. F. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly and Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.85. 
193
 Northen Shipping Co. v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH and Others (The Kapitan Sakharov) 
[2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, p.266, per Auld J. 
194
 Diamond, A., ‘The Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) LMCLQ 445, p.470; See von Ziegler, A., ‘The 
Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, (2009) 44 Texas Int. L.J., 329-348, p.338. See also 
Delebecque, P., ‘Obligations of the Carrier’ cited as Chapter 4 in von Ziegler, A. et al. (eds.), 
The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), p.88; See also 
von Ziegler, A., ‘The Liability of the Contracting Carrier’, (2009) 22 Texas I.L.J., p.329; 
Berlingieri, F., ‘Basis of Liability and exclusions of Liability’, (2002) LMLCQ 336, p.339. 
195
 Those factors relevant to the obligation of due diligence before the commencement of the 
voyage will be referred to here. 
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The seriousness of the consequences resulting from a particular kind of defect 
will have an impact on the standard of the action and the amount of care 
required to be taken. Clearly, a defect such as rust on the vessel’s bridge can 
be treated more lightly than rust in the cargo hold. In The Amstelslot, Lord 
Devlin196 concluded, as regards a defect of the engine gear, that “[what] has to 
be balanced is in the one scale the extreme unlikelihood of there being any 
crack to be found and in the other scale the serious damage and loss that would 
occur if there was a crack.” 
It might be true that the consequence of a defect on a vessel, her machinery or 
a container that leads to unseaworthiness, is the same in many cases, i.e. the 
vessel will be deemed unseaworthy, and thus reflects the same basic standard 
of care. In other cases, however, depending on the type and length of the 
contract of carriage, the nature of the cargo, the type of the vessel, etc., there 
may be a greater impact.197   
 
2.14.2.2 The Possibility of Causing Damage to the Cargo 
Inspections are made regularly and pursuant to the shipping industry’s 
standards and practices. Certain visual inspections may be adequate to 
                                               
196
 Union of India v N.V. Reederij Amsterdam [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223, at p.235. 
197
 A defect might result in the carrier being liable for damage and/or termination of the contract. 
The Court of Appeal in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 Q. 
B. 26 (CA), has classified the obligation of seaworthiness as an ‘innominate term’. The criterion 
adopted when determining the right to terminate a contract of carriage for unseaworthiness. 
However, the consequence of the unseaworthiness before loading the cargo might have a 
lesser effect on the carrier than the consequence of unseaworthiness when the cargo is on-
board and suffers damage. For example, The Madeleine did not carry a deratting certificate 
which was required by port state control and for that reason the port authority refused The 
Madeleine to enter in order to discharge her cargo. The vessel had arranged to be delivered to 
the charterer by May 10
th
 but the certificate of deratting would not be granted until May 12
th
. The 
charterer refused the charter because the vessel was not delivered ready prior to the 
cancellation date. The court held that the carrier failed to deliver the vessel in a seaworthy 
condition by the delivery date. Cheikh Boutros Selim El-Khoury v Ceylon Shipping Lines (The 
Madeleine) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 224  
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discharge the due diligence obligation. Porter J observed that “I cannot myself 
believe that in every case it is obligatory upon a ship’s officer on the 
commencement of a voyage to go and tap every rivet to find if it has a defect or 
not”.198 However, if normal regular routine inspections and examinations indicate 
or raise the carrier’s suspicion that something would be likely to make the 
vessel unseaworthy, then a further examination is required. For example, it was 
agreed in The Amstelslot199 that if a survey of engine machineries indicates that 
there is more corrosion or pitting than normal, then a further advanced method 
of testing, e.g. magnaflux testing, is necessary to discharge the obligation of 
due diligence.200 Similarly, the history and/or the class records of a vessel, 
which may indicate a possibility of failure, will ascertain the required action(s) 
that a diligent carrier should take.201  Events increasing the likelihood of an 
incident taking place, such as adverse weather202 or a preceding collision,203 
might be regarded as matters increasing the amount of the required due 
diligence actions. The more likely that a danger will be encountered during the 
                                               
198
 Brown v Nitrate Producers S.S. Co. (1937) 58 Ll. L. R. 188, p.191; Carnfield Bros. v Tatem 
S.N. Co. (1939) 64 Ll. L. R. 264, p.270; M.D.C Ltd. v N.V. Zeevaart Maatschappij “Beursstraat” 
[1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 180. 
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 Union of India v NV Reederij Amsterdam (The Amstelslot) [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223. The 
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The owner argued that an examination should have been carried out to reveal the defect. 
However, the test that had been performed by the surveyor was adequate to discharge the duty 
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 Courts may not always require extra precaution to detect, for example, a crack. A balance 
has to be made between the seriousness of the damage and the likelihood of the crack 
occurrence. Lord Devlin in Union of India v NV Reederij Amsterdam (The Amstelslot) [1963] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 223, p.235. 
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 See Clarke, M., Aspects of The Hague Rules: A comparative study in English and French 
Law, (Martinus Nijhoff-The Hague, 1976), p.227. 
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 The Bunga Seroja [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512, p.527, per McHugh J, “If the ship is expected 
to sail through an area of sea which is renowned for its severe weather, appropriate precautions 
must be taken to ensure that the ship is fit to undertake that voyage both in respect of the ship 
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during the voyage as for the ongoing obligation under the Rotterdam Rules] to make the ship 
seaworthy in the light of the anticipated weather conditions.” 
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 The Assunzione [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 487, p.487, per Willmer J. A vessel after a casualty 
must receive extra caution such as superintendence. 
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voyage, the more care that is expected from the carrier in order to forestall it.204 
However, the standard of due diligence under the current law will, arguably, be 
different to that under the Rotterdam Rules. In The Australia Star, 205  the 
defective rivets and butts in the fuel oil tanks at the commencement of the 
voyage resulted in a leakage when the vessel was exposed to the stresses of 
the high seas. The vessel was thus unseaworthy. Nonetheless, the shipowner 
was discharged from liability because due diligence in inspecting a defect is 
judged in light of the shipbuilding and shipping industry standards and 
knowledge at the time in question.206 The case implies that, under the new 
regime, the obligation to carry out extra examinations for a defect that might 
cause damage is extended to the entire voyage. In other words, if the defect 
was not apparent and the extra examination was not required before the 
commencement of the voyage, it would then be required during the voyage, 
provided that such a diligent examination is feasible during the voyage. To 
summarise, what was good enough before and at the beginning of the voyage 
may well be inadequate if experience has shown that during the voyage or at an 
intermediate port, the vessel needs further examination. During the voyage, 
when the vessel changes places and perhaps type of operations, the 
associated risk factors207 also change. This is why under the new regime, the 
ongoing due diligence obligation becomes important. A defect that is not 
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 The Assunzione [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 487. 
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 The Australia Star (1940) 67 Ll. L. Rep. 110. 
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 See para. 4.5.2, at p.312 on shipping standards where it is noted that the shipping industry 
regulation that relates to seaworthiness, though not adequate, has become more advanced and 
demanding. 
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 Perils of the sea are different to the perils of a port or river. See Great China Metal Industries 
Co. Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (The Bunga Seroja) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
512, p.517, per Gaudron, Gummow and Hayan JJ, stating that the vessel’s due diligence 
standard in providing a seaworthy vessel is to be assessed according to the voyage under 
consideration. See e.g., The Gudermes [1991] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 456, pp.472-474; [1993] 1 Lloyd's 
Rep. 311, p.324, where the vessel was unseaworthy due to a lack of capacity to heat the 
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discoverable in the port but is discoverable at sea triggers the due diligence 
obligation of the carrier afresh, once the defect was discovered or ought to have 
been discovered. 
 
2.14.2.3 What is Required in the Circumstances Depends Upon Access to 
the Necessary Repair Facility 
Repairability through the use of spare parts either on board the vessel or 
remotely available and reasonably obtainable at the nearest supply station or 
port, or access to a repair facility,208 is one of the factors that should be taken 
into account when deciding upon the amount of the required activity that is 
adequate to discharge the due diligence obligation. It must be borne in mind 
that the maintenance, inspection and repair at sea is limited by the availability of 
spare parts and equipment as well as the ability of the crew. If a defect, 
repairable with the use of limited resources on board, manifested during the 
voyage and was not repaired, the carrier is most likely to be held as not having 
exercised due diligence in relation to the particular defect. On this point, 
Berlingieri stated that “[t]he degree of diligence that is “due” must be determined 
on the basis of the circumstances. During the voyage, only the master and the 
crew are available to correct any unseaworthiness that arises during the 
voyage”.209 However, if the case required the vessel to obtain spare parts or 
expert technicians, the required action(s) for the discharge of the due diligence 
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 Document A/CN.9/510 - Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its 
ninth session April 2002, p.15 taken from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V02/541/ 
91/PDF/V0254191.pdf?OpenElement on 21 Nov 2011. The Working Group III stated: “However, 
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effect that, for example, the duty of the carrier would be different depending on whether the 
vessel was at sea or in port.” 
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 Report of the Fifth Meeting of the International Sub-Committee on Issue of Transport Law, 
(London 16 - 18 July 2001), Yearbook 2001, p.296. 
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obligation is to call at the nearest supply station or port,210 provided that the 
ensuing delay would be reasonable. In other words, if loss, damage or delay is 
avoidable by exercising due diligence whilst at sea, then the carrier would be 
liable if he did not exercise it. In the pre-Hague/Hague-Visby Rules case of 
Worms v Storey,211 the vessel was chartered for a voyage with a cargo of coal. 
She was seaworthy at the beginning of the voyage but damage occurred during 
the voyage, which could have been repaired during the voyage. The repair was 
not effectual and part of the cargo was lost. The court held that the carrier was 
liable in damages to the cargo-claimant. The court’s proposition as regards the 
required activity and the need to exercise reasonable care during the voyage, 
which, for all material purposes is equated to the exercise of due diligence, was 
the following “Suppose, [during the voyage] a leak had sprung in the side of the 
vessel in such a position, that by lightening it the leak would be above water, if 
the master had an opportunity of repairing the leak, he would not be justified in 
throwing the cargo overboard”.212 
The above three considerations suggest that the standard of due diligence 
during the voyage is the same standard of due diligence before the beginning of 
the voyage; its application depends on the differences between the two 
periods.213 This may raise the question as to whether or not a defect which 
manifests after the beginning of the voyage but which is not repairable during 
the voyage would result in a less favourable finding for the carrier under the 
Rotterdam Rules as compared to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. It is highly 
                                               
210
 Due to the availability of new communication equipment, the master can arrange for spare 
parts or a repairer from the nearest port of call. 
211
 Worms v Storey [1855] 11 EX. 427. 
212
 Worms v Storey [1855] 11 EX. 427, at pp.428-429, per Pollock B. 
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 See Sturley, M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.85. 
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likely that the same test applied by the English courts in deciding a vessel’s 
seaworthiness would be used to decide whether the carrier has exercised due 
diligence. Possibly, the test to be applied for the on-going due diligence 
obligation under the Rotterdam Rules would be “… would a prudent shipowner, 
if he had known of the defect, have continued the voyage without affecting any 
possible repairs?”214 In order to decide whether, in this context, the carrier has 
discharged his obligation, the court will examine the conduct of the prudent 
carrier in relation to the surrounding circumstances of each case. How should 
the carrier behave in keeping the vessel seaworthy? In other words, if a defect 
were to manifest during the voyage, how should due diligence be exercised?       
 
2.15 Practical Implications of the Extension of the Due Diligence 
Obligation to Keep the Vessel Seaworthy  
It is always possible for a vessel, whilst en route to her destination, to suffer a 
mechanical failure or a problem with her equipment, even if the requisite due 
diligence is exercised before or at the commencement of her voyage. Where 
the actual safety of the vessel, and consequently, that of the cargo, is 
endangered, it is the master’s duty, if possible, to save the vessel by removing 
the cause of danger.215 The officers and crew on board may be able to repair 
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 The test was first introduced by Carver on Carriage of Goods, (18
th
 ed.). The test was then 
applied to many cases, e.g. McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697, at 703; M.D.C. Ltd v 
NV Zeevaart Maatschappij [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 180. The test is “Would a prudent owner have 
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Nicholas, A., ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seaworthiness’ cited as 
Chapter 6 of Thomas, R., The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules (Lloyd’s 
List, 2010), para. 6.14. 
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 See the Common Law examples below at pp.143-144. 
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the vessel, provided that the required spare parts216 are available on board.217 
However, it may not be possible for the crew to repair the vessel and render her 
seaworthy until she reaches a port of repair. It is important here to remind 
oneself that the obligation of seaworthiness is not a strict one. What is required 
of the carrier is to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.218 In 
other words, the carrier is not under an obligation to provide a vessel fitted with 
sound working machinery that never breaks. It is also important to remember 
that, in this respect, the vessel must be equipped with an adequate number of 
spare parts to support her everyday operations and to rectify any possible 
defects that occur, as a lack of such tools and equipment would render her 
unseaworthy.219 
The form of action to be taken by the carrier in the fulfilment of the extended 
obligation of due diligence, which, by necessity, will involve instructions to, and 
action by, the vessel’s master and crew when the vessel is at sea, depends on 
the circumstances of each case. This is a completely new area and the matter, 
therefore, will be left entirely for the courts to decide whether, on a case-by-
case basis, the reaction by the crew and the carrier to a defect encountered 
during the voyage was adequate to discharge the carrier’s due diligence 
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 Spares and repair equipment must be provided for life-saving appliances, for their 
components and for other equipment and machineries which are subject to excessive wear or 
consumption and which need to be replaced regularly (Regulation 84(4) OSR; no equivalent 
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obligation in keeping the vessel seaworthy. However, it is pertinent and 
convenient at this juncture to examine some hypothetical scenarios and see the 
potential differing conclusions or interpretations that courts may arrive at in 
dealing with the issue as to whether or not, under the assumed scenario, due 
diligence was adequately exercised by the carrier. Our inquiry will deal with four 
potential scenarios which involve (a) a defect repairable at sea; (b) a repairable 
defect which causes unreasonable delay; (c) a defect repairable only 
temporarily; and, (d) a defect repairable only if the vessel is at port. It goes 
without saying that the assumption in each of these cases is that the defect was 
not discoverable by the exercise of due diligence before and at the 
commencement of the voyage. 
 
2.16 Practical Aspects of Remedying Unseaworthiness after the 
Commencement of the Voyage 
2.16.1 First Scenario: A Repairable Defect  
A repairable defect, such as leakage, that manifested during the voyage was 
detected in one of the cargo holds. If the master had instructed the crew to try 
their best to remedy the defect and, as soon as reasonably practicable, the 
defect had been remedied, then the carrier would most probably be held to 
have discharged his obligation to exercise due diligence to keep the vessel 
seaworthy without unreasonable delay or expense to the various interests 
involved.220 This is clear in the words of Scrutton LJ221 who stated that “[a]s I 
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 The contract of carriage may contain an express term imposing on the owner the duty to 
maintain the vessel in a seaworthy condition. Also, the obligation under maintenance clauses is 
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carrier is still required to execute any repairs which may be necessary to maintain her in a 
seaworthy state; see Golden Fleece Maritime Inc and Another v ST Shipping and Transport Inc. 
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understand the authorities, a ship is not unseaworthy where the defect is such 
that … remedied on the spot and in a short time by materials available”.222 
However, whether the defect is repairable or not, there might be some further 
actions for the crew to take in this respect which, if not taken, might lead to an 
inference of lack of due diligence. The crew and the carrier are under a duty to 
use skill and diligence to mitigate the consequences of such a defect,223 e.g. 
keeping the cargo holds free of water by pumping water out. In other words, if a 
defect or water leakage through a fractured pipe becomes apparent, the crew, 
along with the repair of the defect, should exercise due diligence to minimise 
the consequences of such unseaworthiness. 224  In order to prevent water 
damaging other cargo, it follows that if a defect manifests itself during the 
voyage, the crew and the carrier must exercise due diligence to preserve the 
undamaged cargo as well as to repair the defect, i.e. to take proper action to 
avert or minimise the loss. This is clear in the words of Pollock who stated that 
“suppose the cargo was slightly damaged by salt water, but by reasonable care 
might be preserved; the master would not be justified in taking no care of it”.225 
 
                                                                                                                                          
(The Elli and The Frixos) [2008] EWCA Civ 584. Also, see the cases prior to the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules, Svendsen v Wallace Bros (1885) 10 App. Cas. 404, at pp.417-418; 5 Asp MLC 
453, p.457 (HL), per Lord Blackburn, approving Rosetto v Gurney (1851) 11 CB 176 and 
Shipton v Thornton (1838) 9 Ad & El 314; Hill v Wilson (1879) 4 CPD 329, p.333, 4 Asp MLC 
198, p.200, per Lindley J; Moss v Smith (1850) 9 CB 94, p.106, per Cresswell J; Philpott v 
Swann (1861) 11 CBNS 270; Benson v Chapman (1849) 2 HL Cas 696, p.720, per Alderson B; 
The Rona (1884) 5 Asp MLC 259. Most of these cases were insurance cases. In contrast, the 
view has been expressed that the shipowner is not bound to execute any repairs at all, Atwood 
v Sellar & Co. (1879) 4 QBD 342, p.358, 4 Asp MLC 153, pp.157-158, per Cockburn CJ; cf 
Worms v Storey (1855) 11 Exch 427, pp.429-430, per Parker, but this is inconsistent with the 
cases cited above. See also Wilson v Bank of Victoria (1867) LR 2 QB 203, pp.211-212, per 
Blackburn J.  
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2.16.2 Second Scenario: A Repairable Defect which Causes 
Unreasonable Delay  
This scenario may be most relevant to the carriage of perishable cargoes, e.g. 
banana fruits. For instance, a leakage in a cargo hold manifests itself during the 
voyage at sea but the master and his crew, following an assessment, have 
determined that the repair of the defect cannot be repaired unless, for example, 
the vessel’s engines were stopped, which would cause unreasonable delay and 
probably more damage to the perishable cargo should the vessel arrive late at 
the port of discharge. The master decides, following consultation with his 
managers, not to repair it at sea, as the defect would only cause slight damage 
to the cargo in that particular hold, whereas repairing the defect at sea would 
cause delay and thus cause damage to the entire cargo. Declining to repair the 
defect at sea would most probably not be held as a lack of due diligence to 
restore the vessel’s seaworthiness (in other words, to keep the vessel 
seaworthy during the voyage). In this case, one might rightly argue that, on the 
basis that both obligations of due diligence and of care of cargo continue for the 
entire voyage, whether the failure to protect the cargo would be considered as a 
failure to exercise due diligence or a failure to care of cargo. The question of 
why a court might need to distinguish Articles 13 & 14 immediately follows. 
 
Act of the Carrier on Voyage: Exercising Due Diligence or Care of Cargo 
Under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the obligation to exercise due diligence 
to make the vessel seaworthy is an overriding obligation and the carrier must 
comply with it if he wishes to invoke the management of the ship exclusion in 
Article IV, r.2(a). The carrier could not use the exception of fault in the 
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management of the ship if the fault occurred during the seaworthiness 
obligation period, namely, ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’. During 
this period, the act of management is regarded as an act of seaworthiness or 
unseaworthiness. If any action occurred that caused loss or damage, the 
carrier will be in breach of his obligation to exercise due diligence. Under the 
Rotterdam Rules, the duty to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy 
vessel before and at the beginning of the voyage is extended to cover the 
entire voyage. Any act relating to the management of the vessel that results 
in loss, damage or delay will be regarded as a breach of seaworthiness. 
Tetley has concluded that “in practice, deciding whether the carrier has 
properly and carefully kept, carried and cared for the goods within the 
meaning of art. 3(2) of the Rules cannot really be done in isolation, without 
also having regard to the carrier's due diligence obligation in respect of 
seaworthiness under art. 3(1)”.226 This interrelationship between the ongoing 
duties makes it necessary to distinguish between the action of the carrier as 
an exercise of due diligence or as an exercise of care over the cargo. 
  
The approach taken when deciding whether an action or omission is a failure to 
exercise due diligence or a failure to care for the cargo may differ in different 
jurisdictions. It should be noted that the ‘management of the ship’ defence is 
abolished under the Rotterdam Rules. However, one approach might be for the 
court to distinguish between error of management of the ship and failure to care 
for the cargo for the purpose of correctly classifying whether Article 14, as an 
obligation to exercise due diligence, or Article 13, as an obligation to take care 
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 Tetley, W., ‘Properly Carry, Keep and Care for Cargo - art. 3(2) of the Hague/Visby Rules’, 
cited in http://www.mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/maritime-admiralty/art3-2#N_88. 
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of the cargo, applies. This is a difficult task to pursue and it is suggested that 
courts must ascertain, on a complicated question of fact, what constitutes 
negligence as regards the management of the ship or negligence as regards 
the cargo. For instance, in The Touraine, a drainpipe in the seaman’s 
washhouse became blocked during the voyage. A seafarer, in attempting to 
unblock the drainpipe, negligently pushed an iron rod down it which, unknown to 
him or anyone else, caused a pipe that passed through a cargo space to 
fracture with the result that every time a seafarer took a bath, a quantity of 
waste water fell onto the cargo. Nonetheless, because the seaman’s negligence 
was directed purely towards the management and effective operation of the 
washhouse and not in any way directed at the care of the cargo, the court held 
that the owner could rely on the defence. If the Rotterdam Rules are applied to 
the facts, the carrier would be liable for failing to exercise due diligence as 
opposed to, in this case, the act of the seafarer which constituted a failure in the 
management of the ship, rather than in the care of the cargo. Under the current 
law, negligence relating to the management of the ship is excepted under 
Article IV, r.2(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. In contrast, under the new 
continued obligation of due diligence in Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules, 
similar negligence relevant to the management of the ship would now, under the 
Rotterdam Rules, equate to a failure to exercise due diligence and only 
negligence that relates to the cargo would equate to a failure to take care of the 
cargo under Article 13. In Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant 
Marine,227 the vessel became damaged on her voyage. Repairs were needed to 
enter the cargo hold where tin plates were stowed. This required the hatches to 
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be open and unprotected during a rainy day. The carrier could not rely on the 
management of the ship exception, as the cause of damage was the misuse of 
tarpaulins, which were used solely to protect the cargo. This case, if heard 
under the Rotterdam Rules, would result in a failure to care for the cargo, which 
is a failure to fulfil the obligation in Article 13. This case can be contrasted with 
International Packers London Ltd v Ocean Steam Ship Co Ltd,228 where the 
crew failed to use locking bars on the hatch covers during bad weather. As the 
bars were regarded as necessary for the protection of the ship, if Article 14 of 
the Rotterdam Rules had applied at the time, the crew’s failure would be 
regarded as a failure to keep the vessel seaworthy as part of the continuous 
exercise of due diligence. The failure of the crew in endangering the safety of 
the vessel did not prevent the carrier from using the exception under Art. IV, 
r.2(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The critical factor was that proper use 
of the locking bars was mandatory under the Load Line Conventions, which aim 
to maintain the safety of vessels at sea.229 Where instruments, such as the 
Load Lines Convention or SOLAS, that relate to the safety of the vessel and 
constitute part of the exercise of due diligence before and at the beginning of 
the voyage, are not adhered to under the current regime, the vessel would be 
rendered unseaworthy.230 If the Rotterdam Rules form part of the applicable law, 
under the continued obligation of due diligence, the vessel is likely to be 
regarded unseaworthy if matters that affect the safety of the vessel at sea fail to 
be observed. Such a failure would obviously be regarded as a failure to 
exercise due diligence. Greer LJ has provided a good test to identify the act 
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 ed.), 2009), at p.125. 
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the safety rules and regulations, e.g. SOLAS, on the seaworthiness of the vessel are discussed 
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leading to a breach of the seaworthiness obligation, which can now be used to 
distinguish such a breach from a breach of care of the cargo: 
“In my judgment, the reasonable interpretation to put on the [Hague] Rules is 
that there is a paramount duty imposed to safely carry and take care of the 
cargo, and that the performance of this duty is only excused if the damage to 
the cargo is the indirect result of an act, or neglect, which can be described as 
either (1) negligence in caring for the safety of the ship; (2) failure to take care 
to prevent damage to the ship, or some part of the ship; or (3) failure in the 
management of some operation connected with the movement or stability of the 
ship, or otherwise for ship’s purposes.”231     
The conclusion on this point is that acts, such as failing to observe safety rules 
and regulations, during the voyage which could make the ship unseaworthy or 
uncargoworthy can now fall within Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules. The 
following will demonstrate why, on some occasions, it is important to distinguish 
between a failure to adhere to either Article 13 or Article 14. 
 
- Transhipment and Selling of Cargo: An Exercise of Due Diligence or 
Care of the Cargo? 
Take for instance a defect that emerges during the voyage, which is likely to 
cause damage and which may constitute either a failure to exercise due 
diligence or a failure to care for the cargo. The test to ascertain whether the 
defect will constitute a failure in due diligence or a failure to care for the cargo is 
similar to that currently used under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, in deciding 
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whether a failure is a failure in the management of the ship or a failure in caring 
for the cargo. However, if another action were required, such as transhipment or 
the selling of the cargo at an intermediate port, that action would be equal to a 
failure to care for the cargo under Article 13.232 It is helpful to use a hypothetical 
situation to understand this point. Take, for example, a scenario where a defect 
emerges during the voyage. The defect may cause damage to the cargo and 
perhaps, if left unfixed, would endanger the safety of the vessel. In this example, 
the vessel is carrying two types of cargo; one perishable cargo and one non-
perishable cargo. 
The defect that emerged is one that can be repaired but it would cause 
unreasonable delay. The carrier, through his master, decides to carry out 
repairs but the delay causes the perishable cargo to become damaged. The 
decision to repair the defect will be considered as exercising due diligence to 
keep the vessel seaworthy because such a defect would have affected the 
safety of the vessel. However, the carrier might be under another obligation that 
is to tranship or sell the perishable cargo at the nearest port to prevent it from 
deteriorating.233 If the carrier does not sell or tranship the cargo, then this might 
constitute a failure to care for the cargo. In Lekas & Drivas v Basil Goulandris, a 
cargo of cheese was loaded on board the vessel, which was subsequently 
faced with an excepted peril (restraint of princes). The delay in the voyage 
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 International Packers London Ltd v Ocean Steam Ship Co. Ltd [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 218, at 
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caused the cheese to deteriorate. The Claimant attempted to prove that the 
damage to the cargo arose due to improper care of the cargo, arguing that the 
cheese should have been sold or refrigerated at an intermediate port where the 
vessel was delayed.234 It is possible that in this situation, the carrier may be 
obliged to land and sell cargo to prevent it from deteriorating.235 The obligation 
to tranship the cargo is different to the obligation to exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy. The necessity and the duration of repair would 
damage the perishable cargo if it has not been transhipped. If the repair is short 
and unlikely to damage the cargo, the carrier might choose between either 
transhipping the cargo or stowing it in a refrigerated warehouse or container 
port side until the repair is completed.236 However, if the cargo is damaged 
during the discharge and re-stowing of the cargo, as necessitated by the repairs, 
this would be equal to a failure to care for the cargo under Article 13 and not a 
failure to exercise due diligence in repairing the vessel. In The Oakhill,237 the 
ship was under a voyage charter and stranded very shortly after sailing due to 
an error in navigation. For the repair to take place, cargo had to be discharged 
at the port of repair. The discharge was carried out negligently as different 
grades of pig iron were mixed and damaged. The carrier was held liable. The 
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court concluded that the loss caused during discharge at the intermediate port 
was directly due to a lack of care of the cargo and not to an error in 
navigation.238 Applying the Rotterdam Rules to this case, the deletion of the 
error of navigation exclusion would render the carrier liable for damage, loss or 
delay caused by the failure to exercise due diligence during the voyage (Article 
14). However, the damage and the mixing of cargo at the port of repair would 
be a failure to care for the cargo under Article 13.   
 
- The Importance to Make the Distinction 
It is fundamental for the courts to distinguish the reason for the loss, i.e. 
whether it was caused by a failure to exercise due diligence or a failure to care 
for the cargo, for two reasons. First, the Rotterdam Rules allow a third party (a 
maritime performing party)239 to carry out or undertake to carry out any of the 
carrier’s responsibilities during the port-to-port leg of the transport operation. If 
the preconditions of Article 19.1 are met, the carrier and the maritime 
performing party will be, according to Article 20.1, jointly and severally liable up 
to the limit provided for in the Rotterdam Rules.240 Therefore, the level to which 
the sub-contracted carrier is at fault will assist the court in determining the 
extent to which they must contribute to the loss.  
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Second, Article 80.4241 illustrates that parties to volume242 contracts of carriage 
are allowed to agree upon greater or lesser obligations and liabilities than those 
required by Article 14(c) if the proviso in Article 80.2243 is fulfilled. This means 
that it is possible for the carrier to derogate from his duty to exercise due 
diligence to provide a cargoworthy vessel and container but not from other 
aspects of seaworthiness. 244  This may make it important for the court to 
distinguish between a breach of the exercise of due diligence and a breach of 
the obligation to care for the cargo. Accordingly, if the court decides not to 
determine which of the obligations is breached, liability might fall on the carrier 
even if the contract of carriage included an express agreement for the carrier to 
derogate from the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a 
cargoworthy vessel. The ruling of the court, as a result, would be odd and 
contradict the provisions of the contract. Further, it would impose an obligation 
contrary to what the parties agreed upon. 
Third, deciding on which obligation has been breached would determine the 
standard of proof of causation on the claimant. The text ‘probably caused’ in 
Article 17(5) intended to give a somewhat lower standard than the normal 
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causation standard in proving seaworthiness. 245  This might mean that the 
claimant bears a lesser burden when proving the causal link between loss and 
unseaworthiness, as compared to proving the causal link between loss and 
breach of the duty to care for the cargo. Thus, it might be easier for the claimant 
to prove a breach of the seaworthiness obligation instead of a failure to care for 
cargo.   
The carrier should choose between sacrificing the cargo by not rectifying the 
unseaworthiness and the damage to or loss of the cargo that will be incurred in 
the event that measures are taken to rectify the unseaworthiness. In the event 
of loss and a subsequent claim, a court will carry out the same balancing 
process, albeit ex post facto, and will take into account the seriousness of the 
consequences of the unseaworthiness. According to Broderick DJ “‘Due 
diligence’ requires a careful balance between inspection and repair 
proportionate to the danger (and the seriousness of the consequences of the 
unseaworthiness)”.246 Consequently, the balance that a carrier is required to 
strike is a fine one “because liability to delay would also be for its account if the 
fulfilment of the due diligence obligation causes delay”.247 It appears that, in a 
dilemma between the need for the carrier to answer rationally a question of pure 
economics (i.e. saving more cargo) and the need to restore, at least in theory, 
the vessel’s seaworthiness at sea and cause more damage, the former should 
prevail. Besides, apart from risk sharing and attribution of liability, commercial, 
monetary and practical efficiency as well as preservation of wealth are 
underlying reasons behind the very notion of seaworthiness. This is certainly 
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something to be taken into account in the subsequent general average 
adjustment. The situation might be different if the cargo carried on board a 
vessel belonged to a single cargo owner and a defect emerged during the 
voyage. If the carrier chooses to repair the vessel, which causes delay and in 
turn causes damage to perishable cargo owned by a single owner, the carrier 
would be liable for the damage of the entire cargo. The best option in this case 
would be for the carrier to sacrifice some of the cargo by not repairing the defect 
and to carry on with the voyage, perhaps with maximum possible speed to 
reach the discharge port as quickly as possible in order to reduce the amount of 
damage to cargo as a result of a defect in the cargo hold. The carrier pursuant 
to Article 16248 will be excused from the obligation to repair the defect and 
“sacrifice [a small amount of the] goods at sea when the sacrifice is reasonably 
made for the common safety or for the purpose of preserving … property 
[namely, the majority of the goods]”.249   
The fact that a carrier discovers in the course of the voyage that the vessel is 
unseaworthy does not necessarily mean that the voyage has to be terminated 
or that the vessel should be diverted to the nearest port in order to remedy the 
unseaworthiness. If the situation shows that the “cure is sometimes worse than 
the disease”, it will not be wise to effect such a repair. Hobhouse J250 in The 
Yamatogawa stated that “[d]ismantling any piece of gearing, particularly one as 
large as this and in an engine room as cramped as this one was, involves an 
element of risk which should not be undertaken unless there is some adequate 
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reason for doing so.” Similarly, if the defect causing the unseaworthiness was 
not serious, it would not be unreasonable for the shipowner to defer the repair 
until the next port of call. On the contrary, in the interest of commercial 
convenience and for the purpose of avoiding delays, this might be the chosen 
course of action. It follows that if the claimant cargo-interests are able to 
suggest something that the carrier should have done, the court should take into 
account how burdensome the carrying out of the suggested work would have 
been in terms of both the length of time required251 and the associated cost. For 
example, in The Australia Star, Bucknil J252 ruled that peeling off the insulation 
from the refrigerated walls prior to each voyage to check for and repair leaks 
was impracticable on the grounds of expense. So, if the deviation and repair 
would involve a higher cost, the carrier might not be liable for failing to exercise 
due diligence in deciding not to call at an intermediate port or a port of refuge. 
However, with regard to the costs associated with the restoration of the vessel’s 
seaworthiness, the approach of the courts in the application of a similar 
obligation under a term of a charterparty, that is the maintenance clause, seems 
to be different. In the recent case of The Elli and The Frixos,253 the court held 
that the maintenance clause of the relevant charterparty imposed on the 
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shipowner a continuing duty to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy without any financial limit.  
On the other hand, Article 14 would render the carrier liable for delay,254 not 
only for not taking reasonable steps in the exercise of due diligence to repair the 
defect in a timely manner and restore the vessel’s seaworthy condition but also 
for the time taken to discover the defect, when no reasonable or adequate effort 
was made to discover such a defect and as a result, damage or delay 
occurred.255 However, it should be noted that a vessel is not to be rendered 
unseaworthy for a defect that has no material effect on the vessel’s safety, her 
operational efficiency, or the safety, integrity or condition of her cargo or for a 
defect which is of no real commercial significance. For example, a defect which 
does not render the vessel unfit, even though the equipment in question does 
not comply with the requirements of the vessel’s charterparty256 or some other 
statutory or class requirement, but is harmful to the environment.  
                                     
2.16.3 Third Scenario: A Defect Temporarily Repairable 
This scenario, unlike the first one, relates to a defect that can be rectified by a 
temporary repair but will require further attention at a later stage. The example 
of leakage in one of the cargo holds that was detected during the voyage will be 
used again. In this case, if the defect could only be temporarily remedied due to 
a lack of time, manpower, spares or tools or in order to avoid unreasonable 
delay then, insofar as delivery of the cargo at the discharge port is concerned, it 
                                               
254
 See Diamond, A., ‘The Rotterdam Rules’ (2009) LMCLQ 455, p.470. 
255
 Cranfield Bros. Ltd v Tatem S.N. Co. Ltd (1939) 64 Ll. L. Rep. 264, p.267, per Hilbery J. The 
time that has elapsed from one inspection to another is an essential element in deciding 
whether the carrier has exercised due diligence or not.  
256
 See Coghlin, T. et al., Time Charters, (LLP, 6
th
 ed., 2000), para.38.8. 
158 
 
would suffice for the carrier to discharge his due diligence obligation by carrying 
out such temporary repairs. However, further attention would be required to 
carry out a permanent repair at the next port of call because, if during the 
carriage of any subsequent shipment under a new bill of lading the temporary 
repairs gave way and consequential damage was caused to the cargo, the 
carrier would be held liable on account of his failure to exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy before or at the commencement of the voyage.257 
 
2.16.4 Fourth Scenario: A Defect Unrepairable at Sea 
This scenario envisages a failure that cannot be rectified at sea. For example, a 
defect with the autopilot system that cannot be fixed during an ocean passage 
with the resources on-board the vessel. The defect may not be repairable at sea 
for a number of ‘innocent’ reasons, including the work might demand a highly 
skilled specialist technician or spare parts that might be required are 
unavailable258 or are not those required by the vessel’s class or administration 
to be on-board.259 
In such circumstances, the way for the carrier to discharge the continuing due 
diligence obligation is (a) to refrain from using the autopilot, if, of course, this is 
                                               
257
 The court in The Merchant Patriot (2000) transcript of the US District Court of Georgia, 17 
February, pointed out the critical acts of the owners, inter alia. There was a failure to make a 
permanent repair to the patched aft pipe after more than three years and intervening dry-
docking. This demonstrated, the court said, either an ineffective follow-up system, or a 
conscious decision to leave the pipe in place, which established a case of failure to exercise 
due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 
258
 The spare parts required should not be listed as spare parts available on-board. Otherwise, 
their absence would constitute unseaworthiness due to inadequate supplies or a shortage of 
supplies. For example, see Guinomar of Conakry v Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Ltd 
(The Kamsar Voyager) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57, per Dean J. The vessel was found 
unseaworthy for inadequate spare parts; namely, the wrong supply of the main engine’s piston.  
259
 In terms of a sufficient and competent crew, navigational equipment and supplies, stores, 
provisions and spares, bunker fuel, fresh water etc., the vessel must be properly equipped and 
supplied for the expected duration of the voyage, Project Asia Line Inc v Shone (The Pride of 
Donegal) [2002] EWHC 24; [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 659, p.674, per Smith J. 
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not considered to be risky; and/or (b) to proceed to the nearest port and carry 
out the repair there.260 With the latter requirement, however, the proper course 
of action may depend on the circumstances of the case and, in particular, the 
reason that prevents the vessel and her crew to carry out the repair at sea.261 If, 
for instance, the vessel’s electrician could have repaired the defect but was 
unable to do so due to a lack of spare parts, the master, through the company’s 
DPA, 262  the vessel’s superintendent or the carrier’s agents, should have 
requested the required spare parts to be received at the next port of call so that 
the electrician would be able to carry out the repair without delay. It could be 
said that the proper course of action depends largely on the imminence of the 
situation.263 The safety of the vessel and cargo, or even the possibility that the 
defect may cause damage to the cargo, might dictate the master’s decision to 
call at the nearest port for repairs. 
Finally, there may be circumstances where the carrier might not be able to fully 
discharge his continuing due diligence obligation even if he or his employees 
did take action but did not fully exercise due diligence in that particular case. 
For instance, if after a collision, the crew did not take any action to isolate cargo 
holds that were damaged by seawater and prevent damage spreading to the 
rest of the cargo holds, while the decision to deviate to the nearest port of repair 
was being made. Similarly, it might be the case that failing to sail to the nearest 
                                               
260
 Returning to the port of loading or proceeding to a port of refuge for the purpose of executing 
the necessary repairs. See Phelps, James & Co. v Hill [1891] 1 Q.B. 605; 7 Asp MLC 42. As to 
proceeding to a port of refuge, see Kish v Taylor [1912] AC 604; 12 Asp MLC 217 (HL). 
261
 A/CN.9/510 - Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth session 
April 2002, p.15 cited in http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V02/541/91/PDF/V0 
254191.pdf?OpenElement, on 17 July 2006. Working Group III stated: “However, it was 
suggested that the degree of diligence would or should depend on the context, to the effect that, 
for example, the duty of the carrier would be different depending on whether the vessel was at 
sea or in port.” 
262
 The role of the Designated Person Ashore (DPA) under the ISM Code is liaising between the 
vessel and the shore management of the carrier. 
263
 See Baatz, Y., The Rotterdam Rules: a practical annotation (Informa, 2009), para.14-03. 
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port of repair and choosing to go to one further away that charges less for the 
same repair, results in more cargo being damaged than if the vessel had called 
at the nearest port of repair. The carrier in such cases would be liable for the 
damage caused by not discharging his duty of seaworthiness, as required of a 
diligent carrier. 
It is important that the master and crew should carry out, in addition to any 
repair work, a risk assessment, as part of the ongoing obligation, to prevent 
cargo damage once a defect has been detected and damage has already been 
caused to the cargo. 264  These considerations should include, for example, 
stopping a flow of water, preventing fire or water from spreading to other cargo 
holds, and so on. It should not be forgotten, however, that issues of cargo 
transhipment and onward carriage, or even issues of frustration of the 
contractual voyage, might come into play if the damage is so extensive that it 
cannot be fixed, e.g. crankshaft damage rendering the vessel a constructive 
total loss.265 The question that would naturally arise in such circumstances is 
whether the carrier, in order to fulfil his other contractual obligations under 
Article 11,266 would be bound to tranship the cargo onto another vessel for 
onward carriage to, and delivery at, the contemplated destination.267 
Instead, it was pointed out that the obligation is to exercise due diligence to 
make the vessel seaworthy rather than an absolute obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel,268 the standard of due diligence exercised would be judged 
                                               
264
 See f.n. 177, at p.130. See also subpara. ‘(b) the impact of risk assessment on the manning 
of the vessel’, at p.304. 
265
 The City of Alberni [1947] 2 D.L.R. 647 (defected shaft was not repairable on-board). 
266
 Article 11 reads: “The carrier shall, subject to this Convention and in accordance with the 
terms of the contract of carriage, carry the goods to the place of destination and deliver them to 
the consignee.”  
267
 See Diamond, A., ‘The Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) LMCLQ 455, p.470. 
268
 See para.2.2, at p. 82. 
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by reference to that which a reasonable and prudent shipowner would exercise. 
This essentially means that damage, loss or delay resulting from 
unseaworthiness that arose after the commencement of the voyage does not 
automatically signify that a shipowner would be liable. However, the shipowner 
still needs to discharge the due diligence obligation for the period after the 
commencement of the vessel’s voyage. This will be done by showing that 
reasonable measures have been taken during the voyage and, more 
importantly, 269  before and at the beginning of the voyage. In ascertaining 
whether the shipowner has acted reasonably, the court would not merely take 
into account that repairing a ship at sea may be difficult but also that the 
discovery and cure of a defect might be traced back to the period ‘before and at 
the beginning of the voyage’. It is submitted, therefore, that the essential 
difference between the duty to exercise due diligence before and at the 
beginning of the voyage and the continuing duty to exercise due diligence 
during the voyage is that the courts have to take into account that both 
discovering and repairing unseaworthiness is more difficult at sea and that this 
might be overcome by increasing the required due diligence activity imposed on 
the carrier for the period before the commencement of the vessel’s voyage. The 
Admiralty Judge, Dr Lushington, in 1863 propounded that “[r]easonable 
diligence [means] not the doing of what is possible only, but the doing of that 
which, under ordinary circumstances and having regard to the expense and 
difficulty can be reasonably required”.270 
2.17 Conclusion 
                                               
269
 It has been explained that most of the efforts related to exercising due diligence are made 
before the beginning of the voyage. See under para. 2.14.1, at p.128. 
270
 Cadwallader, F. J., ‘Seaworthiness - An Exercise of Due Diligence’, a paper on Bill of Lading 
Conventions Conference, New York, (Lloyd’s of London Press, November 29/30, 1978), at p.2. 
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Insofar as the ‘due diligence’ obligation is concerned, the language of Article 14 
of the Rotterdam Rules is similar to Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. However, there are words such as ‘keep’ and ‘container’ in Article 14 that 
might raise the question as to the potential effect of these words on the 
obligation of seaworthiness. 
However, the main difference in language that is expected to substantially 
increase the risk of liability of the carrier is the addition of the word ‘during’, 
thereby extending the obligation to exercise due diligence to the entire voyage. 
Arguably, the Rotterdam Rules remove the uncertainty as to the moment at 
which the obligation ends at the loading port, namely ‘before and at the 
beginning’271 of the voyage. However, the grey area has now shifted to the ‘end’ 
of the voyage and the question of when is the exact moment at which the duty 
comes to an end arises. Is it when the sea passage comes to an end (i.e. at the 
ship’s arrival at the destination port) or at some time later (e.g. on the ship’s 
berthing)? The Rotterdam Rules do not define this. It may be anticipated, 
therefore, that the Courts (and indeed scholars) will need to deal with this 
question. It is doubtful whether the ‘end’ of the obligation coincides in time with 
the completion of the discharge of the cargo, although this has been argued by 
one scholar.272 Whilst cargo discharge is one aspect of cargo management, it 
cannot, by any overstressing of the language or purposive interpretation, be 
said to fall within the ‘voyage by sea’. Arguably, the interpretational approach by 
the mere addition of the words ‘and during’ to the voyage, would be that the 
obligation terminates when the sea voyage terminates. This is to include the 
                                               
271
 Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
272
 Nikaki, T., ‘The obligations of carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care’ cited as 
Chapter 4 in Thomas, R. (ed.), A new convention for the carriage of goods by sea - The 
Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), at p.107. 
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duty for container seaworthiness where ‘discharge’, in door-to-door 
transportation, can technically take place far away from the port. Further, by 
analogy to some decided cases on the Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules on the issue 
of voyage ‘commencement’, the voyage may be said to come to an end once 
the vessel has entered the ‘commercial limits’ of the discharging port.273 The 
parties, in any event, can remove any uncertainty by making specific provision 
for this in the contract of carriage.  
The addition of the word ‘during’ certainly cannot be taken to mean that the 
carrier will be entitled to discharge his pre-voyage due diligence obligation after 
the commencement of the voyage. ‘During’ cannot be an alternative to ‘before 
and at the commencement’ but only an addition. The on-going duty, as 
extended beyond the commencement of the voyage, might require extra 
activities for the fulfilment of the due diligence obligation, which the carrier has 
to bear in mind when planning the voyage before its commencement. The court, 
in deciding whether the carrier has exercised the required pre-voyage due 
diligence, should arguably consider the post-commencement on-going 
obligation. Again, the prudent carrier’s behaviour in accordance with shipping 
practice at the time is the yardstick against which all of the above will be judged.   
Although the pre- and post- commencement due diligence obligations appear to 
be the same, there may be significant differences in practice as regards its 
exercise by the carrier. This may be dictated by factors such as (i) the nature of 
the defect; (ii) the possibility of causing damage to the cargo; and, (iii) access to 
the necessary facility to remedy the defect and reinstate the vessel’s 
seaworthiness. What was good enough before and at the beginning of the 
                                               
273
 See under para. 2.13, at p.127 
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voyage may well be inadequate if experience has shown that during the voyage 
or at an intermediate port, the vessel needs further examination. A defect that is 
not discoverable in the port but is discoverable at sea triggers the due diligence 
obligation of the carrier afresh once this is discovered or ought to have been 
discovered. This is why under the new regime the on-going due diligence 
obligation becomes important. The carrier, most likely, will be held to not have 
exercised due diligence in relation to a defect which manifested during the 
voyage and either (i) it was not repaired even though it was repairable with the 
use of the limited resources on board, or (ii) the carrier did not obtain the spare 
parts or summon the services of expert technicians by calling at the nearest 
supply station or port provided that the ensuing delay would be reasonable in 
the circumstances. The position, however, would be the same as that under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules when a defect manifests itself after the beginning of 
the voyage but is not repairable during the voyage. To conclude, the test for the 
on-going due diligence obligation under the Rotterdam Rules should be ‘Would 
a prudent shipowner, if he had known of the defect, have continued the voyage 
without effecting any possible repairs?’ 
In practice, whether or not the carrier has exercised due diligence to ‘keep’ the 
vessel seaworthy during the voyage will be left entirely for the courts to decide 
on a case-by-case basis. There may be numerous situations but four potential 
(hypothetical) scenarios were examined above in respect of the exercise of due 
diligence for defects that manifested themselves after the commencement of 
the voyage and which, by definition, were not discoverable by the exercise of 
due diligence before and at the commencement of the voyage. These 
hypothetical scenarios concern (i) a defect repairable at sea; (ii) a repairable 
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defect which causes unreasonable delay; (iii) a defect repairable only 
temporarily; and, (iv) a defect repairable only if the vessel is at port.   
As regards the first, it goes without saying that when a defect can be repaired 
(temporarily or permanently) at sea by the crew and the crew fail to take such 
remedial action, the carrier should be held not to have exercised due diligence 
in relation to the particular defect. This will be the outcome in such 
circumstances either by drawing an analogy to cases under the current law 
concerning unseaworthiness caused by crew actions or omissions (negligence) 
and/or by upholding that that was the intention of the drafters of the Rotterdam 
Rules when they decided to abolish the ‘crew negligence’ defence. The carrier, 
through the master and his crew, must as a minimum take all reasonable steps 
to prevent further damage or loss and mitigate the consequences of a defect 
causing unseaworthiness.  
Turning to the second hypothetical scenario, in circumstances where the 
restoration of a vessel’s seaworthy condition would cause unreasonable delay 
or further damage, the carrier (and the court ex post facto) will need to carry out 
a balancing exercise when sacrificing part of the cargo for the preservation of 
the rest. In circumstances where the cure would be worse than the disease, it 
will be wise to not effect the repair. Alternatively, where the only choice is 
between (a) the costs involved in saving more cargo and (b) restoring the 
vessel's seaworthiness at the expense of causing further damage to the cargo, 
the carrier should choose the former, as long as safety is not in issue.  
With regard to the third hypothetical scenario, the temporarily repairable defect 
is one that needs further attention at a later stage. Whilst it would suffice for the 
carrier to discharge his due diligence obligation by carrying out the required 
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temporary repairs, lack of further attention and failure to permanently repair the 
defect, for instance at the next port, could be taken as an overall failure to 
exercise due diligence if subsequent damage is caused to the cargo by the 
unseaworthiness. 
The last (fourth) hypothetical scenario, concerns defects that may not be 
repairable at sea or at an intermediate port for a number of ‘innocent’ reasons, 
e.g. a repair that demands a highly skilled specialist technician or unavailable 
spare-parts. In such circumstances, the proper course of action would largely 
depend on the imminence of the situation. The safety of the vessel and cargo, 
or even the possibility that the defect may cause damage to the cargo, might 
dictate the master’s and the carrier’s decision to call at the nearest port for 
repairs. This would involve a risk assessment to consider the vessel’s safety 
and any cargo damage prevention or mitigation, along with, of course, the 
safety of the crew and pollution prevention. Cargo transhipment and onward 
carriage, or even issues of frustration of the contractual voyage, might come 
into play if the damage is so extensive that it cannot be fixed at all or within a 
reasonable time. The question that would naturally arise in such circumstances 
is whether the carrier, in order to fulfil his other contractual obligations under 
Article 11, would be bound to tranship the cargo onto another vessel for onward 
carriage to, and delivery at, the contemplated destination.   
It was further discussed in this chapter whether the act of the carrier which 
caused damage to the cargo should be classified as a failure to exercise due 
diligence pursuant to Article 14, or as a failure to fulfil his obligation under 
Article 13 of the Rotterdam Rules, e.g. negligence as regards the cargo. It was 
suggested that failure to observe safety matters which endanger the safety of 
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the vessel should now be regarded as falling within Article 14 of the Rotterdam 
Rules. Whereas acts which affect the status of the carrying cargo should be 
regarded as a failure to observe Article 13. It was further discussed that it is 
important to make such a distinction between Articles 13 and 14 in order to 
determine the exact obligation imposed on the carrier and thus the potential 
liability of the carrier. For example, if the contract of carriage is a volume 
contract, the distinction between Articles 13 and 14 would determine the limit of 
each party’s obligation and thus the correct liability.  
 
2.18 Overall Conclusion  
 
The nature of the due diligence obligation is relative to and dependent upon the 
dynamics and circumstances274 surrounding each case. First, there is no single 
definition that could embrace all aspects of the required standard of due 
diligence. Secondly, the standard of due diligence might depend upon the 
circumstances of each case. However, the various standards of the shipping 
industry, as well as outcomes from case law, provide guidance and are a good 
indication as to whether or not the carrier has in particular circumstances 
exercised the required due diligence. It might be correct to say that the exercise 
of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel would be extended well before 
the beginning of the voyage 275  but there is an uncertainty under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules as to when exactly the duty ends and also its 
                                               
274
 I.e. knowledge, technology and standard of shipping industry. See, Demand Shipping Co. 
Ltd v Ministry of Food Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and Another (The 
Lendoudis Evangelos II) [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 304. F. C. Bradley & Sons Ltd v Federal Steam 
Navigation Co. Ltd (1926) 24 Ll. L. Rep. 446. President of India v West Coast S.S. Co [1963] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 278, p.281. 
275
 In theory, and depending on the nature of the defect, it could be extended as far back in time 
as the vessel’s last dry-dock, which could be up to 5 years. 
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preconditions. The matter should be determined by looking into the legal and 
operational requirements relevant to the ‘commencement’ of the voyage in each 
case.  
A familiar phraseology appears also in Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules which 
provides for the carrier’s duty to exercise due diligence in respect of 
seaworthiness. Unlike the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the duty imposed upon 
the carrier is for the period before, at the beginning and during the voyage. The 
extension of the duty extinguishes the problems existing under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in relation to exact time of the end of the duty. One 
might argue that the same problem might be relevant under the Rotterdam 
Rules with the question having shifted from the ‘commencement’ of the voyage 
to the ‘end’ of the voyage. What would be the position in the case of cargo 
damage caused by unseaworthiness when the vessel was sailing upriver under 
the pilot’s instructions towards her discharging berth and after her sea passage 
had ended? Did, for such purposes, the voyage actually end at the ‘end of sea 
passage’ or did the damage occur during the ‘during’ period?  
It should be remembered that the duty is to exercise due diligence and it is not 
an absolute duty. It should also be remembered that the transition to an 
extended duty does not mean that the duty to exercise due diligence is 
necessarily the same throughout the period of the carrier’s responsibility. It is of 
the same legal importance but it differs in a significant practical sense.276 The 
circumstances of each case are different and must be taken into consideration 
when determining whether or not the carrier has discharged his obligation in the 
exercise of due diligence. The same applies to the on-going duty of due 
                                               
276
 See Sturley, M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.85. 
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diligence. One could claim that incidents which could not have been foreseen 
by the exercise of due diligence, i.e. by proper procedures, inspections and 
tests, and consequently could not have been avoided by a prudent carrier, 
would not render the carrier liable for unseaworthiness in respect of the initial 
obligation of due diligence.277 The same is true for the on-going obligation but 
then the carrier must exercise due diligence to restore the vessel’s 
seaworthiness at sea even if this would necessitate the ship’s deviation. 
Nevertheless, it might not always be possible to repair a defect at sea or restore 
the vessel’s seaworthiness. 
The extended duration of the due diligence obligation will inevitably increase the 
required activities and the standard of due diligence from that applicable for the 
period only ‘before and at the beginning’ of the voyage. This might mean that 
the shipowner should now exercise due diligence not only in relation to the 
vessel’s repair or restoration as regards seaworthiness but also in relation to the 
carrying out of checks, examinations and preventative risk assessments at all 
times including actions to be taken in mitigation of the consequences of a defect. 
It would not be enough for the carrier to say that he had done his best upon the 
emergence of a defect when he should have had in place a system with 
procedures providing for regular tests, checks and risk assessments which 
might have enabled him to discover the defect in question at an earlier time or 
to prevent its occurrence and the consequent cargo loss or damage. 
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 See Karan, H., The Carrier’s Liability under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, 
Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules, (The Edwin Mellen Press, 2004), p.282. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BURDEN OF PROOF AND COMMERCIAL RISK 
ALLOCATION 
 
“It is He Who has made the sea subject, that ye may eat thereof flesh that is 
fresh and tender, and that ye may extract therefrom ornaments to wear; and 
thou seest the ships therein that plough the waves, that ye may seek (thus) of 
the bounty of Allah and that ye may be grateful.” (Ibrahim, Chapter 14, Verse 32) 
 
 
 Introduction 
In order to form a view as to whether the Rotterdam Rules provide a sound 
regulatory regime in respect of the seaworthiness obligation, it is as important to 
consider not only Article 14 that deals with the due diligence obligation but also 
a number of other factors. The current law can arguably be said to be carrier-
oriented.1 Accordingly, one must question whether the Rotterdam Rules are 
seen as serving the interests of the respective national industries better; in other 
words, are they cargo-oriented or carrier-oriented?2  On balance, the cargo-
interests arguably seem to be better served by the new regime rather than by 
the present one. Furthermore, one of the basic questions relating to the 
question of seaworthiness is that of the burden of proof. This Chapter deals with 
this area of law.  
                                               
1
 Nicholas, A. ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seaworthiness’ cited as 
Chapter Six in Thomas, R. (ed.), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules, 
(Lloyd’s List, 2010), at p.117; American Bar Association, ‘Maritime Law Association of the 
United States Tort Trail and Insurance Practice Section’, (2010) report 101, cited in: 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/2010/annual/pdfs/executive_s
ummaries_index.authcheckdam.pdf 
2
 This Chapter will look at one of the problems considered by Tetley who argues that on policy 
grounds, the burden of proof under both regimes should rest with the carrier being usually the 
party with access to the full facts; see Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims (4
th
 ed., 2008), p.889. 
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The main issue of this Chapter is how the burden of proof is regulated in the 
Rotterdam Rules and how liability is allocated between the carrier and the 
cargo-interests in cases where there are one or more cooperating or 
independent causes of the loss, damage or delay. The answers to these 
questions are essential in determining whether, as a matter of policy, the 
seaworthiness obligation and the consequent liability are heavier under the 
Rotterdam Rules or, whether the current law is preferable.3 For this purpose, a 
comparison between the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in Part I and the Rotterdam 
Rules in Part II is provided. 
There have been cases where the liability might have been decided differently if 
the burden of proof had been allocated differently between the two litigants. 
Cases have been lost because the party on which the burden was lying failed to 
discharge that burden. Insofar as seaworthiness is concerned, the relevant 
questions regarding the ‘burden of proof’ are as follows: in an unseaworthiness 
dispute between the carrier (shipowner) and a cargo-interest or charterer, who 
needs to prove what?4 Is it the carrier or is it the cargo-interest who must prove 
that the vessel was seaworthy? What difficulties are faced by each party (carrier 
v cargo-claimant)? Answering these questions will demonstrate whether the 
current law regarding burden of proof in an unseaworthiness case is sound or 
constitutes an area that needs reform.  
                                               
3
 Specific consideration of this issue in the context of carriage of goods by multimodal transport 
within the regime of the Rotterdam Rules is covered in Chapter 5, entitled: The implications of 
the multimodal aspect of the Rotterdam Rules on the seaworthiness obligation and the 
consequential liabilities, and thus only a general discussion is made in this chapter. 
4
 See Aktieselskabet de Danske Sukkerfabriker v Bajamar Compania Naviera SA (The Torenia) 
[1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, p.215, per Hobhouse J: “The incidence of the legal burden of proof 
can therefore be tested by answering the question: What does each party need to allege?” 
172 
 
Finally, in light of some of the problems demonstrated, certain solutions are 
proposed as these have been advanced by a number of scholars.  
Part 1 – The Burden of Proof in Article IV r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules5 
 3.1 Introduction  
The starting point is Article IV, r.16  of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules which 
provides that the carrier shall not be liable for loss or damage due to the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel unless caused by want of due diligence. More 
importantly, under English law, Article IV, r.1 plays a role in the allocation of the 
burden of proof.7 Carver,8 Scrutton9 and Cooke10 refer to Minister of Food v 
Reardon Smith Line11 and submit that the allocation and division of the burden 
of proof is regulated by Article IV, r.1, which imposes the burden of proof on the 
cargo-claimant. It must be said that many jurisdictions have considered the 
                                               
5
 The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not specifically deal with the onus of proof. Exactly how the 
burden is allocated is a matter that is left to the court to decide in each country; UNCITRAL 
Working Group on International Shipping Legislation Report of the 3
rd
 session (A/CN.9/63) 
(United Nations Geneva, 1972), para. 167. 
6
 ‘Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be liable for loss or damage arising or resulting from 
unseaworthiness unless caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make the 
ship seaworthy, and to secure that the ship is properly manned, equipped and supplied, and to 
make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods 
are carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation in accordance with the 
provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III. Whenever loss or damage has resulted from 
unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or 
other person claiming exemption under this article.’ 
7
 In Leesh River case, it argued that Article IV r.1 should be regarded as an ordinary exception 
and it was the ground for appeal; Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation 
Company Ltd [1966] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 450, p.457; on appeal [1967] 2 Q.B. 250, p.270, as per 
Seller LJ and Salmon LJ.  
8
 Colinvaux R., Carver’s Carriage by Sea, (Steven & Sons, 1982), p.377. 
9
 See Eder, B. et al., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 
2011), para.20.072. 
10
 Cooke J., Voyage Charters, (22
nd
 ed., 2007), para.85, 251. 
11
 Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265. McNair J stated that: “the 
second sentence in Article IV r.1 strongly supports the submission…that no onus as to 
seaworthiness is cast on the shipowner, except after proof has been given by the other party 
that the damage has resulted from unseaworthiness,” p.272. 
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provisions in Article IV, r.1 as an additional exception rather than as allocating 
the burden of proof.12 It is difficult to see that this Article has a purpose other 
than to ensure that the burden of exercising due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy rests on the carrier. Most of the Article seems a mere repetition in 
negative order of the positive seaworthiness duty stated in Article III, r.1.13 
However, the present Article has no limitation as to the time at which the carrier 
should exercise due diligence, that is ‘before and at the beginning of the 
voyage’, as required under Article III, r.1. The reference to ‘in accordance with 
the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article III’ would suffice to apply such a limit.14 
The net effect of this Article when read with Article III, r.1 seems to be that the 
carrier is liable for loss or damage caused by unseaworthiness unless he can 
prove that he exercised due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage 
to provide a seaworthy vessel. However, this suggests a general presumption 
that no onus is imposed on the carrier in relation to proof of due diligence until 
the claimant has initially established the unseaworthiness that caused the 
loss.15 This, therefore, raises the question as to whether this system of burden 
of proof is a sound one. In order to answer this question, it would be essential to 
analyse in detail the position under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
                                               
12
 In many jurisdictions, such as France and The Netherlands, Article IV r.1 is considered as the 
exception beside the exceptions listed in Article IV r.2. It has been regarded as an exception for 
loss or damage caused by unseaworthiness for which the carrier is not responsible; that is, 
unseaworthiness which was not a result of his failure to comply with Article III r.1. See 
Margetson, N. H. Margetson, N. J. and Hendrikse, M. L., Aspects of Maritime Law: Claims 
Under Bills of Lading, (Wolters Kluwer, 2008) at p.117; on the French Law, see  Clarke, M., 
Aspects of the Hague Rules (Martinus Nijhoff, 1976) at p.151. 
13
 Treitel G., and Reynolds F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), para. 
9.206. 
14
 This was assumed in Leesh River Tea Co. Ltd v British India S.N. Co. Ltd [1967] 2 Q.B. 250, 
pp.270, 275 (C.A.). 
15
 See The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 40, p.50; Eridania SPA and Others v Rudolf A Oetker 
and Others (The Fjord Wind) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191; Guinomar of Conarky v Samsung Fire 
& Marine Insurance (The Kamsar Voyager) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57; The Antigoni [1991] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 209. Also, Eder, B., Scrutton on Charter Parties and Bills of Lading, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 22
nd
 ed., 2011), para.20-072; Wilson, J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Pearson, 7
th
 ed., 
2010), p.190; Carr, I., International Trade Law, (Routledge Cavendish, 4
th
 ed., 2010), p.240. 
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 3.2 The Burden of Proof under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in 
General (Article IV r.1 & 2)16 
For a claim of loss or damage caused by unseaworthiness, the court’s approach 
to the burden of proof is that accepted in the common law17 system of proof.18 
The rules regarding the allocation of the burden of proof under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, Phases 1 and 2 are summarised in The 
Farrandoc.19 
Accordingly, the process of a claim of unseaworthiness consists of several 
phases20:  (a) the cargo-interests’ prima facie case, (b) the carrier’s response, (c) 
the displacement of the carrier’s defence, and (d) the carrier’s further defence.  
                                               
16
 Variation in the order of proof exists: see Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 
2008), pp.880-893. 
17
 See Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line Ltd [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265, pp.271-272, per 
McNair J. 
18
 It is important to note that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not contain such an explicit 
provision. However, under English, Canadian and US case law, the cargo-claimant is required 
to make a prima facie case, which means that the cargo-claimant has to establish its interest in 
the cargo; the fact that the cargo was not received at the destination in the same apparent good 
order and condition as loaded on board; and, the value of the transported goods lost or 
damaged; see The Hellenic Dolphin (1978) 2 Ll. Rep. 336. Also, see Diamond A., ‘The 
Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) LMCLQ, 445, p.473. For US case law: Edouard Materne v S.S. 
Leerdam, 143 F.Supp 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); for Canadian case law: Kruger Inc. v Baltic Shipping 
Co. [1988] 1 F.C.262 (F.C.C.). 
19
 Robin Hood Flour Mills Ltd v N. M. Paterson & Sons Ltd (The Farrandoc) [1967] 2 Lloyd's 
Rep (Canada Exchequer Court) 276, p.284, per Mr Justice Noel, who stated that “[t]he cargo-
owner must, firstly, prove damage or loss to his cargo and as the primary obligation of the 
owner of the vessel is to deliver to a destination the goods of the plaintiff in like good order and 
condition as when shipped. Once damage or loss of the goods so shipped is established, the 
owner of the vessel becomes prima facie liable to the cargo-owner for the damages. This 
liability is, however, subject to any exception clause contained in the bill of lading such as that 
the loss or damage arises or results from an “act, neglect, or default . . . in the navigation or in 
the management of the ship. If the shipowner establishes the cause of the damage or loss and 
that he falls within the conditions of the above exception, the owner of the cargo, in order to 
succeed, must then prove some other breach of the contract of carriage to which the exception 
clause provides no defence such as the unseaworthiness of the vessel for instance, and then 
the owner of the ship may establish, that notwithstanding such unseaworthiness, he is still 
protected by the exception clause because unseaworthiness does not give rise to a cause of 
action unless it consists of unfitness at the material time (which must be at the commencement 
of the voyage) and damage to the cargo must have been caused thereby and that such 
unseaworthiness occurred after the commencement of the voyage or it did not cause the loss or 
damage.” 
20
 Other than The Farrandoc explained above, see The Polessk and the Akademik Iosif Orbeli 
[1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 40, “(1) The burden is on the plaintiffs to prove (a) that before and at the 
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 3.2.1 Phase One: The Cargo-Interests’ Prima Facie Case21 
As has been established by common law, and under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules, at the first stage in an unseaworthiness (or any other) claim, the burden 
is on the claimant to establish a prima facie case against the carrier.22 The 
claimant must, besides showing that he is the person with the right of suit under 
the contract of carriage, prove that the amount and nature of loss or damage to 
the goods occurred while the carrier was in charge.23 He does the latter by 
showing that the goods listed in the bill of lading were entrusted to the carrier in 
a good order and condition and that they were damaged or did not arrive at 
all.24 The cargo-claimant, thus, raises the inference that the occurrence of loss 
or damage occurred during the carriage.25 Such a presumption reflects Article III, 
r.4 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.26 Prima facie, the carrier of goods is liable; 
he has failed to perform his promise to deliver the goods in the same condition 
that they were consigned.27 The evidence of proof that can be used is a clean 
                                                                                                                                          
beginning of the voyage the vessel was either unseaworthy or improperly equipped or supplied 
or that at the time the holds were unfit or unsafe for the reception, carriage and preservation of 
the cargo and [as opposed to cargoworthiness]; (b) that the cargo was lost as a result; (2) If the 
plaintiffs prove (a) and (b), the defendants are liable unless they prove that the loss occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence by themselves, their servants, agents or 
independent contractors”, at p.45, per Clarke J. 
21
 A similar onus of proof falls on the claimant under other inland transport conventions; CIM 
(Article 6, Article 27.1); CMR (Article 9, Article 17.1); Warsaw Convention (Article 11, Article 
18.1). 
22
 Aktieselskabet de Danske Sukkerfabriker v Bajamar Compania Naviera SA (The Torenia) 
[1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, it was stated that: “the legal burden of proof arises from the principle: 
He who alleges must prove,” p.215, per Hobhouse J. 
23
 See e.g. The Amstelslot [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 539, p.545, per McNair J. 
24
 Albacora v Westcott & Laurance [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 53; this is also the law in the USA; 
Brown & Williamson v S.S. Anghyra (1957) 157 Fed. Supp. 737. 
25
 Robin Hood Flour Mills Ltd v N. M. Paterson & Sons Ltd (The Farrandoc) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 276 at p.284. 
26
 Article III r.4 provides that ‘[s]uch a bill of lading shall be prima facie evidence of the receipt by 
the carrier of the goods as therein described in accordance with paragraph 3(a), (b), and (c).’ 
27
 Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (The 
Bunga Seroja) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512, p.526, per McHugh J; Phillips Petroleum Co. v 
Cabaneli Naviera SA (The Theodegmon) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52, pp.53-54, per Phillips J; The 
Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336. p.339, per Lloyd J; Goodfellow Lumber Sales Ltd v 
Hovington and Verreault Navigation Inc. [1971] 1 Lloyd’s 185 at pp.186-187, per Richie J; Robin 
Hood Flour Mills Ltd v N. M. Paterson & Sons Ltd (The Farrandoc) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 276, 
176 
 
bill of lading.28 It is apparent that, at this stage, the cargo-claimant needs merely 
to show the damage and the contract. He is not required to prove the cause of 
the loss or damage or unseaworthiness. At this moment, the claimant has 
provided prima facie evidence and Phase One ends.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
 3.2.2 Phase Two: The Carrier’s Response – Proof of the Loss 
Caused by One of  the Specific Exceptions 
 
Phase Two lies with the carrier. He, in turn, may seek to meet the prima facie 
case by either pleading against the evidence of loss or damage alleged by the 
cargo-claimant, or by proving that the damage or loss was caused by one of the 
exceptions available under Article IV, r.2.29 The situation nowadays is that the 
carrier is no longer30 bound to prove that he has provided a seaworthy vessel in 
order to rely on such exceptions. For instance, in The Hellenic Dolphin,31 a 
cargo of asbestos was found on arrival to be damaged by seawater. Seawater 
had penetrated through the defective shell plating of the vessel, of which the 
                                                                                                                                          
pp.283-284, per Noel J; Albacora SRL v Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
53(HL), p.63, per Lord Pearson. 
28
 Under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, such presentation will be considered as prima facie 
evidence for the cargo condition. See e.g. The River Gurara [1998] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 225; Naviera 
Mogor S.A. v Societe Metallurgique de Normandie; The Nogar Marin [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 412; 
See full discussion in Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Routledge, 5
th
 ed., 2012), pp.63-70. 
29
 For the exceptions, see part II of this chapter, para. 3.9.2.2, at p.219-221. 
30
 Some cases in the past required the carrier, in order to rely on the exceptions under Article IV 
r.2, to prove that there was no fault or negligence on his part. See e.g. Bradley & Sons Ltd v 
Federal Steam Navigation Company (1927) 27 Ll. L. Rep. 395. On discharge, the shipment of 
apples was found to have developed brown heart disease. The cargo-owner claimed that the 
cause of damage was due to the vessel’s unseaworthiness because the vessel did not use a 
particular refrigeration system. On attempt by the carrier to rely on the exception in the bill of 
lading, Viscount Sumner stated that: “the burden of proof passed from the consignees to the 
shipowners to prove some excepted peril which relieved them from liability, and further, as a 
condition of being allowed the benefit of that exception, to prove seaworthiness at Hobart, the 
port of shipment, and to negative negligence,’”at p.396. 
31
 The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336; Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government 
Merchant Marine [1927] 2 K.B. 432. A cargo of tinplate was damaged while the ship sent for 
repairs. To carryout repairs, the hatch cover and the tarpaulins covering cargo was removed. 
During such repairs rainwater damaged the cargo. It was held that the damage was caused by 
the failure to replace the tarpaulins to prevent rain from damaging cargo. Failure to replace the 
tarpaulins which were related to the cargo and not the management of the vessel. 
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carrier had been unaware. In the absence of evidence as to whether the 
damage to the vessel took place before or after the cargo had been loaded, 
Lloyd J allowed the carrier to rely on the exception of perils of the seas since, in 
his opinion and in the absence of the evidence to the contrary, ‘the incursion of 
seawater through an undetected defect in the ship’s basic plating is a classic 
case of damage by perils of the sea.’32 This might support the view that the 
intended construction of Article IV, r.1 is to make it clear that the carrier does 
not have to prove due diligence before he is allowed to invoke an exception.33 In 
some civil law countries,34 this feature, which has been inherited from English 
law,35 is not followed at all.  
Finally, it should be added at this point that if the loss or damage was attributed 
to more than one cause, i.e. to concurrent causes of which one was 
unseaworthiness and the other was one of those listed under Article IV, r.2, the 
position of the cargo-claimant would be ameliorated. This may enable the court 
                                               
32
 The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336, p.339, per Lloyd J. 
33
 See Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265, where it was stated 
that: “it seems to me that if one treats the matter purely as a matter of contract, the second 
sentence in Article IV r.1 strongly supports the submission made on behalf of the ship that no 
onus as to seaworthiness is cast on the shipowner, except after proof has been given by the 
other party that the damage has resulted from unseaworthiness,’ p.272, per McNair. Also, 
Carver states that ‘[i]t cannot mean that if the seaworthiness duty is not first proved to have 
been complied with, the exceptions of Article IV cannot be invoked at all whether or not the 
damage occurred in connection with unseaworthiness…rather, it must mean that if Article III (1) 
is not fulfilled and the non-fulfilment causes the damage the immunities of Article IV cannot be 
relied on.” Treitel, G., and Reynolds F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 
2011), para. 9.241. 
34
 Clarke, M., ‘The Carrier’s Duty of Seaworthiness under the Hague Rules’ cited as Chapter 6 
of Rose, F. D. (ed.) Lex Mercatoria: Essays on International Commercial Law in Honour of 
Francis Reynolds (LLP, 2000), p.106. For the contrary approach under the Dutch law, see 
Margetson, N., The system of liability of articles III and IV of the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Paris 
Legal Publisher, 2008), p.178.  
35
 Most courts in the US also take a view similar to that in England. See: Isbrandtsen Co. v 
Federal Ins Co. (1952) 113 F. Supp.357 (S.D.N.Y.); Irish Spruce [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 63, p.72, 
per Goettel J. (S.D.N.Y.). 
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to avoid the full effect of shifting the burden of proof back to the cargo-
claimant.36  
 3.2.3 Phase Three: Proof of Unseaworthiness – The Claimant’s 
Burden 
In this phase of the claim process, the claimant might defeat the carrier’s 
reliance on Article IV, r.2. The claimant can still rebut the pleaded defence 
(excepted peril) by providing evidence to demonstrate that the defect, which 
occurred before and at the beginning of the voyage, caused the loss or 
damage.37 In other words, the claimant, at this stage must provide the relevant 
evidence in order to show unseaworthiness. This means that the claimant bears 
the risk associated with a potential lack of evidence. Nevertheless, how difficult 
is it to prove that someone else’s vessel is unfit for the contemplated voyage?  
 3.2.3.1 The Difficulties Facing the Cargo-claimant at Phase Three 
In unseaworthiness claims, the availability of evidence is of such significance 
that it may affect the outcome of the dispute. This is particularly true in cases 
where it is difficult for the cargo-claimant to obtain evidence. The cargo-claimant, 
mainly due to his limited access to the relevant facts, faces several difficulties in 
his effort to prove the unfitness of the vessel. First, the required standard of 
proof of unseaworthiness is not very clear and it seems that the standard of 
evidence is not merely a suggestion of a particular fact; otherwise, the claimant 
would need neither effort nor wit to put the carrier in a difficult position.38 It may 
                                               
36
 See para. 3.11.1, at p.257. 
37
 Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v Malaysia International Shipping Corp Berhad (The 
Bunga Seroja) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512, p.526, per McHugh J; Phillips Petroleum Co. v 
Cabaneli Naviera SA (The Theodegmon) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52, pp.53-54, per Phillips J; The 
Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336, p.339, per Lloyd J. 
38
 Clarke, M., Aspects of Hague Rules, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.177. 
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be possible to say that the standard of evidence to persuade the court, on a 
balance of probabilities,39 might be set relatively high. In Cosmopolitan Shipping 
v Hatton & Cookson,40 in the Court of Appeal, Greer LJ stated that the cargo-
claimant must ‘give evidence which makes it quite certain that the vessel was 
unseaworthy. All he needs to do is to give evidence which establishes 
unseaworthiness beyond the reach of reasonable doubt. If the evidence merely 
raises a suspicion, or if it goes beyond suspicion but leaves in the mind of the 
tribunal a reasonable doubt whether unseaworthiness is established, the cargo-
owner alleging unseaworthiness fails’.41 Clarke42 indicates that Greer LJ’s view43 
in Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson was rejected in Canada44 and 
that his view is neither realistic nor consistent with current legal trends. Clarke 
supports the better view of Scrutton LJ which creates a lesser degree of burden 
on the claimant to prove unseaworthiness.45 This difficulty is associated with 
other problems, such as the time and location of the occurrence. Perhaps, in 
order to prove unseaworthiness, it would be easier to trace evidence of a vessel 
that trades long distance, taking her days to arrive at the discharge port as 
                                               
39
 Certain jurisdictions have different approaches to the principle of ‘balance of probabilities’. 
The required standard of evidence to defeat the proof of the carrier is lesser than that used by 
the English court. For further information regarding the standard of evidence, see  Wright, R., 
‘Proving Causation: Probability versus Belief’, cited as Chapter 10 in Goldberg, R., Perspectives 
on Causation, (2011, Hart Publishing), pp.195-220. 
40
 Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. L. Rep. 117. The vessel was 
abandoned and sank. The cargo-owners contended that, on the ground that the sails were 
insufficient in number and not of good quality, the vessel was unseaworthy at the 
commencement of the voyage as a counterclaim to one-half of the freight that was payable on 
shipment. 
41
 Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. L. Rep. 117, p.128, per Greer LJ, 
applied by the Canadian court in Western Canadian Steam Ship v Canadian Commercial Corp. 
(1958) 14 D.L.R. (2d.) 487. 
42
 Clarke, M., Aspects of Hague Rules, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p.177. 
43
 Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. L. R. 117, at p.128. 
44
 Canadian cases cited by Clarke; De Carvalho v Kent Line (1951) 32 M.P.R. 282, at p.300. “To 
put the shipper to the task of proving unseaworthiness beyond reasonable doubt is virtually to 
render the due diligence provision in the Act a nullity and meaningless. That stage would never 
be reached.” per Winter J. 
45
 Finding of Scrutton is that it is adequate for the court to feel that the vessel was unseaworthy 
at the commencement of the sailing, Clarke, M., Aspects of Hague Rules, (Martinus Nijhoff, 
1976), p.177. 
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opposed to a vessel which trades over a fairly short distance. The longer the 
time between the unseaworthiness occurrence and the time at which the vessel 
arrives at her port of discharge, the more difficult it is to discover evidence of 
unseaworthiness.46  
Secondly, the cargo-claimant’s burden is not always easy. In the past, it may 
have been difficult to prove that the vessel, belonging to someone else who had 
exclusive access to all the necessary information, 47  was unseaworthy at a 
specific time and stage if the court was not willing to make certain inferences. 
The cargo-claimant has to face circumstances where the cargo, as from the 
time of its delivery, is in the hands of the carrier and/or his servants whilst the 
cargo-claimant (particularly when this is the consignee as opposed to the 
shipper) has little opportunity, if any at all, of knowing what took place during the 
time with reference to which he must prove the unseaworthiness; that is, before 
and at the beginning of the voyage.48 
The current law does not take into consideration the difficulties faced by the 
cargo-claimant. For instance, in Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line,49 the 
officer of the vessel negligently gave instructions to top up the ballast tanks 
                                               
46
 See Maclean, I., ‘Secure the evidence’ (19 Oct. 12), MRI, at pp.1-2. 
47
 In Levison v Patent Steam Carpet Cleaning Co. Ltd [1978] Q.B. 69, Sir David Cairns stated: 
“However difficult it may sometimes be for a bailee to prove a negative, he is at least in a better 
position than the bailor to know what happened to the goods while in his possession,’’p.85. 
48
 Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v S.S. Hong Kong Producer [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 536, p.543 
(2
nd
 Cir. 1969). The Second Circuit declared such difficulties when stating that: “[i]t is almost 
impossible for the shipper to prove that the carrier was negligent or lacked due diligence 
because as a practical matter, all evidence on those issues is in the carrier’s hands.” 
49
 Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265; see also The Kriti Rex 
[1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171. The vessel’s engine suffered a problem and stopped during the 
voyage. The cargo was of a perishable type that could not reach its destination because of the 
prolonged delay; it was given away at the port of repair. It was argued that the carrier was in 
breach of Article III r.1. Moore-Bick J stated that the cargo-claimant must satisfy on the balance 
of probabilities that the damage was caused by unseaworthiness by stating that the claimant 
should determine the exact defects which caused the failure of the engine. See also The Danica 
Brown [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 264; The Subro Valour [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; The Antigoni 
[1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 209; Union of India v Reederij Amsterdam [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223. 
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without making sure that the opening lids were shut. As a result, the cargo was 
damaged by ballast water. The charterer brought a claim on the basis that there 
was unseaworthiness in the act of not closing the opening of the ballast tank 
before the commencement of the voyage. The shipowner relied on Article IV, 
r.2(a) exempting their servant’s negligence in the navigation and management 
of the ship. The charter incorporated the Hague Rules.50 McNair J51 held that, 
once the owner asserted the exemption, the onus shifted to the charterer to 
establish that unseaworthiness was the cause of the loss. 
Further, as argued in Chapter Two, the carrier is not liable for cargo loss or 
damage that has been caused by the unfitness of the vessel until the vessel is 
under his ‘orbit’.52 This might be a fair law that caters for the absence of the 
carrier’s fault until the minute the carrier has control over the vessel and applies 
his own system of exercising due diligence, i.e. after inspecting and 
ascertaining the status of the vessel so that he has knowledge of any defect 
(unfitness) that might cause loss or damage. If this means that the obligation of 
exercising due diligence (in detecting and, if necessary, rectifying matters 
bearing on seaworthiness) comes into being only when the vessel is in the 
carrier’s orbit, then by analogy, the vessel is never within the ‘orbit’ of the cargo-
                                               
50
 The provisions on proof are the same under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. When COGSA 
1971 is incorporated into time or voyage charters as paramount terms, the seaworthiness 
obligation provided by COGSA will prevail over either the common law absolute seaworthiness 
warranty (if so implied under the charters) or the seaworthiness obligation imposed by other 
express charter terms. See The Fjord Wind [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191. 
51
 Minister of Food v Reardon Smith Line [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265, p.272. McNair J held that 
“…the second sentence in Article IV r.1 strongly supports the submission made on behalf of the 
ship that no onus as to seaworthiness is cast on the shipowner, except after proof has been 
given by the other party that the damage has resulted from unseaworthiness.”  
52
 See Riverstone Meat Co. v Lancashire Shipping Co. (The Muncaster Castle) [1961] A.C. 807, 
per Lord Radcliffe at p.867; The Happy Ranger [2006] EWHC 122, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649. 
The ‘carrier’ in this instance should be considered as the commercial and legal shipowner but 
not the carrier who is not the owner. The vessel is considered within his orbit only at the time 
she is delivered to him and not beforehand.  
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interests and thus, the status of the vessel, i.e. the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel, is beyond the cargo-interests’ knowledge.53 
Insofar as the burden of proof for a claim under a bill of lading is concerned,54 
most of the mentioned cases are considered in light of the common law 
principle that is based on The Glendarroch case.55 
In that case, the Court of Appeal accepted the argument of the defendants and 
ruled that “the law is clear that the burden of proving this negligence lies upon 
the plaintiff”.56 
According to the principle established by The Glendarroch and followed 
subsequently in later judgments,57 the carrier has no initial burden of proving 
that he was not negligent. In light of the practicality of obtaining evidence to 
discharge the burden of proof, as outlined above, one would naturally ask what 
would be the possible solution for such a harsh burden.  
                                               
53
 Shore-based equipment (shore cranes or floating cranes) is not a part of the vessel and thus, 
they are never within the ‘orbit’ of the carrier. The carrier must have recourse against whoever 
supplies this equipment so that, in the final analysis, the injured party would recover and the 
party at fault would fund the recovery. This is in the case where the carrier undertakes the 
performance of cargo handling causing damage outside his ‘orbit’. See Cooke J., Voyage 
Charters, (Informa, 3
rd
 ed., 2007), para. 85.344. 
54
 Additionally, a charterparty that incorporates the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and its burden of 
proof. However, the dispute should have arisen from a contract containing FIO, bringing the 
loading and unloading operations as well as the equipment used, within the orbit of the carrier. 
55
 The Glendarroch [1894], P.226. In this case, the claimants’ cargo of cement cases was 
loaded on board the defendant’s steamship under a bill of lading which accepted the usual 
perils, but not negligence. After the stranding of the vessel, all the cement cargo was damaged 
by seawater. In an action for damage, the defendant relied on the exception of perils of the sea, 
while the claimant argued that the exception was brought about by negligence on the part of the 
defendant. At first instance, Sir F. H. Jeune ruled that the carrier in order to be excused had to 
prove that the peril of the sea was not occasioned by their negligence. 
56
 The Glendarroch [1884], P.226, p. 233, per Lord Esher M.R. 
57
 See i.e., The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, for an opposing approach to The 
Glendarroch (that upon establishing the peril of the sea, the burden shifted to the plaintiffs to 
prove their lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy); see further, The Tasman 
Pioneer [2010] NZSC 37; The Bunga Seroja [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512 (Australia); The Kriti Rex 
[1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171; The Danica Brown [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 264; The Subro Valour 
[1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; The Amigoni [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 209; Union of India v N.V. 
Reederij Amsterdam [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223, at p.235;. Cf. The Yamatogawa [1990] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 39. 
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Given that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules make no specific stipulation as to who 
bears the burden of proof of fault when the carrier claims an exemption under 
Article IV, r.2, courts are not restricted to any particular approach, i.e. as 
regards the current burden of proof in proving unseaworthiness. 
 3.2.3.2 Possible Solutions 
There is no binding English decision as to the application of The Glendarroch to 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules,58 or as to whether other principles should or 
should not be applied. Thus, in order to reach a solution, the matter is open to 
the court to change its approach. One solution to this problem is for the court to 
make an inference as to the unseaworthiness of the vessel. However, this is 
limited to the fact that the carrier cannot prove the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel. Thus, the court could take one of these possible approaches: a) 
following the principles of, or similar to, bailment; and, b) rebutting the existence 
of the peril.  
- The Inference of Unseaworthiness – A Life Buoy for the Claimant   
Given that “the carrier is not obliged to produce watertight evidence of the 
causal connection between the loss and the exempted occurrence,”59 the court 
may have to decide on the basis of weak or lacking evidence either that the 
carrier satisfied the burden of proof; that there are sufficient doubts for the court 
                                               
58
 See The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210 per Hobhouse J. It was there stated that: ‘No 
authority was cited to me as being binding on me with regard to a Hague Rules contract’ at 
p.217. Although the case Albacora S.R.L. v Westcott & Laurance Line Ltd [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
53, is a House of Lords’ case, but it does not represent a decision on the point. For this point, 
see Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting 
principles’, [2001] LMCLQ 261, p.275. 
59
 Karan, K, The Carrier’s Liability under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, 
Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules, (The Edwin Mellen, 2005), p.331. See also Ezeoke, C., 
‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting principles’, [2001] 
LMCLQ 260, p.273. 
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to raise an inference of unseaworthiness60; or, that the loss or damage is traced 
backed to the period before or at the beginning of the voyage.61 Should the 
claimant succeed in the latter, he will discharge the burden of proof.  
It is submitted that the court62 is quite prepared to draw an inference (and rather 
willing to favour the cargo-claimant in this respect) even if the evidence 
adduced by the claimant is not adequate, provided that the carrier is not able to 
demonstrate the exercise of due diligence before and at the beginning of the 
voyage.63 However, one cannot consider the inference principle as a solution; it 
is limited to particular incidents calling for a presumption of unseaworthiness 
and/or the timing of such presumed unseaworthiness to which courts pay 
particular attention when deciding their case.64  
                                               
60
 See Wilson, J., Carriage of Goods by Sea, (Pearson, 7
th
 ed., 2010), p.191. The author stated 
that seawater in a vessel’s hold is one way to infer unseaworthiness. He suggests that the 
problem of burden of proof on the part of the cargo-claimant is frequently solved by the 
readiness of the court to treat some facts as a prima facie evidence of unseaworthiness. 
61
 The Assunzion [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 468. 
62
 The Amstelslot [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223. Claiming that in practice the burden on the plaintiff 
must be light. Lord Devlin stated that the “proof of unseaworthiness fulfils…the same function in 
this type of case as res ipsa loquitur does in the ordinary case of negligence,” p.235. 
63
 Phillips Petroleum Co. v Cabaneli Naviera (The Theodegmon) [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 52. In 
this case, the vessel was navigating in a river and ran aground. As a result, the cargo was 
damaged. The carrier contended that the grounding happened due to perils of the seas. The 
claimant did not submit adequate evidence to prove the unseaworthiness and submitted that not 
all strandings were caused by perils of the seas. The lack of frankness on the part of the 
defendants and of their witnesses in relation to what had gone wrong with the steering system in 
the past induced the court to infer the unseaworthiness of the vessel. The carrier, however, was 
not able to prove the exercise of due diligence at and before the commencement of the voyage. 
Phillips J stated that: “the inference of unseaworthiness at the commencement of the voyage 
was overwhelming. But if, at the end of the day, having heard all the evidence and drawn all the 
proper inferences, the Court is left on the razor's edge, the cargo-owner fails on 
unseaworthiness and the shipowners are left with their defence of perils of the sea. If, on the 
other hand, the Court comes down in favour of the cargo-owners on unseaworthiness, the 
shipowners can still escape by proving that the relevant unseaworthiness was not due to any 
want of due diligence on their part or on the part of their servants or agents”, p.54, as per 
Phillips J. See also Fyffes Group Ltd v Reefer Express Lines Pty (The Kriti Rex) [1996] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 171. Also see Eridania SpA v Rudolf A Oetker (The Fjord Wind) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
307(Q.B.); aff’d [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 (C.A.). 
64
 These are usually: (i) technical evidence which would indicate to the court that there is a 
defect in design and in which case no further evidence would be required (See for instance, 
Angliss and Co. Proprietary Ltd v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co. [1927] 2 K.B. 
456); (ii) weather conditions from the minute the vessel began her voyage until the time that the 
damage occurred (Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v Hatton & Cookson (The Rotellan) (1929) 35 Ll. 
L. Rep. 117; The Assunzion [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 468 – in the latter case, the steering gear that 
185 
 
The suggested approach would be for the court to follow a view similar to 
Scrutton LJ’s finding in Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson65; that is, it 
is enough for “the court to feel that it looks as if the ship had been unseaworthy 
on sailing”, 66  and that, on the balance of probabilities, the claimant has 
discharged his burden of proving his point.67 This, arguably, is the approach 
adopted by the Rotterdam Rules. However, the language of Article 17(5)(a)68 of 
the Rotterdam Rules appears clear with regard to the word ‘probably’ that 
operates only as to the proof of causation related to unseaworthiness but not to 
the unseaworthiness itself. 69  There is no equivalent to Article 17(5) of the 
Rotterdam Rules in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
 
- Shifting the Burden to the Defendants – The Bailment Approach70 
                                                                                                                                          
broke down after three days of sailing in calm weather gave rise to the assumption that it was 
defective when the vessel commenced the voyage); (iii) records of the ships, i.e. those 
maintained for a ship and/or a company under the requirements of the ISM and ISPS Codes 
might be valued as evidence (see, for example, CHS Inc Iberica SL and Another v Far East 
Marine SA (The Devon) [2012] EWHC 3747 (Comm). 
65
 Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. L. R. 177 cited in Clarke, M., 
Aspects of The Hague Rules: A comparative study in English and French Law, (Martinus 
Nijhoff- The Hague, 1976), at p.177 
66
 Ivamy, ‘Liability of cargo damage’, (1959) 12(1) Current Legal Problems, 208-223, p.214, 
Who referred to Scrutton LJ in Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. L. R. 
177 cited in Clarke, M., Aspects of The Hague Rules: A comparative study in English and 
French Law, (Martinus Nijhoff- The Hague, 1976), at p.177 
67
 Clarke, M., Aspect of The Hague Rules, (Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 177. See above 
discussion related to this point at para. 3.2.3.1, p 178  
68
 Article 17(5)(a) provides: “The claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or was 
probably caused by or contributed to by (i) the unseaworthiness of the ship; (ii) the improper 
crewing, equipping, and supplying of the ship; or (iii) the fact that the holds or other parts of the 
ship in which goods are carried, or any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which 
goods are carried, were not fit and safe for reception, carriage, and preservation of the goods.” 
69
 For further discussion on the probability of causation see Part II of this Chapter. 
70
 The law of bailment imposes upon bailees a duty of care and this duty would be subject to the 
terms (contractual or otherwise) on which the bailee had accepted the goods. This is known as 
bailment on terms. The claimant cargo-interest may be compelled by the circumstances to sue 
on bailment on terms instead of on the contract of carriage, particularly in a situation where the 
claimant received a charterer’s bill, where he has made a contract with a charterer but then 
wishes to sue the shipowner (thus no contract with the owner- the bailment on terms). See Elder 
Dempster & Co Ltd v Paterson Zochonis & Co Ltd [1924] A.C. 522. The shipowner, in the Elder 
case, could rely on the limitation of liability clauses in the charterer’s bill in defending a suit by 
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The bailment approach as a solution was proposed and discussed in detail by 
Ezeoke.71 It would be sensible to draw the difference between a legal and an 
evidential burden. The evidential burden is said to include “going forward in 
argument in the course of trial. It embraces the tactical obligation to lead 
counter evidence against a proponent’s adduction of evidence…This approach 
leaves the claimant with a legal burden to prove that the carrier is at fault. On 
the other hand, the substantive law on a subject dictates the allocation of the 
legal burden. It is borne by the party who bears the risk of non-persuasion on 
any given proposition…such risk of non-persuasion to negative fault is born by 
the carrier as a bailee in the bailment approach [which is used by some 
cases].”72 The nature of proof in bailment is that when the bailor shows the loss 
or damage he suffered from the bailee,73 it is the bailee who should show that 
he exercised reasonable care and that the loss or damage occurred without his 
fault. 74  For example, in Coldman v Hill, 75  a shepherd made no attempt to 
recover his stolen cattle. The decision of the divisional court that the cattle 
owner had to prove the fault of the shepherd was reversed. It was ruled that it 
                                                                                                                                          
the cargo-interest (the shipper in this case). In light of the Himalaya clause, which protects the 
shipowner for limitation of liability, the court would not extend the terms of the original contract 
to matters such as jurisdiction or choice of law when the owner is being sued in bailment. Any 
clause that derogates the obligations of the carrier would be nullified by Article III, r.8. (see The 
Starsin [2003] UKHL 12). ` 
71
 Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting principles’, 
[2001] LMCLQ 261, pp.264, 271-272. 
72
 Ibid, p.261. Note that Ezeoke in f.n. 1 of his article has referred to Colin Tapper (ed.), Corss & 
Tapper on Evidence, 9
th
 ed. (London, 1999), 115- 120, indicating that: “The terminology used to 
describe the two senses of burden of proof is not uniform. The factual, provisional and tactical 
burdens are cariations of the evidential burden, whereas, the ‘risk of non-persuasion’, the 
ultimate, and the fixed burdens describe the legal burden.”  
73
 Bailment involves the transfer of possession in law in the goods by the bailor to the bailee (the 
bailee in carriage of good cases is often the carrier). The legal possession does not necessary 
involve the physical possession of the goods. See Spectra International v Hayesoak [1997] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 153.  
74
 Gledstane v Hewitt (1831) 1 C. & J. 565. 
75
 Coldman v Hill [1919] 1 K.B. 443. 
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was the shepherd’s onus to prove the exercise of reasonable care. 76  This 
indicates that once the bailor proves to the court his loss or damage, there is 
prima facie liability and the burden shifts to the bailee to absolve himself.77 In 
such a case, the cargo-owner constructs a prima facie case of liability against 
the carrier by proving that the cargo was shipped in good order and lost or 
undelivered. The carrier must then exonerate himself by proving that the 
exclusion he relied on was not caused by any fault of his own. A very similar 
approach was expressed, soon after the Hague Rules came into existence, at 
first instance in Gosse Millard v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd.78 
The carrier invoked the exception of negligent management of the ship under 
Article IV, r.2(a) of the Hague Rules. The cargo-owner argued that the carrier 
had failed to care for the cargo and he had breached Article III, r.2. Wright J 
stated that ‘it is enough if the owner of the goods proves either that the goods 
have not been delivered, or have been delivered damaged. The carrier is a 
bailee and it is for him to show that he has taken reasonable care of the goods 
                                               
76
 Coldman v Hill [1919] 1 K.B. 443, where Bankes LJ stated that “the law still is that if the bailee 
is sued in detinue only, it is a good answer for him to say that the goods were stolen without any 
default on his part, as the general bailment laid in the declaration pledges the plaintiff to the 
proof of nothing except that the goods were in the defendant’s hand and were wrongly detained.” 
Cited in Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting 
principles’, [2001] LMCLQ 261. P. 263. 
77
 Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting principles’, 
[2001] LMCLQ 261, p.275. Ezeoke referred to the summarised principle of Denning LJ in J. 
Spurling Ltd v Bradshaw [1956] 1 W.L.R. 461. He has stated that: “A bailor, by pleading and 
presenting his case properly, can always put on the bailee the burden of proof. In the case of 
non-delivery for instance, all he need plead is the contract and the failure to deliver on demand. 
That puts on the bailee the burden of proving either loss without his fault (which of course, 
would be a complete answer at common law) or, if it was due to his fault, it was a fault from 
which he is excused by the exempting clause…likewise, with goods which are returned by the 
bailee in a damaged condition, the burden is on him to show that the damage was done without 
his fault; or that, if the fault was there, it was excused by the exempting clause.” 
78
 Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1927] 2 K.B. 432. The same 
approach was followed in The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210. In the latter case, the vessel’s 
shell plating failed, causing a leak. Subsequently, a list developed and the vessel was 
abandoned. The plaintiff argued that the vessel was unseaworthy. The carrier contended that, 
according to The Glenddaroch, the burden shifted to the claimant to prove the lack of due 
diligence to prove unseaworthiness of the vessel. Hobhouse J rejected this and stated that: “the 
carrier has to prove that he had exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy…” p.219.   
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while they have been in his custody (including the custody of his servant) and to 
bring himself, if there be loss or damage, within the specific immunities’.79 
Ezeoke points out that this principle of bailment can be used in incidents where 
the carrier is in breach of the due diligence obligation to provide a seaworthy 
vessel, thus placing the sea carrier in the same position as other bailees, 
thereby requiring him to prove due diligence in respect of seaworthiness.80 
It is to be noted that, along with the many general warnings as to the dangers of 
assuming that the international conventions should be construed in light of 
earlier English decisions,81 the current authors of Carver82 have recognised a 
need for change that is similar to the bailment approach rather than the rule 
derived from The Glendarroch.83 However, the learned authors observe that the 
majority of authorities,84 including obiter dicta in the House of Lords,85 favour 
the aforementioned view of Scrutton.86 Subsequent authorities have expressed 
doubts about the principle that derived from The Glendarroch.87 As discussed 
                                               
79
 Gosse Millerd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1927] 2 K.B. 432, pp.434-436. 
80
 Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting principles’, 
[2001] LMCLQ 261, at p.274. 
81
 E.g. Stag Line Ltd v Fascolo Mango & Co. Ltd [1932] A.C. 328 at p.342, per Lord Atkin; 
James Bunchanan & Co. Ltd v Babco Forwarding & Shipping Co Ltd [1978] A.C. 141, p.152, per 
Lord Wilberforce. 
82
 Treitel G. and Reynolds F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed., 2011), 
para.9.243. See also Schoenbaum T., Admiralty and Maritime Law (2
nd 
ed., 1994, St Paul), at 
p.569; a similar proposal by Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 2008), p.890-891. 
82
 Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F. M., Carver on Bills of Lading (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), 
para. 9.243. 
83
 Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F. M., Carver on Bills of Lading (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), 
para. 9.243. 
84
 The common law principle is well established and some courts continue to adopt it; Milan 
Nigeria Ltd v Angeliki B Maritime Co. [2011] EWHC 892 (Comm); The Tasman Pioneer [2010] 
NZSC 37; The Bunga Seroja [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 512; The Kriti Rex [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171; 
The Danica Brown [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 264; The Subro Valour [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509; The 
Antigoni [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 209.   
85
 Albacora v Westcott & Laurance [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 53, pp.61 and 64. 
86
 See Eder, B., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 22
nd
 ed., 
2011), para.20-073. 
87
 The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, p.219, per Hobhouse J; The Starsin [2004] 1 A.C. 571. 
A parcel of timber was progressively damaged on voyage because of negligent stowage before 
the voyage began. Charterer bills of lading were issued. It was stated that “the cargo owners 
could, by relying upon the goods owner/sub-bailee relationship, have put the burden on the 
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above, the current principle creates difficulties for the claimant regarding 
matters particularly within the knowledge of the carrier. Moreover, the carrier is 
more knowledgeable (despite not being an expert) in terms of sea carriage 
technicalities than the cargo-claimant. Therefore, it would be logical if the 
burden of proving seaworthiness is imposed on the party who is obliged to 
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, i.e. someone who knows 
best what he did or did not do towards the discharge of his obligation to 
exercise due diligence.  
 
- Rebutting the Existence of the Peril 
An alternative route would be two consecutive contests immediately following 
each other. In the first, the burden is on the carrier who invokes the excepted 
peril. In the second, it is on the cargo-claimant to simply disprove the existence 
or causal connection of the excepted peril invoked by the carrier rather than 
showing that the vessel departed in an unseaworthy condition.88 There may be 
situations where it would be easier for the cargo-claimant to rebut either the 
existence of the peril or the causal connection between the peril and the loss.89 
This might strike a better balance between the claimant and the carrier when 
                                                                                                                                          
shipowners to excuse their failure to deliver the goods undamaged. But at the trial they did not. 
They relied upon a Donoghue v Stevenson claim and had to discharge the burden of proof 
which that entailed”, at [138], per Lord Hobhouse of Woodborough. See also Svenska Trakto 
Aktiebolaget v Maritime Agencies (Southampton) Ltd [1953] 2 Q.B. 295, p.303, per Pilcher J 
(citing the 9
th
 ed. of Carver); Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v Malaysian International 
Shipping Corp Bhd (The Bunga Seroja) (1998) 196 C.L.R. 161, pp.171-172. American cases: 
e.g. The Tuxpan (1991) 765 F.Supp. 1150, p.1173 (S.D.N.Y.).  
88
 If the claimant fails to rebut such exclusion, he is left with an alternative approach as to 
establish the unseaworthiness of the vessel. This proposition would be, however, subject to 
procedural rules of the lex fori. 
89
 Tetley W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4th ed., 2008), pp.934 and 965. See also Margetson 
N., The system of liability of article III and IV of the Hague [Visby] Rules, (2008, Paris Legal 
Publisher), pp.180-181. 
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the claimant has a difficulty90 in proving unseaworthiness or in situations where 
no such inference can be drawn by the court.91 It is submitted that rebutting or 
raising merely an uncertainty as to the peril invoked by the carrier should act in 
favour of the cargo-claimant notwithstanding that the cargo-claimant was unable 
to prove a breach of Article III, r.1.92 
It could not be known whether an English court, without a precedent on this 
point, would adopt such an approach. However, this was, for example, the 
approach of the American court in New Rotterdam Insurance Co. v S.S. 
Loppersum.93 In this case, the cargo was lost during the voyage. The cargo-
claimant made a prima facie case for the loss but the carrier contended that the 
loss was caused by perils of the seas adducing evidence that the weather was 
force nine. The cargo-claimant contradicted the carrier’s evidence by 
introducing evidence by means of weather reports issued by the US Weather 
Bureau to the effect that the weather was force seven. The court accepted the 
reports of force seven and the carrier was found liable. This view suggests that 
it should be sufficient for the cargo-claimant to raise doubts as to the cause of 
damage if he is to discharge his burden of proving the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel. The main aim is to ease the onus on the claimant by providing an 
alternative route to proving unseaworthiness. Consequently, one should not 
look at this proposition as if it is prolonging the stages of the burden of proof. 
                                               
90
 This might depend on the standard of proof that affects the balance of probabilities. Thus, the 
evidence adduced by the claimant must persuade the judge that it is more probable than not on 
the facts that the carrier asserts to invoke the excepted peril. See Tapper C., Cross and Tapper 
on Evidence, (Oxford University Press, 11
th
 ed., 2007), pp.171-172. 
91
 See above, The Hellenic Dolphin [1978] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 336. 
92
 Simon Baughen, Shipping Law, (Routledge, 5
th
 ed., 2012), p.116. 
93
 See New Rotterdam Ins Co. v S.S. Loppersum 215 F. Supp 563, 1963 AMC 1758 (S.D.NY. 
1963). See also Freeman & Slater v M. V. Tofevo 222 F. Supp 964, 1963 AMC 1758 
(S.D.N.Y.1963). (Signs such as absence of proof of proper stowage, damage to the vessel and 
the speed of the vessel in comparison to other vessels’ speed in the vicinity gives indication that 
unexplained alterations in the log book prevented the carrier from demonstrating that the storm 
encountered was not a peril of the seas). 
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The court would look at and examine all the relevant facts after all the evidence 
has been adduced and it would then apply the balance of probabilities approach. 
In the eyes of the court, in some occasions it probably would not matter as to 
where the onus of proof originally lay.94 
It is suggested that the burden of proof should be divided as follows:95 
- The cargo-claimant makes a prima facie case by providing a clean bill of 
lading and evidence for loss or damage. 
- The carrier then invokes an exclusion by proving that the damage was 
caused by an excepted peril. 
- The cargo-claimant will have the burden to (i) disprove the existence of 
the peril; or (ii) rebut the causal connection between the peril and the 
damage. The casting of doubt on the defence raised by the carrier, i.e. 
that the loss or damage was not caused by the excepted peril (or by any 
of the exempted causes) invoked by the carrier would ease the difficult 
burden on the claimant.  
- If the carrier succeeds in proving that the damage was caused by an 
excepted peril, the cargo-claimant can also try to prove that the damage 
was caused entirely or partially by unseaworthiness.  
- The burden is moved back to the carrier to prove that he exercised due 
diligence before or at the beginning of the voyage to provide a seaworthy 
vessel.  
                                               
94
 It was shown above that, as far as English courts are concerned, the standard of proof is on 
the balance of probabilities. See McWilliams v Arroll [1962] 1 WLR 259, p. 307, where Lord Reid 
stated: “when all the evidence has been brought out, it rarely matters where the onus of proof 
originally lay, the question is which way the balance of probability has come to rest.” 
95
 See generally Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of 
conflicting principles’, [2001] LMCLQ 261. Also see the reference made to the same article with 
regards to the evidential and legal burden. 
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Article IV, r.1, of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules provides that “[w]henever loss 
or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness, the burden of proving the 
exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier or other person claiming 
exemption under this article”. However, the Rules make no specific stipulation 
on who bears, at the outset, the burden of proof as to the vessel’s 
unseaworthiness (or seaworthiness) when the carrier claims an exemption 
under Article IV, r.2. This may mean that the position is not at variance with the 
common law approach; thus the court could apply the same. Unless, therefore, 
the Rules are redrafted to stipulate in clear language the order of proof and 
where the burden of proof lies, the court can, arguably, follow an approach 
similar to that in bailment.96 
If, for any reason, the above propositions are not considered applicable, it could 
be suggested that in order to address the difficulties faced by the claimant, a 
contractual provision should be agreed in the contract of carriage that imposes 
an obligation on the parties (or the carrier) to disclose material information, 
including access to all information such as temperature charts, loading plan, 
logbooks, policy reports, survey reports, ISM records…etc. It must be said that 
the interpretation and accordingly the outcome of this proposition would depend 
on the lex fori.  
                                               
96
 See Mankabady, S. ‘The Duty of Care for the Cargo’ [1974] E.T.L. 2, p.12. The author stated 
that the disproof of fault by the carrier is just one approach to proof allocation under the Hague 
Rules. He suggested that the rules should be redrafted to deal with the lack of clarity on the 
order of proof. Also cited in Ezeoke, C., ‘Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the 
contest of conflicting principles’, [2001] LMCLQ 261, at p.273. See also: UNCTAD, The 
Economic and Commercial Implications of the Entry into Force of the Hamburg Rules and the 
Multimodal Transport Convention (TD/BC.4/315/Rev.1) (United Nations New York 1991). where 
it was stated that Rules should be redrafted or modified in a way that it “strikes a fairer balance 
between carriers and shippers in the allocation of risks, right and obligations with regard to 
liability…[and] shift the balance of liability slightly from the shipper to the carrier, but without 
radically changing the established liability system”, para.1; Astle, W., The Hamburg Rules - An 
appreciation of the cause and effect of the amendments to the Hague Rules and Hague-Visby 
Rules, (Fairplay Publications, 1981), p.74. 
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3.2.4  Phase Four: The Carrier’s Further Defence   
If the claimant succeeds in rebutting the defence in Phase Three, the carrier 
might still be able to challenge the claimant’s allegation by proving that the 
defect that caused the loss or damage emerged despite his exercise of due 
diligence pursuant to Article III, r.1.97 In other words, once the claimant has 
proved that the vessel is unseaworthy, the carrier will not be able to rely on a 
particular exception unless he has proved that he exercised due diligence 
before and at the beginning of the voyage in order to make the vessel 
seaworthy.98 One can ask, what would be the standard of proof imposed on the 
carrier to demonstrate that he exercised due diligence?99 Must he demonstrate 
that he exercised due diligence in respect of all aspects of seaworthiness? 
 
 3.3 The Standard of Proving Due Diligence 
The carrier will not be required to demonstrate all actions, precautions and 
supervision associated with all the requirements of exercising due diligence to 
provide a seaworthy and cargoworthy vessel before and at the beginning of the 
voyage. The process would be too long and severe. 
                                               
97
 The Polessk and Akademik Iosif Orbeli [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 40, p.45, per Clarke J. 
98
 The Polessk and Akademik Iosif Orbeli [1996] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 40, where Clarke J expressed 
his provisional thoughts on the burden of proof as follows: “(1) The burden is on the plaintiffs to 
prove: (a) that before and at the beginning of the voyage, the vessel was either unseaworthy or 
improperly equipped or supplied or that at the time the holds were unfit or unsafe for the 
reception, carriage and preservation of the cargo and (b) that the cargo was lost as a result. (2) 
If the plaintiffs prove (a) and (b), the defendants are liable unless they prove that the loss 
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence by themselves, their servants, agents or 
independent contractors.” p.45. 
99
 The standard of proof would again be on the balance of probabilities. 
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Under the current law, what follows from the requirement of causation is that the 
carrier is not required to prove that he had exercised due diligence in all aspects 
of seaworthiness (i.e. the exercise of due diligence in respect of the hull, 
machinery, equipment, cargo holds, supply and spare parts, etc.)100 but merely 
in those aspects alleged by the cargo-claimant.101 In other words, the carrier is 
required to establish, on a balance of probabilities, both the fact of causal 
unseaworthiness and due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
The exercise of due diligence depends on the facts of the case and the 
exception the carrier is relying on to escape liability, such as, perils of the seas 
(Article IV, r.2 (c)). This could make the burden on the carrier difficult to carry. If 
the cause of unseaworthiness cannot be determined, this failure would render 
most exceptions in Article IV, r.2 unavailable.102  However, the carrier, if he 
managed to prove that the damage would have occurred even if he had not 
exercised due diligence, may continue to rely on the exception. 103  In The 
Yamatogowa, 104  the cargo-interests attempted to reclaim their salvage and 
general average contributions due to a defect in the reduction gear which 
caused the vessel to breakdown. It was very difficult to inspect the gear 
                                               
100
 All of the provisions (a) - (c) of Article III, r.1. 
101
 The Heinz Horn [1970] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 191 at p.198 (5 Cir.). It was said in this case that the 
position is different from the Harter Act where the carrier is not exonerated unless due diligence 
has been used to make the ship seaworthy in all aspects, regardless of causal connections. On 
the other hand, the exception under Article IV, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules exonerates 
the carrier unless his lack of due diligence proximately causes or contributes to the loss.  
102
 Schoenbaum, T., Admiralty and Maritime Law (St Paul, 2
nd
 ed., 1994), p.567. “The duty to 
exercise due diligence is sometimes referred to as an “overriding obligation.” This interpretation 
of art III.1 of the Hague-Visby Rules was mainly due to the pre-existing authorities on the 
warranty of seaworthiness implied by the common law to mitigate the effect of carriers’ 
exceptions in the period before the adoption of the Hague Rules. (It was reinforced by the 
presence in the English statute of “subject to the provisions of Article IV” in art III.2 coupled with 
the absence of those words in art III.1.) Therefore, the exception of “fire, unless caused by the 
actual fault or privity of the carrier” in art IV.2(b) does not operate if the fire has been caused by 
the carrier’s failure to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy: Maxine Footwear v 
Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] AC 589; [1959] 2 Lloyds Rep 105.  
103
 See also Cooke J., Voyage Charters, (LLP, 3
rd
 ed., 2007), para.85.107. 
104
 Kuo International v Daisy Shipping (The Yamatogawa) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 39, per Clarke J. 
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because of the way in which it had been designed. During the annual inspection, 
the carrier had inspected the gear but only superficially. The carrier failed to 
exercise due diligence but still succeeded on the basis that a thorough 
inspection of the gear would still not have revealed the defect. The case is 
different where the loss or damage has occurred as a result of more than one 
cause (one of which is unseaworthiness) and each of the causes has 
contributed to the loss or damage.105 
 
 3.4 Concurrent Causes  
The obligation under Article III, r.1 has been construed as an ‘overriding 
obligation’106 and if the carrier has failed to fulfil this obligation, he cannot rely 
on a defence listed in Article IV, r.2. This was indicated in Maxine Footwear Co. 
Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd.107 However, where loss or 
                                               
105
 Smith, Hogg & Co. Ltd v Black Sea & Baltic General Insurance Co. Ltd (1940) 67 Ll. L. Rep. 
253, where Lord Wright stated that: “Unseaworthiness…can never be the sole cause of the loss. 
At least, I have not thought of a case where it can be the sole cause. It must, I think, always be 
one of several co-operating causes”; Monarch SS Co. Ltd v Karlshamns Oljefabriker A/B [1949] 
A.C. 196, p.227, per Lord Wright; “The unseaworthiness as a cause cannot from its very nature 
operate by itself.” 
106
 This expression was used by the Privy Council in Paterson Steamship, Ltd v Canadian Co-
operative Wheat Procedures Ltd. (The Sarnidoc) (1934) 49 Ll. L. R. 421 where it was stated that 
“the burden of proof passed from the consignees to the shipowners to prove some excepted 
peril which relieved them from liability, and further, as a condition of being allowed the benefit of 
that exception, to prove seaworthiness”, p.427, per Lord Wright. He added that “[i]f then goods 
were lost, say, by perils of the seas, there could still remain the inquiry whether or not the loss 
was also due to negligence or unseaworthiness. If it was, the bare exception did not avail the 
carrier,” pp.426-427. 
107
 Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1959] A.C. 589 
(PC). A vessel loaded a cargo at Halifax and before the vessel commenced sailing, some 
scrubber pipe was negligently defrosted by using an acetylene torch, which ignited the 
insulation of the pipes and the fire spread to the rest of the vessel causing a total loss. The 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council held that the obligation under Article III r.1 was an 
overriding obligation. Thus, the carrier was not entitled to rely on the exception list under Article 
IV r.2 as he failed to exercise due diligence. Somervell J. stated that: “Article III r.1 is an 
overriding obligation. If it is not fulfilled and the non-fulfilment causes the damage, the 
immunities of Article IV cannot be relied on. This is the natural construction apart from the 
opening words of Article III r.2. The fact that that rule is made subject to the provisions of Article 
IV and rule 1 [Article IV, r.1] is not so conditioned makes the point clear beyond argument” at 
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damage occurs as a result of two causes (one of which being unseaworthiness), 
the carrier remains liable for the full extent of the damage unless he can show 
how much damage falls within the excepted peril on which he relies. This is 
clear from the ruling of Hobhouse J that “It has long been held in construing 
exceptions clauses in contracts for the carriage of goods by sea, both at 
common law and in the context of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules, that 
where the facts disclose that the loss was caused by the concurrent causative 
effects of an excepted and a non-excepted peril, the carrier remains liable. He 
only escapes liability to the extent that he can prove that the loss or damage 
was caused by the excepted peril alone.”108 So the carrier “will not be allowed to 
invoke an exception to escape from liability for the damage caused by the non-
fulfilment of Art. III, r.1”. 109  It may be particularly difficult to prove the 
apportionment of each loss to each particular cause.110 This might be why there 
are very few cases where the carrier managed to determine the exact amount 
caused by the excepted peril. The position of the current law makes it arguably 
unjust for the carrier who must bear the entire loss caused concurrently by 
unseaworthiness and an excepted cause, even though the unseaworthiness 
                                                                                                                                          
pp.602-603. See also, The Farrandoc [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 276; Standard Oil Company of New 
York v Clan Line Steamers Ltd [1924] A.C.100; Smith, Hogg & Co. Ltd v Black Sea & Baltic 
General Insurance Co. Ltd [1940] 67 Ll. L. Rep. 253, pp.259, 262, per Lord Wright. 
108
  Akt de Danske Sukkerfabrikker v Bajamar Compania Naviera S.A. (The Torenia) [1983] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 210, p.218, per Mr Justice Hobhouse. 
109
 Margetson, N., The System of Liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague-Visby Rules, (Paris 
Legal Publishers, 2008), p.79; Asariotis, R., ‘Allocation of Liability and Burden of Proof in the 
Draft Instrument on Transport Law’, (2002) LMCLQ, 382-398, p.388. Cf. Cooke, J. et al., 
Voyage Charters, (LLP, 3
rd
 ed., 2007), at para.85, p.259; Baughen S., Shipping Law, 
(Routledge Cavendish, 5
th 
ed., 2012), p.113; Treitel, G. and Reynolds F., Carver on Bills of 
Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), para.9.244; Eder, B. et al., Scrutton on Charterparties 
and Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 22
nd
 ed., 2011) at para. 11.030.  
110
 Asariotis, R., ‘Loss due to a combination of causes: burden of proof and commercial risk 
allocation’, cited as Chapter 6 in Thomas, R. (ed.), A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea - The Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext, 2009), p.140; Frank Steven, ‘Apportionment of 
damage under the Rotterdam Rules’, (2011) 17 JIML, 343-359, p.344;  Aikens, R., Lord, R. and 
Bools, M., Bills of Lading, (Informa, 2006), para.10, p.128. 
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was one of the causes of the loss or damage in a very small yet unknown 
percentage.   
 
 3.5 Suggested Solution on Concurrent Causes where one is 
unseaworthiness  
The issue of concurrent causation and the amount of liability of damage for 
each party is not explicitly addressed in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules but is left 
to national courts to apply their own domestic approach. As for the English court, 
the carrier, in order to exclude himself from liability for damage caused by the 
excluded peril, must prove the extent of damage that was caused by the 
excluded peril. A solution would be either to redraft the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules or adopt a new set of rules to deal with this aspect. As for the latter, the 
Rotterdam Rules are a relatively new set of rules and their adequacy in terms of 
properly addressing all of the above issues relating to the burden of proof 
should be assessed. 
A possible solution could be for the court to exercise discretion in deciding the 
percentage of the damage caused by the excluded peril. It would be prudent to 
leave the decision to the national courts and let them define the percentages of 
the loss or damage between the different causes, according to the extent which 
each cause has contributed to the loss or damage and/or how much of the loss 
was attributed to the carrier’s fault. It can also be suggested that the probability 
of unseaworthiness and its causes might play, to a certain extent, a role in 
affecting the discretion of the court to decide the percentage of fault that caused 
the loss or damage. The counter-argument to this suggestion is that this 
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approach might lead to non-harmonised decisions by national courts as each 
court would apply their own rules. This might lead to forum shopping by the 
parties. In this respect, it can be said that this point should be disregarded, the 
reason being that in respect of each international set of rules (not only liability 
conventions) national courts tend to interpret their provisions in a different 
manner.111 Some national courts may not be bound by precedent and may even 
ignore the travaux preparatoires112 that provide an indication of the advantages 
and disadvantages, as well as the underlying principles and reasons for the 
adopted international instrument.  
 3.6 Conclusions  
The current English case law on the question of the burden of proof is 
undoubtedly problematic and lacks clarity. In particular, there are difficulties and 
ambiguities in relation to evidential issues concerning both the order of and the 
standard of the burden placed on the cargo-claimant to prove in the first place 
causative unseaworthiness. Moreover, additional difficulties concerning the 
burden of proof may arise in cases of multiple causes of loss.  
With regard to the difficulties faced by the cargo-claimant in proving 
unseaworthiness, this Part of the Chapter suggests a number of solutions. One 
suggested solution is that the common law principle should no longer be applied. 
Instead, the carrier should first prove seaworthiness (in connection with the 
                                               
111
 See Qais, M., Achieving uniform interpretations of uniform rules: a case study of 
containerisation and carriage of goods by sea, (PhD) thesis (Durham University, 2002) at p.148, 
cited in http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1248/. 
112
 Treitel, G. and Reynolds F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed., 2011), 
where it is noted that “even if the travaux preparatoires are available to a tribunal, it may not feel 
bound by them whether clear or not”’ at para.10-001. 
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cause of the loss or damage) and failing that113 prove that he exercised due 
diligence. This approach is not new. Effectively, this is the bailment approach.114 
There have been authorities115 calling for a change to the current approach. 
Arguably, the answer should be based on fairness and in this respect the 
suggested approach is demonstrably practical. The court can follow the 
approach of McHugh J in the Australia High Court116; as the Judge put it, the 
fact that the cargo reached its destination in a damaged condition or never 
arrived amounts to evidence of breach of the seaworthiness obligation and it is 
therefore incumbent on the carrier to prove the contrary. This, in some cases, it 
might be enough to impose a duty on the carrier to show first that his vessel 
departed in a seaworthy condition and if not, to show that he exercised due 
diligence in this respect. 
Another solution is that relating to the court’s readiness to infer the vessel’s 
unseaworthiness. Courts often show sympathy regarding the difficulties faced 
by the cargo-claimant and can be prompted to infer the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel. This, however, is not a complete solution as the courts need to consider 
certain factors in order to determine whether such inference can and will be 
drawn. Each case will be determined on its particular set of facts and 
                                               
113
 i.e. the carrier must show the seaworthiness as opposed to the cargo-claimant showing 
unseaworthiness but if the carrier fails so that the vessel is found, in the first place, unseaworthy 
before and at the beginning of the voyage, then, as a second stage, the carrier should prove 
that, notwithstanding the vessel’s unseaworthiness, he exercised due diligence in this respect.  
114
 This is also a common law concept but should not be confused with the common law 
principle (mentioned earlier) applied by courts in the absence of specific provision or guidance 
in the Hague/Hague Visby Rules in relation to the burden placed on the cargo-claimant to prove 
the vessel’s unseaworthiness in the first place.    
115
 The Torenia [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210, p.216 and p.219, per Hobhouse J. Treitel, G. and 
Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), para. 9.243 
116
 Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp Bhd (The 
Bunga Seroja) (1998) 72 ALRJ 1592, p.1611, per McHugh J. In non-seaworthiness cases, see 
Pendle & Rivett Ltd v Ellerman Lines Ltd (1927) 29 Ll. L. Rep. 133, p.136, per MacKinnon J. 
(The carrier is virtually required to negative the fault on his part).  
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circumstances which may lack factors that would avail the court of the reasons 
to draw the inference. Thus, the ‘inference approach’ may be of a limited use.  
The third solution relates to the willingness of the court to allow the cargo-
claimant to simply rebut the exclusion relied upon by the carrier rather than 
proving, in the first place, the vessel’s unseaworthiness. This approach provides 
an element of flexibility for the court to decide on each case.  
The courts have recognised the difficulties faced by cargo-interests and, as 
shown by existing case law, in circumstances where it was considered unfair for 
the carrier to escape liability only on the basis of a technical procedural rule of 
law or the lack of a clear provision in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, they have 
expressed their sympathy to the claimants by following one or the other, or a 
combination of the three above approaches. This, however, does not mean that 
the issue should be left unaddressed.    
Additionally, it would arguably be fairer if the carrier was not allowed to rely on 
any of the excluded perils/causes unless he had proved first that he exercised 
due diligence in respect of the matter in question. However, it is also arguable 
that fairness and practicality dictate that the defendant carrier should not be 
answerable for the entire damage if he adduced evidence that roughly gives an 
indication of the extent to which he was responsible for the damage. In this 
respect, therefore, the court should be allowed to exercise discretion in 
apportioning the loss between the contributing causes and the carrier should 
not be held answerable for the entire loss as long as some connection with the 
(or an) excepted peril can be demonstrated.    
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It is suggested that the apportionment of liability must be left open for the court 
to decide and not to be dealt with by the carrier or the cargo-claimant in terms of 
a rigid and pre-determined evidential rule on the burden of proof.  
Do the Rotterdam Rules as drafted provide a solution? Part Two of this Chapter 
will attempt to answer this question.  
Chapter Three 
Part II – The Rotterdam Rules: The Carrier’s Rights and 
Immunities 
 
 3.7 Introduction 
Unlike the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Rotterdam Rules in Article 17 provide 
for a detailed system of liability of the carrier. Even so, it is still not yet clear if 
this new system of liability will provide solutions to existing problems under the 
current system. This section therefore intends to discuss in detail the provisions 
of Article 17 of the Rotterdam Rules and to assess the (arguably purported) 
solutions introduced by the Rotterdam Rules to the problems under the existing 
regime. Insofar as liability for unseaworthiness is concerned, the basic question 
addressed in this section is whether the Rotterdam Rules are an improvement 
of the current regime (the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) or whether the problems 
persist. This will be done by examining Article 17(1)-(6) which covers the liability 
for all or part of the loss, damage or delay and relief from all or part of such 
liability. In addition, there will be a discussion regarding the changes in the list of 
exceptions under Article 17(3) and how these might have a bearing on the 
liability for unseaworthiness. This will include a discussion as to how the 
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possibility of apportionment of loss under the Rotterdam Rules may affect the 
apportionment of loss that is partially contributed to by unseaworthiness, the 
basis upon which such apportionment can be effected and the court’s potential 
approach in this respect.  
3.8  The Language of Article 17117 
Article 17 provides as follows: 
“1. The carrier is liable for loss of or damage to the goods, as well as 
for delay in delivery, if the claimant proves that the loss, damage, or 
delay, or the event or circumstance that caused or contributed to it took 
place during the period of the carrier’s responsibility as defined in 
Chapter 4. 
2. The carrier is relieved of all or part of its liability pursuant to paragraph 
1 of this article if it is proved that the cause or one of the causes of the 
loss, damage or delay is not attributable to its fault or to the fault of any 
person referred to in Article 18. 
3. The carrier is also relieved totally or partially of its liability pursuant to 
paragraph 1 of this article if alternatively there is proof regarding the 
absence of fault as provided in paragraph 2 of this article or more of the 
following events or circumstances caused or contributed to the loss, 
damage or delay: 
(a) Act of God 
(b) Perils, dangers, and accidents of the sea or other navigable 
waters 
                                               
117
 The word ‘fault’ is used in this Article, whereas in the English textbooks and case law, the 
word ‘negligence’ is used. In this Chapter, the word is used interchangeably and means the 
failure of the carrier to fulfil his duty of providing a seaworthy vessel. 
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(c) War, hostilities, armed conflict, piracy, terrorism, riots, and civil 
commotions 
(d) Quarantine restrictions; interference by or impediments created by 
governments, public authorities, rules, or people including detention, 
arrest, or seizure not attributable to the carrier or any person referred to 
in Article 18 
(e) Strikes, lockouts, stoppages, or restraints of labour 
(f) Fire on the ship 
(g) Latent defects not discoverable by due diligence 
(h) Act or omission of the shipper, the documentary shipper, the 
controlling party, or any other person for whose acts the shipper or 
documentary shipper is liable pursuant to Articles 33 or 34 
(i) Loading, handling, stowing, or unloading of the goods performed 
pursuant to an agreement in accordance with Article 13, paragraph 2, 
unless the carrier or a performing party performs such activity on behalf 
of the shipper, the documentary shipper or the consignee 
(j) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising 
from inherent defect, quality, or vice of the goods 
(k) Insufficiency or defective condition of packing or marking not 
performed by or on behalf of the carrier 
(l) Saving or attempting to save life at sea 
(m) Reasonable measures to save or attempt to save property at sea 
(n) Reasonable measures to avoid or attempt to avoid damage to the 
environment, or 
204 
 
(o) Acts of the carrier in pursuant of the powers conferred by Articles 
15 and 16. 
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this article, the carrier is liable for all or 
part of the loss, damage or delay. 
5. The carrier is also liable, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this article, 
for all or part of the loss, damage, or delay if: 
(a) The claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or was 
probably caused by or contributed to by, (i) the unseaworthiness of the 
ship, (ii) the improper crewing, equipping, and supplying of the ship or (iii) 
the fact that the holds or other parts of the ship in which the goods are 
carried, or any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the 
goods are carried, were not fit and safe for reception, carriage, and 
preservation of the goods and 
(b) The carrier is unable to prove that either (i) none of the events or 
circumstances referred to in subparagraph 5(a) of this article caused the 
loss, damage, or delay or (ii) it complied with its obligation to exercise 
due diligence pursuant to Article 14. 
6. When the carrier is relieved of part of its liability pursuant to this article, 
the carrier is liable only for that part of the loss, damage or delay that is 
attributable to the event or circumstances for which it is liable pursuant to 
this article.”  
 
The first comment is that Article 17(5) expressly provides detailed rules with 
regard to the burden and order of proof in general. This is lacking from the 
equivalent provisions in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. It can arguably be said 
205 
 
that this is at least a prima facie improvement. However, before seeing whether 
the codification of this general system of liability developed under the Rotterdam 
Rules is an overall improvement compared to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, it 
is necessary to discuss the changes introduced by Article 17. For example, the 
nautical fault exception118 is removed, and the doctrine of seaworthiness as an 
overriding obligation does not exist in this article. The latter can be understood 
from the language used in the article for it recognises: (a) the ‘partial liability of 
the carrier’ (or ‘liability for only part of a loss’ / ‘all or part’) and (b) a combination 
of causes for a loss (‘cause or causes’ / ‘caused or contributed’). A detailed 
discussion regarding changes in the carrier’s rights and immunities will follow 
after discussion of the allocation of the burden of proof.119 
 
3.9 Allocation of the Burden of Proof by Article 17 of the Rotterdam Rules 
This lengthy Article expressly systemises and allocates the burden of proof 
between cargo-interests and carrier. It is obvious that the language differs, both 
in structure and working,120 from that in the current regime. However, there 
must be a close examination of the issue in order to ascertain whether this 
actually makes any difference to the approach existing under the Hague/Hague-
                                               
118
 There is no nautical fault exclusion in the Rotterdam Rules similar to the one under Article IV, 
r.2(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
119
 Note the express restriction to cargo claims in the introductory wording of Article 17.1. This, 
together with the title of the provision (Basis of liability) and of Chapter 5 (Liability of the carrier 
for loss, damage or delay) suggests that Article 17 is not applicable in the context of a claim by 
the carrier against cargo interests, such as for loss due to dangerous cargo. 
120
 It was said that the language of Article 17 appears to differ from the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules in structure, language and substance. See Asariotis, R., ‘Loss due to a combination of 
causes: burden of proof and commercial risk allocation’ cited as Chapter 6 of Thomas, R. (ed.), 
A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam Rules: An analysis of the 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
(Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), p.146. 
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Visby Rules and whether, and if so to what extent, this language would improve 
the position of the parties.  
 
 
 
3.9.1 Phase One: Article 17(1) – The Claimant’s Prima Facie Case 
Article 17(1) recognises the basic rule that sets in motion every liability process. 
This can basically be described as the claimant showing that he has suffered a 
loss (loss/damage/delay) and that the relevant event occurred during the period 
of the carrier’s responsibility.121 The presumption of liability of the carrier can be 
inferred by providing (a) a clean bill of lading122 and (b) notice of loss, restricting 
the time period during which the damage could have occurred.123 This prima 
facie case is consistent with industry practice established under English law.124 
The prima facie case is only the beginning. The carrier is liable if no persuasive 
evidence is put forward by the carrier to rebut the claimant’s prima facie case. 
However, the subsequent paragraph of Article 17 provides the carrier with some 
tools to escape some or all of the presumptive liability. Whilst, in terms of 
                                               
121
 This is the same as under the current law: e.g. see Aktieselskabet de Danske Sukkerfabriker 
v Bajamar Compania Naviera SA (The Torenia) [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.210, where it was stated 
that “[t]he legal burden of proof arises from the principle: He who alleges must prove”, p.215, 
per Hobhouse, J. 
122
 Stating that the goods were shipped clean on-board, in apparent good order and condition. 
The clean bill of lading is only prima facie proof of the delivery of the goods in good order and 
condition but, once the bill of lading has been transferred to the hands of the endorsee/receiver, 
the evidentiary value of the bill is strengthened as this will not allow the contrary submission 
against a third-party cargo claimant acting in good faith. This principle of the value of the bill of 
lading is now confirmed in Article 41 given to negotiable transport documents and other forms of 
contract particulars (see Article 41(b) (ii) and (c)). 
123
 See Article 23(1) explaining that the carrier is presumed to deliver the goods according to the 
contract description unless notice of loss was given to the carrier before or at the time of 
delivery. 
124
 This is when the goods listed in the bill of lading were entrusted to the carrier in a good order 
and condition but they were damaged or did not arrive at all, see e.g. The Amstelslot [1962] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 539, at p.545, per McNair J; Albacora v Westcott & Laurance [1966] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep.53; this is also the law in US, see e.g. Brown & Williamson v SS Anghyra (1957) 157 Fed. 
Supp.737. 
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proving damage, this may not be of particular importance to general or bulk 
cargoes, the use of containers may cause considerable evidential problems to 
cargo-claimants in proving that the goods inside the container were damaged 
during the custody of the carrier.125 This inevitably raises the question as to 
whether the codification of this prima facie evidential rule makes the claimant’s 
case easier to prove as compared to the current position.  
 
- The potential advantage/ disadvantage in codifying the claimant’s prima 
facie evidence  
a) The inference raised from the prima facie loss of, or damage 
to, the cargo that occurred outside the period of 
responsibility/carriage of the container by the sea carrier 
In some cases, the loss of or damage to containerised cargo may have 
occurred outside the period of the sea carrier’s responsibility. The typical 
example is of cargo missing from inside a sealed container at its final 
destination or the cargo inside a sealed container found to be damaged by fresh 
water rather than seawater due to the unfitness of the container. This might be 
an indication that the sea carrier cannot be responsible (provided that he was 
not responsible for the arrangement of the land carriage) for loss of or damage 
to the cargo, particularly when the container arrived at the loading and 
discharge port sealed and without signs of any external tampering.126 In Article 
17(1) the term ‘the event or circumstance’ imports an alternative way to adduce 
‘prima facie evidence’. This may solve the difficulties faced by the sea carrier in 
                                               
125
 See Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Cavendish Publisher, 5
th
 ed., 2012), p.14. 
126
 It was held in Lutfy Ltd v C.P.R. Co. [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1066, that the fact that the rail 
carrier did not inspect the top part of the container before giving a clean receipt to the ocean 
carrier prevented the land carrier (who might be the cargo-owner) from proving that the 
container had been received in a damaged condition. 
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proving that the actual loss or damage caused inside a sealed container 
occurred outside his period of responsibility, as the ‘event or circumstance’ 
which caused the loss or damage occurred during that other period, i.e. inland 
carriage. ‘Prima facie evidence’ here is meant to be such evidence which, at 
face value alone, is capable of rebutting the cargo-claimant’s prima facie case. 
Thus, the sea carrier could easily overcome the difficulty of rebutting the cargo-
claimant’s prima facie case as the court could easily draw the inference that the 
sea carrier cannot be responsible for damage that occurred inside the sealed 
container. However, it is otherwise submitted that, as regards the loss of or 
damage to the goods, the Rotterdam Rules would make no difference to the 
prima facie rule compared to the current regime.127 
 
b) The inference raised from the prima facie delay occurred during the sea 
carriage 
Loss or damage caused by delay (due to unseaworthiness) may raise a 
different issue. Conceptually, it is often difficult to determine precisely when a 
‘delay’ occurs but it may not be impossible to discover the ‘event or 
circumstance’ that caused the delay, which, for instance, may relate totally to a 
delay of the vessel while at sea.128 Thus, it is submitted that as regards delay in 
                                               
127
 Another point is that under the law of some jurisdictions, the evidential problems linked with 
the carriage of containers can often be solved by proving that the container was apparently in 
good order and condition when received by the carrier but arrived damaged and, by proving so, 
there will be a strong presumption that the loss or damage to the contents of the container is 
attributable to its damage for which the carrier should be held liable; see, for instance, 
Matsushita v S.S. Aegis Spirit 414 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Wash, 1976). 
128
 von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or Delay’ cited as Chapter 5 of von 
Ziegler, A., The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Conventions on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods (Wholly or Partly) by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 
2010). It was stated that: “it may suffice for claimants to prove the factual prerequisite of a prima 
facie delay”, at p.99; Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
209 
 
sea carriage, the reference to ‘event or circumstance’ may assist a cargo-
claimant to establish his prima facie case by demonstrating that the relevant 
event or circumstance occurred during the period of the carrier’s responsibility 
without regard to the timing of the actual loss, damage or delay.129 
3.9.2 Phase Two: Article 17(2) or (3) 
Article 17(2) and (3) provide two different routes for the carrier to relieve himself 
of responsibility if he proves either (a) that the cause of the damage (or part of it) 
was not his fault or the fault of those for whom he is responsible (Article 17(2)); 
or, (b) that the damage was caused (fully or partially) by one of the enumerated 
exceptions contained in Article 17(3).  
It is a known fact that the exemption under Article IV, r.2(q)130 was added to the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules particularly because delegates from civil law 
countries requested it. They did so because lawyers from civil law countries 
were not familiar with listing and enumerating different reasons for exoneration 
of liability.131 They were used to a system where all of what is included in the list 
is covered under a general test of the carrier. The use of the catch all or general 
exclusion provision might be more beneficial to civil law countries and is not 
dissimilar in principle (though dissimilar in construction) to the relevant 
                                                                                                                                          
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 
2010), p.99. 
129
 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010), p.99.   
130
 Article IV, r.2(q) reads: “Any other cause arising without the actual fault or privity of the 
carrier, or without the fault or neglect of the agents or servants of the carrier.” It was laid down 
by Hourani v Harrison (1927) 32 Com. Cas. 305; [1927] 28 Ll. L. Rep. 120, that the second ‘or’ 
in the text is said to be an error and should read as ‘and’. This means that the carrier is not 
merely required to prove the absence of his own fault or privity, but the absence of the fault or 
negligence is also required. See Margetson, N., The system of liability of Articles III and IV of 
the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Paris Legal Publishers, 2008), p.164. 
131
 This was in the course of the seventh plenary session of the Diplomatic Conference, held on 
25 October 1920. See CMI (eds.), The travaux préparatoires of the Hague Rules and of the 
Hague-Visby Rules (Antwerp, 1997), pp.371-390. 
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provisions of the Hamburg Rules and CMR.132 This approach is not favourable 
for a carrier under the English system.133 However, for jurisdictions where the 
court has taken the approach that ‘[i]t is reasonable to place this burden upon 
a carrier because he undertook to carry the goods and he has, or ought to 
have, at his disposal almost all of the relevant information available’,134 a 
carrier’s exoneration from liability is only allowed where he can prove that he 
has operated with due diligence and that the damage has not resulted from his 
fault.135 Article IV, r.2(q) is thus an additional alternative approach in the liability 
regime of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules which is essentially replicated in Article 
17(2) of the Rotterdam Rules. 136  The obvious effect of Article 17(2) is to 
encourage States to unify their liability system with other inland transportation 
regimes should the contract of carriage be door-to-door. 137  This approach, 
based on Article IV, r.2(q) was acknowledged in the Rotterdam Rules in Article 
                                               
132
 See para. 3.11.1.1, at p.262, where it is demonstrated that the carrier need only show one of 
the causes is not attributed to its fault.  
133
 See below why it is not a favourite defence amongst carriers, probably because a heavy 
burden lays on the carrier to be discharged; the carrier has to prove the lack of fault on his part, 
or the fault or neglect on the part of his servants. Also, the other provisions in Article IV, r.2(a)-(p) 
are so wide that it is only on the rarest occasion that the carrier has not been adequately 
accommodated. Further, the ejusdem generis rule could not apply to (a)-(p) exceptions. This 
was the approach taken by Finlay J in Potts & Co v Union S.S. Co of New Zealand [1946] 
N.Z.L.R. 276, at p.286.  
134
As the Second Circuit declared in Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc. v S.S. Hong Kong 
Producer [1969] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.536, at p.543 (2 Cir. 1969) (US case)  “It is almost impossible 
for the shipper to prove that the carrier was negligent or lacked due diligence because as a 
practical matter all evidence on those issues is in the carrier’s hands .” This approach is 
contrary to what is explained in Part I regarding the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
135
 See Hourani v Harrison (1927) 28 Ll. L. Rep.120, where Bankes LJ stated that: “[s]o far as 
the burden of proof is concerned, it is plain that the obligation is laid upon the person seeking 
the benefit of the exception to establish not only that the loss has been without his actual fault or 
privity, but also that it has been without the fault or neglect of his agents or servants,” at p.124 
(C.A.). 
136
 Article 17(3) reads that: “[t]he carrier is also relieved of all or part of its liability pursuant to 
paragraph 1 of this article if, alternatively to proving the absence of fault…” (emphasis added). 
This point was suggested in the CMI Yearbook 2000 - Singapore I, at p.131, para.5.1.2. 
137
 The terms of reference of the International Sub-Committee on Issues of Transport Law 
approved by the CMI Executive Council at its meeting of 11 November 1999 (CMI Yearbook 
1999, at p.117) were the following: “to consider in what area of transport law, not at present 
governed by international liability regimes, greater international uniformity may be achieved; to 
prepare the outline of an instrument designed to bring about uniformity of transport law.” 
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17(2)138 but separated from other exclusion clauses contained in Article 17(3). 
This separation is important to the civil law countries in a way that the entire 
exclusion list which can be of no use to the civil law countries is now covered 
under one general provision. Both provisions are examined below. 
 
3.9.2.1 One Approach: Article 17(2) – The Carrier’s Burden to Prove 
Absence of Fault 
Once the cargo-claimant has established its prima facie case, the burden is on 
the defendant carrier to establish why he should not be liable – wholly or 
partially – for the loss, damage or delay. The carrier will be exonerated if he 
manages to show that ‘the cause or one of the causes of the loss, damage or 
delay is not attributable to its fault or to the fault of any person referred to in 
Article 18.’139 This may arguably look identical to what the carrier would seek to 
establish by relying on Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules at 
Phase Two.140 However, it in fact differs in that it seems easier for the carrier to 
satisfy this burden of proof as compared to the equivalent burden under Article 
IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.141 The carrier may be unable to 
                                               
138
 Article 17.2 provides “the carrier is relieved of all or part of its liability…it proves that the 
cause or one of the causes of the loss, damage, or delay is not attributable to its fault or to the 
fault of any person for whom the carrier is responsible.” 
139
 Article 17(2), Rotterdam Rules. 
140
 Since there is no genus that would embrace all other causes not covered by the rules from 
(a)-(p) of Article IV, r.2, it is generally accepted that it is not required to read into the words ‘any 
other cause’ such as those covered from (a)-(p), and that the words must be given a wide 
interpretation as to provide the carrier with immunity in respect of all cases of cargo loss or 
damage where this has arisen without any neglect or fault on the part of the carrier or his agent 
or servants, as held in Potts v Union S.S. Co. of New Zealand [1946] N.Z.L.R. 276 (New 
Zealand). 
141
 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010). It was 
stated that: “a carrier cannot rely on article 4(2)(q) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules unless 
it can show that its fault (and the fault of those for which it is responsible) did not even contribute 
to the loss or damage”, at p.103; von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or 
Delay’ cited as Chapter 5 of von Ziegler, A., The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the 
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escape liability on the basis of Article IV, r.2(q) because he must show that such 
loss or damage arose solely from the excepted peril and that there was no other 
(non-exempted) cause or contribution by any fault or privity of the carrier.142 
Additionally, the carrier has to prove that the loss or damage occurred without 
the fault or neglect of the agent or servants of the carrier.143 Therefore, under 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules this general exception was of limited use if not, 
as far as the English approach is concerned, effectively redundant due to the 
above difficulties. This is because the carrier cannot rely on any exception 
clause without satisfying first the overriding obligation of exercising due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. 144  Under the Rotterdam Rules, 
however, there is no such condition; the carrier might escape part of the liability 
by showing that part of the loss, damage, or delay ‘is not attributed to its fault or 
to the fault of his servant.’145 
 
- The liability of the carrier attributed to his agent’s negligence 
One could logically suggest that a reading of Article 17(2) together with Article 
18146 would afford the carrier with at least a partial exclusion of liability that is 
                                                                                                                                          
United Nations Conventions on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods (Wholly or 
Partly) by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 2010). It was stated that: “it may suffice for claimants to prove 
the factual prerequisite of a prima facie delay,” at p.99; Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
(Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010). It was stated that: “Article 17(2) indicates that it is 
easier for the carrier to meet this burden of proof than the equivalent burden under the (q) 
clause of the Hague-Visby Rules,” p.103. 
142
 The slightest ‘contribution to the loss or damage’ by the carrier would render the exclusion in 
(q) inapplicable. 
143
 Article IV, r.2(q), Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
144
 See para. 2.16.2, at p.145 and para. 3.4, at p.195. 
145
 Article 17(2), Rotterdam Rules. 
146
 “The carrier is liable for the breach of its obligation under this Convention caused by the acts 
or omissions of: 
(a) Any performing party; 
(b) The master or crew of the ship; 
(c) Employees of the carrier or a performing party; or 
213 
 
not available under Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules; where 
the loss or damage is partially attributed to an act or omission of the carrier, it 
follows that the carrier will only be partially responsible for such loss or damage 
even if it resulted from the negligence of the carrier’s servant (maritime party). 
In other words, under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, in practice, a carrier 
wishing to rely upon this exception must prove not only that the loss or damage 
claimed did not arise from his own actual fault or privity147 but also that it did not 
arise from the fault or negligence of his servants, agents or independent 
contractors. In this respect, a distinction must be made between the act of the 
carrier’s agent that caused unseaworthiness when acting outside the scope of 
his employment and the act of the agent when performing the task delegated by 
the carrier. 
In The Chyebassa,148 a cargo of tea was loaded on board the vessel in Calcutta. 
The vessel was seaworthy at that time. She subsequently called at Sudan, an 
intermediate port, where she discharged part of the cargo and loaded some 
other cargo. Whilst in the port, a stevedore employed by the shipowner stole a 
brass storm valve cover plate. When the vessel later encountered heavy 
weather, seawater gained access to the hold therefore damaging the cargo. 
The shipowner relied upon a number of exceptions under Article IV, r.2, one of 
which was (q), and managed to prove that he had taken reasonable care as 
regards the policing of the stevedores whilst they were working in the vessel’s 
                                                                                                                                          
(d) Any other person that performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations 
under the contract of carriage, to the extent that the person acts, either directly or 
indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or control.” 
147
 See Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Routledge Cavendish, 2010), at p.129-130. 
148
 Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. (The Chyebassa) [1966] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 193. 
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holds.149 The Court of Appeal, stated that the stealing of the cover was in no 
way incidental to the delegated task of unloading/loading the cargo, and that the 
stevedores were not therefore the carrier’s “servant or agent”.150 The Court held 
that the act of the stevedore that interfered with the vessel and rendered her 
unseaworthy was to be regarded as an act of a stranger and, as a result, the 
shipowner was entitled to rely on the exception under Article IV, r.2(q). As long 
as the employee’s or agent’s act (i.e. stealing) is outside the scope of the task 
delegated to him, it is considered to be an act of a stranger and not an act of the 
shipowner’s employee or agent.151 In other words, although an employee or 
agent is considered to be an agent of the carrier for the purposes of 
unloading/loading cargo, he will not be so for the purposes of the above 
exception if his act causing the loss or damage was not within the scope of this 
task.152 
It is unlikely that The Chyebassa would be decided in the same way today. The 
problem in The Chyebassa was that the obligation of exercising due diligence 
under the Hague/Hague-Visby regimes did not cover the entire voyage and thus 
did not make the shipowner liable for unseaworthiness at an intermediate port. 
The Rotterdam Rules now, under the continued obligation to exercise due 
                                               
149
 Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. (The Chyebassa) [1966] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 193, at p.200, per Sellers LJ. 
150
 Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules states: “Any other cause arising without 
the actual fault or privity of the carrier, or without the actual fault or neglect of the agent or 
servants of the carrier, but the burden of proof shall be on the person claiming the benefit of this 
exception to show that neither the actual fault or privity of the carrier not the fault or neglect of 
the agents or servant of the carrier contributed to the loss or damage.” 
151
 Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. (The Chyebassa) [1966] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 193, at p.200, per Sellers LJ. 
152
 Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. (The Chyebassa) [1966] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 193, at p.200, per Sellers LJ, also per Danckwerts LJ, at p.201. See also, RF Brown & Co. 
Ltd v T & J Harrison (1927) 43 TLR 633. As a rule, the stevedores appointed to load or 
discharge a vessel are independent contractors (and not infrequently imposed by local unions 
under monopolistic regimes with not much room, if any, for negotiation or selection by the 
shipowner). However, they are regarded as servants of the shipowner for the purposes of sub-
clause (q). 
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diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, would reverse the ruling of The 
Chyebassa and render the carrier liable for the action of the stevedores under 
Article 18. Article 18 provides that the carrier will be liable (either wholly or 
partially) for loss or damage153 ‘caused by the acts or omissions of: (a) any 
performing party; (b) The master or crew of the ship; (c) Employees of the 
carrier or performing party; or (d) any other person that performs or undertakes 
to perform any of the carrier’s obligations under the contract of carriage, to the 
extent that the person acts, either directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or 
under the carrier’s supervision or control.”154 The Article can only be interpreted 
as holding the carrier (partially or fully) liable for any act of a performing party or 
their employee which caused the vessel to be unseaworthy even if such an act 
is outside the scope of the contract of carriage or the contract of the third party’s 
employment.155 It appears that if and when the Rotterdam Rules do come into 
force, Article 18 will be one of the first provisions which would need to be tested 
                                               
153
 The exact phraseology of the opening sentence of Article18 is that the carrier will be liable 
“….for the breach of its obligation under this Convention caused by….” a certain act or omission. 
This can be read only to mean loss or damage (or delay) caused by the act or omission. The 
literal reading of the provision may appear circular. There must be a breach of an obligation 
caused by an act or omission of a certain person (agent) but when that act or omission does not 
cause a breach (but causes loss or damage) is such an act or omission an act and omission in 
isolation? The phraseology seems to equate ‘breach’ with ‘loss or damage’. If there can be no 
‘loss or damage’ without ‘breach’ then is the liability for any act or omission of such person 
essentially strict? Alternatively, is this provision saved by the combined reading of Article 17(2) 
which refers to ‘fault of any person referred to in article 18?’ (emphasis added).       
154
 The words ‘acts or omissions’ of an employee/agent used in Article 18 of the Rotterdam 
Rules do not have the same meaning with the words ‘fault or neglect’ used in Article IV, r. 2(q) 
of the Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules. It is clear that Article 18 cannot stand alone and that such 
‘acts or omissions’ can be understood only as the ‘faults’ referred to in Article 17(2). Otherwise, 
the carrier will arguably be strictly liable for the ‘acts or omissions’ of any of the persons referred 
to in Article 18.  
155
 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010), pp.144.-
145. The authors have given the following example: a carrier contracts with a stevedoring 
company to unload highly flammable cargo. During unloading, the company’s photographer, 
who is on-board to take pictures for the company’s website, accidentally drops a hot photo lamp 
into the hold. The ensuing fire destroys the cargo. The company is a performing party, but the 
photographer did not perform or undertake to perform any of the carrier’s obligations under the 
relevant contract of carriage. The carrier is still vicariously liable for the photographer’s act or 
omissions under Article 18(c) because the photographer is an employee of a performing party. 
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before a court. Arguably, if The Chyebassa is read in light of Article 18, it would 
provide that a stevedore was simply one of the ‘employees of the carrier or a 
performing 156  party’ and thus the carrier is liable for the stevedore’s acts. 
Consequently, the test that emerged in The Chyebassa is not applicable under 
the Rotterdam Rules. The carrier will also be liable for an act of the stevedores 
even if it was outside the scope of their delegated work.157  Performing parties, 
subject of Article 19,158 would be considered as ‘maritime performing parties’159 
who are subject to the obligation and liabilities imposed on the carrier under the 
                                               
156
 Pursuant to Article 1(6) of the Rotterdam Rules; (a) ‘Performing party’ means a person other 
than the carrier that performs or undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations under a 
contract of carriage with respect to the receipt, loading, handling, stowage, carriage, care, 
unloading or delivery of the goods, to the extent that such person acts, either directly or 
indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s supervision or control. 
(b) ‘Performing party’ does not include any person that is retained, directly or indirectly, by a 
shipper, by a documentary shipper, by the controlling party or by the consignee instead of by 
the carrier.’ 
157
 Unlike the approach that the court follows where the case is one falling within the scope of 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, i.e. Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. 
(The Chyebassa) [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193. The court made it abundantly clear that in the 
interpretation of the effect of Article IV, r.2, stevedores, ship-repairers and others must be 
regarded as agents or servants of the carrier, and any neglect or failing on their part causing 
cargo loss or damage must be regarded as a fault or failure on the part of the carrier, his agents 
or servants. (See http://www.bing.com/news/search?qSamantha+Mumba+is+engaged& 
FORM=MSNTM3&mkt=en-gb&ocid=today). 
158
 Article 19 states that: “1. A maritime performing party is subject to the obligations and 
liabilities imposed on the carrier under this Convention and is entitled to the carrier’s defences 
and limits of liability as provided for in this Convention if: (a) The maritime performing party 
received the goods for carriage in a Contracting State, or delivered them in a Contracting State, 
or performed its activities with respect to the goods in a port in a Contracting State; and (b) The 
occurrence that caused the loss, damage or delay took place: (i) during the period between the 
arrival of the goods at the port of loading of the ship and their departure from the port of 
discharge from the ship; (ii) while the maritime performing party had custody of the goods; or (iii) 
at any other time to the extent that it was participating in the performance of any of the activities 
contemplated by the contract of carriage.  
2. If the carrier agrees to assume obligations other than those imposed on the carrier under this 
Convention, or agrees that the limits of its liability are higher than the limits specified under this 
Convention, a maritime performing party is not bound by this agreement unless it expressly 
agrees to accept such obligations or such higher limits.  
3. A maritime performing party is liable for the breach of its obligations under this Convention 
caused by the acts or omissions of any person to which it has entrusted the performance of any 
of the carrier’s obligations under the contract of carriage under the conditions set out in 
paragraph 1 of this article.  
4. Nothing in this Convention imposes liability on the master or crew of the ship or on an 
employee of the carrier or of a maritime performing party.” 
159
 A ‘maritime performing party’ means a performing party to the extent that it performs or 
undertakes to perform any of the carrier’s obligations during the period between the arrival of 
the goods at the port of loading of a ship and their departure from the port of discharge of a ship. 
An inland carrier is a maritime performing party only if it performs or undertakes to perform its 
services exclusively within a port area.” 
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Rotterdam Rules. If the provisions of Article 19 apply to the performing parties, 
they will be regarded as maritime performing parties. The carrier might in this 
case be encouraged to seek compensation for the damage that was caused by 
the act of the maritime performing party. It is important to note that the 
stevedores in The Chyebassa were would not be considered maritime 
performing parties in light of the Rotterdam Rules, as the actions of the 
stevedores did not fall within the scope of their employment nor within any of 
the carrier’s obligations, e.g. cargo operations. Under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules, if the carrier’s servants are even partially at fault, the carrier cannot rely 
on Article IV, r.2(q).  
 
3.9.2.2 An Alternative Approach: Article 17(3) - The Specific Exceptions 
under the Catalogue of Defences 
a) The Language of Article 17(3) 
Article 17(2), which is similar to Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules, is very wide and is indeed included in the list of exemptions. It should not 
be understood as a supplement to the list of exemptions enumerated in Article 
17(3). The latter article is an alternative means of liability exemption in the 
system of liability provided for by the Rotterdam Rules. 160  The obvious 
interpretation of the opening sentence of Article 17(2), which provides that ‘the 
carrier is relieved of all or part of its liability’, together with the opening sentence 
of Article 17(3), which provides that ‘the carrier is also relieved...if, alternatively, 
to proving the absence of fault as provided in paragraph 2 of this article,...’ is 
                                               
160
   von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or Delay’ cited as Chapter 5 of von 
Ziegler, A., The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Conventions on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods (Wholly or Partly) by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 
2010), p.101. 
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that both Articles 17(2) and (3) stand side by side as alternatives to each other. 
This means that Article 17(2) should not be given a wider interpretation and 
exempt the carrier from liability for all perils, even those included under Article 
17(3) where neither he nor his employees or agents were at fault.161 The use of 
Article 17(2), with the words ‘any other cause’ now omitted, can only be an 
alternative to Article 17(3) when the cause of loss or damage is not included in 
the exclusions listed under Article 17(3).  
The above differs from Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, where 
the opening words ‘any other cause’ of paragraph (q) naturally lends itself to 
being interpreted as an ejusdem generis exception to those listed in paragraphs 
(a) to (p) of Article IV, r.2. Arguably, this could lead to interpretational difficulties 
as any interpretation of Article IV, r.2(q) should only include exceptions of the 
same genus.162 Such a problem should not exist anymore under the scheme of 
Articles 17(2) and (3) of the Rotterdam Rules as the requirement to invoke 
Article 17(2) differs from Article 17(3). Under Article 17(2), “the carrier must 
prove the absence of fault (which will generally require the carrier to prove the 
cause). It must prove not only its own absence of fault but also the absence of 
fault on the part of anyone for whom it is responsible under Article 18…under 
Article 17(3), in contrast, the carrier must prove the cause of the loss…”163  
 
                                               
161
 See Potts v Union S.S. Co. of New Zealand [1946] N.Z.L.R. 276. Cf. Paterson Steamships v 
Canadian Co-operative Wheat Producers [1934] A.C. 538, at pp.549-550. Also, see Astle, W., 
Shipping and the Law (Fairplay Publication, 1997), pp.178-179. 
162
 Eder, B., Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 22
nd
 ed., 2011), 
p.438, para.20-082. 
163
 Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.104. 
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b) The Exclusion List 
The list of exclusions in Article 17(3) is not identical to the traditional catalogue 
under Article IV, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, which has been the 
carrier’s principal recourse to defend himself in most cargo claims. This 
inevitably raises the question as to whether the changes in the new list will 
affect the liability for unseaworthiness and as to whether such changes were 
necessary to strike a fair balance between the respective interests of cargo and 
carrier.  
As outlined above, most of the exceptions in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
have been maintained or incorporated in the catalogue of exceptions in the 
Rotterdam Rules. It is not the intention of this thesis to deal with each and every 
one of those exceptions. This section is intended to concentrate only on the 
changes that may be relevant to the carrier’s potential liability for 
unseaworthiness. 
 
c) Deletion of the ‘Error in Navigation’ Exception 
The most obvious difference in the new list of exceptions is the deletion of the 
first from those included in Article IV, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.164 
This was heavily debated and eliminated under the Hamburg Rules 165  and 
under the UNCITRAL negotiations, as it was a primary goal for many delegates 
and industry observers.166 It dates back to clauses under bills of lading in the 
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 Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.105. 
165
 It was criticised and eliminated under the Hamburg Rules; see Herber, R., The Hamburg 
Rules: A Choice for the E.E.C.? at pp.17 and 41. See also Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam 
Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or 
Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.105. 
166
 See, e.g. 10
th
 Session Report, para.35. 
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nineteenth century.167 The master’s and/or crew’s ‘error in navigation’ exclusion 
has been described as the carrier’s major defence.168 Naturally, this raises the 
question as to what motivated the deletion of such an important defence for the 
carrier from the exclusion list.  
There have been several arguments in support of adding or incorporating this 
exception into a bill of lading. The major one, at the time when the Harter Act 
and the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules were adopted, was the lack of control by the 
carrier himself after the vessel cast off from the berth and commenced her 
voyage. In other words, the carrier’s lack of means of communication with his 
vessel whilst at sea and the fact that the masters had to act on their own 
judgment were the underlying reasons for this argument. 169  Among the 
traditional rationales favouring this exclusion was the perception that the vessel 
herself constituted an adequate incentive for the carrier to take due care when 
appointing a competent master and crew. A more noteworthy rationale, 
however, is that this exclusion emerged as a commercial statutory compromise 
in an era when the carrier was attempting to contract out of every kind of 
liability.170 
                                               
167
 It was included in the Harter Act in 1893. See, Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The 
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, 
(Thomson Reuters, 2010), p.105. See The Glenochil [1896], p.10 and Foreman and Ellams v 
Federal Steam Navigation Co. [1928] 2 K.B. 424. 
168
 Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed., 2011), 
para.9.210. It was described as the ‘shipowners clause’ by Sir Norman Hill at the Hague 
Conference on 31 August 1921; see Sturley M., The Legislative History of the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea Act and the Travaux Preparatoires of the Hague Rules, (F. B. Rothman & Co, 
Littleton 1990), Vol.1, p.248. It was described as ‘…one commonly accepted exemption in 
maritime contracts which would cause most surprise to the man on the Clapham omnibus…’; 
Aikens, R., Lord, R. and Bools, M., Bills of Lading, (Informa, 2006), para.10.201. 
169
 See e.g. The Lady Gwendolyn [1965] P 294, p.330 (Sellers LJ). 
170
 Gosse Millerd Ltd v Canadian Government Merchant Marine Ltd [1929] A.C.223, at p.236, 
per Lord Sumner,”[t]he intention of this legislation in dealing with the liability of a shipowner as a 
carrier of goods by sea undoubtedly was to replace a conventional contract, in which it was 
constantly attempted, often with much success, to relieve the carrier from every kind of liability, 
by a legislative bargain, under which he should be permitted to limit his obligation to take good 
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In view of technological advances171 over the past 90 years and of the more 
demanding safety and operational standards with which the carrier is required 
to comply, the emerging question is whether it would now be satisfactory for the 
carrier to escape liability by pleading ‘act, neglect or default of the master, 
mariner, pilot, or the servants of the carrier in the navigation.’ The answer to this 
question would also indicate the answer to be given to the question as to 
whether it would be a sound policy that the navigational fault defence is 
removed from the list of exceptions in the Rotterdam Rules and whether the 
changes in the exclusion list from the current system is necessary to strike a fair 
balance between the interests of carrier and cargo.  
 
- The Principle of Allocation of Risks 
The deletion of the navigational error exclusion would encourage the carrier to 
take precautions172 by exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel 
and container as long as such precautions do not exceed the cost of any loss or 
diminution in the value of the goods in transit.173 These precautions would be 
                                                                                                                                          
care of the cargo by an exception, among others, relating to navigation and management of the 
ship. Obviously, his position was to be one of restricted exemption.” 
171
 See, in this respect, the argument advanced in Chapter Four dealing with the effect of 
shipping industry standards on the standard of seaworthiness. 
172
 Lord Diplock gives a summary of this close relationship stating that “[g]oods in transit 
inevitably run the risk of being lost or stolen, damaged or destroyed. The risk can be reduced, 
but not eliminated, by physical precautions taken by those persons having custody of the goods 
during the transit…but, taking precautions costs money, which is included in the cost of 
transport and adds to the cost of the goods at their destination. That expenditure is unproductive 
to the extent that it exceeds the cost of any loss or diminution in the value of the goods in transit 
which would have occurred if the precautions had not been taken. The economic aim of any law 
relating to the contract of carriage should be to encourage custodians of goods in transit to take 
those precautions, and no more, which on this basis are economically productive.” In Lord 
Diplock, ‘Conventions and Morals-Limitation Clauses in International Maritime Conventions’, 
(1970) JMLC 525, at pp.525-526. 
173
 Makins, B., ‘The Hamburg Rules: A Casualty?’(1994) 96 Il Diritto Marittimo 637, p.652. It was 
stated that the “[m]andatory marine cargo liability regime is to allocate financial risk between the 
carrier and the cargo interests in an economically efficient manner…thus protecting the credit of 
the bill of lading (or other transport document) as an instrument of currency in international 
trade.” 
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taken by the carrier as a result of the fear of an increase in his P&I calls (or 
premiums) or when the insurer’s recovery costs would be greater than the cost 
of the total loss of the cargo.174 
 
- The Principle of Inconsistency with other Transport Modes 
One can criticise that the nautical fault defence under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules is not consistent with inland transport conventions. All other liability 
conventions impose upon the carrier the liability for cargo loss or damage 
arising out of or resulting from the negligence of the carrier or his agents, 
servants or any person employed by him.175 As explained in Chapter Five,176 
the scope of application of the Rotterdam Rules is for door-to-door carriage 
rather than simply for tackle-to-tackle carriage. Therefore, disregarding and 
deleting the ‘navigational error’ exclusion, a feature especially applicable to sea 
carriage, would only make the marine transport liability under the Rotterdam 
Rules more compatible with the rest of the inland transport conventions.    
 
3.9.3 Phase Three: Article 17(5) - The Proof of Unseaworthiness of the 
Vessel and the Carrier’s Proof of Due Diligence 
                                               
174
 Makins, B., ‘The Hamburg Rules: A Casualty’, (1994) 96 Il Diritto Marittimo 637, p.666. 
175
 In air carriage, for example, a carrier can be exempted from liability for the loss or damage to 
cargo where the carrier successfully proves he or his agent took ‘all necessary measures to 
avoid the damage or where it was impossible for him or them to take such measures’ 
(Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air 
(Warsaw Convention) 1929, Article 18(1)). The CMR Convention imposes absolute liability on 
the carrier that he should keep the vehicle in good condition and that he should be liable for any 
neglect of a person from whom he may have hired the vehicle or neglect the agents or servants 
of the latter (Article 3 and 17(3) of the CMR Convention). 
176
 See para. 5.3, at p.336. 
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Article 17(5) introduces a new provision with regard to the carrier’s liability for 
loss, damage or delay caused wholly or partly by the breach of the 
seaworthiness obligation. It provides that the carrier will also be liable for all or 
part of the loss, damage or delay if the cargo-claimant establishes that the 
vessel was unseaworthy and the unseaworthiness was the probable cause of, 
or contributed to, the loss. However, the burden of proof then shifts onto the 
carrier who will avoid liability if he establishes that the unseaworthiness was not 
a causative event or circumstances or he had exercised due diligence to make 
the vessel seaworthy pursuant to Article 14.  
Article 17(5) (a) requires the cargo-claimant to prove that the loss, damage, or 
delay was or was ‘probably caused by or contributed to’ the unseaworthiness.177  
 
3.9.3.1 Article 17(5)(a): Claimant’s Proof that the Vessel was 
Unseaworthy  
Article 17(5)(a) 178  more or less affirmed the approach adopted under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, 179  that the claimant may prove that the loss, 
damage, or delay was, or was probably, caused by the vessel’s 
unseaworthiness or the improper crewing, equipping, and supplying of the 
                                               
177
 Article 17(5)(a); see A/CN.9/572 - Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work 
of its fourteenth session, para.20, 23-26, 30-31, 33; cf. A/CN.9/544 - Report of Working Group 
III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session, para.131-132. 
178
 “The carrier is also liable, notwithstanding paragraph 3 of this article, for all or 
part of the loss, damage, or delay if: 
(a) The claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or was probably 
caused by or contributed to by (i) the unseaworthiness of the ship; (ii) the 
improper crewing, equipping, and supplying of the ship; or (iii) the fact that 
the holds or other parts of the ship in which the goods are carried, or any 
containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the goods are carried, 
were not for and safe for reception, carriage, and preservation of the 
goods…”   
179
 The Europa [1908] P 84, pp.97-98; Smith, Hogg & Co Ltd v Black Sea and General 
Insurance Co. Ltd [1940] AC 997, pp.1004-1005. 
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vessel, or the fact that the holds, with the addition of the containers supplied by 
the carrier, were not fit and safe for the reception, carriage and preservation of 
the goods or he may prove that any of the above causes contributed to such 
loss, damage, or delay. However, there may be a question raised as to the 
effect of this new wording on the burden of proof for unseaworthiness. The 
answer to this question may also answer the question as to whether Article 
17(5)(a) makes it easier for the cargo-claimant to prove unseaworthiness. 
Arguably, the interpretation and/or application of Article 17(5)(a) may also 
determine the effect of the container’s cargoworthiness and of the carrier’s 
ongoing obligation of due diligence as regards his liability. 
 
3.9.3.2 Determining the ‘probable’ Standard of Causation  
A close reading of Article 17(5)(a) reveals two points worth commenting on. 
First, it is clear from the language of Article 17(5) that, like all other international 
conventions, the Rules are not intended to define a standard of proof for the 
cargo-claimant in asserting his case. This is left for national law to decide.  180 
The standard of proof is a procedural matter and all questions relating to 
procedure are decided according to the court’s national law (the lex fori), which 
extends to questions concerning evidence; for example, the admissibility and 
weight of different kinds of evidence.181 
                                               
180
 Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 6-17 
October 2003), para.131. See Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 
2010), p.113; von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or Delay’ cited as 
Chapter 5 of von Ziegler, A., The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations 
Conventions on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods (Wholly or Partly) by Sea, 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2010), p.109. 
181
 Braekhus, S., ‘The Hague Rules Catalogue - Article IV, r.2, paragraph (c) to (p) of the 1924 
Bills of Lading Convention’ cited as Chapter 1 in Kurt Gronfors, Six Lectures on the Hague 
Rules, (Akademiforlaget-Gumperts, 1967), p.23. The Rotterdam Rules were drafted with the 
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Secondly, the phrase ‘probably’ in the provision refers to both the words 
‘caused’ and ‘contributed’. This might cause an inquiry as to whether a court will 
apply differing degrees or levels of probability between these two words and this 
will inevitably include an inquiry into the interpretation of the word ‘probable’ 
within the context of Article17(5)(a). It has been argued182 that the applicable 
standard of probability should not be the same as the standard that various 
national courts would apply for the burden of proof in terms of causation but that 
it should be somewhat lower. However, because the matter is left to national 
courts and given that most of the complex provisions of any new Conventions 
are in practice to be interpreted and applied by national courts, it is arguable 
that the same standard will be applied to the word ‘probably’ as is currently 
applied to causation. This would effectively mean that the word ‘probably’ in 
Article 17(5)(a) could be taken as referring to a standard equal to that of ‘on the 
balance of probabilities’.183 
 
3.9.3.3 The Potential Interpretation by the English Courts 
In turn, it follows from the above that when the level of ‘causation’ (level of 
probability) differs, the standard of required evidence will vary as well. This will 
                                                                                                                                          
intention of having as wide an application as possible and this might be a reason for not 
including in the Rules an explanation or a definition of the word ‘probably’. Consequently, the 
courts in different jurisdictions will determine the amount and kind of evidence required. 
Naturally, this will depend on the interpretation that will be given by various national courts to 
the phrase ‘probable cause’ and in turn this may vary from one jurisdiction to another. In other 
words, the standard or degree or level of probability is left entirely to national courts, which will 
have to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the cargo-claimant has satisfied that standard; 
see in this respect Hannu Honka, ‘Main Obligations and Liabilities of the Carrier’, (2004), 
Transporttecht, 279-284, p.281. 
182
 See Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), pp.113-114.  
183
 Braekhus, S., ‘The Hague Rules Catalogue - Article IV, r.2, paragraph (c) to (p) of the 1924 
Bills of Lading Convention’ cited as Chapter 1 in Kurt Gronfors, Six Lectures on the Hague 
Rules, (Akademiforlaget-Gumperts, 1967), p.24. 
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arguably be the case not only from one jurisdiction to another184 but also from 
one case to another within similar jurisdictions involving interplay between the 
‘procedural law of the jurisdiction…and the …....substantive laws’.185 This might 
depend to some degree on the readiness of the court to consider the difficulties 
associated with the carrier’s due diligence obligation as extended throughout 
the whole voyage. These difficulties might encourage the English courts to 
interpret the word ‘probably’ as referring to the ‘balance of probabilities’. The 
principle of the ‘balance of probabilities’ is in itself merely a response of the 
courts to problems of evidential impossibility. When there are two or more 
possible competing or contributing causes of a known outcome and it cannot be 
said with some degree of certainty which of them was the cause, it would be 
enough to show which of them was the more probable. 186  The matter of 
differences between the two types of causes (competing or contributing) is 
discussed in the Report of Working Group III of the Rotterdam Rules on the 
work of its 12th session.187 It was suggested that “In the case of concurring [or 
contributing] causes, each event caused part of the damage but none of these 
events alone was sufficient to cause the entire damage (for example, where the 
damage was attributable to both weak packaging by the shipper [Article 17(3)(k)] 
and improper storage by the carrier [which caused unseaworthiness]).”188  
It is submitted that English courts should appreciate the difficulties faced by the 
claimant and should not interpret the word ‘probably’ as referring to the ‘balance 
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 See Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), pp.113-114. 
185
 von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or Delay’ cited as Chapter 5 of von 
Ziegler, A., The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Conventions on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods (Wholly or Partly) by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 
2010), p.108. 
186
 See Peel, E., ‘Lost chances and proportionate recovery’, (2006) LMCLQ 289, p.294. 
187
 Document A/CN.9/544, p.42-45. 
188
 Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 6-17 
Oct 2003): Document A/CN.9/544, para. 142. 
227 
 
of probabilities’ standard.189 Nonetheless, the cargo-claimant should be taken to 
have satisfied the probability threshold even if he has not adequately satisfied 
the ‘balance of probabilities’ standard when he showed that the damage was 
probably caused or contributed to by the unseaworthiness of the vessel 
occurring at any stage of the voyage even if the carrier proved (by invoking 
Article 17(3) that damage was likely to have been caused partially by an 
excepted peril. This is to say that if the carrier argues that the damage was 
caused by an excluded peril under Article 17(3), the claimant’s burden of 
proving causation, under Article 17(5)(a), should be considered to be 
adequately discharged if he proves that “a sufficient causal connection exists 
between an unseaworthy condition and the relevant loss.”190  
In the case of competing causes, “the court might have to identify an event or 
the fault of one party as having caused the entire damage, irrespective of the 
fault of the other party (for example, where the goods were damaged as a result 
of artillery fire hitting the vessel, a decision might need to be made as to 
whether the artillery fire was to be regarded as the only cause of the damage, 
irrespective of the fault the master of the vessel might have committed by 
bringing the ship into a war zone).”191 However, it was pointed out that in this 
second situation [competing causes]; the doctrine of “overriding obligations” 
would often apply. “It was suggested that draft article 14 [now Article 17] dealt 
only with the situation where concurring faults were at stake and not with the 
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 See Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), 
para.10.020. 
190
 See Sturley M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters, 2010), para.5.095. 
191
 Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 6-17 
Oct 2003): Document A/CN.9/544, para. 142. 
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second situation [described as competing causes].”192 No further explanation is 
given by the Working Group as to whether this meant that competing causes 
are not applicable under the Rotterdam Rules, perhaps, for the reason that the 
overriding obligation is no longer applicable under the Rotterdam Rules. 193 
However, if one is assuming that other aspects of causation, e.g. competing 
causes, would still be applicable under the Rotterdam Rules, the reduced 
standard of probability on the claimant should extend to them.   
For example, in The Kite,194 the plaintiff’s cargo, while on board a barge that 
was being towed by a tug of the defendant, was damaged following the barge 
colliding with a bridge. The plaintiff brought an action in tort against the tug-
owners. As there was a prima facie case of negligence against the tug owners, 
the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence and the defendant called the Master 
who had been in charge of the tug. The Master stated that he did not see the 
actual contact but heard the blow and saw the barge flared out owing, in his 
opinion, to the breast rope not having been properly made fast by the lighter’s 
servant as opposed to the tug’s servant. It was held that there was no greater 
probability that the accident happened as a result of negligence on the part of 
the tug owner’s servants or the lighteners’ servants. Applying the provisions of 
                                               
192
 Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 6-17 
Oct 2003): Document A/CN.9/544, para. 142. 
193
 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Limited, 2010), it was stated that: 
“in permitting an allocation of responsibility even when the carrier has breached its due diligence 
obligation, the Rotterdam Rules unequivocally reject the doctrine [of overriding obligation] that a 
carrier must exercise due diligence to furnish a seaworthy vessel before it is permitted to rely on 
its defence.”, at f.t. 215, p.116. 
194
 See e.g., The Kite [1933] P. 154. The claimant’s goods, while on board of one of the 
lighteners’ barges, which with others was in tow by a tug, were damaged through the barge 
colliding with a bridge. The claimant brought an action against the tug owners, framing it entirely 
in tort. There was a prima facie case of negligence against the tug, the plaintiffs called no 
evidence on this point, and the defendants called one witness only, the master in charge of the 
tug, who did not see the actual contact but heard the blow and saw the barge ‘flared out’, owing, 
in his opinion, to the breast rope not having been properly made fast by the lighteners’ servant 
and not the tug’s servants. 
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the Rotterdam Rules to a similar case with competing possible causes of equal 
degrees of probability would have the opposite result. The word ‘probably’ in 
Article 17(5)(a) would be likely to reduce the required level of probability on the 
claimant (barge owner) from the full  burden of proving causation that the carrier 
(tug owner) would be required to prove under Article 17(5)(b)(i). Thus, the 
standard under Article 17(5)(a) “reduced the burden on the claimant to prove 
the causation” and if it applied to a case that has more than one competing 
possible cause with an equal degree of probability, it would help the claimant to 
win the case.195 This brings more fairness to the claimant who faces difficulty in 
gaining access to all the relevant facts that are needed to prove a causal 
reference to potential unseaworthiness.196   
It has been said that the interpretation of the word ‘probably’ will differ and may 
vary, according to facts, between ‘slightly’ or ‘very’. 197  Thus, the level of 
probability (or likelihood) would also be variable and not fixed depending on 
several factors. This may raise the question as to which benchmark is to be 
used by the courts for deciding the applicable level of probability in each case, 
as arguably, in any given case there may be a number of factors affecting the 
level of probability. These factors are explored below.  
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 It was stated that: “[t]he carrier is subject to the normal burden of proof under Article 17(5)(b) 
since that showing would be dispositive of the issue In any event, Article 17(5)(b) uses the 
ordinary causation language that appears in the first paragraph of Article 17 and thus the 
standard is presumably the same.” See Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention 
on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters 
Limited, 2010), para. 5.095 
196
 von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or Delay’ in von Ziegler, A. et al. 
(eds), The Rotterdam Rules 2008, (Kluwer Law International, New York, 2010), p.108. 
197
 See Brons, W. R., ‘The Legal Position of the Carrier in the Light of the Rotterdam Rules’ 
cited as in Lagoni R. et al. (ed.), Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea (Schriften zum 
See - und Hafenrecht, 2010), pp.215-216; Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the 
work of its twelfth session (Vienna, 6-17 October 2003), it was stated that the standard of 
probability is “part way between full proof of causation for the damage and mere allegation of 
[unseaworthiness],” para.132. 
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3.9.3.4 Factors affecting the Level of Probability of Causation 
As has been explained in Chapter Two (at para. 2.14.2) on due diligence, it is 
believed that the court may similarly rely in any given case on particular factors 
for interpretation of the word ‘probably’. There are suggestions below as to what 
these factors may be. 
a) Stage of the Voyage 
Proving unseaworthiness after and/or during the voyage is a new option which 
differs from the current law.198 Given that the obligation of due diligence is now 
a continuous one, it may be more difficult for the cargo-claimant to prove, as 
regards a vessel at sea, the causal connection of unseaworthiness with the 
damage or loss.199 In practice, as far as cargoworthiness is concerned, the 
cargo-claimant might have better knowledge of the condition of the vessel’s 
cargo holds whilst undertaking the cargo loading and stowage,200 or through a 
pre-loading inspection by their surveyor (or charterer’s surveyor if other than the 
cargo-claimant).201 It follows that it might be easier for the claimant to prove 
causative unseaworthiness relating to the period before, rather than after, the 
beginning of the voyage. This problem is partially solved by the readiness of the 
courts to infer unseaworthiness as damage occurred during the voyage.202 
                                               
198
 See para. 3.9.3.5, at p. 245.  
199
 See Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), 
para.10.020. 
200
 The Rotterdam Rules allow the carrier and the shipper/cargo-interests to agree that, the 
shipper, documentary shipper or consignee may perform the loading, handling, stowage, or 
unloading of cargo, thus validating the commonly used FIOS or similar clauses. See Article 13(2) 
and 17(3)(i).  
201
 Petrofina SA of Brussels v Compagnia Italiana Trasporto Olii Minerali of Genoa (1937) 57 Ll. 
L. Rep. 247 (CA). The findings of a surveyor may be relevant in considering whether due 
diligence has been exercised. See for instance, Empresa Cubana Imporan do de Alimentos 
Alimport v Iasmos Shipping Co SA (The Good Friend) [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.586. 
202
 Madras v P & O (1924) 18 Ll. L. R. 93, p.96; Anderson v Morice (1875) L. R. 10, C .P. 609, 
Affirmed (1876) 1 App.Cas 713; Waddle v Wallsend [1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.105, p.139. 
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For a claim based on unseaworthiness to succeed, the claimant must prove the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel as well as the causal link between the 
unseaworthiness and the loss under Article 17(5)(a). For instance, if a cargo 
was damaged by an unexplained fire during the voyage, the carrier will respond 
to the claimant’s prima facia case and will rely on Article 17(5)(b) to exclude all 
or part of his liability for the damage caused by the fire. In response, the 
claimant may prove that the crew were not familiar with the vessel’s firefighting 
system (i.e. where the ship is new) and that the crew’s incompetence renders 
the vessel unseaworthy.203 In this example, one important source of evidence 
from the ship could be a seafarer’s testimony.204 It was stated that it was very 
likely that the fire occurred while the vessel was on the High Seas and damaged 
much of the ship’s stores and supply resulting in inadequate hygiene and food 
of very little nutritional value.205 This may necessitate, prior to any investigation, 
medical assessments as to the crew’s physical health. Such assessments 
would need to take place before any interviewing process took place. Such 
interviews may provide information in relation to the incompetence of the crew, 
which in turn may shed light on how the fire spread and consequently damaged 
the cargo. However, as a result of slow steaming, the vessel may take longer to 
reach a port of refuge or repair. This would add to the time taken to treat the 
crew before interview and will also affect: a- proving the incompetence and that 
the said incompetence is, b- the cause or the probable cause of the fire. Adding 
to that, if the fire spread to the location where records are kept, most of the 
evidence will be destroyed. Furthermore, the vessel may at the port of repair 
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 See the example given in Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters 
Legal Ltd, 2010), pp.115 & 116. 
204
 Maclean, I., ‘Secure the evidence’, MRI, 19 Oct 2012, p.1.  
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 Ibid. 
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start to remove most of the destroyed equipment in order to repair the ship. One 
can argue that the court should consider in a similar case the difficulties for the 
early collecting and securing of evidence that might prove not only the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel but also that the damage was, or was probably 
caused by, or contributed to by, the unseaworthiness/incompetence of the crew. 
The court should consider that “an early assessment of the evidence is vital to 
determine the potential liability to, say, a fire”206 and reducing the standard of 
causation from the normal standard imposed on the carrier when disproving the 
cause of the damage. 
Therefore, a court, having in mind the above difficulties, might differentiate 
between the required levels of probability of causation in cases where the 
vessel is in port as compared to those where the vessel is at sea. In the latter, 
the level may well be lower.  
 
b) The level of probability might depend on the standard of due 
diligence (standard of reasonableness) on the part of the 
carrier during the voyage  
There may be an argument that the court should adopt a new approach that 
links the level of probability to the required standard of due diligence imposed 
on the carrier. As discussed in Chapter Two,207 the standard of due diligence is 
a question of fact depending on a number of factors including the type of the 
vessel, the cargo carried, the route followed,208 access to repair facilities, etc. If 
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 Maclean, I., ‘Time to call in the expert?’ MRI, 01 June 2006, p.1. 
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 See para. 2.14.2, at p. 135. 
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 Artemis Maritime Co. v S.W. Sugar Co. [1951] AMC 1833 (4 Cir. 1951); for a general view, 
see Villareal, D., ‘The Concept of Due Diligence in Maritime Law’, (1971) 2 JMLC 763. 
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the element of causation is integrated with the concept of due diligence,209 
these factors might then have a bearing on the level of probability of causation 
and will vary in accordance with the standard of due diligence. Take for instance 
a ship carrying cargo owned by a single person that was damaged by a defect 
(such as a crack that allowed seawater into one compartment), which emerged 
during the voyage. If the carrier did not repair the defect until arrival of the 
vessel at the port of discharge, the claimant, in order to prove that the extent of 
damage could have been less than it would have been if due diligence had 
been exercised, may need to prove that the damage was or was probably 
caused by or contributed to as a result of the carrier not exercising due 
diligence. For example, in mitigating the loss and stopping the flow of water 
from spreading to other cargo holds. Second, the claimant may need to prove 
that the cause or the probable cause of loss resulted from the carrier’s failure to 
repair the defect on board, as long as such defects were repairable on board. 
Alternatively, it may be proved that the defect necessitated the services of 
technical experts and that the damage that occurred to the second 
compartment was caused or was probably caused by unseaworthiness that was 
exacerbated by not calling at an intermediate port. In effect, the carrier has 
continued without making any repairs at an intermediate port that could have 
prevented much of cargo in the second compartment from being damaged.210 In 
this type of scenario, the carrier, in order to discharge his obligation, should 
demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in keeping the vessel seaworthy by 
carrying out two things; first, mitigating the cargo loss by preventing the water 
                                               
209
 Derrington, S., ‘Due Diligence, Causation and Article 4(2) of the Hague-Visby Rules’, (1997) 
Third International Trade and Business Law Annually, 175-186, p.186. 
210
 The motive for not carrying out a repair at an intermediate port would be that the cost of 
repair at the intermediate port is more expensive than at the port of discharge. 
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from reaching the second compartment; second, repairing the defect (if it is 
repairable by ship’s crew) or calling at the nearest port of repair if the type of 
defect is not repairable on board. The damage would have been less if the 
carrier, at least, had effected one of the above actions. For instance, the carrier 
may have admitted that the defect is not repairable on board and that there was 
an intermediate port of repair closer than the port of discharge but he refrained 
from taking the ship to the intermediate port and relied on Article 17(5)(l), 
namely, “saving or attempting to save life at sea”. For that reason he did not 
divert to the intermediate port of repair to carry out a repair but continued to 
save life at sea. The claimant proves that the ship was unseaworthy, pursuant 
to Article 17(5)(a)(i), in failing to stop the flow of water from running to the 
second compartment and that the unseaworthiness was probably a cause of 
damage to the cargo in the second compartment. This scenario obviously 
contains more than one obligation on the carrier to keep the vessel seaworthy 
thus this might give bearing to the court to reduce the level of probability. Had 
he not succeeded in relying on Article 17(3)(l), the claimant could have proved 
unseaworthiness as a result of not going to an intermediate port of repair. 
Second, the carrier failed to keep the vessel seaworthy in failing to stop the flow 
to the second compartment and that unseaworthiness was probably a cause of 
damage to the second cargo hold. The court should consider the difficulties 
faced by the claimant and allow for a reduced standard of probability of 
causation in cases where the obligation on the carrier to keep the vessel 
seaworthy is heightened, as this will affect the level of probability of causation 
as seen in the above example.   
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c) Differentiation between Proving the ‘cause of’ or ‘contribution 
to’ Unseaworthiness 
Under the current law, in assessing whether the carrier is responsible for loss or 
damage, the claimant has to prove that the loss was one ‘arising or resulting 
from unseaworthiness’.211 The liability for unseaworthiness will follow in cases 
where the unseaworthiness was one of the causes of the loss regardless of 
whether there have been other causes contributing to the loss for which the 
shipowner could have ordinarily excluded his liability under the exceptions listed 
in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. This is what seems to have been in the mind 
of Lord Wright in Smith Hogg & Co v Black Sea & Baltic Ins. Co.,212 with whom 
other members of the House of Lords agreed.213 In this case, the vessel had 
listed to port on taking bunkers because of the combined effect of poor 
seamanship on the part of the master who was excused under Article IV, r.2(a) 
and because of the instability of the vessel as she was overloaded at the port of 
departure; a fact that rendered her unseaworthy. The House of Lords held that 
the unseaworthiness caused the loss. It follows that the standard of causation is 
affirmed to be singular and this was also confirmed elsewhere where the same 
test was being used, regardless of whether other perils had contributed to the 
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loss.214 It is important, however, to note that in the cases referred to above, it 
was stated that for causation purposes we ‘must also look at the whole complex 
of circumstances’ and should approach the issue ‘in a broad common-sense 
way.’ If this flexible and broad common-sense notion is adopted under the 
Rotterdam Rules, a different standard of probability should then be applied 
between cases where loss, damage or delay was caused by unseaworthiness 
and cases where the unseaworthiness merely contributed to such loss, damage 
or delay.  
Under the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier is liable for ‘all or part of the loss, 
damage or delay if (a) the claimant proves that the loss, damage, or delay was 
probably caused or contributed to by (i) the unseaworthiness of the ship…[and 
its variants].’ One would wonder first, whether the word ‘probable’ in Article 
17(5)(a) also qualifies the word ‘contributed’ or whether it should qualify merely 
the word ‘cause’. Second, whether the level of probability of ‘causation’ differs 
from the level of probability of ‘contribution to’ the unseaworthiness of the vessel. 
Assessing the meaning of the words ‘cause’ and ‘contribute’ would be a good 
way of addressing the issue. The ordinary meaning of the word ‘cause' is “a 
person, thing, event, state, or action that produces an effect”.215 In light of the 
Rotterdam Rules, one can define the word “cause” as an event 
[unseaworthiness] that produces an effect (namely, loss, damage, or delay). 
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The Collins dictionary216 defines the term ‘contribute’ as being partly responsible 
for. Therefore, under the Rotterdam Rules, for unseaworthiness to ‘contribute’ 
to the damage, it must be partly responsible for the event, e.g. the ingress of 
water, and consequently increase the severity of the loss, damage or delay. 
Some concerns were given during the drafting process that the phrase 
“contributed to” should not suggest “that if the carrier was in any way 
responsible for any portion of the loss, even only 5 per cent of it, then the carrier 
would be liable for the entire loss.”217 But it should be construed as if “the carrier 
was liable only to the extent it had contributed to the loss or damage”.218 In 
practice, the phrase ‘contribute to’ might mean that entire damage of a 
particular cargo resulted from more than one cause. The claimant can pursue a 
claim of unseaworthiness against the carrier pursuant to Article 17(5)(a) in two 
ways. First, when the claimant “proves that the loss, damage, or delay was or 
was probably caused by […] (i) the unseaworthiness of the ship…” This means 
that the claimant should pursue a claim of unseaworthiness assuming from the 
evidence available to him that the loss/damage/delay resulted from one element, 
e.g. unseaworthiness, and no other factors, such as the excluded perils under 
Article 17(3) or Article 17(2), were involved in effecting the loss/damage/delay. 
In other words, even if the carrier has argued that the damage was caused by 
one excluded peril under Article 17(2) or (3), then the phrase ‘cause’ in Article 
17(5)(a) means that the claimant is proving that the damage resulted or 
probably resulted from unseaworthiness alone, regardless of whether the carrier 
has relied on an excepted peril or not. Alternatively, when the claimant “proves 
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that the loss, damage, or delay was or was probably […] contributed to by (i) the 
unseaworthiness of the ship…” This means that the claimant should pursue a 
claim of unseaworthiness, assuming from the evidence available to him, that the 
loss/damage/delay resulted or probably resulted partially from unseaworthiness 
and partially by the excluded peril under Article 17(3) or Article 17(2) relied upon 
by the carrier. In other words, the claimant is admitting that part of the damage 
resulted from some other factors such as the expected perils which the carrier 
relied on. But the claimant need only prove that part of the damaged cargo 
resulted from unseaworthiness. The phrase ‘contribute’ in Article 17(5)(a) 
means that the claimant has a burden to prove the causation as regards the 
damaged cargo. Admitting that the damaged cargo resulted, to some extent, 
from an excluded peril and unseaworthiness has added to the severity of the 
damage. In other words, the amount of damage would have been less had the 
vessel been seaworthy. It is important to mention that in both of the above 
options, the claimant “should be required to prove both the unseaworthiness 
and that it caused or could reasonably have caused the loss or damage”.219 It 
can be seen that it is easier, at least theoretically, for the claimant to prove 
damage that was caused partially by unseaworthiness in comparison to proving 
damage that was caused solely by unseaworthiness. Take for an example, a 
fire that started in one of the cargo holds and spread to another cargo hold. The 
carrier argued that an unexplained fire started in the first cargo hold and spread 
to the second cargo hold and relied on Article 17(3)(f) to avoid liability. 
Assuming that the claimant concedes that the carrier is not responsible for the 
damage caused by the unexplained fire in the first cargo hold, but he has 
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chosen to prove that part of the damaged cargo in the second cargo hold was 
contributed to by unseaworthiness. This might be an easier task to carry out as 
opposed to proving that the cause of the damage for both cargo holds where 
the claimant would need to prove unseaworthiness and prove each cause of 
damage. The relevant evidence and facts that are needed to prove causation 
are likely to be fewer and easier to collect. Thus, it might be logical if courts 
assume that the word ‘probably’ should apply to the word ‘cause’ only. Although 
the Rotterdam Rules are silent on whether the phrase ‘probably’ applies to the 
phrase ‘contributed’, Sturley argues that the word ‘probably’ applies only to the 
word ‘caused’.220 Adding the word ‘probably’ is “a recognition by the drafter of 
the difficulties for the claimant to gain access to all the relevant facts that are 
needed to form an allegation of causal relevance of unseaworthiness.”221 This 
statement acknowledges the level of difficulties faced by the claimant when 
proving that the cargo damage was caused solely by unseaworthiness. This is 
believed to be similar to the level of difficulties faced by the same claimant who 
instead wishes to prove that the damaged was contributed to by 
unseaworthiness. The difficulty that arises in gaining access to the relevant 
facts arises irrespective of whether he is seeking to prove that the cargo 
damage was caused by or contributed to by unseaworthiness. Thus, some 
courts might consider that the word ‘probable’ in Article 17(5)(a) qualifies not 
only the word ‘cause’ but also the word ‘contributed’. 
Currently, under the Rotterdam Rules, it is unknown whether the court will be 
prepared to draw an inference of unseaworthiness in circumstances where 
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another cause has contributed to the loss. Arguably, it is less likely for the court 
to draw an inference of unseaworthiness because case law on unseaworthiness 
and causation is to the effect that an inference is only drawn in circumstances 
where the carrier is not able to provide the cause of the loss or, on a balance of 
probabilities, an adequate counter-argument. Thus, if the same approach is 
adopted under the Rotterdam Rules, it can reasonably be assumed that when 
unseaworthiness is considered as a contributory cause of the loss, the required 
level of probability as regards causation is unlikely to be the same as that where 
unseaworthiness is considered to be the sole cause of the loss.  
 
d) Increase of Risk causing an Increase of the Probability of 
Loss as an Alternative in Establishing the Causal Connection  
The word ‘probable’ as a qualifying epithet to the words ‘cause’ or ‘contribution’ 
in respect of the loss, damage or delay might be interpreted to impart a less 
exacting standard of causative proof. If so, the problem of some evidential 
shortcomings in any given case for which no one is to be blamed but which 
prevent the making of the causal connection between unseaworthiness and the 
loss would be solved. Further, the carrier’s ongoing due diligence obligation for 
the entire voyage may create the setting for a situation where, subsequent to an 
initially excluded cause, the carrier’s act(s) or omission(s) may be taken to have 
increased the risk to the cargo and contributed to the loss. For example, even 
where a carrier has fulfilled his obligation of exercising due diligence (before 
and at the beginning of the voyage), if a defect manifests during the voyage that 
could only be fixed by a specialist, the risk to the cargo would nonetheless be 
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increased should the carrier decided to carry out temporary repairs. If the carrier 
decided to carry out temporary repairs (i.e. complying with the minimum 
required standard of due diligence) instead of carrying out permanent repairs by 
calling at the nearest repair port, which would have minimised or completely 
eliminated the risk of loss, the decision to carry out temporary repairs may be 
taken to be a contributory cause to the subsequent loss. The carrier’s decision 
not to perform permanent repairs may be taken to have materially increased the 
risk of loss 222  and this might suffice to establish the causal connection 223 
between unseaworthiness and the loss, and as a consequence, a lack of due 
diligence. In other words, a failure by the carrier to comply with a higher 
standard  of due diligence (e.g. higher in a practical sense), which, as a result, 
increased the risk of loss, damage or delay would be taken as a failure to 
exercise due diligence to keep the vessel seaworthy which, in turn, would 
amount to a ‘material contribution’ to the loss, damage or delay. The alteration 
of risk principle is recognised outside shipping law. In the tort of negligence 
case, McGhee v National Coal Board,224 the claimant was employed to work in 
hot and dusty conditions without any cleaning facilities. Consequently, he cycled 
home each day caked in dust and sweat and contracted dermatitis. Although it 
was impossible to prove medically that, but for the dust, he would not have 
contracted the disease, the House of Lords held that the evidential gap ought to 
be filled by the employer,225 whose exercise of precaution would have prevented 
the increased risk to the employee.226    
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Now, the interpretation of the word ‘probably’, as a qualification to the words 
‘caused’ or ‘contributed’ in Article 17(5)(a) might assist to adopt the alteration of 
risk principle that lowers the burden on the claimant to prove the cause of his 
loss. By the same analogy, it would suffice for causation purposes if the 
claimant proved that the loss was ‘probably’ caused, or contributed to, by the 
increased risk.227 Also, in The Fiona,228 the Court of Appeal was reluctant to 
uphold that the above principle applies generally to all claims.229 However, one 
could argue that if the court is ready to infer unseaworthiness without strong 
proof and also recognises the difficulties that a cargo-claimant faces to prove 
unseaworthiness during the voyage, it should be prepared to fill in the evidential 
gaps as an alternative to establishing causation, which does not require 
elaborate legal doctrines.230 
e) Duty to Facilitate the Taking of Evidence - Article 23(6) 
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Article 23(6) of the Rotterdam Rules provides that ‘[i]n the case of any actual or 
apprehended loss or damage, the parties to the dispute shall give all 
reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods231 and 
shall provide access to records and documents relevant to the carriage of the 
goods’ (emphasis added). The emphasised text imposes a general obligation 
on all parties (not only the carrier) to disclose material information to the other 
party where there is an actual or apprehended loss of, or damage to, the goods. 
This would, probably, include access to information such as temperature charts, 
loading plans, logbooks, police reports, survey reports and more importantly, 
ISM records.232 The interpretation of such a duty would vary in accordance with 
the procedural provisions of the lex fori of each Contracting State and thus the 
amount of access to the information would vary from country to country.233 If 
this is true, the word ‘probably’ might be regarded as superficial when the court 
interprets Article 23(6) to impose, on the carrier, maximum access to the 
relevant information.234 Further, there is no provision and, therefore, it is unclear 
what the penalty would be for breach of that duty.235 The non-disclosure of 
(existing) evidence by the carrier might suffice for raising an adverse inference 
making it unnecessary for the claimant to demonstrate a ‘probable’ causal 
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connection and in turn shifting the burden of proof to the carrier.236 On the other 
hand, the unveiling of evidence would not always be regarded as evidence 
against the carrier.237 It has been held that ‘…an adverse inference from the 
non-production of evidence may not be used to satisfy [the claimant’s] evidential 
burden of proof until the burden of production has been shifted [to the 
carrier].’238 
The final point to highlight is the submission by some commentators239 that the 
only fact that speaks for itself under the Rotterdam Rules is that the court, 
insofar as proof of causal connection with unseaworthiness is concerned, 
should refrain from adopting any concept of strict proof. For causation purposes, 
the Rules intended to indicate a burden of proof lower than the normal one and 
this has been the result of a compromise.240 In order to redress the balance, 
however, the carrier can still escape part of the liability even if he did not exactly 
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prove the precise extent of the damage that was caused by the excluded 
peril.241 
It is important to mention that paragraph (5)(a) of Article 17 reflects the 
obligation of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel in Article 14. 
Consequently, a special reference must be made to the new features of 
seaworthiness. First, the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel (cargoworthiness, human seaworthiness, vessel 
seaworthiness) is extended to the entire voyage and does not refer exclusively 
to unseaworthiness at the beginning of the voyage, and secondly, the inclusion 
of the container in the obligation of exercising due diligence. A question that 
may be raised is how these two new seaworthiness features will interact with 
Article 17(5)(a). An associated issue may be whether, and if so to what extent, 
there should be proof by one of the parties of the exact time of the ‘event or 
circumstance’ that caused the unseaworthiness.  
 
3.9.3.5 The Exact Time of the Occurrence of the ‘event or circumstance’ 
that caused the Unseaworthiness: Is Proof Required? 
This matter is not clear and has not been addressed so far. However, an 
attempt is made below to demonstrate, with no particular preference, the 
potential approaches that may be adopted by courts.   
 
a) Proof is Not Required 
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Under the current law, if the evidence adduced by the claimant does not show a 
fault traceable to the period before or at the commencement of the voyage, the 
carrier will not be liable. The unseaworthiness and the defect must be attributed 
to the carrier’s lack of due diligence before or at the commencement of the 
voyage regardless of whether the loss or damage occurred after the 
commencement of the voyage.242 The Rotterdam Rules are silent as to whether 
the cargo-claimant needs to prove that a defect relates to the time before or 
after the beginning of the voyage. Given the now on-going due diligence 
obligation, this issue is of little or no importance. One may therefore surmise 
that this is the reason that there is no relevant provision in the Rotterdam Rules. 
If this is the case, the claimant will not be required to show any more than the 
vessel’s unseaworthiness, regardless of the time of its occurrence. 
Consequently, the extension of the due diligence obligation for the entire 
voyage might be said to indirectly reduce the burden of proof on the cargo-
claimant243 in that he is not required to prove unseaworthiness for the period 
before or at the beginning of the voyage only. This may result in an increased 
number of claims for damage caused by unseaworthiness.  
Support for the above proposition can be given by reference to the language of 
Article 17(5)(a), which codifies the current law requirement for the prima facie 
proof of causative unseaworthiness.244 This codification does not include any 
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requirement to prove when the causative unseaworthiness occurred. 
Nonetheless, a court may need to decide whether the carrier had exercised due 
diligence. As it was argued above, if the court is content to apply a different 
standard of due diligence between the period before or at the commencement 
of the voyage and the period post-commencement, then by necessity it would 
need to examine whether the causative unseaworthiness occurred in port or at 
sea. In turn, the time when the defect manifested itself would be important and 
this would raise an inquiry as to the time and the period at which the carrier 
should have exercised his due diligence to ‘make’ or ‘keep’ the vessel 
seaworthy. Then, proof of the time of the ‘event or circumstance’ would be 
required. 
 
b) Proof is Required 
On the assumption that the court will apply a different standard of due diligence 
for the period before (including the commencement) and after the 
commencement of the voyage and, in this respect, will require that the time of 
the causative unseaworthiness be proved, one might question who should 
ascertain the exact time at which the unseaworthiness emerges. 
Under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the evidence adduced by the claimant 
should give an indication that damage to the cargo was caused by 
unseaworthiness of the vessel, which took place before the commencement of 
the voyage and if the carrier did not exercise due diligence before and at the 
                                                                                                                                          
p.1004, per Lord Wright, applying the common law position in The Europa [1908], p.84; Minister 
of Food v Reardon Smith Line [1951] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 265; for a case where there were 
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beginning of the voyage, he will be liable for his lack of exercising due diligence. 
If the unseaworthiness of the vessel related to a time after the commencement 
of the voyage, then the carrier will not be liable for unseaworthiness. This is 
because the carrier is only required to exercise due diligence at the period 
before and at the beginning of the voyage. “Unseaworthiness does not give rise 
to a cause of action unless it consists of unfitness at the material time (which 
must be at the commencement of the voyage)’”.245 This might not be the case 
under the Rotterdam Rules. If a claimant proves (pursuant to Article 17(5)(a)) 
that the ship was unseaworthy in failing to have adequate navigation charts and 
that unseaworthiness was probably a cause of the damage to the cargo, it might 
not be necessary for the claimant to prove that the unseaworthiness caused the 
damage at the exact time that the unseaworthiness arose. This is because the 
carrier (pursuant to Article 17(5)(b)) has the burden of proving either that the 
damage was not caused by unseaworthiness, or that he exercised due 
diligence and by doing so, he would indicate the time when he exercised due 
diligence. In the above example, if the cargo-interest brought a claim for 
unseaworthiness based on defective charts which caused the vessel to run 
aground and consequently caused damage to the cargo, the carrier will need to 
demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in supplying the latest available 
chart. But what if the carrier failed to demonstrate that he exercised due 
diligence in applying the latest chart correction, which had been released 5 days 
prior to the vessel reaching her discharge port and prior to the grounding of the 
vessel? This would indicate that the carrier had exercised due diligence in 
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supplying the vessel with adequate navigation charts, but he failed to 
demonstrate that he exercised due diligence (by making all the recent 
corrections on the navigational charts) after the beginning of the voyage and 
thus the vessel was unseaworthy as a result of the out of date chart. The 
claimant would not be required to prove the timing at which the 
unseaworthiness occurred. It is irrelevant to the claimant at what point the 
unseaworthiness arose. The issue as discussed above relates to the exercise of 
due diligence; any burden in respect of timing would be borne by the carrier.   
Further, one might propose that the timing issue becomes even more relevant 
when seen from the multimodal container carriage perspective. It will not only 
be a question of before (including the commencement) or after the 
commencement of the voyage but also a question of before the port of loading 
and/or after the port of discharge. This will raise difficulties for the cargo-
claimant.246 
On the one hand, one could argue that the quality of the carrier’s due diligence 
does not need to be examined until the claimant has first shown that the vessel 
was unseaworthy upon sailing. This is because ‘the court may well hear 
evidence of diligence before it decides the question of seaworthiness and that 
the evidence may bear indirectly on the [ascertaining of the timing of the 
occurrence of the causative unseaworthiness]’.247 Therefore, some courts might 
still follow the first of the two proposed approaches. 
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c) Concurrency of Causative Unseaworthiness and Exempted 
Causes: Is Proof Required and by Whom 
Article 17 provides for apportionment of liability if the damage was caused 
partially by a cause included in the exclusion list and partially by 
unseaworthiness. The liability of the carrier might depend on when the excluded 
cause had occurred. Therefore, in the context of the current discussion, this 
would raise the question of whether it is imperative for the claimant to prove that 
the unseaworthiness arose prior to the excepted peril.  
Assume the claimant has proved the unseaworthiness of the vessel when, at 
the same time, the carrier is successfully relying on one of the exception 
clauses (e.g. perils of the seas). Additionally, assume that depending on the 
sequence of the occurrence of each of the two causes, the proportion of loss or 
damage attributed to each of them will be different and, in this respect, timing is 
crucial. The court, in determining the respective proportions, will decide248 the 
proportion of the loss or damage attributed to unseaworthiness on the basis of 
the point in time at which the ‘event or circumstance’ causing the 
unseaworthiness occurred and on the basis of whether this was before or after 
the excluded cause. Although there is no provision as to whether, and if so by 
which party, the time of the occurrence of the causative unseaworthiness must 
be proved, Article 15(b) provides that the burden is on the carrier to prove the 
exercise of due diligence. This might indirectly create the requirement to prove 
the time of the occurrence of the causative unseaworthiness and impose this 
burden on the carrier.  
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3.9.4  Phase Four: Article 17(5)(b)(i) and (ii) - Disproving Unseaworthiness  
Once causative unseaworthiness is successfully shown, the burden shifts onto 
the carrier who must (i) either (dis)prove, pursuant to Article 17(5)(b)(i), the 
causal connection between the unseaworthiness and the loss/damage/delay; or, 
(ii) prove, pursuant to Article 17(5)(b)(ii), that due diligence was exercised.249 
Both options are available to the carrier. The question for the carrier would thus 
be which of the two defence avenues would be easier to pursue. It was 
discussed above250 that there is a possibility that an English court will interpret 
the word ‘probably’ as equal to that of ‘on a balance of probabilities’.251 This will 
frustrate the intention of easing the burden on the claimant of proving the causal 
connection between loss and seaworthiness if the court has not considered the 
difficulties faced by the claimant in gaining access to all the relevant facts that 
are needed. As a result, the standard in Article 17(5)(a) in proving that the 
damage was a ‘probable’ cause of the unseaworthiness will be similar to the 
standard of the burden in Article 17(5)(b)(i) in disproving that the damage was 
caused by the unseaworthiness.  
Where the carrier relies on Article 17(3) to exclude himself from part of the 
liability for damage that was partially caused by unseaworthiness and partially 
by an excluded peril (under Article 17(3)), if the standard of causation to prove 
the connection between the damage and unseaworthiness is considered to be 
equal to a normal standard, i.e. not somewhat lower than the full burden of 
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proving causation that applies elsewhere in Article 17,252 the claimant might find 
it difficult to prove unseaworthiness.  
After the claimant has established, under Article 17(1), prima facie evidence of 
loss or damage, the carrier may then rely on an exclusion listed in Article 17(3). 
What if the claimant managed to prove that the damage to his cargo was 
‘probably caused’ by unseaworthiness according to Article 17(5)(a), and for 
financial reasons he did not engage adequately qualified experts to seek further 
evidence on the assumption that the facts he collected sufficed to satisfy the 
lower standard of proof; i.e. that the damage was caused by unseaworthiness 
as required under ‘probably caused’? Given that the court has held that the 
standard of proof for causation required by ‘probably caused’ is similar to that of 
a balance of probabilities, the defendant carrier, on a balance of probabilities, 
will not be liable for the damage if he responds by proving under the normal 
standard that the damage was not caused by unseaworthiness. This scenario is 
likely to happen if the Rotterdam Rules are first adopted in a common law legal 
system. The standard required to prove that the damage was the cause of 
unseaworthiness will be unknown until paragraphs (5)(a) and (5)(b) of Article 17 
are tested.    
As a result, it might be argued that it will be more convenient for the carrier to 
disprove the fact that unseaworthiness caused the damage under Article 
17(5)(b)(i) than proving the exercise of due diligence under Article 17(5)(b)(ii).253 
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This might be true because, according to Article 17(5)(b)(ii), the carrier has to 
prove that ‘it complied with its obligation to exercise due diligence pursuant to 
article 14’. This perhaps requires that the carrier prove he exercised due 
diligence in relation to all aspects of unseaworthiness rather than just the cause 
suggested by the claimant. Unlike Article 17(5)(a), which provides three 
alternative avenues (responding to the three facets of seaworthiness; (i) ship 
seaworthiness, (ii) crew and equipment seaworthiness, and (iii) cargo-hold and 
container seaworthiness) that the claimant may elect to prove the cause of 
unseaworthiness.254 For instance, the claimant can prove that the damage was 
caused or was probably caused by unseaworthy cargo-holds, which 
corresponds only to paragraph (iii) (‘the fact that the holds or other parts of the 
ship in which the goods are carried…’) as compared to the rest of Article 
17(5)(a). In comparison, Article 17(5)(b) does not outline the three facets of 
seaworthiness. The carrier thus may be required to respond not only to the 
exact case that the claimant alleges, i.e. that the carrier failed to exercise due 
diligence in making the cargo holds seaworthy as required under Article 14(c). 
He is required to prove the fact that he had exercised due diligence with other 
facets of seaworthiness required under (a), (b) and (c) of Article 14.255 It is a 
very heavy burden to prove that the carrier exercised due diligence 
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correspondent to all of the facets of seaworthiness required under Article 14, 
especially now that the obligation is a continuous one.  
It can be said that the claimant in a common law court, would not know whether 
he would benefit from the reduction on the level of probability in terms of 
causation. Until this is clarified, the claimant might face uncertainty as to the 
standard of proof in respect of the causation i.e. that the damage was caused 
by unseaworthiness, and therefore he should approach Article 17(5)(a) with 
great caution. Further, the imprecise drafting of Article 17(5)(b)(ii) might cause 
confusion as to whether the carrier is required to prove that he exercised due 
diligence generally or just in relation to the suggested unseaworthiness. 
Modification is proposed below.  
 
3.10  Proposed Modification- Solution 
As explained above, the Rotterdam Rules place on the shoulders of the cargo-
claimant two tasks: to prove the unseaworthiness and also that the 
unseaworthiness caused or probably caused the loss, damage, or delay. As 
long as the word ‘probably’ is unlikely to make any change to the required 
standard of proof for unseaworthiness, the burden on the shoulders of the 
cargo-interests appears not too different from that under the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules. It has been mentioned above that the difficulties on the claimant in 
proving the cause of unseaworthiness consists of difficulties in relation to 
gaining access to all the relevant evidence that is needed to prove that the 
damage was caused by unseaworthiness. Article 23(6) obliges the parties to 
‘give reasonable facilities to each other for inspecting and tallying the goods and 
shall provide access to records and documents relevant to the carriage of the 
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goods.’ As mentioned earlier, there is no penalty for not complying with this 
obligation. Therefore, the carrier might not be encouraged to provide access to 
the claimant in relation to all of the relevant facts, which may help him to prove 
his case. It is suggested that Article 23(6) should be redrafted to include a 
penalty against the carrier who does not fulfil this obligation. Also, in order to 
overcome the difficulties faced by the claimant in proving that the damage 
caused by unseaworthiness and thus the uncertainty that will emerge from the 
different interpretation by courts in construing the word ‘probable’, one may 
suggest that the obligation under Article 23(6) should be regarded in Article 
17(5)(a) as a solution to the difficulties faced by the claimant in proving the 
causation (the damage was caused by the unseaworthiness). In re-drafting 
paragraph 17(5), in order to redress the imbalance, the following line should be 
added to paragraph (6) to read as follows: “(a) When the carrier is relieved of 
part of its liability pursuant to this article, the carrier is liable only for the part of 
the loss, damage or delay that is attributable to the event or circumstance for 
which it is liable pursuant to this article; and (b) the carrier shall provide access 
to all facts, records and documents relevant to the carriage of goods pursuant to 
Article 23(6)”. 
 
    3.11 Article 17(6) 
A reading of Article 17(6)256 raises a number of questions such as ‘What is the 
system of apportionment of damage?’ ‘Does this Article consist of an individual 
stage of its own?’ ‘Who bears the burden of proving the damage percentage?’ 
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‘Which party bears the risk of “unexplained/unknown losses”?’ This section will 
address these questions. 
 
3.11.1 Concurrent Combination of Losses, One of which is Unexplained 
It is important when discussing the apportionment of liability to differentiate 
between two main types of causes; concurrent causes and competing 
causes.257  It has been stated that “Concurrent causes refers to a situation 
where each event causes part of the damage but none of these events alone 
was sufficient to cause the entire damage.”258 For example, where the entire 
damage was attributed to both the perils of the seas and the unseaworthiness 
of the vessel. Both causes (unseaworthiness and the perils of the seas) are 
operative causes in relation to the loss. These types of causes are different 
from causes which contribute to the total loss, for instance, fire which causes 
part of the loss and failure to put it out the fire, which causes the rest of the loss. 
The secondary damage has contributed to the first event to cause the total loss. 
In the case of competing causes “the court might have to identify an event or 
the fault of one party as having caused the entire damage, irrespective of the 
fault of the other party”.259 This is, for example, when sensitive cargo that needs 
special packing and refrigeration; when the packing of cargo was not 
adequately prepared by the shipper and the carrier did not provide a sound 
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refrigerated cargo hold, the inadequate packing, as a result, would cause all the 
loss, even if the refrigeration system of the cargo holds was also inadequate. 
The improper packing of the cargo would render the cargo a total loss. Similarly, 
the supplying of inadequately refrigerated cargo hold would also result in the 
cargo becoming a total loss, even if the cargo had been adequately packed. It is 
important to mention that all of the examples given by the writer are concerned 
with concurrent causes. 
Under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, if the loss or damage was caused by two 
causes, one of which is unseaworthiness and the other is an excluded peril, e.g. 
perils of the seas, in order for the carrier to be relieved of part of the liability (i.e. 
that which was caused by the excluded peril), the carrier should show the exact 
extent of damage caused by the excluded peril.260 If the carrier fails to prove the 
exact extent, he will be liable for the entire loss. 261  The carrier will be 
responsible for loss that was caused partly by unseaworthiness and partly by 
unexplainable causes.262 Regarding the Rotterdam Rules, the conclusion in 14th 
UNCITRAL Session was that the intention of the draft is to grant the courts the 
task of allocating liability for damage that the carrier is partially responsible for 
while setting aside that which he is not responsible for.263 If there are several 
underlying causes and one or more is unexplained, the court might apply Article 
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17(6) and render the carrier not liable even if he fails to provide evidence which 
demonstrate that he exercised due diligence. This can be an escape route for 
the carrier, as it allows him to withhold evidence and allege that the cause of the 
loss is unexplained. It must be borne in mind that due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy should be exercised at all times. Damages or unexplained 
losses may be attributed to the carrier’s delayed reaction (even where he 
reacted and exercised due diligence) to replace the missing equipment which, 
as a result, further extends the amount of damage. Some views were given 
during the 14th Session to support the approach that the carrier is responsible 
whereas others disagreed.264 Also, commentators265 who have been involved in 
drafting the Rotterdam Rules are of the opinion that in cases involving 
unexplained losses, the carrier will be excused from liability. For instance, after 
establishing a prima facia case, if the carrier proves that the cargo was 
damaged by one excluded peril but the claimant was not able to establish 
unseaworthiness under Article 17(5), the carrier will be relieved of all liability. 
This interpretation is similar to that applied under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules.266  
One may ask how a court will deal with a case where the entire loss was 
caused by more than two underlying causes; unseaworthiness, an excluded 
peril and an unexplained loss. Will the carrier or claimant be responsible for the 
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extent of the unexplained loss? For example,267 after the incident inspection, it 
may be shown that the major cause of damage was the unseaworthiness of the 
vessel (e.g. caused by a crack in the hull) and defective packing also 
contributed to some extent but the combined effect of defective package and 
unseaworthiness does not suffice to explain all of the damage. The damage 
must have been contributed to by another unexplained/unknown cause. If the 
carrier proved that part of the damaged cargo (e.g. 20 per cent of the total 
damaged cargo) was caused by the defective packing (pursuant to Article 
17(3)(k)), the burden shifts to the claimant (pursuant to Article 17(5)(a)(i)) to 
prove that some damage (e.g. 60 per cent of the total damaged cargo) was 
caused by unseaworthiness. However, the rest of the damage (the remaining 
20 per cent) is the result of an unknown cause. It is unclear how a court will deal 
with this type of case; it is most likely that it will relieve the carrier of liability for 
the damage caused by the unexplained/unknown cause.268 It has been stated 
that “as far as the carrier can prove that a part of the loss, damage or delay is 
not attributable to the events or circumstance for which it is liable, the court 
should relieve the carrier of that part of its liability. This is true, even if the exact 
extent of the loss, damage or delay that is not attributable to the events or 
circumstances is not specified.”269 Referring again to the same example, what if 
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the unexplained damage was caused by a defect in the sprinkler of the 
firefighting system (where this type of damage usually renders the vessel 
unseaworthy) that had leaked seawater before the crack in the cargo hold gave 
way and caused 20 per cent of the total damage? What if it was difficult for the 
claimant to gain access to all the relevant facts that prove the unseaworthiness 
as a result of the defective fire system, so that he only managed to gain access 
to facts that lead him to prove unseaworthiness in respect of the crack? 
Arguably the court must consider the type of difficulties that may face the 
claimant especially if the carrier did not allow the claimant to gain access to all 
the relevant facts pursuant to Article 23(6).   
  
3.11.1.1 The Liability under Concurrent Causes where one of the Causes 
is Unseaworthiness 
In order to analyse the apportionment of damage under Article 17(6), it is 
necessary to outline the multiple stages of the burden of proof under Article 17, 
as explained above.  
First stage: Pursuant to Article 17(1), the claimant has to prove either the loss 
or the event that caused or contributed to the loss which occurred while the 
goods were in the carrier’s care. Initially, it is required that the claimant prove at 
which stage the original loss was suffered. If the damage has occurred during 
the inland carriage (namely, outside the scope of responsibility), then, other 
inland conventions are more likely to govern the liability.270  
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seaworthiness obligation and the consequent liability. 
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Reading Article 17(1) on its own (without further addressing the general 
exclusion of Article 17(2) or the exclusion list of Article 17(3) that excludes the 
carrier for loss for which he is not responsible), might make one think that there 
is no issue of causation at this stage nor is there an issue of apportionment.271 
This statement can be questioned upon a closer reading of paragraph (1). The 
reference to ‘caused or contributed’ in Article 17(1) should be read to mean that 
a carrier might be either fully liable, if the claimant was to ‘prove that the 
loss…or event or circumstance was caused during the period of the carrier’s 
responsibility,’ or, if the ‘claimant proves that the loss… or the event or 
circumstances that contributed to it during the period of the carrier’s 
responsibility’, the carrier, as far as this stage extends, will be liable only for the 
damage that he is responsible for.272 So, if the claimant proves that part of the 
loss occurred during carriage and the cause of the rest of the damaged cargo 
was unexplained, then the carrier will be liable for the entire loss if nothing 
further is established beyond the claimant’s prima facie case.273 It must be said 
that the Rotterdam Rules have now made the inland transportation modes 
applicable.274 Thus, knowing that the sea carrier would not be responsible for 
any damage that was caused outside the sea carrier’s responsibility, the claim 
                                               
271
 Compare Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’, (2011) 17 
JIML, at p. 351, where he stated that “there is no issue of causation at this stage, nor an issue 
of apportionment.” Contrast with Sturley, M. et al., (ed.), The Rotterdam Rules - The UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea 
(Thomas Reuters Limited, 2010), para.5.063, where they said that: “the possibility of multiple 
causation is recognised in Article 17(1) by the provision for events or circumstances that caused 
or contributed to the loss, damage, or delay.” 
272
 See Sturley, M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Thomas Reuters Limited, 2010), 
para.5.054. It was stated that: “many cases…will be resolved without going beyond the first step 
[stage].” 
273
 Sturley, M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010), 
at para. 5.064. 
274
 See Chapter Five, para. 5.3, at p.336 
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might be raised for the part of the loss that occurred during the sea carriage and 
the other part of the loss that was caused during the other carriage modes.275 
Second stage: The burden reverts to the carrier to prove in two ways that the 
cause, or part of the cause, of the damage has not been by virtue of his fault: 
either (1) by proving that the loss (or part of the loss) was caused by the general 
defence of Article 17(2) or, (2) ‘alternatively’ by proving that the loss (or part of 
the loss) was caused by one of the excepted perils listed in Article 17(3). If the 
carrier selected the general defence under Article 17(2), in the case of 
concurrent causes, the carrier has to prove that a particular circumstance or 
event was one of the causes of the loss and that this event or circumstance was 
not attributable to its fault.276 However, if the carrier wants to invoke one of the 
excepted perils under Article 17(3) (for example, perils of the seas), he should 
demonstrate that the peril has contributed to the loss. It is of prime importance 
that causation is also demonstrated. A question that has emerged is: ‘who has 
to prove and to what extent do they have to prove that the event or 
circumstances or the excepted peril have contributed to the loss?’ 
 
3.12 The Potential Implicit Burdens that are not mentioned in the Context - 
Allocation of Responsibility in Cases of Multiple Causation  
Article 17(2)-(3) does not explicitly state who has to prove and to what extent 
that they have to prove the event or circumstances of the excepted peril that 
contributed to the loss, on which the carrier relies to exclude part of his liability. 
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 Sturley, M. et al., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010), 
pp.98-99. 
276
 See Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2011) 17 JIML, 
p.351. 
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They do not explicitly state either whether this extent has to be considered at 
the preceding stages (from Article 17(1)-(5)) or only at the final stage of Article 
17(6). To this end, the courts in different jurisdictions may arrive at several 
possible approaches in finding who has the burden of proof; carrier, claimant or 
both parties. The following section will address these approaches. 
 
3.12.1 Allocating Responsibility between Both Parties depending on the 
Decision of the Court 
The court could follow the approach that the burden of proving the extent of the 
liability should be connected with the burden of proving what lies with each 
particular party at a particular stage. A possible interpretation may be that if the 
carrier, pursuant to Article 17(3) wants to be relieved of all or part of his liability, 
he has the burden of proving the absence of fault; that the cause or one of the 
causes of the loss, damage or delay is not attributable to his fault at each stage 
of claim. Another interpretation could be that if he proves that one or more of 
the events or circumstances (the excluded perils) caused or contributed to the 
loss, damage or delay, courts could also impose on the carrier the burden of 
determining the extent of the loss. Similarly, when the burden is reverted to the 
claimant, as for example under Article 17(5)(a), the court may impose the 
burden of determining the extent of the liability on the claimant to prove how 
much damage the unseaworthiness of the vessel has contributed to the loss.277 
The intention of the drafters was to impose on the carrier the proof of fault, in 
other words, the carrier’s initial proof of the cause of the loss. For instance, 
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 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010), at 
para.5.055, 5.101. 
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where an ingress of water has destroyed part or all of the cargo, it is then for the 
claimant to prove that all or part of the damage is due to the carrier’s fault, i.e. 
unseaworthiness.278 
 
3.12.1.1 The Standard of Proof of the Extent of Liability 
It might be sensible to say that the probable causation required by the claimant 
in Article 17(5)(a) is connected closely to the extent of the loss.279 Thus, the 
word “probable” in Article 17(5)(a) would be implicitly applied to the extent of 
liability and thus the standard imposed to ascertain the extent of loss should 
coincide with the standard of causation imposed on the claimant when proving 
causation (that the damage was caused by unseaworthiness). In other words, it 
would not be logical to impose a standard for proving the extent of loss higher 
than the standard required for ‘probable causation’. Otherwise, the Rotterdam 
Rules do not differ to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules as regards how much each 
party is responsible for the damage, even though the drafters of the Rotterdam 
Rules intended to remove the ‘overriding obligation’ that has been adopted in 
some jurisdictions. Common sense dictates that the relevant facts required to 
prove the ‘probable’ causation are similar to the facts used to ascertain the 
extent of damage. If the standard of proving the extent of liability is higher than 
the standard of proving the probable causation, then the claimant is faced with 
another problem in discharging the burden of proof under Article 17(5)(a), 
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 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Legal Limited, 2010), at 
para.5.072-5.087; Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2011) 
17 JIML, 343, at p.349-351. 
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 It might possible to base the apportionment on either the degree of causation or on the 
degree of fault or negligence. See Hart, H. and Honoré, T., Causation in the Law, (Clarendon 
Oxford, 1985), at pp.205, 207-235.  
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namely, proving the probable causation (that the damage caused 
unseaworthiness) and the extent of liability of the loss that was caused by 
unseaworthiness. Consideration must be given to the problems that still create 
difficulties for the claimant to prove the actual percentage of loss (i.e. the 
apportionment of liability).280 
The difficulties behind knowing the exact percentage could be solved by the 
potential obligation required pursuant to Article 23(6). 281  This requires both 
parties to cooperate in good faith, including reference to providing access to 
records and documents relevant to the carriage of the goods.282 Article 23(6) 
imposes a general obligation on all parties to disclose material information to 
the other party where there is an actual or apprehended loss of, or damage to, 
the goods.283 Such coordination, at least theoretically, should assist the other 
parties, e.g. the claimant in satisfying its onus of proof.284   
 
3.12.1.2 The Soundness of this Approach 
Stevens’285 argument that there is no need to impose the entire burden of proof 
of the extent of damage wholly on the carrier is a logical one.286 First, imposing 
                                               
280
 For example if improper stowage makes the vessel unseaworthy and defective packing 
combined to produce damage, no expert will be able to calculate and prove that exactly 39.74 
per cent of the damage was caused by the improper stowage and exactly 60.26 per cent by the 
defective packing. See Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ 
(2011) 17 JIML, p.356. 
281
 See para. the suggestion made in the light of Article 23(6), under para. 3.10, Proposed 
Modification-Solution, at p. 255.  
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 See Article 23(6). See WG III (30 June-11 July 2003) A/CN.9/525, para 100. 
283
 See above sub-para. ‘e- Duty to Facilitate the Taking of Evidence- Article 23(6)’, at p. 243 
284
 See A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.32, p.31. See also WG III (30 June-11 July 2003) A/CN.9/525, para 
96. 
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 See Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2011) 17 JIML, 
343-359, at p.352-3.  
286
 Cf. See Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (4
th
 ed., 2008, Blais), p.917. It is also legitimate to 
say that given the absence of the principle of the burden of proof as regards who is responsible 
for adducing the evidence of proportion of loss, it would be awkward to see courts impose this 
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a burden of proof with regard to the extent of loss lies with the party who has 
the burden of proving facts and causation.287 In the stages (Article 17(2)-(3)), 
assuming that he also has to prove the extent of the liability, the claimant would 
have a clear idea about the area that he needs to counter-prove and there 
would not be any need to re-establish the carrier’s liability with regard to the 
entire loss. Therefore, the difficult part in determining the extent of liability would 
be initiated by the carrier rather than the claimant.288 For instance,289 if the 
carrier managed to prove that perils of the seas caused 60 per cent of the 
damage, he will remain liable for the remaining 40 per cent. Consequently, any 
counter-measure by the claimant in proving the unseaworthiness, at the stage 
of Article 17(5)(a), clearly applies only to that part of the damage (60 per cent) 
for which the carrier might have been relieved of liability in the previous stage 
(of Article 17(2)-(3)). As a result, proving the extent of the damage is not 
imposed entirely on the carrier. 
Secondly,290 it can also be said that if the burden is entirely borne by the carrier, 
it might be unrealistic and unfair to render the carrier losing the defence and as 
a result be fully liable again if the claimant merely proves unseaworthiness, 
without proving the extent of the carrier’s fault that contributed to the damage. It 
might seem logical to take the approach that each party which has the burden 
                                                                                                                                          
burden on the part of the cargo-claimant, despite in reality, it would be an impossible effort for 
the claimant to pursue. See Asariotis, R., ‘Burden of proof and allocation of liability for loss due 
to a combination of causes under the new Rotterdam Rules’, (2008) 14 JIML, 537-554, p.548. 
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 See Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2011) 17 JIML, 
343-359, at p.352. 
288
 Since the investigation for evidence to prove unseaworthiness is not made for the entire loss, 
it is merely made by the carrier who is relying on one of the listed exclusions. For the above 
example, where the carrier has proved that he is not liable for 70 per cent of the loss, and the 
cargo-claimant has managed to prove that 30 per cent of the 70 per cent was contributed to by 
unseaworthiness, the carrier will then only be liable for the remaining 40 per cent. 
289
 A similar approach to the example was given by Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages 
under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2011) 17 JIML, 343-359, at pp.352-353. 
290
 See Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ (2011) 17 JIML, 
343-359, at p.352. 
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of proof should also decide the extent of damage. However, difficulties remain 
where the carrier has successfully discharged his burden of proof under Article 
17(2) or (3), and thus has adduced evidence showing that he should be fully 
relieved of any liability at this stage. The burden of proof will be very difficult for 
the cargo-claimant to discharge, focusing on 100 per cent of the claim rather 
than just 60 per cent as per the above example.  
Thirdly, the complex question of apportionment arises where the claimant has 
difficulty in proving his case. It is quite easily avoided by considering that there 
is only one legal cause of the loss. This is possible when, together with the 
inference of the unseaworthiness of the vessel, there is an inference as to the 
apportionment of liability. In other words, the overall result of the provision 
seems to make the carrier liable if he cannot prove the extent of the loss, 
damage or delay caused by a pleaded excepted peril.291 
 
3.12.2 The Discretion of the Court without Allocating the Responsibility to 
One of the Parties  
Article 17(6) may be construed in a way that reduces any doubt about the 
imprecise wording that made reference (inference) to the apportionment of 
liability from the whole structure of Article 17. Such a paragraph gives the court 
discretionary power for apportionment: ‘or by leaving national courts to 
determine the different portions of the loss to be attributed to each event or 
circumstance, depending on the attribution of causation and/or fault for it.’292 If 
this approach is followed, due to the lack of guidance on the matter of 
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 Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 3
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 ed., 2011), 
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 edn, 2011), 
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apportionment in Article 17 in general and paragraph (6) in particular, courts in 
various jurisdictions are likely to adopt different approaches.  
It can be said that this approach might demand substantial litigation until the 
desired legal certainty can be achieved. However, this approach is not new and 
may be followed in many jurisdictions. 293  It has been considered in some 
jurisdictions294 where, for example, it is used in collision cases and the courts 
have to determine the apportionment of liability between the two colliding 
vessels.295 This might indeed be the case for damage that is caused by the 
mutual faults of the carrier and the cargo-claimant who had jointly contributed to 
the damage of the cargo. One could consider, for instance, that the claimant 
shipper, who is the cargo-owner, failed to inform the carrier of the dangerous 
nature of the cargo. During the voyage, part of the cargo ignited and started a 
small fire, which normally would have been noticed immediately by the crew 
and easily extinguished by means of the vessel’s firefighting equipment. The 
crew negligently failed to notice the fire and in addition the firefighting 
equipment was out of order. As a result, the fire continued to burn and damaged 
the entire vessel and cargo. It should be possible for the court to find, on the 
basis of the proof submitted by the carrier and the counter-proof of the shipper 
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 See Asariotis, R., ‘Loss due to a combination of causes: burden of proof and commercial risk 
allocation’ cited as Chapter 6 of Thomas, R., A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by 
Sea - The Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext Publishing Ltd, 2010), p.148. 
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 See examples given by Stevens, F., ‘Apportionment of damages under the Rotterdam Rules’ 
(2011) 17 JIML, 343-359, at p.348, n.26. In Belgium, the Antwerp Court of Appeal held the 
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collision situations, a ‘both-to-blame’ collision is not a single event that damaged the cargo on 
board the carrying vessel. Rather, another relevant event might be that, along with the carrying 
vessel’s failure to keep a proper lookout (now considered as a lack of exercising due diligence 
to maintain a seaworthy vessel), the other vessel failed to give way. 
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that the carrier has only proven that the shipper breached his obligation and 
caused, for example, 60 per cent of the damage.296 
It appears that proposals were made to WG III, which did not pursue the matter 
further, Including one imposing a burden of proof on the carrier to determine the 
extent to which he was not responsible for the loss, damage or delay, where the 
other imposing party will provide proof but permit apportionment so as to make 
the carrier 50 per cent liable as a last resort. It was held preferable for the 
decision to be left for the national courts to make; even though they may not 
take the same approach.297 
  
3.13  Potential misconception from the imprecise wording  
One scholar298 has stated that, because of the imprecise wording, Article 17(5) 
(the same with Articles 17(2)-(3)) could be read to mean that a court, in its 
discretion, could apply either one of two consequences - relief of all liability, or 
relief of part of the carrier’s liability - if either one of the two scenarios - sole 
cause of the loss, or contributory cause of the loss - is proven. This approach is 
unlikely to be taken by an English court, for three reasons. First, as far as 
English law is concerned, the carrier is responsible for the whole loss even if an 
excepted peril is operative, but this has no place under the Rotterdam Rules.299 
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 von Ziegler, A., ‘Liability of the Carrier for Loss, Damage or Delay’ in von Ziegler, A. et al. 
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Secondly, despite the wording being imprecise, the inference seems to be that 
apportionment at each stage is envisaged; that is, the carrier may be liable only 
for part of the loss.300 This, of course, relates to situations where there are two 
or more operatives causes to which the Rules attribute different results than 
under the current system. The decision of finding the carrier liable for part of the 
entire damage depends upon the extension of loss that is demonstrated by the 
carrier.301 Thus, he will not be exonerated from the entire damage if he could 
not determine that the loss had been fully caused by the excluded peril. Thirdly, 
the court is not likely to take the decision of apportionment without referring to 
the subsequent paragraphs of Article 17(2)-(3) that give the claimant the 
opportunity of holding the carrier liable for losses caused solely by or 
contributing to the loss.  
 
3.14 Assessment of Article 17(6): Is it Sensible to regard paragraph (6) as 
an Individual Stage in Itself? 
Paragraph (6) should not be considered as the stage of apportionment if it is 
being taken on its own for two reasons. First, in Draft WP.56, which presented 
an earlier form of paragraph (6), it is stated that ‘liability must be apportioned on 
the basis established in the previous paragraphs.’302 This line has been deleted 
in the final version. The provision was not to be discussed anymore. The redraft 
was only to shorten the provision and retain the same meaning.303 Likewise, this 
bonds with the idea expressed by a number of delegates that the burden of 
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proof has been clearly detailed at the outset in the paragraphs of Article 17 and 
that the last paragraph (6) should not be construed as reversing this order of the 
burden of proof.304 It is clear, therefore, that the apportionment should not be 
considered to be made at the final stage but only to emphasise the 
apportionment, during each stage of the burden of proof. Secondly, for the court 
to establish the allocation issue, they must find that more than one 
event/circumstance has contributed to the loss/damage/delay and that the 
carrier is partially responsible for such an event/circumstance. That finding 
should be made under the framework established by Article 17(1)-(5). Article 
17(6) instructs the court to adhere to the same approach when allocating the 
apportionment of liability and paragraph (6) was intended to be confined to the 
distribution of loss amongst multiple parties, covering all types of concurring 
causes.305 
 
3.15 Conclusion 
In the Rotterdam Rules, Article 17(1) establishes a prima facie presumption for 
the fault of the carrier if cargo damage occurred during its period of 
responsibility. Paragraph (2) provides that the carrier is excluded from all or part 
of his liability if he demonstrates that the cause or one of the causes of the loss, 
damage or delay was not due to his fault (or the fault of any person for whom he 
was responsible). This provision can be compared to the catch-all exception in 
Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. An alternative route available 
to the carrier is the common law approach, demonstrating that one of the 
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exceptions in paragraph (3) caused or contributed to the loss etc. The most 
noticeable differences in the list compared to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are 
that the “navigational error” exception has been deleted,306 which in practice 
places harder demands on the carrier. 
 One can say that, today, there is no reason for this rule since the carrier is able 
to keep contact with its crew during the whole voyage. The nautical fault 
exception is a remnant from older times and while it is still beneficial for carriers, 
it is nonetheless a provision that cannot be justified in a modern carriage of 
goods regime. Particularly since the obligation relating to seaworthiness has 
been made continuous; it would be inconsistent to keep the nautical fault 
exception. 
Paragraph (5) provides that if the claimant demonstrates that the 
damage/loss/delay was, or was ‘probably’, caused by unseaworthiness and the 
carrier is unable to demonstrate that that was not the case or that it exercised 
due diligence as required by Article 14, then the carrier is also held liable. This 
paragraph puts the burden on the claimant to prove the unseaworthiness and 
the causation. However, the draftsmen’s attempt to consider the difficulties 
faced by the claimant may be reflected by adding the word ‘probably’. Even so, 
this does not ascertain the standard of proof required and it is a matter left for 
national courts to decide, which will probably vary from one jurisdiction to 
another. Nonetheless, it is more probable amongst the untested 
phrases/provisions that the carrier will be given the possibility of not being liable 
for part of the loss, damage or delay for something that is not within his liability. 
Thereby, paragraph (6) comes into play when there are concurrent causes. 
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Overall, it is constantly stressed in Article 17 that more than one cause of the 
loss may be involved since the words ‘caused or contributed to’ are used 
repeatedly. If that is the case, the Rotterdam Rules provide that the carrier may 
be liable for the whole or only part of the loss depending on the circumstances.  
The burden of proof under Article 17 is left for national courts to construe as 
regards the standard of proof on which the balance may be achieved, and this 
will surely vary. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 EFFECT OF SHIPPING STANDARDS ON 
SEAWORTHINESS 
 
“It is Allah Who has subjected the sea to you, that ships may sail through it by His command, 
that ye may see of his Bounty, and that ye may be grateful” 
(AL-Jathiya, Chapter 45, Verse 12) 
 
Introduction 
Laws associated with the carriage of goods by sea have been in existence 
since ancient times. They have developed from policies, customs and 
precedents in common law, and have been influenced by cargo-interests and 
ships’ operators. A major part of Carriage of Goods by Sea Law is, for example, 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules,1 which emerged to regulate the obligations and 
liabilities of commercial interests to a carriage contract. Shipping Law in general 
and Carriage of Goods by Sea Law in particular are likely to mutate according 
to developments within the shipping industry. Such development results from 
the practice of good seamanship, quality customs, scientific research, and from 
related organizations etc.,2 which make a major contribution in establishing the 
standards of the shipping industry that are codified in regulations, codes, 
                                               
1
 Before that there was the Harter Act 1893. 
2
 Numerous groups and associations of non-governmental origin have contributed to the 
process of developing safety regulations, such as shipbuilders and equipment manufacturers; 
shipping companies including shipowners, charterers, fleet operators and managers; seafarers; 
shippers and cargo owners; insurers; classification societies and standard-setting bodies; port 
authorities; and, navigational aid services. The rise in marine incidents led to extensive research 
funded by governments, such as the UK Department of Transport, who, in 1988, funded 
research carried out by the Tavistock Institution. This research resulted in the report The Human 
Element in Shipping Casualties (HMSO, London, 1988) ISBN 0 11 551004 4. This report was 
then taken to the IMO. In 1992, the House of Lord’s Select Committee on Science and 
Technology, chaired by Lord Carver, issued a report on the Safety Aspects of Ship Design and 
Technology, House of Lord Session 1991-92, HL Paper 30-II and HL Paper 75. 
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conventions, and so on. 3  Such standards are considered by courts when 
deciding cases4 and are used as a yardstick when distinguishing a prudent and 
diligent carrier from a negligent carrier who did not comply with his obligations 
e.g. to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
Historically, the need to act in response to shipping casualties and to adopt new 
standards to cope with the thrust of new technologies and developments 
relevant to vessels and their equipment has caused the shipping industry to 
experience numerous legal developments, including the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) Convention and the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention).  
As these conventions influence a major part of the shipping industry, they could 
directly or indirectly affect the carrier’s obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
It would be sensible to consider these conventions, as well as any potential 
issues that affect both the standard of seaworthiness on the one hand and the 
carrier’s obligation on the other. It is therefore crucial to deal with the industry 
standards, which may influence a carrier in complying with his obligation to 
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel in accordance with the 
current Carriage of Goods by Sea Law, i.e. the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
 
4.1 The Relevance and Importance of the Industry Standards  
                                               
3
 Shipping industry can be defined as the rules, regulations and guidance (e.g. conventions, 
codes etc) issued by official bodies at the international or national level concerned with or 
interested in the safety of shipping such as the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). See 
f.n. 12, para. 1.2, at p. 53. 
4
 The shipping industry’s instruments (conventions, codes, regulations etc.) set the standard 
which creates the force behind nearly all of the technical standards and legal rules for safety at 
sea and prevention of accidents, pollution, loss of life and loss of cargo at sea. See Boisson, P., 
Safety at Sea, (1999, Bureau Veritas), p.137. Cooke, J. et al., Voyage Charters, (LLP, 3
rd
 ed., 
2007), para. 11.19. The rules, in general, and seaworthiness, in particular, must be judged by 
the standards and practices of the industry. 
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Shipowners5 have to comply with a number of requirements of the cargo-owner. 
These requirements are ordinarily set out in the contract of carriage or are part 
of various statutory regulations. The application of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules also obliges the shipowner to adhere to certain requirements in order to 
provide a seaworthy vessel.6  
 
The above obligations reflect the common law test of seaworthiness cited in 
McFadden v Blue Star Line,7 which stated that, for a vessel to be seaworthy, 
she “must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent 
owner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage 
having regard to all the probable circumstances of it”.8 In other words, under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the shipowner must exercise due diligence 9  by 
applying all of his knowledge and by taking all reasonable measures according 
to the standards of the industry prevailing at the material time. These standards 
include requirements relating to the vessel’s manning,10 equipment,11 supply12 
and, in all aspects, fitness13 to encounter perils of the seas.  
                                               
5
 The term shipowner is used throughout this chapter in its widest meaning. This includes the 
bareboat charterer and ship manager, i.e. the sea carrier, but excludes the time or voyage 
charterer. 
6
 HVR, Article III, r.1, “The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to 
exercise due diligence to: (a) make the ship seaworthy; (b) properly man, equip and supply the 
ship; (c) make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in 
which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
7
 McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697, p 706, per Channel J. 
8
 Also Field J in Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377, stated that the shipowner should provide a 
vessel “fit to meet and undergo the perils of the sea and other incidental risks which of necessity 
she must be exposed in the course of the voyage,” p. 380. 
9
 Tetley defined due diligence as a ‘genuine, competent and reasonable effort of the carrier to 
fulfil the obligations set out in subparagraph (a), (b) and (c) of Art III (1) of the Hague or Hague-
Visby Rules’. See Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 2008), p.876. 
10
 See The Roberta (1938) 60 Ll Rep 84, where the court held the ship to be unseaworthy 
because the shipowners employed an engineer who proved to be incompetent. Also, The 
Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 719, where the master’s ignorance of fire hazards, lack of 
supervision of stevedores and particular characteristics of the firefighting equipment on the ship 
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4.2 The Potential Legal Implications of the Industry Standards on 
Seaworthiness 
As mentioned above, the law is dynamic and has reasonable flexibility to 
develop and meet the constant changes of the industry. This illustrates that the 
legal question of what constitutes the necessary level of seaworthiness and due 
diligence has changed over time and will continue to change in line with trends 
of the shipping industry.14  
This is because “[s]eaworthiness must be judged by the standards and 
practices of the industry at the relevant time, at least so long as those standards 
and practices are reasonable”.15 
It goes without saying that there are a vast number of regulations governing the 
industry’s standards and it would be impossible to cover every one of them in 
                                                                                                                                          
constituted incompetence and consequently rendered the vessel unseaworthy due to improper 
manning. 
11
 Project Asia Line Inc v Shone (The Pride of Donegal) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 659, where 
defects in the generators amounted to a real risk that the ship might have been left without 
power during the course of the voyage and therefore rendered the vessel unseaworthy; 
Haracopos v Mountain (1934) 49 Ll. L Rep 267, where a defect in the steering gear rendered 
the vessel unseaworthy. 
12
 A Turtle Offshore SA v Superior Trading Inc (The A Turtle) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 177, where 
there was a breach of the exercise of due diligence by providing inadequate bunkers at the 
commencement of the voyage, which in turn rendered the tug unseaworthy. However, the 
defendants were protected from liability by an exemption clause. See also Owners of Cargo 
Lately Laden on Board the Makedonia v Owners of the Makedonia (The Makedonia) [1962] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 316, where contaminated bunker fuel rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
13
 The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 40, where damaged plating and deformation of the bracket 
rendered the vessel unseaworthy; Southern Sugar & Molasses Co Insurance v Artemis Maritime 
Co Insurance [1950] AMC 2054, where loose rivets rendered the vessel unseaworthy; Huilever 
SA v The Otho [1943] AMC 210, where a crack in one of the ship’s hull plates rendered the 
vessel unseaworthy. 
14
 See Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v ST Shipping and Transport Inc. (The Elli & The Frixos) 
[2008] 2 Lloyds Rep 119. Clause 52 of the NYPE form reads “owners warrant that the vessel is 
in all respects eligible under application conventions, laws and regulations for trading to and 
from the ports and places specified in Clause 4 of the Charter Party and that she shall have on 
board for inspection by the authorities all certificates, records, compliance letters and other 
documents required for such services … Owners further warrant that the vessel does, and will, 
fully comply with all applicable convention, law, regulations and ordinances of any international, 
national, state or local government entity having jurisdiction including … MARPOL 1973/1978 as 
amended and extended and SOLAS as amended and extended.” For further information, see 
the previous chapters. 
15
 Papera Trades Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai Merchant Co Ltd and Another (The Eurasian 
Dream) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, para.127, as per Cresswell J affirming the words of Lord 
Sumner. 
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this study.16 This Chapter will cover some of the international industry standards, 
which have a direct impact on a vessel’s operational standards and may impact 
upon the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. In 
particular, reference will be made to two IMO conventions that are widely 
adopted and enforced by most of the maritime nations, namely17: 
 The International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 1974, as 
amended18; 
 The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and 
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, as amended. 
The first convention sets out rules and regulations that are principally concerned 
with the strength and fitness of a vessel and the reliability of its machinery and 
equipment, as well as the management and security of the vessel. The second 
provides minimum standards for formal qualifications, such as training, 
certification and watchkeeping capabilities, relevant to the competence of the 
crew. These conventions aim to promote a culture of safety at sea and improve 
the standards of the shipping industry, which in turn impacts upon the standard 
of seaworthiness. In other words, both directly or indirectly relate to the 
shipowner’s/carrier’s obligation under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules to exercise 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. This means that the required 
                                               
16
 Although other regulations contribute to the industry’s standards, such as those of 
classification societies, they generally exclude the ship’s operational standards, i.e. manning, 
crew qualification, equipment management and lifesaving appliances such as lifeboats, life rafts 
and lifejackets, navigational aids, on-board equipment and navigational equipment such as 
radar, electronic charts and Gyro. 
17
 In Hodges, S., ‘The ISM Code and the law of Marine Insurance’, p.12, cited in http://www.nadr. 
co.uk/articles/published/shipping/ISMMarineInsurance.pdf. Hodges has affirmed that safety of 
ships relates to seaworthiness, although it has a specific and precise meaning under maritime 
law. Still, this particular aspect of safety is regulated primarily by IMO conventions, namely, 
SOLAS 1974, the Load Lines Convention 1966 and STCW 1978. 
18
 For example, certificates required by SOLAS (to be issued by the Flag administrations) 
include the international tonnage certificate, passenger ship safety certificate, cargo ship safety 
certificate and load line certificate, etc. 
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standard of care or due diligence set by law might be assessed by reference to 
the standards of the industry that prudent shipowners would require to be set for 
their vessels.19 For example, if a vessel’s construction does not comply with 
industry standards, such as SOLAS, or if heavy corrosion has resulted in the 
ingress of water damaging the cargo, then the vessel is rendered 
unseaworthy. 20  It is noted that rules and regulations, such as SOLAS 21  or 
STCW, usually set the minimum standards of the industry. 22  Yet, for the 
purposes of the seaworthiness obligation, in certain circumstances, even 
compliance with these minimum standards may not suffice. 
 
4.3 SOLAS23 
SOLAS requires Flag States to enforce compliance with its minimum safety 
standards as regards the construction, equipment and day-to-day operations of 
ships.24 The minimum standards set by SOLAS influence the seaworthiness of 
the vessel,25 as they apply to the entire construction of the ship and her cargo 
                                               
19
 See The Subro Valour [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 at p.516; and the same point in The Kapitan 
Sakhrov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255; [2000] C.L.C. 933, where Auld LJ stated “the test to be 
objective, namely to be measured by the standards of a reasonable shipowner, taking into 
account international standards and the particular circumstances of the problem in hand”, p.947. 
20
 See The Miss Jay Jay [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 32 (CA), where a design error, namely, using 
materials in the design that were unsuitable for the purpose of navigation, was held to have 
rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
21
 For example, the purpose of SOLAS is “to specify minimum standards for the construction, 
equipment and operation of ships, compatible with their safety.”  
22
 The undertaking implied by common law requires that the vessel be seaworthy. There is no 
implied undertaking that the vessel be a ‘safe ship’ in English law, though this is probably the 
case in the US. For American cases, see The Fiona [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 506; Woolf v Clagget 
[1800] 170 E.R. 607. However, these rules were adopted into English law by the Merchant 
Shipping (Safety of Navigation) Regulations 2002, SI 2002/1473, as amended by SI 2004/2110. 
23
 The generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices governing ship 
construction, equipment and seaworthiness required by Article 94 and other provisions of 
UNCLOS are essentially those contained in SOLAS, the Load Lines Convention and MARPOL. 
24
 See http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-for-the-Safety-of-Life-at-Sea-(SOLAS),-1974.aspx. 
25
 Harrison, J., Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), at p.159; Honka, H. ‘The standard of the vessel and the 
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holds.26 Further, SOLAS regulates the technical standards for the construction 
of the ship, life-saving equipment, radio communications, safety of navigation, 
carriage of cargoes including hazardous cargoes, safety management on ships, 
and measures to enhance maritime security.27 The materials used must comply 
with a particular standard. The vessel should be designed in such a way to 
withstand the perils of the sea and to deliver the cargo safely and without harm 
to human life or the sea. Ships should be fitted, in accordance with SOLAS, with 
adequate detection and protection systems to prevent the outbreak of fire and 
have a suitable number and type of extinguishers to fight fire.28 Life-saving 
appliances should be adequate to save the life of the crew in the case of an 
emergency. Equipment, navigational equipment, spare-parts and the machinery 
of the ship are no exception; they must be adequate, which requires that there 
be a spare or stand-by equipment ready to be used at all times, and of the 
approved type.29  
                                                                                                                                          
ISM Code’ cited as Chapter 4 in Schelin, J., Modern Law of Charterparties (Axel Johnson 
Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, University of Stockholm, 2003), at p.114. 
26
 See The Princess Victoria [1953] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 619. The Court of Appeal, upholding the 
findings of the lower court, held that the weather, though severe, was not so phenomenal or 
abnormal as not reasonably to have been foreseen; that the loss was due to the inadequacy of 
the stern doors and poor design of the clearing ports of the door, and was contributed to by the 
shifting of cargo stowed on the car deck; that the ship was in consequence unseaworthy in that, 
by reason of her defects, she was unable to cope with sea perils which should reasonably  have 
been anticipated. In the American case, The Marine Sulphur Queen [1973] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 88, 
the court held that the vessel breached building regulations when converted from a tanker to a 
sulphur carrier and was therefore unseaworthy. Both cases are cited in Spurin, C. H., The Law 
of International Trade and Carriage, Chapter nine, at p. 34-35. It is important to state that the 
construction regulations of merchant vessels are extracted from the regulations of SOLAS, the 
Load Lines Convention and the rules of the classification society of the vessel. See also 
Leornard v Leland (1902) 18 T.L.R. 727, where, during a lifeboat drill, a hook fell off and a davit 
broke. The plaintiff, the lifeboat and the hook fell into the water. The jury, by reason of the 
defective hook and davit of the lifeboat, ruled in favour of the plaintiff. The lifeboats, their hooks 
and davits are nowadays regulated by SOLAS, Regulations 19-20.  
27
 Harrison, J., Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development of International Law, 
(Cambridge University Press, 2011), at p.159. 
28
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719. Discussed in detail below, see p.283-284 
29
 SOLAS Chapter III, Regulation 20, sec.5, provides that: “Spares and repair equipment shall 
be provided for lifesaving appliance and their components which are subject to excessive wear 
or consumption and need to be replaced regularly.” SOLAS, Chapter III, Regulation 7.2, as 
amended on 6 July 2010 by MSC. 201 (81), provides that: “2.1 A lifejacket complying with the 
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The above requirements make no difference when comparing SOLAS with the 
duty to exercise due diligence. The latter demands the effort of a competent and 
reasonable carrier or any person working for him to provide a safe and 
seaworthy vessel in order to fulfil the requirements set out in Article III, Rule 1 of 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.30 
Due diligence obliges the shipowner to carry out all reasonable measures in 
light of the standards of the industry for the purpose of providing a seaworthy 
vessel and to ensure the safe state of the vessel. In this manner, the safety of 
shipping is, 31  at present, governed principally by the international industry 
standards; i.e. conventions and regulations. SOLAS is therefore one of those 
standards.  
In an American case,32 the Judge indicated that the court is guided by rules, 
such as SOLAS, to ascertain whether the vessel is seaworthy or not. Thus, all 
vessels must comply with these regulations and must “have on board a reliable 
compass or compasses, sextants and sounding apparatus and be equipped 
with adequate charts, light books, pilot books, lists of radio beacons, and 
notices to mariners”.33 This quotation emphasises the fact that a vessel might 
                                                                                                                                          
requirements of paragraph 2.2.1 or 2.2.2 of the Code shall be provided for every person on 
board the ship and, in addition: 
1 for passenger ship on voyage less than 24 h, a number of infant life jackets equal to at least 
2.5% of the number of passenger on-board shall be provided”. SOLAS, Chapter III, Regulation 
32 requires the carriage of immersion suits which applies to cargo ships over 500GT to carry 10% 
additional (minimum 2) immersion suits required for people working at remote control stations 
such as the bridge and engine room. 
30
 See also, Margetson, N., The System of Liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague (Visby) 
Rules (Zutphen: Uitgeverij Paris, 2008). 
31
 The old phraseology of ‘unseaworthy ship’ as in the old s.457 M.S.A. 1894 has been replaced 
to a ‘dangerously unsafe ship’ under s.44 M.S.A 1988 in respect of a vessel that is ‘unsafe to go 
to sea.’ ‘Dangerously unsafe ship’ still applies under the M.S.A 1995. The most recent edition of 
MSA 1995 has altered all of the above section numbers. 
32
 The Southwark (1903) 191 U.S. at 8-9, 24 S. Ct. 
33
 The Southwark (1903) 191 U.S. at 8-9, 24 S. Ct. at p.3.  
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be rendered unseaworthy if she is not equipped with any equipment that is 
mandatory under SOLAS.  
In short, SOLAS aims to provide the minimum standards of the shipping 
industry as regards technical aspects and the integrity of the vessel’s 
construction, strength, design and the safe carriage of cargo. 
 
4.3.1 Objectives of SOLAS - Construction and Equipment of the Vessel   
SOLAS34 sets out industry standards in respect of the vessel’s design by laying 
down technical regulations on the construction and equipping of the vessel in 
order to prepare her to withstand the perils of the sea to which she will be 
exposed during navigation. First, SOLAS aims to prevent the structural failure of 
the vessel; as such, a failure can cause damage to the cargo and/or the sinking 
of the vessel. Accordingly, each vessel has to be built strong enough to 
withstand hydrostatic35 and hydrodynamic36 forces. In other words, if a vessel is 
to be considered seaworthy, she must be tight and strong enough to safely 
encounter the ordinary actions of the wind and the waves to which she will be 
exposed.37  
Secondly, the stability of the vessel38 varies depending on the loading/unloading 
operations and the fuel and water distribution in the vessel’s holds and 
                                               
34
 The Load Line Convention also sets out similar requirements. 
35
 Force that is generated from the wind and water sprays. 
36
 Force of the sea current and waves. 
37
 Aktieselskabet de Danske Sukkerfabrikker v Bajamar Compania Naviera SA (The Torneia) 
[1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 210; Demsey & Associates Inc v Steamship Sea Star [1970] AMC 1088. 
Hatches should be designed in such a way that they do not obstruct the proper stowage of 
cargo in tween decks, which would otherwise render the vessel unseaworthy. 
38
 I.e. the need to keep the ship upright and to withstand heeling and various other stresses. 
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compartments. Accordingly, SOLAS 39  provides regulations that require the 
captain to have information on the stability of his vessel and distribution of the 
cargo,40 as well as regulations41 on the importance of how certain cargoes are 
stowed. However, it is important to bear in mind that even with this type of 
implemented regulation on a vessel’s structure, the cargo, if so badly stowed, 
will affect the stability of the vessel and consequently render her unseaworthy.42  
Thirdly, particular regulations under SOLAS are to be applied to protect the 
vessel against the occurrence of fire and to extinguish any fire that may break 
out and cause damage to the vessel or her cargoes. Obviously, such 
regulations insist that it is important to equip the vessel during the construction 
process with equipment to detect and fight fires, provided that such equipment 
is operated by competent, trained crew members. A commentator has stated 
that “where the equipment on board a vessel is necessary as a means of 
locomotion or safety then it obviously has direct implications for the 
seaworthiness of the vessel”.43 
In The Eurasian Dream,44 the vessel was found to be unseaworthy because, 
inter alia, of an incompetent master. He lacked the requisite knowledge to use 
the firefighting system on board the vessel and, moreover, his firefighting 
training was inadequate.  
                                               
39
 Since 1991, the Bulk Cargo (BC) Code has been inserted into Chapter VI of SOLAS. 
40
 SOLAS, Chapter VI, Regulation 8. 
41
 SOLAS, Chapter VI, Regulation 7 
42
 Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 377, where iron armour plates were so badly stowed that they 
rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
43
 See Carbett H. Spurin, The Law of International Trade and Carriage, Chapter nine, p.33, cited 
in The National Academy for Dispute Resolution website: http://www.nadr.co.uk/articles/articles. 
php?category=4. 
44
 Papera Trades Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai Merchant Co Ltd and Another (The Eurasian 
Dream) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, per Cresswell J. See also The Star Sea [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 
651, when a fire broke out in the engine room, the master did not know how to operate the CO2 
system to fight the fire. Tuckey J held that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the incompetent 
master. 
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SOLAS also regulates the minimum standards in the industry for the 
construction, equipment and operation of ships including such subdivisions as 
stability, machinery and electric installations, fire protection and detection 
systems, and lifesaving appliances.45 
Questions which inevitably arise include: How efficient are these regulations? Is 
SOLAS adequate to govern most of the physical and legal aspects of 
seaworthiness? 
 
The Impact of the Limitation of SOLAS on the Obligation of Due Diligence 
If a shipowner has complied with the requirements of SOLAS and those 
requirements turn out to be inadequate in providing a safe vessel, they are 
unlikely to prevent an incident of damage caused by unseaworthiness. Similarly, 
if the SOLAS regulations or their implementation prove to be deficient, despite 
the fact that the shipowner has complied with them, he will not be taken to have 
exercised due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel. This may result even 
though the inadequacy was a product of the deficiency of the regulations and 
not of the shipowner’s act or omission. In order to illustrate this proposition, it is 
important to refer to case law. 
For instance, in The Eurasian Dream,46 industry standards, in particular SOLAS, 
were clearly questioned. In that case, the ship caught fire as a result of 
stevedores jumpstarting a car’s engine (while it was on board the ship) by using 
fuel in the car’s carburettor. The car caught on fire, the fire then spread to the 
                                               
45
 Amendments to SOLAS Chapter II-2 and to the International Code for Fire Safety System 
(FSS Code) to strengthen the fire protection arrangements in relation to cabin balconies on 
passenger vessels were developed in response to the fire aboard the cruise vessel the Star 
Princess. 
46
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719. 
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entire ship, and the ship and cargo became a constructive total loss. As the 
crew could not contain the fire, the claimant alleged that the vessel was 
unseaworthy due to an incompetent master and crew, as well as defective 
equipment and inadequate documents. The court criticised the competence of 
the crew and the master, as well as the safety standards of the vessel, in 
particular the inadequacy of her safety equipment. The court found that the 
claimant had proved that the loss or damage to the cargo was caused by the 
unseaworthiness of the ship on the following grounds: (1) the fire would not 
have broken out if the master and crew had been properly instructed and 
trained (this was contrary to the discharging operation regulations related to the 
carriage of vehicles contained in SOLAS)47 and there was no proper system i.e. 
a procedures manual, to give guidance as to the supervision of stevedores48; (2) 
the crew had not been properly instructed, trained and drilled, as it took a long 
time before the fire alarm was raised and there was a lot of confusion about 
where the fire was49; (3) there was not a sufficient number of walkie-talkies (part 
of the lifesaving appliances (LSA))50 and the fire extinguisher51 on deck had not 
                                               
47
 SOLAS, Regulation 31, entitled, ‘protection of cargo spaces other than special category 
spaces intended for the carriage of motor vehicles with fuel in their tanks for their own 
propulsion’ specifying (a) fire detection … (b) fire-extinguishing arrangements … (c) Ventilation 
system … (d) precautions against ignition of flammable vapours.’ 
48
 There was no proper or sufficient procedures’ manuals, such as the Safety Management 
System (SMS), which is now required by the ISM Code. At the time, the ISM Code was not 
mandatory, as it was not incorporated under SOLAS. It came into operation after the incident of 
The Eurasian Dream. However, the court has emphasised the need to have a system manual 
on-board a ship. This is equal to SMS. The system of procedures’ manuals in The Eurasian 
Dream was too voluminous to be digested and was irrelevant or obsolete; it did not provide for a 
safe and prudent system. See The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, pp. 723, 730, 
742 and 744. 
49
 SOLAS, Chapter, III, part A - Regulations (7) Development of plans for shipboard, (8) 
Emergency preparedness, (9) Report and analysis of non-conformities, accident and hazardous 
occurrences, and (10) Maintenance of the ship and equipment. 
50
 See, SOLAS, Chapter III, entitled, ‘Life-saving appliances’.   
51
 See SOLAS, Chapter II-2, ‘Construction - Fire protection, fire detection and fire extinction’. 
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been properly serviced, which is contrary to SOLAS.52 SOLAS had set out the 
minimum amount of safety equipment to be placed on board and it was 
essential for the carrier to comply with its provisions. The court stated that “In 
accordance with SOLAS, fire-fighting instructions and procedures in particular 
should have been concentrated in one concise and clear manual, catering 
specifically for Eurasian Dream. The master himself complained of the fact that 
he had not been given such a manual. Univan should have provided the vessel 
with clear checklists of the essential actions to be taken in the event of fire: (a) 
at sea and (b) in port.”53  
However, the court also found that even if the ship had been in compliance 
with all SOLAS provisions, i.e. by having the minimum number of walkie-talkies 
(four sets) on board, the ship would still have been rendered unseaworthy.54 
This gives a clear indication that compliance with SOLAS safety standards 
does not guarantee compliance with the requisite safety standards that arise 
when exercising due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage under 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.55     
This proposition was also confirmed as regards the breathing apparatus. 
SOLAS sets the minimum number of breathing apparatus as part of the fire-
fighting appliances required on board all ships. For a ship the size of the 
                                               
52
 The court held that the fire could have been controlled if proper firefighting training and 
procedures had been in place. The carrier had therefore breached Article III, r.1 and could not 
rely on the fire defence under Article IV, 2(b) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
53
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, at p.743-744, per Cresswell J. 
54
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, at p.744, per Cresswell J. 
55
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, Cresswell J stated that: “(1) The vessel was 
not supplied with an adequate number of functioning walkie-talkies. (a) The vessel had (at 
most) only four walkie-talkies. It was usual during bunkering operations for the bunkering team 
to take three of the walkie-talkies. This left only one walkie-talkie. The officer on duty (if he had 
that walkie-talkie with him) had no means of communicating with the master, chief officer or 
duty A/B. (b) There should have been a sufficient number of walkie-talkies so that at all times 
there was one each in the possession of the master, chief officer and the other deck officers 
and all members of the crew engaged in supervising discharge (in addition to the three 
required for bunkering)” at p. 742. 
287 
 
Eurasian Dream, SOLAS requires two breathing apparatus sets to be on board. 
However, the court agreed with the recommendation of the expert witness that 
compliance with the minimum safety standard set by SOLAS was not sufficient 
to operate the ship safely. It was stated that “two sets of breathing apparatus 
were not sufficient for this particular vessel (although two represented the 
minimum number required by SOLAS)”.56 In terms of being fit to encounter 
emergencies, e.g. fire, the same experts have recommended that “four 
breathing apparatus sets are normally carried on a vessel such as this [the 
Eurasian Dream]”,57 as the sufficient number that would not render the vessel 
unseaworthy, at least as far as the breathing apparatus were concerned. The 
Eurasian Dream complied with the minimum number of breathing apparatus 
sets. This might be right, on the basis that SOLAS recommends only the 
minimum amount of safety equipment, and the standard of safety provided by 
SOLAS should not be considered as one size fits all.  
The Kapitan Sakhrov58 is another case which confirms that shipping industry 
Codes, which are incorporated into SOLAS, do not guarantee the fulfilment of 
the seaworthiness obligation. In this case, a container stuffed with undeclared 
dangerous cargo was loaded on deck. The owner of the cargo had failed to 
indicate the dangerous nature of the cargo. At the same time, the carrier had 
loaded a highly flammable cargo that produced a dangerous vapour inside a 
tank container. This type of cargo required ventilation to extract the dangerous 
vapour in order to avoid the risk of explosion. The carrier, however, had stowed 
the flammable cargo below deck with no means of ventilation. As a result of the 
                                               
56
 Ibid. The court had agreed to the common ground between expert witnesses, at pp.729 and 
742. 
57
 Ibid. at p.732. 
58
 The Kapitan Sakhrov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255. 
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high temperature during the voyage through the Arabian Gulf, the undeclared 
dangerous cargo on deck exploded, causing a fire that subsequently spread to 
the flammable dangerous cargo below deck, which ultimately resulted in the 
sinking of the ship. The Court of Appeal held that stowage of flammable 
dangerous cargo below deck rendered the ship unseaworthy and thus the 
owner had failed to exercised due diligence in making the vessel seaworthy 
before and at the beginning of the voyage. This was found to be in breach of 
SOLAS Chapter VII, Regulation 6.3, IMDG Code59 Regulation 5, and MOPOG, 
the Russian Code for the carriage of dangerous goods equivalent to the IMDG 
Code, confirms the same provision. Those regulations require that cargo which 
gives off dangerous vapours be stowed in a well-ventilated space. The carrier 
recovered his losses arising from the initial explosion caused by the undeclared 
cargo but the shipowner did not recover the other claims against him by the 
dependants of the two deceased seamen; by other shippers for loss of their 
cargo; and, by the Iranian authorities for pollution damage. The court in this 
case indicated that compliance or otherwise with codes60 like MOPOG was not 
necessarily determinative of the exercise of due diligence before and at the 
beginning of the voyage 61  and “a reasonable misconstruction or 
misunderstanding of such an instrument may not amount to want of due 
diligence.” 62  However, the unreasonable conduct of stowing the dangerous 
cargo in the wrong location, e.g. under deck without ventilation, will render the 
vessel unseaworthy because “it should have been obvious to the shipowner and 
                                               
59
 International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, which is now mandatory under 
SOLAS Chapter VII. The IMDG Code is a uniform international code for the transport of 
dangerous goods by sea covering such matters as packing, container traffic and stowage, with 
particular reference to the segregation of incompatible substances. 
60
 The reference to ‘codes’ should be considered to cover shipping industry codes in general. 
61
 The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, at p.268 
62
 Ibid, at p.268 
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experienced seamen that such cargo should not be stowed in a confined 
spaces unless it was well ventilated.”63 On this ground, the judges held that the 
shipowner had failed to exercised due diligence.  
The above two cases demonstrate that SOLAS or other shipping industry codes 
are not necessarily fully determinative of seaworthiness. It should be 
remembered that SOLAS does not provide exact numbers for sufficient safety 
equipment. For example, cargo ships are recommended to comply with “The 
minimum number of firemen’s outfits [e.g. two outfits]” 64  but this is only a 
recommendation. Further, SOLAS allows the carrier some discretion in deciding 
on the amount of safety equipment for each particular ship.65 The carrier and his 
crew should exercise their seamanship knowledge in order to ascertain the 
sufficient amount of safety equipment that makes the ship seaworthy according 
to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.           
 
What can a shipowner do to overcome the inefficiencies of SOLAS? 
Mere compliance with industry standards, i.e. SOLAS, is not conclusive 
evidence of the carrier having exercised due diligence, nor is it sufficient proof 
                                               
63
 Ibid, at p.268. It was further held that: “Given the potential scale of the catastrophe if, as a 
result of a breach of MOPOG, vapour from isopentane stored below deck in unventilated 
conditions catches fire, I can see no ground for sparing the ship's officers from a finding of a 
lack of due diligence merely because they had done their honest but incompetent best to 
understand what MOPOG and the technical certificate required or permitted them to do,” at p. 
276. 
64
 SOLAS, Chapter II, Regulation 32: ‘Maintenance of fire patrols, etc., and provision for fire-
extinguishing equipment’, paragraph (m).  
65
 SOLAS, Chapter II, Regulation 32(i), reads that: “(iii) … there shall be at least two such 
extinguishers in each such spaces”; Chapter II, Regulation 14(b) reads that “(ii) A self-contained 
breathing apparatus which shall be capable of functioning for a period of time to be determined 
by the Administration”;  Regulation 63 provides that: “The system [cargo pump room system] 
shall use water-spray or another suitable medium satisfactory to the administration.” 
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of the vessel’s physical seaworthiness. 66  A carrier needs to determine his 
vessel’s seaworthiness by assessing the standard of due diligence at all times 
and not merely by relying on meeting industry regulations or recommendations, 
such as SOLAS. He should draw on the inherent specialised knowledge that he 
possesses or ought to possess as regards the fitness of his vessel and by doing 
so,67 will know the standard of care necessary to fulfil the obligation of due 
diligence and avoid bringing about damage caused by unseaworthiness. “The 
standard of seaworthiness must rise with improved knowledge of shipbuilding 
and navigation”,68 which is not fully embraced by SOLAS. That is to say, relying 
exclusively on shipping regulations, such as SOLAS, to determine the standard 
of due diligence is the wrong approach. 69  Those regulations, especially 
technical ones such as those involving firefighting equipment,70 mostly evolve 
                                               
66
 In Transpetrol Maritime Services Ltd v SJB (Marine Energy) (The Rowan) [2012] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 564 (CA), Longmore LJ said that he saw “considerable force in Mr Kendrick's argument on 
the construction of the unamended clause 18 of the Vitol terms. If the judge were right, an 
owner would find himself in breach of the clause, if any fact existed which would cause the 
approval letters to be amended or withdrawn whether or not he knew of that fact and whether or 
not he had had any opportunity to put right the defect which would have caused the letters to be 
amended or withdrawn. That is a very far reaching warranty which would indeed cut across the 
warranty of seaworthiness in the Asbatankvoy form. The only way to avoid that conclusion 
would be to treat clause 18 as a warranty in relation to documentation; not a warranty as to the 
underlying condition of the vessel”, at para.24. 
67
 Knowledge that is known exclusively by the carrier/shipowner, such as the stability of the 
vessel. See Onega Shipping & Chartering BV v JSC Arcadia Shipping (The SOCOL 3) [2010] 
EWHC 777. The improper stowage of cargo had affected the vessel’s overall stability on 
departure from the last load port in Finland. This was an aspect that only the chief officer and 
master would have known about, not the charterers. Mr Justice Hamblen found that there had 
been a failure on the part of the master and chief officer to supervise the cargo stowage 
properly with the ship’s stability and ultimate seaworthiness in mind. See also Donaghy, T. 
‘There goes the deck cargo’, Maritime Risk International (12 November 2010). 
68
 Burges v Wickam (1863) 3 B. & S. 669, at p.693, per Blackburn J. 
69
 It is important to note that the private sector plays, nowadays, an important role in the 
enhancement of the safety and seaworthiness of vessels. The International Chamber of 
Shipping, for example, issues recommendations to reinforce precautionary measures during 
loading or discharging operations. See ‘Long Campaign’ Lloyd’s List, 7 September 1995. As 
does the international Cargo Handling Coordination Association (ICHCA) to ensure proper 
performance of operations. See ‘Pressure grows for action on overloading/discharging 
practices’, International Bulk Journal, December 1994, 99-101. See also, ‘Figures hide why bulk 
carrier sinkings are still a problem’, Lloyd’s List, 14 August 1992. 
70
 Horrocks, C., ‘Challenges Facing the Shipping Industry in the 21st Century’, Sixth Annual 
Cadwallader Memorial Lecture (15 September 2003), at p.3. 
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from reactions71 to maritime incidents rather than proactive steps by advanced 
research and are therefore effectively amendments to the regulations. The 
Shipping Industry needs to undertake a long-term, comprehensive review with a 
view to ensuring that regulations embrace all future challenges associated with 
applicable new technologies, the human element, the needs of the maritime 
industry and the expectations of society. Without the Industry doing so, by 
simply following the basic industry standards, a shipowner may quite possibly 
exercise a lower standard of due diligence. 
In fact, SOLAS recommends that the carrier ascertains the requisite amount of 
safety equipment to ensure that they are sufficient in number and are 
accessible at all times, having regard to the type of the ship and the nature of 
the trade on which the ship is employed.72 Each of the shipping industry codes, 
e.g. ISM Code, “is a system used daily which is actually growing and developing 
through a process of continual improvement”.73 Continual improvement can be 
achieved by an on-going obligation.74 The shipowner by continuously exercising 
due diligence can achieve two things. First, he would be able to identify the ‘risk’ 
of unseaworthiness that may be caused by, for example, an insufficient amount 
                                               
71
 For example, the origin of the ISM Code was a reaction from representatives of the UK during 
the 15th session of the IMO in November 1987. They requested that the IMO immediately 
investigate designs to improve the safety of roll-on/roll-off ferries. The Secretary of the General 
International Chamber of Shipping stated: “It is often said that advances in the technical 
regulation of shipping tend to follow a casualty - that the maritime sector responds to, rather 
than anticipates its problems.” Horrocks, C., ‘Challenges Facing the Shipping Industry in the 
21st Century’, Sixth Annual Cadwallader Memorial Lecture (15 September 2003), at pp. 3-4. 
72
 SOLAS, Chapter II, Regulation 52(b); Regulation 47(a) reads: “The ship, whether new or 
existing, shall at all times when at sea, or in port be so manned or equipped as to ensure that 
any initial fire alarm is immediately received by a responsible member of the crew.” 
73
 Anderson, P., ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal Insurance Implications (2nd ed., 
2005), Chapter One, para. 1.1. 
74
 Glory Maritime Co, Swedish Management Co. SA v Al Sagr National Insurance Co. (The 
Nancy) [2013] EWHC 2116 (Comm). Mr Justice Blair confirmed the expert statement that the 
ISM Code and shipping regulations ‘cannot be compared with a technical standard for the 
condition of a vessel’, para.212. Blair J stated that: “the implementation of the ISM Code is a 
complex one, involving interpreting the code itself, and taking account of various procedural 
requirements that are published from time to time [even after the ship sails], and (potentially) an 
assessment of the audits of the safety management system, and audits of the vesse.” para.212. 
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of safety equipment. Secondly, he will rectify any shortage that has arisen by 
mere compliance with the minimum amount of equipment required by the 
industry regulations, e.g. SOLAS. As a result, the carrier will be ‘establishing 
safeguards’ that avoid loss or damage from that unseaworthiness. 
4.4 STCW Convention  
It became clear to the IMO that the problems of safety and crew 
unseaworthiness occur mostly as a result of human error.75 It is often said that a 
good crew makes a good ship. Therefore, the IMO and ILO united to produce 
guidance consisting of recommendations on the training and education of 
seafarers.76 The IMO77 has established the first convention on standards for 
seafarers, namely, the International Convention on Standards, Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW). The STCW Code78 is 
divided into two parts. Part A contains compulsory requirements consisting of 
the minimum standard of training required for seafarers to gain their 
certification. 79  Part B consists of recommendations and measures to guide 
parties when implementing the Convention. Furthermore, certain 
recommendations contained in Part B will be transferred in due course to Part A 
                                               
75
 James C., ‘Human Element in Maritime Safety & Marine Pollution Prevention’, (1996) Tenth 
Chua Chor Teck Annual Memorial Lecture, Singapore January 1996. “While statistical analyses 
suggest that around 80% of all shipping accidents are caused by human error, the underlying 
truth is that the act or omission of a human being plays some part in virtually every accident, 
including those where structural or equipment failure may be the immediate cause.”, p.2. See 
also, Anderson, P., ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal Insurance Implications (LLP, 2nd 
ed., 2005), p.15. 
76
 See the joint study between IMO and ILO, Guidelines on the medical examinations of 
seafarers, (ILO, 2013). The ILO and IMO agreed to create a joint working group to develop 
revised guidelines of the STCW Convention, p.8  
77
 In 17 July 1978. 
78
 The regulations contained in the STCW Convention are supported by sections in the STCW 
Code. Generally speaking, the Convention contains basic requirements which are then enlarged 
upon and explained in the Code. 
79
 For example, Chapter II deals with standards regarding the master and deck department. 
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if they become compulsory.80 The STCW Convention81 has established global 
minimum professional standards of competence for seafarers. It sets out 
responsibilities which are placed upon the shipowner82 to ensure that all of his 
seafarers, pursuant to their rank, are educated and trained in order to be 
granted certification by marine schools and institutions. As discussed in the 
previous Chapter (see para.1.4.3), manning is one aspect of a vessel’s 
seaworthiness. Seafarers on board a vessel must be competent. They must 
hold the necessary certificates that are required by relevant regulations and as 
far as the UK is concerned, these regulations give effect to the STCW 
Convention.83 Therefore, seafarers must be adequately trained and qualified to 
execute their tasks and be able to communicate sufficiently using one working 
language. Additionally, refresher training as well as renewal of certificates are to 
be carried out regularly in compliance with the STCW Convention, as amended. 
                                               
80
 See, Ziarati, R., ‘Innovation in Maritime Education and Training’, (last visited 17.9.2014) cited 
in http://www.egmdss.com/pictures/press/2010_10_01_cn_IMLA2010_innovation_in_ 
maritime_education_and_training.pdf. Resource Management and Engine-room Resources 
Management principles that were part of Part B-section VIII/2 have been transferred to Part A- 
section VIII/2 of the STCW Code since they have been made compulsory, at para. 2.6. The Flag 
State must provide IMO with information on how it intends to give legal effect to the provisions 
of the Convention. This includes information on the training courses to be provided, 
examinations and intended assessments for certification. 
81
 It must be noted that basic relevant qualifications and minimum manning requirements may 
be laid down in the legislation of the Flag State and/or possible relevant trade union agreements. 
It may include ILO Convention No. 147, the Merchant Shipping (Minimum Standards) 
Convention 1976, and make it by the language of the ISM Code a requirement of Flag States to 
incorporate it into their national legislation minimum requirements in respect of criteria such as 
safe manning standards, hours of work, seafarers’ competency and social security. 
82
 Responsibilities such as record keeping, shipboard familiarisation of crew, ability of the crew 
to co-ordinate their activities and minimum rest periods. See IMO website http://www.imo.org/ 
OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/STCW-Convention.aspx (last visited 
17.9.2014). Part A of the STCW Code is mandatory. The minimum standards of competence 
required for seagoing personnel are given in detail in a series of tables. Chapter II of the STCW 
Convention, for example, deals with standards regarding the master and deck department.  
83
 Merchant Shipping (Training and Certifications) Regulations 1997, SI 1997/348, as amended 
by SI 1997/1911; Merchant Shipping (Master’s Licences and Hours, Manning and Training) 
Regulations 1993, SI 1993/1213, as amended by SI 2003/3049. 
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Further, IMO needs to approve the public or private marine institutions,84 which 
issue the required certificates.85  
The fact that the crewmembers of a vessel hold the required certificates of 
competence issued by a reputable marine institution does not automatically 
mean that they are competent. There is still the possibility that they might be 
regarded as incompetent due to a lack of knowledge or training on specific 
issues, in spite of holding a valid certificate.86 
A question which inevitably arises in light of crew seaworthiness is whether 
these regulations are sufficient to govern the minimum industry standards in 
order to reflect the adequate standard of due diligence required by a shipowner 
in light of the crew’s competence. Or alternatively, is the STCW Convention 
sufficient as a minimum industry standard to govern the manning aspects of 
seaworthiness?   
The following section will demonstrate the inadequate implementation of the 
STCW Convention; the inadequate regulations of the STCW Convention; and, 
the problem of the safety manning certificate in relation to crew fatigue. 
 
                                               
84
 Scope and objectives of the training in the institution must meet the requirements of STCW 
regulation II/1. See, IMO, ‘Maritime training institutions approved by Member States’, (visited 
17.9.2014) cited in http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/ 
MaritimeTrainingInstitutes.aspx. 
85
 IMO has issued a ‘White List’ with the countries assessed and found to be implementing the 
revised STCW Convention (STCW 95) properly. The 1978 STCW Convention responded to 
concerns relating to developing countries. Due to limited and poor infrastructure of marine 
institutions in some countries, the Convention allowed seafarers to acquire experience while 
serving on board a vessel at sea after periods spent in teaching. As far as the UK is concerned, 
the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is the relevant governmental department that 
provides approval to nautical colleges and marine institutions to issue the required certificates of 
competency. 
86
 An example of this can be seen in The Star Sea [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 651. 
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4.4.1 Inadequate Implementation of the STCW Convention - A Factor 
Requiring different in practical sense Due Diligence in Employing the 
Crew 
Despite the guidance given in the STCW Convention, it is regarded as the 
minimum practice of the industry in respect of manning vessels.87 Yet, some 
factors within the Convention prevent the achievement of that minimum 
standard and diminish it from the standard required of a diligent shipowner; the 
result being an unseaworthy vessel with incompetent personnel. Therefore, 
these factors require the shipowner to raise his due diligence standards in order 
to avoid unseaworthiness.88 A factor such as self-evaluation by the Flag State in 
complying with the STCW Convention will consequently affect the standard of 
the crew’s competency. For example, IMO requires countries to provide it with 
information on how the provisions of the STCW Convention will be implemented 
in their domestic system. This includes supervision training, the assessment of 
all training institutions and the awarding of certificates, which must be carried 
out to a certain quality standard.89 All of the documents provided by the State 
are subject to assessment. However, the communicated information might not 
reflect the reality of a lower standard of training or a fault in the certification 
                                               
87
 Bachxevanis, K., ‘”Crew negligence” and “crew incompetence”: their distinction and its 
consequence’, JIML 16 (2010), 128. 
88
 The author is of the opinion that industry standards would be improved if the IMO’s mandatory 
audit scheme were in place. However, the IMO Assembly has agreed a programme to make this 
scheme mandatory, with the entry into force of the mandatory audit scheme likely to be in 2015.  
89
 ‘Cooperation make it happen’, Seatrade Review (March 1997), 65. 
296 
 
scheme of the State.90 The result could be the supply of an incompetent crew 
because the Convention was not implemented in good faith.91  
It may be argued that a more competent crew would have been supplied if the 
industry had complied with the STCW Code evaluated and verified by IMO 
itself. 92  The correctness of information and the adequacy of the issued 
certificates would have been properly checked.93 
Due diligence of a shipowner in a situation similar to the above would not be 
limited to recruiting ship’s personnel with recognised shipping certificates under 
the STCW Convention. The STCW certificate that is granted to the crew may 
not be conclusive as to the actual educational standard of the crew as required 
by the industry. A new standard of due diligence is required and it should not be 
limited to the assessment of a seafarer’s certification pursuant to the STCW 
standard. This problem was highlighted in The Eurasian Dream.94 The Court 
held that the master, chief officer and the chief engineer, who were from the 
same labour-supplying State and possessed the necessary certificates of 
                                               
90
 It is impossible for IMO to have authority to enforce its regulations in each Member State. This 
is due to the limited resources of IMO. Also, it is impossible politically. Most governments would 
never agree to ships flying their Flags being boarded by a team of IMO inspectors. See the IMO 
website at www.imo.org/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx (last visited on 17.9.2014).  
91
 In The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 SLR 232, the claimant’s expert investigation concluded that “[the 
officer in question] was not the person who sat for the third mate’s examination. Indeed, he [the 
expert] thought that the signature on the application form for the third mate’s certificate was not 
Orlanda’s [the officer in question], neither was the photograph. Consequently, Orlanda did not 
hold a third mate’s certificate when he served on-board the vessel” and the qualification of the 
officer was highly questionable, at p.248. 
92
 ‘Labour supplies face STCW deadline’, Lloyd’s List (28 April 1998). This will have the effect of 
stopping the supply of underqualified and therefore incompetent officers to the maritime sector. 
93
 All documents submitted by Member States have to be analysed by a group appointed by the 
Secretary-General and approved by the MSC. Following such an examination, the group will 
issue a report stating which State has or has not been capable of showing that they are applying 
the standards of the Convention. The IMO will then decide which States have met their 
obligations and place them on the “White List”. This means that a certificate issued by a State 
on the list must be recognised by other parties to the STCW Convention. 
94
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719. 
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competence, were incompetent for, inter alia, “receiving improper or inadequate 
training in firefighting”.95 
It is submitted that particular diligence should be exercised by a shipowner 
when a person is appointed for a job in the first place, especially from a labour-
supplying State that has an unknown or doubtful status in terms of training.96 
However, the standard of due diligence should be heightened, to a greater or 
lesser extent, according to the standard of marine schools in the labour-
supplying State, in order to embrace a new test similar to the one that was 
given to the person who applied to the marine school from which he/she 
received his/her certificate.97  
The test as to whether a seafarer has been supplied from a nation with dubious 
implementation procedures is an objective one. The test is “Would a reasonably 
prudent owner, knowing the relevant facts of the standard of the marine school, 
have allowed this vessel to put to sea with this seafarer?”98 
Therefore, in exercising due diligence, an owner appointing a new crewmember 
on his ship must take the following steps. First, regarding technical competence, 
                                               
95
 The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, p.743, per Cresswell J, “Moreover the crew 
were not drilled or otherwise instructed in the following: (i) responding to firefighting during cargo 
operations; (ii) checking and shutting gas tight doors; (iii) deploying CO2 on the decks…” It 
should be emphasised that the shipowners were ignorant of the fact that the master lacked 
particular knowledge of the vessel and there was also a lack of general training in the firefighting 
department. 
96
 Some Flag States have no establishments for nautical or engineering education or training 
and their supply of certificated and qualified personnel comes from the major shipping nations, 
which keep colleges and training centres operating largely at the expense of their own 
taxpayers. Sass, C. A. ‘Seaworthiness Factors’, a paper delivered for ‘Fitness for Sea’, an 
international conference on seaworthiness at Newcastle University (9-10, September 1980), 
p.67.  
97
 “Would a fully competent (prudent) person be able to discover the problem and resolve it? If 
the answer was yes and the engineer, for example, acted in the same way as a prudent person 
would act, then he is competent, but if he did not act in the same way then he is not”, The 
Roberta (1938) 60 Ll. L. Rep. 84, p.86, per Greer LJ. 
98
 The Hong Kong Fir [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159, p.168, per Salmon J; A. P. Stephen v Scottish 
Boatowners Mutual Insurance Association (The Talisman) [1989] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 535, p.539, per 
Lord Keith of Kinkel, “The test is an objective one, directed to ascertaining what an ordinarily 
competent fishing boat skipper might reasonably be expected to do in the same circumstances”. 
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the owner should demand the appropriate certificate of competency and other 
training certificates in order to check whether the officer has the required 
qualifications to work on board the shipowner’s vessel. An officer of the watch 
and a deck officer are required: 1) to undertake training involving college time 
and sea time in order to achieve the Watch Certificate of Competence (CoC);99 
2) to pursue STCW 95 basic safety training courses such as, personal survival 
techniques, fire prevention and firefighting, elementary first aid and personal 
safety and social responsibilities and to hold appropriate medical certificates.100 
It is not enough that the crewmember has the relevant certificate required by the 
law of the Flag State,101 as certificates are not conclusive proof of competence. 
An officer of the watch can be qualified by holding the required certificates but 
not competent to work on a particular vessel.102 For instance, an officer who is 
qualified and holds the correct certificate of competence cannot work on a 
particular ship, e.g. a tanker, unless he has carried out training, both at a marine 
college and on board a tanker, in order to allow him to work on that specific type 
of ship.103 Accordingly, the carrier should secondly inquire about his crewing 
                                               
99
 In accordance with Ch. II and Ch. VIII of the STCW Convention. 
100
 In accordance with Ch. V, VI and VII of the STCW Convention. See also, MCA notes; Marine 
Information Note (MIN) 469 (M). 
101
 There is no consistency as regards training requirements among States; see The Makedonia 
[1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, p.336; Cosmopolitan Shipping Co v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. 
L. R. 117, p.121. 
102
 Lack of training or unfamiliarity with a particular type of vessel will render the officer 
incompetent. See Bachxevanis, K., ‘The distinction between ‘crew negligence’ and ‘crew 
incompetence’ and the consequence thereof’, cited at p.3 of the ReedSmith website, 
http://www.ukpandi.com/fileadmin/uploads/uk-pi/Documents/Legal_sources/ReedSmith_Crew 
NegligenceVsIncompetence_Nov2011.pdf. 
103
 See, e.g. Regulation V/1, which provides that: “Officers and rating assigned specific duties 
and responsibilities related to cargo or cargo equipment on takers shall have completed an 
approved shore-based firefighting course in addition to the training by Regulation VI/1 and shall 
have completed: 
1. at least three months of approved seagoing service on takers in order to acquire adequate 
knowledge of safe operational practices; or 
2. an approved tanker familiarization course covering at least the syllabus given for that course 
in section A-V/1 of the STCW Code.” 
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experience and should also examine his seaman’s book. 104  Thirdly, the 
crewmember’s character should be properly examined by the carrier, as 
allowed by the length and nature of the interview.105 Fourthly, all of the above 
should be further explored and verified by taking up references of the 
interviewee and, in particular, by consulting his/her previous employers,106 even 
if this necessitates the vessel’s sailing to be delayed by a couple of days.107 If 
information from the previous employer is sufficient and correct for the 
shipowner to rely on, then the new recruit can be appointed and the owner may 
be said to have discharged his due diligence obligation.108 If not, the shipowner 
must have a satisfactory system of procedures109 to show that a crewmember 
has received adequate training from the marine institute.110 For instance, in The 
Patraikos 2,111 the court decided that the second officer, in spite of holding the 
requisite STCW certificates, was nevertheless incompetent. The Judge stated 
that “[T]he second officer was poorly trained at the [marine institute] in 
seamanship and/or radar observation. Without contrary evidence from the 
defendants, I accept the testimony of [claimant’s expert] that the institute 
provides sub-standard education in marine and nautical engineering and 
                                               
104
 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, p.336. 
105
 Thames & Mersey Ins Co. v The “Gunford” Shipping Co. [1911] A.C. 529, p.541 per Lord 
Shaw, cited in Clarke, M., Aspects of the Hague Rules: a comparative study in English and 
French Law, (Martinus Nijhoff publishers, 1976), p.216. 
106
 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, at p.336. It was stated that: “A man … may hold 
certificates of competency and yet have a disabling lack of will and inclination to use his skill 
and knowledge so that they are well-nigh useless to him”, p.335, per Hewson J.  
107
 The Hong Kong Fir [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159, p.169. 
108
 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316, p.337; Moore v Lunn (1922) 2 Ll. L. R. 86, p.93. 
109
See http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga07-home/workingatsea/mcga-trainingandcert/ds-
stc-usefulcontacts/ds-stc-externalorgs-colleges.htm. 
110
 In the UK, the MCA is responsible for assessing the standard of the marine colleges within 
the jurisdiction. If a marine college is not approved by the MCA, then that college will not be able 
to issue certificates of competence. A list of approved marine colleges is available on the MCA 
website at http://www.mcga.gov.uk/c4mca/mcga07-home/workingatsea/mcga-trainingand cert/ 
ds-stc-usefulcontacts/ds-stc-externalorgs-colleges.htm. 
111
 The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 SLR 232 (Singapore High Court, Admiralty Division). 
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produces inferior graduates.”112 One may ask whether it is practical to obtain 
information about a particular crewmember or training institution, or alternatively, 
how the court in The Patraikos 2 was informed of the poor training at the 
relevant marine institute and whether such information is readily available. 
Defendants (and perhaps claimants) may prove their case by providing the 
court with information, regarding the certificates of a crewmember, which was 
obtained at the time of recruitment. The information should show that the 
crewmember was trained to the minimum required standard under the STCW 
Convention. Such information is also easily accessible through the ‘Direct 
access to certificate verification database’ that is maintained by STCW State 
Parties. 113 This database provides information regarding certificates and 
endorsements and allows for their validity to be checked online. A claimant, in 
order to prove his case, can appoint an experienced expert to investigate the 
matter and provide his opinion in court. The claimant in The Patraikos 2 
provided factual evidence to support his allegation of a breach of the Hague 
Rules. The evidence arose from the expert investigation that found out what 
had actually happened prior to the incident that resulted in the loss.114 The 
expert brought an important piece of evidence to court and importantly “visited 
the Philippines in the course of his investigation and made inquiries … of: (1) 
the Professional Regulation Commission; (2) Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (3) Philippine Maritime Institute (PMI); (4) the Maritime Industry 
Authority; (5) Philippine Seafarers Training and Review Center”. 115  The 
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 The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 SLR 232, p.271. 
113
 Parties interested in verifying certificates and their information can do so by utilising the 
database provided on the IMO website at http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/Training 
Certification/Pages/CertificateVerification.aspx. 
114
 The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 SLR 232, at p.238. 
115
 The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 SLR 232, at p.245. 
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investigation proved the poor standards of training at the relevant marine 
institute. The expert was “unimpressed by the standards and facilities of the 
PMI … there was [inter alia] a shortage of teaching staff.”116 The investigation 
indicated that the officer of the watch was incompetent and that the defendants 
failed to exercise due diligence in checking his background, training and 
qualifications. It follows that the court would expect to see details of the 
owner’s/carrier’s procedures and system, such as the Safety Management 
System required by the ISM Code, for recruiting a new member of the crew. 
Such a system should not only include details of the vetting of prospective crew 
members or officers in terms of their certification, relevant experience and due 
diligence in order to be discharged, but also procedures for the vetting of 
manning agencies and/or marine schools.  
 
a) The Role of the ISM Code on the Developed Aspect of the 
Manning  Obligation  
As discussed previously, the manning of a vessel is an essential part of 
exercising due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel. Developing 
technology and sophistication of vessels creates the need for crewmembers 
with specialist knowledge. In this respect, the owner needs to ensure the 
engagement of a properly qualified, adequately trained and competent crew. 
Paragraph 6 of the ISM Code has organised this process by requiring the 
shipowner/carrier to arrange a procedure which must be implemented during 
the recruitment and assessment of the certification, competency and past 
experience of all officers and crew. This procedure must be applied to the 
                                               
116
 The Patraikos 2 [2002] 4 SLR 232, at p.246.  
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previous employer and the certificate-issuing institutions. 117  Further, this 
procedure needs to be adhered to, not only by the shipowner, but also by the 
recruiting agency and the shipping management company. Part A, paragraph 6 
of the ISM Code reads: 
“6   RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL 
  
6.1  The Company should ensure that the master is: 
1. properly qualified for command; 
2. fully conversant with the Company’s safety management system; and 
3. given the necessary support so the master’s duties can be safely performed. 
6.2   The Company should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, 
certificated and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and 
international requirements. 
6.3   The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel 
and personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection 
of the environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. 
Instructions which are essential to be provided prior to sailing should be 
identified, documented and given. 
6.4   The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company’s 
safety management system have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, 
regulations, codes and guidelines. 
6.5   The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying 
any training which may be required in support of the safety management 
system and ensure that such training is provided for all personnel concerned. 
6.6   The Company should establish procedures by which the ship’s personnel 
receive relevant information on the safety management system in a working 
language or languages understood by them. 
6.7   The Company should ensure that the ship’s personnel are able to 
communicate effectively in the execution of their duties related to the safety 
management system.” 
 
                                               
117
 As far as the UK is concerned, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is the authority 
responsible for the assessment and certification of master and crew certificates. See https:// 
mcanet.mcga.gov.uk/public/coc-2007-2/index.asp (last visited on 17.9.2014). 
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In fulfilment of Paragraph 6 of the ISM Code, a diligent owner/carrier needs to 
constantly deal with and take remedial action for various emerging 
shortcomings concerning existing personnel. Diligence is first a question of 
adequate supervision. Second, there must be a satisfactory system of 
communication within the structure of the organisation. Not only should the 
carrier know his crew but he should also ensure that the crew and officers 
receive technical information and training necessary to maintain requisite levels 
of competency.118 This suggests that the obligation to provide an adequate and 
competent crew should be continued for the entire contract period and it is not 
enough to satisfy the obligation merely at the outset. The shipowner should not 
be excused from liability by simply asserting that he had exercised due 
diligence before and at the commencement of the voyage, especially where 
circumstances between the recruitment of the crew and the material voyage 
have changed.119 For instance, training that might have been considered to be 
adequate before and at the beginning of the voyage, may be classed as 
insufficient in light of later developments and emerging circumstances that 
require the crew to have further training during the same contract period.  
Accordingly, as Anderson suggests, “the safety management system may have 
to be modified to take into account the new risk.”120 For this reason, the latest 
amendment to the ISM Code, i.e. paragraph 1.2.2.2, is now imposing the duty 
to carry out risk assessments.121 
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 The Lady Gwendolen [1965] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335; The Farrandoc [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 276; 
Papera Traders Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd and Another (The 
Eurasian Dream) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719. 
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 According to Article III r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
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 Anderson,P.,  ISM Code: A practical guide to the legal and insurance implications, (LLP, 
2005), Ch. 5, case study on ‘The Toledo’ case. 
121
 Paragraph. 1.2.2.2 of the ISM Code. “Assess all identified risks to its ships, personnel and 
environment and establish appropriate safeguards.” This amendment entered into force on 1
st
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b) The Impact of Risk Assessment on the Manning of the Vessel 
As part of the exercise of due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel, it is 
essential to have on board a competent122 and efficient123 crew. The recent 
revised amendment 124  of the ISM Code, paragraph 1.2.2.2, is intended to 
develop a new general standard of due diligence with a particular focus on 
manning. This means that a shipowner is now required to carry out risk 
assessments in order to maximise the effectiveness of the implementation of 
the ISM Code. He should therefore also assess the human element as regards 
safety by carrying out a risk assessment. The Code seeks to promote and 
impose a culture of continuous improvement of manning safety by ensuring that 
working conditions do not prevent the crew from working within the set of rules 
and regulations that are required to keep the vessel seaworthy throughout the 
period of the voyage. Implementation of the Code should also reveal whether 
the crew break the general safety rules, and if they do, the situation must be 
corrected. It is worth mentioning that risk assessments will be essential in light 
of exercising due diligence, as it promotes the concept of providing further 
training, i.e. non-statutory training which some shipowners consider expensive 
                                                                                                                                          
July 2010, which made risk assessments a mandatory building block of any Safety Management 
System (SMS). 
122
 For example, The Star Sea [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 651, where Tuckey J held that the vessel 
was unseaworthy, as the master was incompetent. 
123
 The crew on-board a vessel must be adequate in number. Most maritime nations have 
regulations governing the manning of vessels sailing under their Flag. In the UK, manning 
requirements are governed by Merchant Shipping (Safe Manning, Hours of Work and 
Watchkeeping) Regulations 1997, SI 1997/1320. 
124
 Amendments to the ISM Code were adopted through Resolution MSC. 273 (85) on 4 
December 2008, and entered into force on 1 July 2010. Section 1.2.2.2 was amended to 
replace the old words that read “1.2.2 Safety management objectives of the Company should, 
inter alia … 2. establish safeguards against all identified risks” to “1.2.2 Safety management 
objectives of the Company should, inter alia… 2 assess all identified risks to its ships, personnel 
and the environment and establish appropriate safeguards.”  
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and unnecessary. Such training, however, can be seen as an important feature 
for the development and improvement of the due diligence standard. 
 
4.4.2 Inadequate Regulations of the STCW Convention relating to Crew 
Fatigue  
Fatigue has long been a major factor that has contributed to human error and 
resulted in accidents. 125  It is a biological state to which all individuals are 
susceptible, regardless of skill, knowledge, competence or training. The type of 
operations on board vessels demands constant attention and alertness. As 
such, fatigue has a direct impact on the safety of operations. The STCW 
Convention amendment126 sought to address the problem of crew fatigue by 
regulating minimum rest periods. This was introduced in order to ensure that 
crew members had an adequate amount of rest (calculated in hours) and were 
able to operate the vessel safely. Under the STCW Convention, every seafarer 
is allocated a watch or part of a watch. The crew must receive a minimum of 10 
hours rest in every 24-hour period. The rest period may be divided into two 
parts, provided that one part is at least six hours long. Though the STCW 
Convention 1995 seems to provide effective regulations and guidance, issues 
such as training drills,127 emergencies and economic factors, in addition to the 
                                               
125
 Moore, W., ‘Managing Fatigue’, Human Element Alert Bulletin 5 (January, 2005), cited at 
www.he-alert.org. See also, Manadaraka, A. Modern Maritime Law and Risk Management (1st 
ed., 2008), para. 3.2.2. 
126
 S. A-VIII/1 (Mandatory) and s. B-VIII/1 (guidance) of the STCW Code. The ILO Merchant 
Shipping (Minimum Standards) Convention 1976, No. 147, is also relevant. 
127
 Section 1.3 of the ISPS Code reads that: “In order to achieve its objectives, this Code 
embodies a number of functional requirements. These include, but are not limited to … (6) 
requiring ship and port facility security plans based upon security assessments and (7) requiring 
training, drills and exercises to ensure familiarity with security plans and procedures”. This 
section of the ISPS Code requires that vessels must carry out drills and have documented 
security plans. Such requirements were often perceived as placing additional and unreasonable 
demands on the crew; see, Smith, A., ‘Adequate crewing and seafarer’s fatigue: the 
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consistent reduction in crewing levels,128 means that the STCW regulations can 
be interpreted flexibly, thereby having a direct effect on rest periods and crew 
fatigue.129 For instance, on short sea voyages, intense workloads are required 
from the vessel’s crew. This, combined with misuse of the exception provision 
of the Convention as regards rest periods for “emergency, drill or in other 
overriding operational conditions”, could easily result in crew fatigue and a 
subsequent accident.130 
Under the Convention, there is room for the hours of rest requirement to be 
manipulated thereby rendering the provision on rest periods ineffective,131 as 
illustrated by the example below.  
- Example  
A vessel had a short port stay of 24 hours only, carrying out continuous cargo 
operations with intense workload on the crew. There was no time for rest or 
recovery before the beginning of the voyage. After the commencement of the 
voyage an officer either fell asleep or due to impaired judgement as a result of 
acute fatigue, the vessel was involved in an accident (grounding or collision). 
Such temporary incapacity (fatigue) may be held sufficient to render the 
                                                                                                                                          
international perspective’, a study made for the Center for Occupational and Health Psychology 
(Cardiff University) cited in http://www.sindacatomarittimi.eu/media/documenti/83.pdf. It was 
stated that “additional burdens on seafarers were found to include: extra paperwork, ISPS drills 
and longer working hours”, at p.12. It has been reported that: “In the past you could probably 
just get on with your job but now you have got all this extra paperwork to tell you how to do your 
job”, see Smith, A., ‘Adequate Crewing and Seafarer’s Fatigue, http://www.sindacatomarittimi. 
eu/media/documenti/83.pdf, at p. 12. 
128
 Crewing levels have changed over the last few decades. Thirty years ago many large 
commercial vessels went to sea with a crew of 40 persons. Today, much larger vessels often 
have a crew of half that number and crews of less than 10 are common on smaller ships. 
129
 After the incident of The Antari, where the Chief Officer fell asleep during the navigating 
watch, the IMO has been criticised by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 
Report for reacting too slowly in addressing the problem of fatigue-related incidents. See, 
‘Grounding Leads to IMO Warning’, (April, 2009), 23(3) Maritime Risk Assessment 14. 
130
 Section A-VIII/1 of the STCW Convention. 
131
 The MAIB Bridge Watch-keeping Safety Study (2004) has concluded that the current 
provisions of STCW 95 in respect of safe manning, hours of work and look-out are not effective 
and creates a risk factor in collision and grounding. 
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seaman incompetent and, as it was in existence at the commencement of the 
voyage, the vessel departed in an unseaworthy condition.132 This did, of course, 
result in an inquiry as to the owner’s/carrier’s exercise of due diligence to 
prevent such fatigue occurring. In this example, it is likely that the owner/carrier 
would be held to have failed to discharge his due diligence obligation. 
Although there has been no case law on this matter,133 it has been argued that 
a court may find that lack of adequate rest had rendered the vessel 
unseaworthy because of an incompetent or a temporarily incompetent crew.134 
This would undoubtedly be true if the obligation of seaworthiness is extended to 
cover the entire voyage (which is not the case under the current law).  However, 
this problem may be solved by the extension of the obligation of seaworthiness. 
Given that the extension of the obligation would render the carrier liable for 
unseaworthiness as a result of crew fatigue, the carrier would not, in theory, 
allow the working hours of the crew to exceed a limit that is likely to cause crew 
fatigue and consequent incompetence of the crew, in spite of the flexibility 
under the STCW Convention.135  
 
4.4.3 Safety Manning Certificates and Crew Fatigue 
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 See White R, ‘The human factor in unseaworthiness claims’, (1995) L.M.C.L.Q. 221-238, 
p.228. 
133
 Anderson suggests that: “They are being settled amicably out of court or, occasionally, are 
reaching a private arbitration hearing”, Anderson P., ‘Fatigue and ISM’, (Feb-2007) Seaways, 7-
10, p.10. 
134
 Bachxevanis, K., ‘Crew Negligence and Crew Incompetence: their distinction and its 
consequence’, (2010) 16 JIML, 102. 
135
 The extension of the obligation as a solution is explained in more details under para 4.6.1, at 
p.313.  
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The necessary crewing level of a vessel is defined by the vessel’s Safe 
Manning Certificate,136 which sets out the minimum number of crew required137 
to safely manage all operations of the vessel. This certificate, in practice, is 
more widely known as the ‘Minimum Safe Manning Certificate’ and this arguably 
indicates that the practice adopted by Flag States, along with owners/operators, 
shows a tendency to follow what is only the legal minimum requirement. The 
criteria used to determine a vessel’s minimum crew complement is her size, 
type and area of work138 but not her age. However, a vessel that has been 
subjected to the perils of the sea and ensuing wear and tear may require more 
maintenance and repairs than a new vessel. This certainly increases the 
workload of seafarers.139 Therefore, the vessel might be unseaworthy for being 
under-manned regardless of what the minimum manning certificate may say, 
especially if her cargo and navigational operations cannot be executed by her 
crew while receiving adequate rest to avoid fatigue. If not, the minimum number 
is not sufficient to execute the vessel’s operations safely.  
When deciding on the safe number of crew that a vessel needs, the shipowner 
should not limit his observance to the Safe Manning Certificate, 140  the 
provisions of the STCW Convention, the opinion of the vessel’s builders or the 
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 The ‘Safe Manning Certificate’ is a document issued in the case of a UK-flagged vessel, by 
the Secretary of the State, and in the case of other vessels, by or on behalf of the government 
of the State whose flag the vessel is entitled to fly. This Certificate lists the numbers and grades 
of the personnel required to be carried by the vessel. Regulation 5(1) of the Merchant Shipping 
(Safe Manning, Hours of Work and Watchkeeping) Regulations 1997. 
137
 Undermanning renders the vessel unseaworthy. See Forshaw v Chabert (1821) 3 Br & B 158. 
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 SOLAS, Reg. 13 which merely provides that all ships must be “sufficiently and efficiently 
manned” and this is left for the Flag States to regulate. For UK-flagged vessels, see Merchant 
Shipping (Safe Manning, Hours of Work and Watchkeeping) Regulations 1997. 
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 It is interesting to note that the newly built Emma Maersk, the world’s largest container 
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manning document requiring a complement of just 13 crew members. See Smith, A., ‘Adequate 
Crewing and Seafarer’s Fatigue: The International Perspective’, cited at  
http://www.crew2 crew.com/ForumAttachments/'b173972d-6b53-4b50-b7c1-, at p.10. 
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 Annex C of MSN 1767 contains guidance tables showing appropriate manning levels. Bear 
in mind that this consists of a minimum manning level. 
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vessel’s previous owners. 141  The shipowner must also closely monitor the 
management of the crew’s hours of rest and hours of work, and assess them 
against the criteria set out by the STCW Convention in order to confirm that the 
various operations can be performed safely without prejudicing the rest period 
requirement. The prevention of fatigue should parallel the efforts of the 
shipowner in exercising due diligence and making the vessel seaworthy.142 
 
4.5 General Problems 
The following problems may occur generally in relation to the effectiveness of 
the shipping industry’s regulations, codes and conventions. 
 
4.5.1 Matters that Reduce the Effectiveness of the Industry  
The standard of international shipping is currently governed by a tripartite 
agreement.143 The industry standard is adopted by IMO, applied by shipowners 
and carriers, and imposed or policed by State Parties; for example, by Flag or 
Port States. As such, the implementation of the IMO’s conventions and 
regulations, such as SOLAS, is left entirely to States, which means that the 
standard of applying those conventions and regulations varies, which in turn 
potentially results in the reduction of the effectiveness of such instruments. This 
reduction must be considered as negatively affecting the carrier’s obligation to 
provide a seaworthy vessel. However, a tighter new regulation, for example, a 
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 The Hong Kong Fir [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159, pp.168-169. 
142
 Operational tasks must not be performed by people who are too tired to perform them safely 
and procedures should be in place to ensure that fatigue does not occur. See Anderson, P., 
“Fatigue and ISM”, (Feb- 2007), Seaways, 7-10, p.8. 
143
 O’Neil, W., ‘Raising world maritime standards’, cited as Chapter 21 in Legate, H. et al., 
International Maritime Transport Perspectives (2005, Routledge), p.292. 
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regulation imposing a requirement to fit recent technologically innovative 
instruments or machineries under SOLAS, is not normally the sole solution to 
raise the standard of seaworthiness or to increase the obligation of due 
diligence. For example, a new recent regulation came into force144 in respect of 
bulk carriers, obliging them to be fitted with high level alarms and level 
monitoring instrumentation145 that will provide an early warning of water ingress 
into the cargo hold should a crack develop in the ship’s hull. Essentially, this 
means that the shipowner will be notified at an early stage and will be able to 
take action to stop any water from damaging cargo in the cargo holds, which 
would in turn prevent him from being liable under a related unseaworthiness 
claim. However, it is submitted that, in practice, sound regulations will improve 
the industry’s standards and will affect (directly or indirectly) the standard of a 
vessel’s seaworthiness only if there is proper enforcement of those regulations. 
The IMO should be given the authority to verify that Flag States carry out proper, 
conscious and adequate implementation of the regulations by 
shipowners/carriers and maritime training institutions. 
Therefore, even after the adoption of perfect new regulations, vessels are 
susceptible to cargo damage due to one or more of the following: a poorly 
equipped, inadequately maintained, inadequately repaired or unskilfully 
operated vessel. This, essentially, would mean that the carrier, notwithstanding 
the perfect new regulations, has not exercised due care or due diligence.  
                                               
144
 The Committee adopted amendments to Chapter XII (Additional Safety Measures for Bulk 
carrier) of SOLAS, as amended, to require the fitting of high level alarms and level monitoring 
systems on all bulk carriers, in order to detect water ingress from 1 July 2004. 
145
 Water ingress monitoring is not a new concept. The daily monitoring of bilge and tanks is 
part of good seamanship since antiquity. However, this method of monitoring does not provide 
continuous information. Further, when the weather deteriorates, the manual process is usually 
suspended because of the dangers to crew members taking the sounding. 
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Adequate implementation of regulations would, as a matter of public interest, 
improve shipping industry standards and reduce malpractice. Effective 
implementation of rules and policing of the shipping industry would mean that 
those shipowners who are in breach of regulations would, in fact, be in breach 
of their seaworthiness obligation. The industry standards “form a basic standard 
from which the court works”146 and the cargo-claimant would seek to privately 
implement them through private court actions seeking damages for suffered 
losses, even when such regulations are not properly implemented by the 
authorities and are in practice ineffective.147 
 
As an interim conclusion, although the standard of due diligence might be 
increased if developments in the standards of the shipping industry are 
achieved, along with necessary changes to the current system, the IMO needs 
the authority to verify that Flag States actually implement the conventions fully 
and properly. A case in point is the so-called ‘white list’ of Parties deemed to be 
giving full and complete effect to the revised STCW Convention’s provisions.148 
Port State Control inspectors are expected to be increasingly targeting ships 
flying Flags of countries that are not on the ‘white list’.149 The ‘white list’ principle 
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 See Clarke, M., Aspects of the Hague Rules, (Martinus Nijhoff-The Hague, 1976), p. 224. 
Clarke refers to classification societies, which are not covered in this study. 
147
 By effective policing in the port of sailing, unscrupulous shipowners will be detected by the 
State and then required, under a judicial or an administrative intervention, to comply with any 
violated regulations. In terms of enforcement at the port of destination, the risk of being caught 
might encourage a self-conscious shipowner, who does not want his entry into the port delayed 
or withheld or to face detention of his vessel, to comply with the regulations. This fear should 
make the shipowner more diligent in complying with regulations that are related to the obligation 
of seaworthiness. 
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 The White List was published by IMO following the 73rd session of the Organization’s 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), meeting from 27 November to 6 December 2000. Cited on 
IMO website: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/STCW-
Convention.aspx (last visited 18.9.2014). 
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 Cited on IMO website: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/ 
Pages/STCW-Convention.aspx (last visited 18.9.2014). 
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should be applied to other conventions. Also, “there should be a provision for 
sanctions and penalties which may be applied if convention requirements are 
not adhered to. Furthermore, an audit system is needed whereby a Member’s 
performance can be properly monitored.”150  It should be noted that SOLAS 
limits the extent of the inspections. It prescribes “Port State control inspections 
are normally limited to checking certificates and documents. But if certificates 
are not valid or if there are clear grounds for believing that the condition of the 
ship or its equipment, or crew, does not substantially meet the requirements of 
a relevant instrument, a more detailed inspection may be carried out.”151 
 
4.5.2 Inadequate Response to Maritime Safety and Seaworthiness 
Although the container safety standards may not always be adequate or up-to-
date, their implementation as compulsory rules may nevertheless be effective to 
increase standards of safety and seaworthiness. 
In other words, the standards of safety and seaworthiness might, even where 
inadequate, be, to some extent, increased by the proper implementation of the 
relevant regulations if effective and proper implementation is made compulsory. 
For instance, radar equipment on board of ships is considered as an important 
aid of navigation that contributes to safe navigation.152 However, a survey153 
has shown that a high percentage of shipowners are not willing to fit radars onto 
                                               
150
 Speech by W. O’Neil (Former Secretary-General of the IMO), ‘Raising world standards in the 
maritime industry - the IMO perspective’, at the International Maritime Policy Conference, 
(London, 13 May 2003). Cited on http://www.imo.org/blast/mainframe.asp?topic_id=762& doc_ 
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 SOLAS, Chapter XI, Regulation 4.   
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 IMO, ‘The Compulsory Fitting of Seaborne Radar Collision Avoidance Systems: A 
Discussion’, (1980) Journal of Navigation, 33, pp.389-397, at p.390. 
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their vessels because fitting radar equipment was not compulsory until 1982.154 
This shows that regulations are not always adequate and is indicative of how 
shipowners are content to merely meet their minimum responsibilities, 
according to the compulsory shipping industry regulations, when providing a 
seaworthy vessel. 155  By making the implementation of up-to-date safety 
regulations, such as radar fitting on board ships, compulsory, the carrier will be 
obliged to fit the necessary radars. By doing so, fewer accidents should be 
expected. This is to say that regulations which are not adequate, e.g. where up-
to-date regulations are merely recommendations and therefore optional,156 their 
implementation as compulsory rules will increase the safety standard that 
affects the obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
Consequently, what can be done to improve the current situation and reduce 
malpractice regarding shipping standards?  
 
4.6 Solutions 
4.6.1 Extending the Obligation of Due Diligence to Cover the Entire 
Voyage - A Way to Reduce Gaps Created by Industry Standards 
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 IMO, ‘The Compulsory Fitting of Seaborne Radar Collision Avoidance Systems: A 
Discussion’, (1980) Journal of Navigation, 33, pp.389-397. Carrying radar on tanker ships has 
been made compulsory in 1982 and made progressively after ward to different ships from 1984-
1989.  Carrying radar equipment is now compulsory under SOLAS Ch. V, Reg. 19/2.8.  
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 See below f.n. 173, in regards to carrying radar equipment, e.g. President of India v Coast 
S.S. Co. (S.S. Portland Trader) 213 F. Supp 352 at pp.356-357; 1963 AMC 649 at p.654; [1963] 
2 Lloyd’s Rep. 278 at p.281 (D. Ore. 1962) 
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Since the introduction of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, there have been 
tremendous technological developments with regard to electronic aids and 
navigation. New methods of performing contracts of carriage have become 
possible. Thus, “the standard of due diligence required from the carrier gets 
higher and higher everyday”.157 It is debatable whether due diligence requires 
the shipowner of an older vessel to upgrade its machinery and equipment in 
order to satisfy the existing standards of seaworthiness. A shipowner cannot be 
expected to constantly keep up with all of the latest expensive advanced 
technology. However, the shipowner is to some extent required to furnish his 
vessel with certain recent technical developments. The requirement of a 
‘reasonable shipowner’ in preparing or providing a seaworthy vessel is 
determined objectively, so that it can change over time 158  and in line with 
technological developments.159 Further, it has been argued that the shipowner 
is obliged to implement new technology that affects the seaworthiness of the 
vessel, if it is directly related to the shipping industry.160 This is the case with the 
International Safety Management (ISM) Code, which has become mandatory.161 
Ignorance of the provisions of IMO Conventions, ISM, SOLAS, MARPOL, and 
so on, may point to a shipowner’s lack of due diligence in relation to the safe 
operation of his vessel, which might result in unseaworthiness.162 Having said 
that, there has been judicial reluctance to include the development of machinery 
and equipment as part of the shipowner’s due diligence obligation in providing a 
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seaworthy vessel,163 provided that those technological advances are not yet 
standard for a particular vessel or carriage. Nonetheless, an obligation on the 
shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel under the current obligation of 
seaworthiness, accompanied by a clause similar to Clause 52 of the Shelltime 
charterparty,164 would put the shipowner at risk of breaching his due diligence 
obligation. This clause requires a shipowner to exercise all practicable 
precautions, i.e., to modify or fit new equipment according to shipping industry 
rules, in order to bring his vessel in line with the recently developed standards 
of the industry. For example, The Elli and The Frixos, 165  a recent case 
concerning MARPOL, illustrates that a shipowner must modernise his vessel to 
meet the latest amendments to industry standards. The owner of two oil tankers, 
The Elli and The Frixos, time-chartered the vessels on the Shelltime 4 form. The 
tankers were described as ‘double sided’. After approximately 20 months, and 
before the end of the charter period, new MARPOL Regulations 13F, 13G and 
13H came into force, which required all oil tankers to have the relevant 
documents relating to the physical condition of the vessel in order to carry 
heavy grade oil cargo. Vessels should be fitted with double bottoms or double 
sides, extending along the total length of the cargo tanks. The double bottom 
tanks of The Elli and The Frixos did not run the entire length of the cargo tanks. 
Instead, bunker tanks protected the last two tanks (slops tanks) rather than the 
                                               
163
 President of India v West Coast Steamship Company (The Portland Trader) [1964] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 443 (United State); American Smelting & Refining Co. S. S. ‘Irish Spruce’ v Irish Shipping 
Co. Ltd. (The Irish Spruce) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 63, at p. 68 (US District Court of New York). 
164
 Clause 52 of Shelltime 4 provides: “Owners warrant that the vessel is in all respects eligible 
under application (sic) conventions, laws and regulations for trading to and from the ports and 
places specified in Clause 4 of the Charter Party…but not limited to, MARPOL 1973/1978 as 
amended and SOLAS 1974/1978 as amended and extended.” 
165
 Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v ST Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 119; [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 908. 
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ballast tanks as required by the new MARPOL regulations.166 It was held that 
the warranty in Clause 52 of the charter applied both upon and after delivery of 
the vessel to the charterer. Furthermore, the same clause explicitly applied to 
future sailings and expressly referred to the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions. 
Thus, the vessel was unseaworthy for not complying with the new amendment 
of MARPOL as required by Clause 52.167 It is questionable whether the industry 
standards contained in such regulations are adequately effective to guarantee 
that applying the current rules regarding the obligation to exercise due diligence 
will make the ship seaworthy. Since the current obligation of exercising due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is limited to the beginning of the voyage, 
it will not cover any regulatory requirement introduced by SOLAS after the 
vessel has commenced her voyage.168 It can be said that it would be beyond 
doubt if a clear obligation in the contract of carriage forced the shipowner to 
adopt new regulations. This is commensurate with saying that the obligation is 
an ongoing one. Even where the obligation of obtaining a document relating to 
SOLAS or other certificates of the IMO was not required prior to the 
commencement of the voyage, or at least at the time of delivery of the ship, this 
does not equate to the obligation to ‘maintain the vessel in or restore her to’ her 
condition on delivery. Therefore, the standard of due diligence may not be 
adequate even if it is meant to be ongoing. This is because in maintaining 
seaworthiness, the standard will be based on a standard that was set at the 
                                               
166
 Regulation 13H(5) of the MARPOL Convention came into operation on 4 December 2003. 
167
 It is difficult to argue that obtaining a document which was not required at the time of delivery 
can be part of an obligation to ‘maintain the vessel in or restore her to’ the condition in which 
she was at delivery. 
168
 Certain countries have taken the lead in promoting safety and seaworthy vessels by adopting 
new navigational and other safety requirements in advance of the international conventions. 
Ropner, W. G. D., ‘Promoting High Standards at Sea - The Shipowners’ Contribution’, a paper 
delivered in Fitness at Sea - The International Conference on Seaworthiness (1980) organised 
by Newcastle University, at p. 44.   
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time before and at the beginning of the voyage or at her delivery, rather than 
one which is set to the prevailing circumstances. As a result, the standard of 
seaworthiness will not take regard of the new regulations when they are being 
enforced, i.e. after the commencement of the voyage. The standard is, however, 
said to be raised if a new regulation under the conventions comes into 
existence that requires the shipowner to carry out further tasks, such as 
modification of the hull, other than those previously required for maintaining the 
vessel. This is possible only if there is a clause in the charterparty that obliges 
the shipowner to do so. Otherwise, the owner is obliged to carry out such 
modification before a new contract of carriage is agreed, when the regulation 
would be triggered as part of his initial obligation of due diligence.169  
The Elli and The Frixos confirmed that the court will not take into consideration 
developments in the industry that arise any time after the vessel commences 
her voyage but during the course of the charter period as part of the due 
diligence obligation, assuming that the obligation is not an ongoing one. 
Therefore, it was noted that considerations of expediency are already reflected 
in the charterparty contract and to add a clause to them would result in an 
extension of the shipowner’s obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel beyond the basic obligation under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules.  
The case further confirms the need for the obligation of seaworthiness to be 
extended throughout the entire voyage in order to create a fairer 
                                               
169
 To that extent, the charterer will be prevented from trading in some parts of the world. 
Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v ST Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 119, at p.127. Sir Anthony Clarke MR stated that “at a particular South East Asian 
country suddenly required all fuel oil carrying vessels to be doubled hulled.”   
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charterer/shipowner relationship, as opposed to relying on an initial obligation 
such as that under the Hague/Hague-Visby rules, if a clause requiring ongoing 
due diligence of seaworthiness is absent from the charterparty contract. If a 
contract of carriage is governed by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the court, in 
reference to case law that states “It is not the duty of an owner to adopt or use 
the latest inventions or regulations”,170 may be reluctant to take into account the 
application of new technology as part of the carrier’s obligation of exercising 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. The “slowness of the traditional 
procedure for adoption and entry into force of the international regulations and 
conventions [e.g. SOLAS]”, 171  makes a shipowner reluctant to apply new 
provisions of SOLAS or any other regulations, for example to fit new equipment, 
even when their presence is essential to the vessel’s seaworthiness,172 such as 
radar equipment173 or a Loran system.174  
As regards a contract of carriage, without a binding system of compliance with 
new standards in new regulations or without a regime that imposes a continued 
obligation of seaworthiness (although not necessarily as part of public law 
                                               
170
 F. C. Bradley & Sons Ltd. v Federal Steam Navigation Company, supra, see Lord Justice 
Scrutton at pp. 454-455. See also Virginia Co. v Norfolk Shipping Co. 17 Com. Cas. 277, at p. 
278.   
171
 Sir Michael Wood, ‘Lawmaking and implementation in International Shipping: Which Law Do 
We Obey?’ Tenth Cadwallader Memorial Lecture, 1 October 2008. Cited at <www.shippinglbc. 
com/content/uploads/documents/cad10_mensah.pdf>. 
172
 The T.J. Hooper 60 F.2d 737, 1932 AMC 1169 (2 Cir. 1932) where Hand J decided that tugs 
should be equipped with radios, although their use on such vessels at that time was still not 
customary. See also Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims (4th ed., 2008), Chapter 15 ‘Due 
Diligence to Make the Ship Seaworthy’, at p. 42. 
173
 In President of India v Coast S.S. Co (S.S. Portland Trader) 213 F. Supp 352 at pp.356-357; 
1963 AMC 649 at p.654; [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 278 at p.281 (D. Ore. 1962). The District Judge 
commented on the desirability of having radar on-board vessels. The judge warned however 
that in the near future it was most likely that radar would become a condition of seaworthiness. 
The court held that, with the brilliant clarity of hindsight, it was easy to rationalise how the 
disaster could have been avoided if the vessel had been equipped with either one of these 
modern aids to navigation (radar or Loran), but the court has the duty to determine the 
seaworthiness of the vessel from the standpoint of the commencement of the voyage rather 
than measuring the standard by what happened at the time of the incident.  
174
 A subsequent judgment on this question is Argo Merchant Lim Procs. 486 F. Supp. 436 at p. 
459; 1980 AMC 1686 at p. 1702 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). Loran was not deemed essential. 
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enforcement), any regulations that come into operation after the 
commencement of the voyage will be ignored. This may reflect the limited 
obligation of due diligence that is imposed under the current regime, especially 
if invalid certificates cause legal unseaworthiness. For example, the failure to fit 
the vessel with certain equipment might render its safety certificates175 invalid, 
which might lead to a delay or prohibit the vessel from proceeding to sea or 
entering a port. As a result, the vessel will be legally unseaworthy due to its lack 
of certification.176      
 
4.6.2 Problems of the Current Law and the Need for New Rules 
Under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the obligation of due diligence expires 
upon sailing from the port of loading and does not apply to each stage of the 
voyage. 177  Any new requirements under regulations that govern industry 
standards will not be adhered to after leaving the load port. This is normally the 
case for an obligation under the Rules which starts and is ongoing until the time 
the vessel commences her voyage. Accordingly, the Rules confer no ongoing 
obligation on the shipowner to exercise due diligence, i.e. by complying with 
new regulations during the sea voyage. This is seen to avoid the important 
ongoing duty to keep the vessel in line with the latest regulations, especially 
                                               
175
 Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v ST Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 119. 
176
 SOLAS, Chapter V, Regulations 19 & 20 were implemented into UK domestic law by the 
Merchant Shipping (Survey and Certification) Regulations 1995, SI 1995/10, as amended. SI 
1995/21 and 1995/1692. No UK-flagged ship may proceed to sea unless it has been surveyed 
and there is in force the following certificate(s): in the case of a passenger ship engaged on 
international voyages, a Passenger Ship Safety Certificate, or, if the ship is only engaged on 
short international voyages, a short international voyage Passenger Ship Safety Certificate; in 
the case of a cargo ship of 300gt or more engaged on international voyages, a Cargo Ship 
Safety Radio Certificate, Cargo Ship Safety Equipment Certificate and a Cargo Ship Safety 
Construction Certificate. 
177
 Article III, r. 1, HVR. 
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those important regulations, which if contravened, will render the vessel 
unseaworthy.  
 
- The Example of Container Shipping 
An English court has expressed the relevant test as being “would a prudent 
shipowner, if he had known of the defect, have sent the ship to sea in that 
condition?”178 Equally, the test to be applied under the Rotterdam Rules for a 
vessel that has not adhered to new regulations which may affect her 
seaworthiness is “would a prudent shipowner, if he had known of the new 
regulations, have continued the intermediate voyage without affecting any 
possible compliance?”179 In the age of containerised shipping, it seems that 
vessels are more likely than ever to call into intermediate ports.180 This is where 
the ongoing obligation of due diligence under the Rotterdam Rules becomes 
more important in solving the problems of unseaworthiness that might arise due 
to non-compliance with new regulations, especially for containerised vessels 
which did not come about until after the drafting of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. Under the Rotterdam Rules, it is possible that the same ship will be 
subject to different findings as regards seaworthiness and, in turn, the liability of 
the carrier, depending on the port of loading if cargo was loaded at two different 
ports. 
                                               
178
 McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697. 
179
 See Nicholas, A., ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seawrthiness’, cited 
as Chapter 6 of Thomas, R., The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules, 
(Lloyd’s List, 2010), at p.116.  
180
 It is common for container vessels to be involved with large numbers of loading/discharging 
ports. For instance, a container vessel may load cargo from the Far East destined to North 
Africa and en route she may call at two ports in the Middle East. 
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For instance, assume a vessel commenced her voyage from Port A to Port C 
and called at Port B with perishable, refrigerated cargo on board. The container 
was loaded at Port A when the vessel was classed as being seaworthy and it 
then sailed to Port B where another container was loaded, destined for Port C. 
In the course of sailing to Port B, a new regulation came into force. When she 
arrived at Port C, the vessel was detained for some days by the Port State for 
not having a valid certificate reflecting compliance with the new regulation, 
which resulted in the refrigerated cargoes in the three containers being 
damaged. Consequently, the carrier will not be liable for the damage that 
occurred to the container that was loaded in Port A. As the vessel was 
seaworthy, whereas the carrier would be liable for the damage that occurred to 
the cargo in the container that was loaded in Port B, as she was unseaworthy 
for not being in complaince with the regulations. 181  As the the overriding 
obligation was breached in Port B, the carrier will not be allowed to use any of 
the exceptions under Article IV, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. On the 
other hand, for the damage that occurred in the container loaded in Port A, the 
shipowner is able to cite exceptions under Article IV, r.2 despite the fact that 
damage to the cargo resulted from the same cause. The effect of the new 
regulation was therefore different for each of the owners of the containerised 
cargo.182 Accordingly, the change brought about by Article 14 of the Rotterdam 
                                               
181
 In Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193,  
damage was caused to the cargo at an intermediate port by stevedores who had stolen a brass 
cap. This caused water to enter the cargo hold resulting in damage to a cargo of tea. The court 
decided that when the stevedores committed the theft, they were not acting as a servant or 
agent of the carrier. Therefore, the carrier was able to rely on Article IV, r.2(q), HVR. Had the 
stevedores been acting in the course of their employment, they would be considered as an 
agent or servant of the carrier. In such circumstances, the carrier will not be able to rely on the 
exception in sub-clause (q) and the vessel will be rendered unseaworthy. In this case, there was 
unseaworthiness in a practical sense but not in the sense of liability. 
182
 This principle is applicable even where the containerised cargoes are subject to the same 
contract of carriage but loaded at different neighbouring ports and bound for the same 
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Rules is likely to lead to fairer consequences in such circumstances. If the 
Rotterdam Rules governed the bill of lading, the court in a similar case would 
undoubtedly hold the shipowner in breach of exercising due diligence to provide 
a seaworthy vessel founded on non-compliance with new regulations such as 
those provided under SOLAS.  
English courts should not find it difficult to apply the extended obligation of 
seaworthiness to the entire voyage. This is for two reasons. First, English courts 
are familiar with the ongoing duty imposed on the carrier in time charterparties, 
which contain a clause obliging the shipowner to ensure the fitness of his vessel 
on an ongoing basis, even during the course of the voyage.183 This means that 
if unseaworthiness arose after leaving the port of loading, the shipowner, his 
servants or agents should exercise due diligence to bring the vessel back to a 
seaworthy state.184 Secondly, the common law doctrine of stages is generally 
accepted to be good law. It provides some commercial flexibility for vessels to 
commence their voyage from their loading port without incurring superfluous 
delays by complying with charterparty obligations to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
This is, for example, when the condition of the vessel has a deficiency or cannot 
comply with the relevant regulations at the loading stage; the deficiency will not 
be held to amount to a breach of the duty of seaworthiness provided that the 
                                                                                                                                          
destination. See Berlingieri, F., The Liability of the Carrier by Sea in Studies on the Revision of 
the Brussels Conventions on Bills of Lading (Genoa, 1974), pp.68 and 95. 
183
 Maintenance clauses such as that in the NYPE 1993 charterparty in lines 81-82 which states: 
“that the owners shall maintain the vessel in a thoroughly efficient state in hull, machinery and 
equipment for and during the service”. See also NYPE 93, Clause 6 lines 80-82; BALTIME 1939, 
Clause 3 lines 43-48; GENTIME Clause 11 lines 263-267. See also Golden Fleece Maritime Inc 
v ST Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 119. 
184
 Snia v Suzuki (1924) 17 Ll. L. Rep. 78, where Greer J said: “though that does not mean that 
she will be in such a state during every minute of the service, it does mean that when she gets 
into a condition when she is not thoroughly efficient in hull and machinery, they will take within a 
reasonable time reasonable steps to put her into that condition,” p. 88. 
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breach is remedied by the sailing stage or at an intermediate stage. 185 
Analogous with the common law186 doctrine of stages, the English courts would 
not find it difficult to impose an ongoing obligation of seaworthiness, which may 
render the vessel unseaworthy for not calling at an intermediate port to take 
reparative action, e.g. by fitting new equipment to comply with the latest 
regulations, for the purpose of maintaining the obligation of seaworthiness 
during the course of voyage. It is widely known that, nowadays, ports are well-
equipped with agents and ship chandlers who are able to provide vessels with 
supplies and repair services during their loading/unloading operations.   
 
- The Impact of Shipping Standards and Crew Negligence 
If the implementation of shipping industry standards is imposed by extending 
the obligation of due diligence to cover the entire voyage, the carrier may be 
liable for not applying new standards of safety contained in new regulations, 
which require the carrier to have, for example, additional certificates. Assuming 
that the vessel cannot enter the discharge port, non-compliance with shipping 
industry standards will result in legal unseaworthiness. Usually, if new 
regulations come into operation under SOLAS, the carrier, through the 
                                               
185
 The Quebec Marine Insurance Company v The Commercial Bank of Canada (1869-71) L.R. 
3 P.C. 234. Lord Penzance stated: “The case of Dixon v Sadler and the other cases which have 
been cited, leave it beyond doubt that there is seaworthiness for the port, seaworthiness in 
some cases for the river, and seaworthiness in some cases, as in a case that has been put 
forward of a whaling voyage, for some definite, well-recognised, and distinctly separate stage of 
the voyage,” p.241. See also The Vortigern [1899] p.140. 
186
 The charterparty doctrine of stages, under which the vessel is required to be seaworthy at 
the commencement of each stage, is not applicable under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. See 
Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Nav Co. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193. A vessel was 
held not to be unseaworthy within the meaning of Art. III when the cargo was damaged by the 
surreptitious removal of a storm valve plate by a person unknown while the vessel was calling at 
an intermediate port. 
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designated person ashore (DPA), 187  would instruct his employees to make 
certain modifications or if such modifications cannot be carried out by the ship’s 
crew and the vessel needs dry docking, modifications required by the new 
regulations may be carried out at a dry dock. The obligation to exercise due 
diligence is not delegable,188 even where the carrier delegates a task to dry 
dock personnel. This means that simple negligence of the crew will render the 
ship unseaworthy, as well as negligence of the dry dock’s workers, for any loss 
of the cargo that is caused by unseaworthiness. Even if the carrier has 
delegated work that requires special knowledge to an independent, competent 
and professional contractor, the work or modification that is carried out by the 
contractor should comply with the due diligence obligation. If the claimant 
alleges that modifications carried out by the independent contractor caused 
damage to the cargo, the carrier should, in order to escape liability, demonstrate 
that the contractor has exercised due diligence in carrying out their work.189 A 
carrier may be liable for unseaworthiness where he has failed to comply with 
regulations governing the employment of the crew, e.g. STCW and/or the 
operation of the vessel, e.g. SOLAS. The carrier may also be liable where the 
crew’s or a contractor’s negligence in modifying the vessel has caused loss or 
damage to the cargo. This could mean that a greater focus will be placed on the 
                                               
187
 The role of the designated person, mentioned in the ISM Code, is of great importance, as he 
would be liaising between the ship and the management of the shipping company. Article 4 of 
the ISM Code entitled: ‘Designated person’ reads “To ensure the safe operation of each ship 
and to provide a link between the Company and those on-board, every Company, as 
appropriate, should designate a person or persons ashore having direct access to the highest 
level of management. The responsibility and authority of the designated person or persons 
should include monitoring the safety and pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each 
ship and ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based support are applied, as required.” 
188
 The Muncaster Castle [1961] A.C. 807 (HL), p. 836, per Viscount Simonds; The Happy 
Ranger (No. 2) [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649. 
189
 The Amstelslot [1963] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 223(HL). It was held that the inspector was not 
negligent, as the crack was undetectable when due diligence was exercised in inspecting the 
ship and there was no obligation to conduct additional tests, p.234-235, per Lord Devlin.  
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risk of negligence from the employees, crew and contractors of the carrier in 
performing their duties (e.g. when modifying the vessel in order to comply with 
regulations), as opposed to a failure to comply with regulations directed at the 
carrier to reach a particular standard. In other words, in future, the emphasis will 
be mainly placed on the crew’s or the contractor’s negligence in complying with 
the regulations rather than the impact of not complying with the regulations in 
the first place. Failure to comply with the particular standards required by the 
regulations could result from the DPA not communicating with the vessel’s staff 
when directed by the carrier to instruct them to carry out modifications reflecting 
a new standard under new regulations. Bearing in mind the risk of liability that 
can result from the negligence of the crew when complying with the regulations, 
the carrier will be more careful to avoid such a risk by instructing and making 
sure that the crew and contractors are exercising due diligence when modifying 
the ship. The more emphasis that the carrier places on the risk of liability 
resulting from his crew’s negligence, the more likely that the carrier will be 
proactive in exercising due diligence. For example, where a new SOLAS safety 
standard requires a new certificate for existing ships following modification of 
the ship’s cargo hold, the carrier as part of the on-going due diligence obligation 
will instruct his crew to modify the vessel’s hold pursuant to the new regulations. 
If the carrier fails to comply with the new regulations and was not issued with a 
new certificate, perhaps due to the negligence of the DPA in failing to instruct 
the crew, the carrier may be liable for legal unseaworthiness if, for example, the 
ship was prohibited to enter the discharge port and damage to perishable cargo 
followed. On the other hand, if the carrier through the DPA has instructed his 
crew to carry out the necessary modifications pursuant to the new regulations 
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but the modifications were carried out negligently, whether by the crew or expert 
contractors, and such negligence caused damage to the cargo, the carrier will 
be liable for an unseaworthy ship. This will have a greater impact on the way 
that the seaworthiness obligation is exercised, e.g. a shipowner is likely to plan 
well in carrying out the modification rather than simply issuing orders with a 
view to compliance with the new regulation. The carrier will be more vigilant in 
performing his obligation of due diligence. This can be achieved by a shipowner 
frequently asking what can be done to avoid liability and how he should perform 
his obligations. The carrier will also be more proactive in exercising his 
seaworthiness obligation. It is suggested that a good way to achieve 
compliance is by assessing risk constantly. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
Compliance with shipping industry standards varies from one country to another 
and thus from one carrier to another. The IMO has no effective means of 
verifying the implementation of the standards and leaves the matter of 
compliance to each Member State. This results in a varied standard of 
compliance and hence matters related to the vessel’s seaworthiness in 
particular States are directly or indirectly affected. Also, it is right to say that, in 
general, safety standards in the shipping industry are inadequate or dated and 
should embrace the thrust of development. However, making the effective 
implementation of industry standards compulsory would increase the standard 
of safety and perhaps seaworthiness. 
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This Chapter has provided some recommendations that, on their 
implementation, would produce sound regulation and a policy of compliance. 
The regulations of the shipping industry must be updated in relation to incidents 
at sea and must also be regulated on a proactive basis. That can be ensured by 
carrying out further research to promote better shipping practices.  
More importantly, despite the fact that the shipping industry’s conventions are 
not specifically part of the Hague/Hague Visby Rules,190 in order to prevent or 
reduce the direct or indirect impact of inadequate industry regulations, the 
obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel must be 
extended to cover the entire voyage.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
190
 The shipping industry’s body of rules is promoted as a “…framework upon which good 
practice should be hung.” Statement made by Captain Haakansson, an expert in the case 
Papera Trades Co Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co. Ltd (The Eurasian Dream) [2002] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 719, at p.743. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
       THE IMPLICATION OF THE MULTIMODAL 
ASPECT OF THE ROTTERDAM RULES ON THE 
SEAWORTHINESS OBLIGATION AND THE 
CONSEQUENT LIABILITY 
 
 
“He it is who enableth you to traverse through land and sea; so that ye even board ships; they 
sail with them with a favourable wind, and they rejoice threat; then comes a stormy wind and 
the waves come to them from all sides, and they think they are being overwhelmed: they cry to 
Allah, sincerely offering (their) duty unto him saying, If thou dost deliver us from this, we shall 
truly show our gratitude.” 
(Yunus, Chapter 10, Verse 22) 
 
5.1  Introduction 
The advent of the container has increased the transportation of door-to-door 
goods on a multimodal basis. This development cannot, to a certain extent, be 
regulated by the current law on carriage of goods by sea that applies only to 
‘tackle-to-tackle’1 sea carriage. There has been evidence of a need for a regime 
with a wider scope than that existing, in order to address the legal problems that 
arise from door-to-door operations. For example, the carriage of containerised 
goods can raise problems when the damage inside the container is unlocalised; 
i.e. where it is hard to determine the exact point that the damage to the goods 
inside the container occurred and whether it occurred during the carrier’s scope 
of responsibility. The lack of a unified door-to-door regime requires that the 
parties, in order to ascertain issues of liability and identify the applicable 
                                               
1
 Article 1(e) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
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contract of carriage in the event of loss, damage or delay,2 need to refer to the 
responsibility of the carrier in various contracts, which may be set out in legal 
regimes that are mandatory, based on implied rules of national law or regulated 
by contract. 3  The various legislative attempts, through mainly international 
instruments on multimodal transport, to extend the application of the sea 
carriage regime beyond the ‘tackle-to-tackle’ principle, have failed. 4  The 
Rotterdam Rules attempt to address this need by extending the scope of cover 
to the entire contract of carriage in multimodal/door-to-door transport operations, 
provided that a sea leg is included.5 
Problems of multimodality have been extensively discussed in earlier studies, 
but there does not appear to be a study discussing the effect of multimodality on 
the obligation of seaworthiness. Insofar as seaworthiness and multimodal 
carriage under the Rotterdam Rules are concerned, it is essential, in this 
Chapter, to discuss the problems under the current regime and the need for the 
creation of a multimodal regime. Also, the importance of attaching the obligation 
of exercising due diligence when providing a seaworthy vessel to the sea leg 
                                               
2
 Hereinafter will be referred to as ‘loss’. 
3
 Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (2012, LLP), at para.1.31. 
4
 E.g. the ICC Uniform Rules for a combined Transport Document 1975 (based on the TCM 
Draft Convention 1975, UN Doc TRANS/370 CTCIII/1, Annex I) and the UNCTAD ICC Rules for 
Multimodal Transport Documents 1992 (based in part on International Multimodal Transport 
Convention 1980, UN Doc TD/MT/CONF/16, not in force); the UN Convention on the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea (The Hamburg Rules) that applies to ‘port-to-port’ operations Article 1.6 and 
Article 4.1. See generally Wit, R., Multimodal Transport, (London, 1995); Glass, D., Freight 
Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts, (London, 2012), para. 3.1. Lorenzon stated 
that: “the dissatisfaction expressed by the industry may be understandable in the context of 
small and medium eterprises trying to access the market. The way the international community 
has tackled this conundrum is to develop what may be referred to as multimodal thinking for 
unimodal transport approach; ie a philosophical endemic distortion of the unimodal regimes 
which seeks to tackle specific multimodal problems on a piecemeal basis. Provisions of 
multimodal regimes are all complex variations of ad-hoc solutions to specific problems but are 
certainly not multimodal in nature.”, see Lorenzo F., ‘Multimodal Transport Evolving: Freedom 
and Regulation Three Decades after the 1980 MTO Convention’ cited as Chapter 7 in Clarke M., 
Maritime Law Evolving, (Hart Publishing, 2013), at p. 166 
5
‘Maritime-plus’ Convention. See UN Committee on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL] 
Working Group on Transport Law, Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the Work 
of Its Fifteenth Session (Vienna, 4-15 July 2005).  
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will be addressed. The scope of the Rotterdam Rules, and in particular the 
provisions of Article 82 and their impact on the duty of seaworthiness, which 
was intended to solve the problem of conflicting obligations under other 
international transport conventions, will also be dealt with. It will be shown that 
particular aspects of multimodal transport may confuse the specific duties of 
seaworthiness identified and imposed by Article 14. The involvement of other 
conventions may cloud the guidance as to the applicable standard of care in 
relation to seaworthiness. The purpose of this Chapter is to discover the impact 
of the multimodal ‘door-to-door’ concept on the duty or obligation of 
seaworthiness and the consequent liability, whilst also suggesting some 
solutions.6 In addition, this Chapter attempts to ascertain whether it would be 
preferable for the parties to deal with the duty or obligation of seaworthiness 
from the perspective of a contract of carriage made on a ‘door-to-
door’/multimodal basis or on the basis of a contract of carriage as limited by the 
‘tackle-to-tackle’ regime. 
5.1.1 Introduction to the Supply of Containers7 
In practice, containers are supplied either by the carrier or by the shipper. It is 
essential to briefly outline the two different scenarios to which reference will be 
made in the following Chapters.  
 
Scenario One – Container Supplied by the Shipper 
                                               
6
 Some legal problems surrounding the Rotterdam Rules are believed to be similar to those that 
arose with other multimodal systems but, due to the extension of the obligation to the container 
and for a duration that covers the entire sea voyage, these legal problems might have a heavier 
impact on the operator or the cargo-interest with regard to the Rotterdam Rules as opposed to 
other conventions.  
7
 This introduction is a summary extracted from Chapter. 4 in Glass, D., Freight forwarding and 
multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), Ch.4. 
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Where the shipper supplies the container, generally speaking, the carrier will 
not be liable for the defective condition of the container, which causes damage 
to the cargo inside it,8 unless the carrier should have inspected the container 
and also dealt with any apparent defects that were discoverable upon a 
reasonable inspection.9 The carrier may also be liable if he was responsible for 
stuffing the container and while doing so created a defect by improper 
stowage.10  
Liability may arise in three ways. First, the carrier may be liable for the inherent 
defect of the container that was present prior to carriage.11 It is argued however 
that the carrier is probably not liable for damage caused by this type of defect.12 
Second, the carrier may be liable for failing to inspect the containers where he 
was required to do so and also for failing to remedy any defects.13 Finally, the 
carrier will be liable where a defect in the container has come about as a result 
of the carrier’s (or his employees’) negligence.14 This may occur where the 
goods themselves or the way the goods were stuffed inside the container (by 
the carrier) damaged the cargo and/or the container. Alternatively, damage may 
result from the way in which the goods are handled, loaded on board the ship 
and/or cared for during carriage.15 While unlikely, it is possible that a carrier 
                                               
8
 Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at para. 
4.126. 
9
 P. Bugden, P. et al., Goods in Transit, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), at para.18.05 (Carrier as a 
bailee of the container); See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, 
(Informa, 2012), at para.4.116-4.117 and 4.123. 
10
 Bugden, P. et al., Goods in Transit, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), at para.18.02 
11
 See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at para. 
4.57. 
12
Bugden, P., ‘What if a container unsuitable for the intended cargo?’ at http://www. 
forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=138. 
13
 See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at 
para.4.116-4.117 and 4.123; De Wit, R., Multimodal transport, (LLP, 1995), at para. 9.24;  
14
 Bugden, P. et al, Goods in Transit, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009), at para.18.02 
15
 See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at 
para.4.126 
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may be responsible for the container even where it is supplied by the shipper or 
someone acting on the shipper’s behalf.  
 
Scenario Two – Container Supplied by the Carrier 
If the container is supplied by or on behalf of the carrier, the carrier is more 
likely to be liable for damage that is caused by the container’s defective 
condition. The carrier is likely to be liable for (1) the inherent defect of the 
container16; (2) any failure to inspect the container and fix reasonably obvious 
defects17; and, (3) rendering the container defective as a result of negligent 
handling prior to loading the container on the ship or improper care during the 
sea carriage.18  
However, where the shipper was responsible for stuffing the container – even 
where the container is supplied by the carrier – damage caused by improper 
stowage of the cargo inside the container may fall on the shipper.19 Further, the 
shipper will also be liable for any negligent handling of the container.20  
This scenario begs the question of how far, pursuant to Article 80 of the 
Rotterdam Rules, the carrier may exclude his liability for damage even where 
he has supplied the container. If the preconditions set out in Article 80(2) are 
                                               
16
 Bugden, P., ‘What if a container unsuitable for the intended cargo?’ at http://www. 
forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=138. 
17
 See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at 
para.4.116-4.117 and 4.123; De Wit, R., Multimodal transport, (LLP, 1995), at para. 9.24;  
Stevens, F., ‘ Liability for defective containers: chartering a course between seaworthiness, care 
for the cargo and liabilities of shippers’, cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Land and Air, (Informa, 2013) , at p.38. 
18
 De Wit, R., Multimodal transport, (LLP, 1995), at para. 9.62-9.63 and 9.66. 
19
 See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at para. 
4.128. 
20
 See Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (Informa, 2012), at para. 
4.125. 
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met,21 the parties to the volume contract may agree to shift the duty to exercise 
due diligence to make and keep the container supplied by the carrier 
cargoworthy, from the carrier to the shipper. This derogation from the 
cargoworthiness obligation may relieve the carrier of responsibility for any 
damage caused by an uncargoworthy/unseaworthy container. In other words, 
Article 80 may shift the responsibility for cargo damage caused by a container 
that was supplied by the carrier from the carrier to the shipper.22  
 
5.2 Problems under the Current Law 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules (as amended) were initially adopted in 1921. At 
that time, the shipping trade focused on sea carriage only, e.g. tackle-to-tackle, 
where the cargo was mainly handled at the ports of loading and discharge. This 
explains why there was no requirement for a system beyond the scope of 
‘tackle-to-tackle’23 responsibility for the carrier. The subsequent development of 
                                               
21
 Article 80(2) provides that: “A derogation pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article is binding only 
when: 
(a) The volume contract contains a prominent statement that it derogates from this 
Convention; 
(b) The volume contract is (i) individually negotiated or (ii) prominently specified the 
sections of the volume contract containing the derogations; 
(c) The shipper is given an opportunity and notice of the opportunity to conclude a contract 
of carriage on terms and conditions that comply with this Conventions without any 
derogation under this article; and 
(d) The derogation is neither (i) incorporated by reference from another document no (ii) 
included in a contract of adhesion that is not negotiation” 
22
 Nikaki, T., ‘The obligation of carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care’, cited as 
Chapter 4 in, Thomas, R., A new Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam 
Rules: An Analysis of The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods 
Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), where she stated that “it was stated 
that the parties to a volume a volume contract are therefore allowed to agree on greater or 
lesser rights, obligations and liabilities than those imposed by Article 14(c) provided that the 
safeguard set out in Article 80.2 are met.” at p.108. 
23
 Article 1(e) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules provides the ‘tackle-to-tackle’ scope of cover, 
‘‘‘carriage of goods’ covers the period from the time when the goods are loaded on to the time 
they are discharged from the ship.”  
334 
 
the liner trade and containerised transportation24 has created a need for the 
carrier to assume further responsibility from the point when he receives the 
cargo to the point of its ultimate delivery, and to assume the risk of the whole 
carriage from the place of the exporter to the cargo’s final destination. 25 
Nonetheless, the development in international law has not kept apace.26 
This uncertainty has raised the question: what is the regime that should govern 
the liability of unseaworthiness? This is particularly true for, first, ‘unlocalised’ 
damage. The term ‘unlocalised’ in distinction to ‘localised’ is used by the 
Rotterdam Rules in relation to cargo loss or damage when it is unknown at the 
stage or leg, i.e. the mode, at which the loss to the containerised cargo 
occurred. So, where the container has moved through different modes of 
carriage, it is difficult to determine at which stage the damage occurred.27 Take 
for example, a container that was carried by road and subsequently put on the 
deck of a ship for sea carriage, and, on arrival at its destination, the cargo was 
                                               
24
 UNCTAD Secretariat, Implementation of Multimodal Transport Rules, para. 7, delivered to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2 (June 
25, 2001). See id. para. 7 stating that containerisation in the 1960s led to operators taking 
‘responsibility for the whole transport chain under one single transport contract’. 
25
 UNCTAD Secretariat, Implementation of Multimodal Transport Rules, para. 7, delivered to the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, UN Doc. UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/2 (June 
25, 2001). 
26
 As a result, problems emerged from the rigidity of the legal regimes regulating international 
carriage. For example, the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules system of liability was unable to deal with 
the above two legs of transport and was able to deal only with the liability of the ocean carrier in 
an isolated manner (see Berlingieri, F., ‘Multimodal Aspect of The Rotterdam Rules’, a paper 
presented at the Colloquium of the Rotterdam Rules 2009 held on September 21, 2009, p.2 
Papers-colloquium, http://www.rotterdamrules2009.com/cms/index.php?page=text-speakers-
rotterdam-rules-2009; Fujita, T., ‘The Comprehensive Coverage of the New Convention: 
Performing Parties and the Multimodal Implications’ (2009) 44 Tex.I.L.J., pp.349-373, p.351 
stating that the current system is artificially separating the transport chain and creating 
difficulties for the application of different regimes that are involved in the different means of 
transport. 
27
 See, Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (LLP, 2012), another 
problem of unlocalised damage is “whether the damage occurred while the goods are the 
responsibility of the carrier” at para.1.31; Alcantara, J., “The new regime and multimodal 
transport”, [2002] LMCLQ 399, states that: “Container claims nearly always involve concealed 
damage, so there is generally little proof as to whom or what caused the damage,” at p. 403; 
See UNCITRAL Doc A/CN 9/526 of May 2003, Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on 
the work of its eleventh session (New York, 24 March to 4 April 2003) (36
th
 session, Vienna, 30 
June-11 July 2003), para 264. 
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found damaged by fresh water that entered through the roof. The problem with 
this carriage is the difficulty in ascertaining the place at which the damage 
occurred, i.e. during sea or inland carriage, in order to identify the responsible 
carrier/operator for the damage and the relevant legal regime regarding liability, 
whether mandatory, implied or governed by contract. 28  Second, there is a 
problem regarding the defective container. The question of any damage or loss 
to the cargo or ship caused by the defective container is considered differently 
in various jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions consider the defective container to 
fall within the scope of the seaworthiness obligation under Article III, r.1 where 
other jurisdictions consider the defective container as part of the obligation 
under Article III, r.2.29 The application of other transport conventions might also 
create problems.30 Marine risks and the liability of seaworthiness are unique to 
sea carriage only,31 which dictates that other transport conventions might be 
unsuitable to govern the liability of unseaworthiness claims. Such multiplicity of 
regimes32 has certain consequences.33    
                                               
28
 Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (LLP, 2012), at para.1.31. 
29
 See the discussion at para. 5.1.1. Such as Dutch, American and French law, where the 
unfitness of the container might give rise to uncertainty when determining which convention 
should govern liability for the unseaworthy container. The obligation of providing a seaworthy 
container and the liability for not doing so is discussed in Chapter Six.  
30
 Even though the Rotterdam Rules is a multimodal regime, due to its limited network system, 
potential problems may exist. This point is further discussed below, para. 5.5, at p.357 and the 
following paragraphs. 
31
 See UNCTAD Multimodal Transport: the feasibility of an international legal instrument, p.15, 
in: UNCTAD Document UNCTAD/ SDTE/ TLB/2003/1; this is indeed true, particularly for 
developing countries, and for small- and medium-sized transport users, as it makes it more 
difficult for them to access the market without a predictable legal framework; Hill, C., Multimodal 
Mayhem? Maritime Risk International Vol. 18(3), (01 March, 2004).  
32
 The Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail (COTIF-CMI) of 9 May 1980 as 
amended by the Protocol of Modification of 3 June 1999 (Vilnius); The Budapest Convention on 
the Contract for the Carriage of Goods by Inland Waterway of 22 June 2001 (CMNI): The 
Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road - Geneva, 19 May 
1956 (CMR). 
33
 Hancock, C., ‘Multimodal transport under the Convention’ cited as Chapter 2 in A New 
Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam Rules: Analysis of the UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea. 
(Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), p.39; UNCTAD Document, Multimodal Transport: the 
feasibility of an international legal instrument, p.10. It unavoidably leads to the conclusion that 
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There is a need, therefore, for a single liability regime that can apply to a 
contract of carriage by multimodal transport.34 
 
5.3 Scope of Application35 
The Rotterdam Rules take into account the need for a regime that can work 
side by side with any technological and commercial developments that take 
place in subsequent years.36 The scope of application of the Rotterdam Rules is 
provided by Article 1(1) where a contract of carriage is defined as ‘a contract in 
which a carrier, against the payment of freight, undertakes to carry goods from 
one place to another’. Other modes of transport can be combined with sea 
carriage. However, the sea leg is an absolute requirement whereas the other 
modes are not.37 Thus, the Rotterdam Rules can have varying implications38; i.e. 
                                                                                                                                          
the current framework of the law of carriage by sea: (i) creates uncertainty; (ii) increases the 
transaction costs; (iii) increases the cost of legal advice through the necessity of increased legal 
and evidentiary enquiries; (iv) increases the cost, in general, of cargo claims and of the 
consequent litigation; and (v) increases the cost of insurance. 
34
 The Convention of Multimodal Transport is often called a ‘wet multimodal’, ‘maritime-plus’ or a 
‘limited multimodal’ convention. See UNCITRAL Doc A/CN 9/526 of May 2003, Report of 
Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its eleventh session (New York, 24 March to 4 
April 2003) (36
th
 session, Vienna, 30 June-11 July 2003), para 241, p.67, available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Transport html; Baatz, Y. et al. 
(eds.), The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical Annotation (London: Informa, 2009), paras. 5-10, p.16. 
35
 The wording of the Rotterdam Rules does not mention multimodal transport but the scope of 
its application embraces door-to-door transportation. 
36
 This is obvious from the definition in Article 1 (see particularly paragraphs 9 and 10, 17 - 23); 
Chapter 3 on ‘Electronic Transport Records’ and Chapter 8 on ‘Transport Documents and 
Electronic Records’, amongst others: modern transport practices, such as containerisation 
(Article 1(26), 27(3)) and door-to-door transport contracts (Articles 1(1), 11 & 13). See Fresnedo 
De Aguirre, C. ‘The Rotterdam Rules from the Perspective of a Country that is a Consumer of 
Shipping Service’, (2009) Uni. L. Rev., 869-884, p. 871. 
37
 Van der Ziel, G. ‘Multimodal Aspect of the Rotterdam Rules’, (2009), Uni. L. Rev. 981, p.982. 
38
 The ‘maritime-plus’ scope of the application of the Rotterdam Rules, see Article 1.1 and 
Article 5.5 (subject to Articles 6, 7, 26 and 82). The door-to-door scope is not the only choice 
under the Rotterdam Rules. It can be contracted out of or the period of responsibility can be 
limited. See Diamond, A., ‘The Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) LMCLQ 445, at 465-467; Theodora, N., 
‘The UNCITRAL Draft Instrument on the Carriage of Goods [Wholly and Partly] [By Sea]: 
Multimodal at Last or Still All at Sea?’ [2005] JBL 647, pp.652-653. 
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the scope may be port-to-port, tackle-to-tackle or door-to-door.39The multimodal 
system of the Rotterdam Rules might solve some of the problems of the current 
law that are set out above.40 Nevertheless, issues may arise in relation to the 
practical consequences of the multimodal aspect of the Rotterdam Rules on the 
carrier’s liability for seaworthiness. This study is the first to address the potential 
impact of the multimodality system of the Rotterdam Rules on the carrier’s 
obligation of seaworthiness through their interrelation with other conventions.  
 
- The Provisions in the Rotterdam Rules that Deal with Potential Conflicts 
with Other Transport Conventions 
The door-to-door scope of the Rotterdam Rules may give rise to conflicts41 with 
other inland transport conventions such as CMR, CMNI and COTIF/CIM. The 
two articles that deal with potential conflicts between the various applicable 
legal regimes are Articles 26 and 82.42 
In general terms, the conflict problems are to be resolved on the basis of the 
type of loss. The Rotterdam Rules distinguish between ‘localised’ and 
‘unlocalised’ loss. If this is known, one set of Rules applies. If it is not known at 
                                               
39
 There are conditions; (1) the land place of delivery must be in a contracting state, and (2) the 
sea leg must be international. This is not an entirely revolutionary concept. It is common 
practice in the industry to extend the land carriage, for example, to the sea carriage by entering 
the paramount clause. Further, courts will not only enforce contractual provisions that extend 
maritime conventions inland, but also limitation clauses, such as a Himalaya clause, which 
extends the limitation of liability of the carrier to cover land workers such as servants and the 
agents of the carrier, as long as they are not independent contractors (see Sturley, F., 
‘Transport Law for the twenty-first century: an introduction to the preparation, philosophy, and 
potential impact of the Rotterdam Rules’, in R. Thomas (ed), A New Convention for the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea-The Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), p.1-33. 
40
 See above para. 5.2, at p. 333. 
41
 See Diamond, A. ‘The Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) 4 LMCLQ 445, at p.453. 
42
 After a long discussion over the selection between adopting a ‘network’ or ‘uniform’ system to 
adequately suit the multimodal operator and govern multimodal carriage, the drafters of the 
Rules in Article 26 adopted the limited ‘network system’. This can briefly be described as the 
Rotterdam Rules distinguishing between what is called ‘localised’ and ‘unlocalised’ loss or 
damage. 
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which stage of transport the loss, damage or delay occurred, another set of 
Rules will apply.  
(a) Localised loss:43 Article 2644  provides that where loss, damage or 
delay occurs during the non-sea stage, certain provisions related to 
liability, limitation of liability and time for suit will yield to the relevant 
provisions of the mandatory applicable law for that stage, provided 
that the relevant international convention45 would have applied if the 
shipper had made a separate and direct contract with the carrier in 
respect of that stage.46 As the obligation of seaworthiness is pertinent 
only to the ‘specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea’,47 
then it would suffice to briefly cover problems of localised damage in 
relation to the suggestion that the obligation of seaworthiness may be 
extended to inland carriage.  
(b) Unlocalised loss: Article 8248 covers unlocalised damage, but it also 
covers localised damage at sea in situations where there is an issue 
                                               
43
 The word ‘loss’ here is used in its wider sense to include cargo loss, damage or delay. 
44
 Article 26, titled ‘Carriage preceding or subsequent to sea carriage’, provides ‘When loss of or 
damage to goods, or an event or circumstance causing a delay in their delivery occurs during 
the carrier’s period of responsibility but solely before their loading onto the ship or solely after 
their discharge from the ship, the provisions of this Convention do not prevail over those 
provisions of another international instrument that, at the time of such loss, damage or event or 
circumstance causing delay:  
 (a) Pursuant to the provisions of such international instrument would have applied to all or 
any of the carrier’s activities if the shipper had made a separate and direct contract with the 
carrier in respect of the particular stage of carriage where the loss of, or damage to goods, or 
an event or circumstance causing delay in their delivery occurred;  
(b) Specifically provide for the carrier’s liability, limitation of liability, or time for suit; and  
(c) Cannot be departed from by contract either at all or to the detriment of the shipper under 
that instrument,’ 
45
 The scope of this Article is limited to the network system, van der Ziel, G. Multimodal Aspects 
of the Rotterdam Rules p.982; Fujita, T. ‘The Comprehensive Coverage of the New Convention’, 
(2009) 44 Tex. Int. L. J., 345-373, p.357. 
46
 Glass,D.,  “A sea regime fit for the twenty-first century? The UNCITRAL Draft Convention”, 7 
(2009) STI 2, at p.13. 
47
 Pursuant to the heading of Article 14. 
48
 Article 82, titled:‘International Conventions governing the carriage of goods by other modes of 
transport’ provides: 
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of conflict between conventions. In such a case, the Rotterdam Rules 
give way to other applicable conventions in order to prevent the 
simultaneous application of obligations provided by the Rotterdam 
Rules with conflicting obligations provided by other conventions. It is 
important to mention that if neither Article 26 nor Article 82 apply, 
then the other provisions of the Rotterdam Rules apply. 
 
During land carriage, a container may be rendered unfit for the subsequent 
carriage by sea. This, in turn, may have an impact on the safety of the cargo in 
the container, on other cargoes and indeed on the vessel during the sea 
carriage stage. The obvious question, therefore, would be whether one should 
extend the obligation of seaworthiness to cover the land carriage leg. Any 
attempt to answer this question would inevitably raise the question as to what 
will be the legal implications of limiting the seaworthiness obligation to the sea 
carriage leg only.   
 
5.4 The Importance of Extending the Obligation to Land Carriage 
                                                                                                                                          
‘Nothing in this Convention affects the application of any of the following international 
conventions in force at the time this Convention enters into force, including any future 
amendment to such conventions, that regulate the liability of the carrier for loss of or damage to 
the goods:  
(a) Any convention governing the carriage of goods by air to the extent that such convention 
according to its provisions applies to any part of the contract of carriage; 
(b) Any convention governing the carriage of goods by road to the extent that such 
convention according to its provisions applies to the carriage of goods that remain loaded on 
a road cargo vehicle carried on board a ship; 
(c) Any convention governing the carriage of goods by rail to the extent that such convention 
according to its provisions applies to carriage of goods by sea as a supplement to the 
carriage by rail; or  
(d) Any convention regarding the carriage of goods by inland waterways to the extent that 
such convention according to its provisions applies to a carriage of goods without trans-
shipment both by inland waterways and sea.’ 
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5.4.1 The Fitness of Containers 
An example of containerised dangerous cargo will be used. It would not be true 
to state that a container may be rendered unfit for cargo carriage during the sea 
carriage leg only.49 Under the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules, sea carriers, 
who supply the containers, may not know which safety regulations, i.e. whether 
ADR (non-shipping regulations)50 or the IMDG Code,51 the shipper or the land 
carrier may adhere to in checking, packing, stowing and carrying the containers. 
The potential adherence to safety standards other than the widely used 
international safety code,52 i.e. the IMDG Code, might result not only in damage 
to the cargo inside the container but may also affect the vessel’s seaworthiness.  
Paragraph 1.4.3.4(b) of ADR states that the ‘operator’ 53  who is involved in 
handling a tank-container shall maintain the shells (the outer structure of the 
tank container) and their equipment so as to satisfy the requirements under 
ADR. Further, paragraph 1.4.2.2(c) of ADR requires the carrier to “ascertain 
visually that the vehicles and loads have no obvious defects, leakages or cracks, 
missing equipment etc.” One may presume that these regulations produce a 
                                               
49
 See Clarke, A., ‘Containers: Proof that Damage to Goods Occurred during Carriage’, cited at 
Chapter 4 in Schmitthoff, C. and Goode, R (ed.). International carriage of goods: some legal 
problems and possible solutions (Centre of Commercial Law Studies, 1988), p.81. 
50
 The ADR agreements allow dangerous goods travelling by road through more than one 
country to be exempted from the domestic legislation in force in those countries provided that 
the requirements of ADR are met in full. However, ADR does not contain provisions for 
enforcement and therefore, where a vehicle travelling under ADR does not comply in full, the 
vehicle becomes subject to domestic requirements. Such enforcement action would be framed 
in the terms of the relevant domestic regulations rather than a higher international standard. See 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/cdg/manual/regenvirnment.htm#adr. 
51
 The IMDG Code contains internationally agreed guidance on the safe transport of dangerous 
goods by sea and most commonly relates to the carriage of dangerous goods in freight 
containers and tank containers. 
52
 See Northern Shipping Co v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 255, CA, where Auld LJ stated that “compliance with codes like MOPOG [the 
Russian domestic regulations for carrying dangerous container] is not necessarily determinative 
of the issue of due diligence.” 
53
 ‘Tank-container operator’ means any enterprise (i.e. person whether legal or natural) in 
whose name the tank-container is registered. See Chapter 1.2 of ADR. 
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standard of checking but whether such regulations purport a standard similar to 
that required by the IMDG Code is questionable. The shipping industry 
regulations may apply to the inland operator/carrier, if the contracting sea 
carrier is in control of the entire carriage, to check and maintain the tank-
container (as required by ADR) during the inland transit. However, there is no 
scientific paper or academic opinion that demonstrates whether ADR safety 
regulations provide a standard of safety similar to the recommendations in the 
shipping industry regulations. Thus, at least to some extent it would seem likely 
that, on principle, the operator, carrier or other persons who are involved in 
handling and transporting the dangerous goods container when using ADR 
regulations may not provide a standard of care similar to the recommended 
regime under the IMDG Code.54 If this proposition is true, the standard of care 
applied during the inland carriage may result in the container being rendered 
unfit for sea carriage. In other words, the care taken during inland carriage will 
be assessed by the court by reference to the standard set by ADR. 55 
Accordingly, if an inland carrier carried dangerous cargo inside a container over 
which he has exercised care during the inland carriage according to the 
standard set by ADR but the cargo was still damaged, where the standard of 
care under ADR is less than that required by the shipping industry regulations, 
the carrier will still be liable.    
                                               
54
 This may have an impact on the liability of the cargo owner. For instance, if the standard of 
care and the requirements for checking a container are lower than the international standard 
recommended by the shipping industry, the court may accept the standard of care 
recommended by ADR. As a result, the carrier might not be rendered liable for a standard of 
care lower than that imposed by the shipping regulations. See, Clarke, M., International 
Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (LLP, 2013), f.n. 93, at para. 73, stating that: “ADR is 
concerned not with liability between parties to the contract of carriage but with the regulation of 
the mode of carriage and its documentation, reinforced by the criminal law.” 
55
 See, Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (LLP, 2013), at para. 73. 
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However, the standard of care during the inland carriage will be similar to the 
standard under the shipping industry regulations if the contracting sea carrier is 
in control of the whole operation. The sea carrier should ensure that the 
subcontracting land carrier complies with the rules relevant to the sea carriage 
leg during the whole carriage. 
If the standard of care referred to in respect of the carriage of dangerous goods 
in a tank-container/container in both ADR and the IMDG Code is similar, 
problems may still arise during the sea carriage leg due to the lack of 
harmonisation amongst the safety regulations.56 Paragraph 1.1.4.2.1 of ADR 
provides that if the carriage is in a transport chain that includes maritime 
carriage, the containers, tank-container, packing, marking and labelling of a 
container do not need to meet the regulations in ADR but meet the regulations 
in the IMDG Code, then they will be accepted for carriage.57 This demonstrates 
that containers will not necessarily be in conformity with the IMDG Code if the 
containers are transported in a chain including maritime carriage, even if the 
containers, their labelling and marking are in conformity with ADR. This might 
result from a situation where the containers, labelling and marking are not in 
conformity with the IMDG Code, as the provisions relating to the marking, 
labelling etc. under ADR have been misinterpreted, especially where they are 
different from those in the IMDG Code. This would give rise to particular 
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 See, Clark, R., “Focus on…” (01 2002) MRI at p.1. “It has been acknowledged in the shipping 
industry that incidents and problems encountered in the shipment of dangerous goods could be 
traced, to some extent, to a lack of harmonisation amongst the international safety regimes of 
ADR and IMDG Code. The problems are largely identified as largely shipper-based.” 
57
 Paragraph 1.1.4.2.1 concerning ‘carriage in a transport chain including maritime or air 
carriage’ states that: “Packages, containers, portable tanks and tank-containers, which do not 
entirely meet the requirements for packing, mixed packing, marking, labelling of packages or 
placarding and orange plate marking, of ADR, but are in conformity with the requirements of the 
IMDG Code or the ICAO Technical Instructions shall be accepted for carriage in a transport 
chain including maritime or air carriage subject to…the marking and labelling in accordance with 
requirements of the IMDG Code or ICAO Technical Instructions”. 
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problems for the sea carriage leg. For instance, if a container was labelled in 
accordance with ADR regulations and then loaded on board a vessel, the 
master, the crew and the persons who plan for stowage of the containers might 
not be familiar with the labelling or marking, as they have only been trained to 
handle containers that were packed and labelled according to the shipping 
industry regulations. If the crew are not familiar with the requirements under 
ADR, the crew might not properly stow the container of dangerous cargo in 
accordance with the regulations of the IMDG Code. If the dangerous goods are 
stowed in the wrong location, e.g. near to a source of heat, this might result in 
an explosion or fire.58  
Even if the stowage plan was arranged in accordance with the regulations of the 
IMDG Code, difficulties may arise in the case of an emergency. For instance, if 
a container that was labelled, marked and packed in accordance with ADR and 
stowed on board the vessel in accordance with the IMDG Code, but during the 
voyage a leak or fire emerged from the container, there will be difficulties for the 
crew to operate the emergency procedures for this particular container, which 
contains dangerous cargo. During an emergency, there might not be time to 
refer to the container documentation or packing and marking certificates, 
assuming that the crew managed to construe the labelling and the 
dangerousness of the cargo correctly. The crew might eliminate danger by 
using the nearest fire extinguisher to the container in an effort to put the fire out. 
There are several types of fire extinguisher for different types of fire, e.g. gas 
leak fires and electrical fires. Accordingly, the crew, who are unfamiliar with the 
marking posted on the side of the container, which reflects the type of 
                                               
58
 See Northern Shipping Co. v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 255. 
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dangerous goods inside the container, will not know the type of danger they are 
dealing with and may use the wrong fire extinguisher. This is likely to result in 
the fire spreading or an explosion. This problem may be solved by extending 
the obligation of exercising due diligence in respect of the container to the entire 
inland carriage and not merely to the sea carriage leg, so that the standard of 
care and labelling requirements etc. are applicable to the entire transit. At the 
very least, before loading the container into the ship, the container should be 
labelled and deemed fit in accordance with the applicable maritime regulations, 
e.g. the IMDG Code.59 This is not difficult to achieve as paragraph 1.1.4.2 of 
ADR permits regulations regarding the carriage of containers in the IMDG Code 
to override the regulations under ADR when the carriage of containers in a 
transport chain includes sea carriage.60        
Accordingly, if the obligations of supplying a fit container were applicable to the 
land carriage, the shipper or land carrier would then be instructed and obliged to 
use the appropriate safety standards in the international regulations, e.g. the 
IMDG Code, for the particular cargo. This would naturally reduce the likelihood 
of an incident of unseaworthiness during the sea carriage caused by the 
container’s unfitness.61 In short, an imposition of a similar obligation during the 
land carriage leg would minimise the likelihood of an incident caused by 
unseaworthiness and would assist in overcoming the problems of performance 
                                               
59
 Schelin, J., ‘Obligations of the Shipper to the Carrier’, cited as Chapter 7 in von Ziegler, A. et 
al. (eds.), The Rotterdam Rules 2008 - Commentary to the United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea (Wolters Kluwer, 
2010), at p.158.  
60
 This is only possible if the sea carrier ensured that the shipping industry standards, e.g. the 
IMDG Code, are observed during the entire carriage. This may be possible if the sea carrier 
included such regulations and standards in his contract with the inland carrier. 
61
 See Northern Shipping Co v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 255. 
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by land carriers at the lower standard imposed by less strict regulations.62 For 
instance, a court would likely assess the land carrier’s exercise of care over 
containerised goods by reference to ADR standards.63 One can argue that there 
is no need to impose a cargoworthiness obligation on the land carrier prior to 
the sea leg, as general liability provisions of other regulations impose a duty of 
care over the containerised cargo, e.g. Article 17 of the CMR. However, such an 
approach does not address the practical issue where the container’s unfitness 
may be a problem during the sea carriage leg but not during the land carriage 
leg. It is submitted that due diligence to render a container cargoworthy and 
seaworthy should be exercised during the land leg as well, as this stage may be 
the only time where a sea carrier could react and prevent the container’s 
unfitness that may in turn threaten the vessel’s safety and jeopardise the 
voyage.64 This is especially true where the sea carrier has no means of keeping 
or restoring the vessel’s seaworthiness during the sea carriage.65 This would be 
contrary to the new obligation of exercising due diligence to ‘keep’ the container 
cargoworthy during the voyage. Therefore, imposing an obligation of due 
diligence as regards cargoworthiness for the land leg may essentially mean 
exercising a different standard of care in checking and maintaining the container 
                                               
62
 One should note that dangerous goods are not defined in international inland transport 
conventions, i.e. CMR. If a similar obligation of due diligence is not imposed during the land 
carriage leg, the land carrier, will not, for example, be subject to the international law 
requirements for the carriage of dangerous goods. Therefore, land carriers will be using ADR, 
which offers a non-exhaustive list of dangerous goods. See Clarke, M. and Yates, D., Contracts 
of Carriage by Land and Air, (1
st
 ed., 2005), para. 1.138.   
63
 Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (2009, 5
th
 ed.,), para. 73. Also, 
the same author concludes that one should bear in mind that ADR is concerned not with liability 
between parties to a contract of carriage, but with regulation of the mode of carriage and its 
documentation, reinforced by criminal law (therefore, the defendant of the inland carriage might 
be relieved from liability on the basis of such argument).  
64
 See the standard of due diligence exercised in respect of containers. 
65
 It is well established that not all defects endangering the safety of the vessel can be remedied 
during the voyage. See Ingram and Royale Ltd v Services Maritimes du Treport Ltd [1913] 1 K.B. 
538, p.543, per Scrutton J. 
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during the land carriage66 and, by having the sea carriage in mind, the carrier 
would be encouraged to refuse loading a container that could potentially 
threaten the vessel’s safety. 
 
5.4.2 Implications of Extending the Obligation of Container 
Seaworthiness to Inland Carriage 
It is debatable whether the heading of Article 14, ‘voyage by sea’, has confined 
the obligation of seaworthiness to the sea leg only, even though the Rules are 
intended to cover any door-to-door operations within the scope of the carriage 
contract, including e.g. inland carriage.67 One cannot see any sensible reason 
for not extending the obligation of supplying a fit container to the inland carriage 
leg. Extending the responsibility of container seaworthiness to inland carriage 
would not be difficult in light of the current law (Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) as 
regards the duty of seaworthiness. It is well established that the carrier is 
responsible for the vessel’s seaworthiness once it comes within ‘his orbit’.68 By 
analogy, a container supplied by the sea carrier, even if the containers are 
located far away from the vessel, e.g. during the stuffing stage, would already 
be within the supplier’s/carrier’s ‘orbit’ and consequently, one would suggest the 
                                               
66
 Zim Israel Navigation Ltd v The Israeli Phoenix Assurance Company Ltd (The ‘Zim-Marseilles’) 
[1999] ETL 535, pp. 547-548 (Supr. C. of Israel). The district court had held that the standard of 
examination was not sufficient for the shipowner to discharge his obligation. The containers had 
not been inspected individually, even though it was known that the containers suffered from 
manufacturing defects and had undergone repairs, and, just prior to loading, were subjected to 
some strengthening repair. However, the court found that the repair and the standard of 
inspection of the defects were inadequate. It should be noted that Israeli law (as well as 
American, French and Dutch law) imposes the obligation of providing a cargoworthy container 
under the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, i.e. 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
67
 Article 1 provides that the ‘contract of carriage’ shall provide for carriage by sea and may 
provide for carriage by other modes of transport in addition to the sea carriage. 
68
 Riverstone Meat Co Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd (The Muncaster Castle) [1960] 1 Q. 
B. 536 (CA). 
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imposition of a duty to exercise due diligence to provide a cargoworthy 
container during the land leg for that sea carrier who supplies his own 
container.69 As a consequence, the due diligence requirement would impose a 
clearer obligation on the sea carrier who would then contract with the land 
carrier on the understading that the land carrier would also exercise due 
diligence, as opposed to only providing for a duty of care over the cargo.70  It 
should be stressed that the obligation of supplying a fit container is only 
imposed on the sea carrier where he is the supplier of the container and it might 
be sensible to impose the same obligation on the inland carrier. In other words, 
the sea carrier who supplied the container should exercise due diligence to 
make sure that his container is fit to carry the contracted cargo by ensuring that 
the structural strength, integrity, door gaskets, machineries (if the container is 
equipped with such), fittings (if it is a tank-container) and the internal cleanliness 
of the container is sound. The inland carrier, perhaps, should,71 through the 
extended duty, ensure that the soundness of the container’s structural fitness is 
maintained throughout the inland carriage. It seems that, in principle, such an 
obligation (under the Rotterdam Rules) should be imposed on the inland carrier 
regardless of whether the container is supplied by (or on behalf of) the sea 
carrier. Thus, the inland carrier who transports the container to the load port 
                                               
69
 See Northern Shipping Co. v Deutsche Seereederei GmbH (The Kapitan Sakharov) [2000] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 255. 
70
 The non-delegable duty of seaworthiness would still be applicable when the land carrier is 
carrying the subject container and if he exercises a lesser standard of care, the sea carrier 
would be liable for any loss that results. See Riverstone Meat Co. Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping 
Co. Ltd (The Muncaster Castle) [1961] A.C. 807. This approach would not conflict with the other 
provisions of the Rotterdam Rules. The land carrier cannot be sued directly as he is not a 
‘maritime performing party’. 
71
 It can be agreed whether the stuffing and lashing of the cargo inside the container it is dealt 
with by the sea or land carrier. There may be a scenario where the sea carrier who supplied the 
container and therefore knows the internal condition of his container, leaves the stuffing to be 
carried out by the shipper, as he is loading cargo that requires specific lashing and stowing that 
only the shipper can carry out, provided that such stuffing and lashing does not render the 
container unfit.  
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should, for the entire inland carriage, care for and inspect the external structure 
of the container for any visual defect, crack or leakage. Where a defect is 
spotted, the inland carrier, depending on the circumstances of the case, should 
seek a substitute container or fix the defect and notify the sea carrier of the 
damage. This might be the case under the current law. In a nut shell, the 
standard of care extended to the land carrier should not be lower than the 
standard of due diligence in keeping the container fit during the land carriage.   
Article 1(7) of the Rotterdam Rules refers to a ‘maritime performing party’. This 
is a performing party, 72  e.g. an independent contractor, who performs or 
undertakes to perform the carrier’s obligations during the port-to-port carriage.73. 
This includes the inland carrier but only if he performs or undertakes to perform 
his services within the limits of the port. Pursuant to Article 19,74 a maritime 
                                               
72
 ‘Performing party’ means a person other than the carrier that performs or undertakes to 
perform any of the carrier’s obligations under a contract of carriage with respect to the receipt, 
loading, handling, stowage, carriage, care, unloading or delivery of the goods, to the extent that 
a person acts, either, directly or indirectly, at the carrier’s request or under the carrier’s 
supervision or control. 
73
 Sturley, M., The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly, (Thomson Reuters, 2010). It is stated that: “As a general 
rule, everyone that performs the carrier’s obligations from the initial port of loading until the final 
port of discharge qualifies as a maritime performing party” at para. 5.158. 
74
 Article 19. Liability of maritime performing parties: 
1. A maritime performing party is subject to the obligations and liabilities imposed on the carrier 
under this Convention and is entitled to the carrier’s defences and limits of liability as provided 
for in this Convention if:  
(a) The maritime performing party received the goods for carriage in a Contracting State, or 
delivered them in a Contracting State, or performed its activities with respect to the goods in a 
port in a Contracting State; and (b) The occurrence that caused the loss, damage or delay took 
place:  
(i) during the period between the arrival of the goods at the port of loading of the ship and their 
departure from the port of discharge from the ship; (ii) while the maritime performing party had 
custody of the goods; or (iii) at any other time to the extent that it was participating in the 
performance of any of the activities contemplated by the contract of carriage.  
2. If the carrier agrees to assume obligations other than those imposed on the carrier under this 
Convention, or agrees that the limits of its liability are higher than the limits specified under this 
Convention, a maritime performing party is not bound by this agreement unless it expressly 
agrees to accept such obligations or such higher limits.  
3. A maritime performing party is liable for the breach of its obligations under this Convention 
caused by the acts or omissions of any person to which it has entrusted the performance of any 
of the carrier’s obligations under the contract of carriage under the conditions set out in 
paragraph 1 of this article.  
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performing party is subject to the same rights, immunities, obligations (including 
the obligation of seaworthiness under Article 14(a)-(c))75 and liabilities, as those 
imposed on the carrier under the Rotterdam Rules at the time when he has 
custody over the goods or when he is performing the carrier’s obligations 
contemplated in the contract of carriage.76 Article 19 facilitates direct claims 
against maritime performing parties in spite of the cargo-claimant having no 
contractual relationship with such parties.77 If the exercise of due diligence is 
not imposed on the maritime performing party prior to shipment, the cargo-
claimant will not be able to seek an indemnity from the maritime performing 
party who was responsible for the safe transport of containers within the port, 
even though his negligence has resulted in the container becoming defective. 
Take for an example, a maritime performing party who acts as an inland water 
carrier and is responsible for supplying transport containers from the jetty to the 
ocean going ship within the port.78 Through the maritime performing party’s 
negligence in handling one of the containers, it has become defective as a 
result of the heavy overloaded stack from the top containers.79 Consequently, 
                                                                                                                                          
4. Nothing in this Convention imposes liability on the master or crew of the ship or on an 
employee of the carrier or of a maritime performing party. 
75
 Article 79(1) reads: “unless otherwise provided in this Convention, any term in a contract of 
carriage is void to the extent that it: (a) Directly or indirectly excludes or limits the obligation of 
the carrier or a maritime performing party under this Convention; (b) Directly or indirectly 
excludes or limits the liability of the carrier or a maritime performing party for breach of an 
obligation under this Convention.” See Baatz, Y., The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical Annotation, 
(Informa, 2009), who states that Article 79 “makes no reference to the loss of or damage to the 
cargo, but rather to “the obligations” - that is all obligations - imposed on the carrier by the 
Convention as a whole,” at para. 79.03. 
76
 Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Routledge, 2012), at p.144-145. 
77
 Baatz, Y., The Rotterdam Rules: A Practical Annotation, (Informa, 2009), para. 19.01, 19.04. 
It is noted that the Rotterdam Rules do not create liability against performing parties, but only 
against maritime performing parties. However, the carrier’s liability covers actions by all 
performing parties whether maritime or not. 
78
 The CMR Convention is irrelevant to this example but it could be relevant if the CMR 
Convention is part of and enforced by the national law of the country where loading is taking 
place.  
79
 Assuming that the container was loaded inside the ship to prevent exposure to rain, the 
claimant may easily identify where the damage to the goods occurred, especially if it is known 
that it was raining heavily during loading.   
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the cargo is damaged by rain before the container was loaded onto the ocean-
going ship. The maritime performing party did not take any corrective action to 
repair or replace the defective container, nor did it notify the ocean going carrier 
of the damage. If the obligation of container seaworthiness is not imposed prior 
to the loading of the container onto the ship – at the very least, during inland 
transport within the loading port – the cargo-claimant can only claim for damage 
that results from a defective container supplied by the sea carrier but not from 
the inland carrier who performs his duty within the loading port. If the sea carrier 
is insolvent and if the obligation of container seaworthiness is imposed on the 
maritime performing party during the period prior to the loading of the container 
onto the ship (i.e. within the port of loading), the claimant 80  may have an 
opportunity to recover his loss from the maritime performing party.  
Much of Article 14 would be curtailed if due diligence is not required to be 
exercised prior to the container’s loading; its purpose is to extend the 
obligations of the carrier to the entire voyage(s), including the inland voyage.81 
By imposing more responsibility at an early stage, i.e. during the inland carriage, 
and by extending the obligation of keeping the container fit to the inland carrier, 
shipping industry regulations, such as the IMDG Code, would also be imposed 
on the inland carrier. Thus, the extension of the obligation to the inland carrier 
would help ensure that the container remains fit and possibly reduce problems 
related to container unfitness that may emerge during the voyage, especially if 
                                               
80
 Or it might be difficult and more expensive to sue the foreign sea carrier.  
81
 To the contrary, the purpose of an ongoing seaworthiness obligation would be defeated in 
situations where a container’s defect would be discoverable by using only the international 
standards but could only be cured while the container was still on land.   
351 
 
such problems are difficult to resolve.82 The benefit in extending to the land 
carrier a standard similar to, or not less than, due diligence in keeping the 
container seaworthy may help in discovering any unfitness during the inland 
carriage and prior to its loading on the vessel. It might be the case that the 
Rotterdam Rules do not extend the duty (in relation to the fitness of a container) 
to the land carrier unless the sea carrier requires, under the contract, that the 
inland carriage, for example, conforms with the IMDG Code regulations, so as 
to ensure that parallel requirements are imposed for land and sea carriage.  
One of the controversial aspects of the Rotterdam Rules has been their 
applicability to the entire contract of carriage including land carriage preceding 
the loading of the vessel.83 Therefore, extending the scope of the obligation to 
exercise due diligence in providing a cargoworthy container to the land carriage 
leg, as suggested above, might conflict with other inland transport 
conventions.84 These issues will be discussed in the next section. 
 
                                               
82
 As there is not much that can be done to keep the container fit in accordance with Article 14(c) 
where a defective condition of the container emerges during the voyage. See f.n. 127, at p.363.      
83
 In contrast with the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the “tackle-to-tackle” scope of Article 1(e) 
HVR, the application of the Rotterdam Rules is defined by the contract of carriage itself 
pursuant to the definition of the contract of carriage in Article 1(1) of the Rotterdam Rules. 
However, if the contract refers only to the maritime leg of a multimodal movement, then it is only 
that leg that the Rotterdam Rules cover. 
84
 However, the absence of an express provision in Article 26 to exclude provisions which 
‘indirectly affect the liability’ of the sea carrier is likely to give rise to differing interpretations; see 
Tetley, W., ‘Reform of carriage of goods - The UNCITRAL Draft & Senate COGSA’99. Let’s 
have a two-track approach’, (2003) 28 Tul. Mar. L. J. 1-114; it appears that tribunals and courts 
will differ in opinion as to which provisions of each convention prevail over the provisions of the 
Rotterdam Rules; this might lead to potential uncertainty in practice. See Diamond, A., ‘The 
Next Sea Carriage Convention’, (2008) LMCLQ, 135, p.145; Hancock, C., ‘Multimodal transport 
under the Convention’ cited as Chapter 2 in Thomas, R., A New Convention for the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam Rules: An Analysis of the UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), 
p.45.   
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5.4.3 Potential Conflicts as regards the Standard of Liability 
There may be a reason for limiting the scope of the obligation to provide a 
cargoworthy container to the sea carriage leg only. Arguably, this could lead to 
the avoidance of potential problems in relation to the standard of liability under 
other inland transport conventions. An example is the CMR Convention. Where 
loss, damage or delay occurs during road transit, Article 26 of the Rotterdam 
Rules allows for the relevant provisions of an applicable international 
convention, e.g. Articles 17 and 18 of the CMR, which govern liability, limitation 
of liability and time for suit, to prevail over the Rules (provided that the CMR 
would have applied if a separate contract had been made between the carrier 
and the shipper in respect of the carriage). The CMR Convention, as well as 
other inland conventions,85 provide, in principle, stricter liability but not absolute 
liability,86 and differ on the defences which the carrier may plead. Assuming the 
application of Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules, the liability for an unfit 
container arguably creates a new difficulty; the container operator may be 
alleged liable by virtue of Article 26 of the Rotterdam Rules for goods carried in 
a container which are lost, damaged or delayed as this would pertain to 
‘carriage preceding or subsequent to sea carriage.’87 The international transport 
conventions are a patchwork of regimes that could apply in relation to various 
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 Additionally, the Warsaw Convention and CIM Convention. A conclusion can be drawn that 
unimodal conventions have much the same standard of liability. See Kindred, H. M. and Brooks, 
M. R., Multimodal Transport Rules, (Kluwer Law International, 1
st
 ed., 1997), p.80. 
86
 This means that the carrier is not responsible for everything that happened to the goods in the 
course of the carriage. Certain risks are outside his responsibility, such as ‘unavoidable 
circumstances’.  
87
 In other words, the international transport conventions applicable to the different (albeit 
unimodal) transport modes vary significantly in their provisions, e.g. from the central liability 
provisions relating to the carrier’s liability, to the exclusion or limits of liability and the requisite 
time for suit. In such circumstances, if under a hypothetical ‘separate and direct contract with 
the carrier in respect of the particular stage of carriage’, the carrier’s liability would have been 
regulated by some other mandatory international instrument, the provisions of the Rotterdam 
Rules are to yield to that other instrument. See Diamond, A. ‘The Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) 4 
LMCLQ 445, p.456. 
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potential claims, 88  including provisions that have an indirect impact on the 
carrier’s liability for unseaworthiness, even though such liability is unique to sea 
carriage conventions.89 In such circumstances, the Rotterdam Rules give way to 
the general system of liability provided by other transport conventions, where 
the majority of their provisions impose stricter liability with ‘special risks’ that act 
as limits on the carrier’s liability. Further, Article 18(1) of the CMR provides that 
the burden of proof rests on the carrier to show that the loss, damage or delay 
falls within the exemptions provided by Article 17(2). Thus, the carrier, under the 
CMR, is liable for loss of the goods while they are in his charge unless he 
proves that he was unable to avoid the incident by virtue of the unfitness of the 
container or to avert the consequences of such unfitness. 90  The Rotterdam 
Rules, however, as explained in Chapter Three, are essentially a fault-based 
regime91 with other stipulated defences,92 which means that the carrier would be 
held (fully or partially) liable only where he did not exercise due diligence to 
provide a cargoworthy container.93 
It has already been proposed during a meeting of the Working Group of the 
Rules94 and elsewhere95 that provisions in other transport conventions, which 
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 UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/4 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development - Commentary 
by UNCTAD Secretariat on Draft Instrument on Transport Law 13 March, 2002, p. 19. 
89
 Cf. van der Ziel, G., ‘Multimodal Aspects of the Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) 4 Uni. L. Rev., pp. 
981-995, p.984. 
90
 See Kindred, H. M. and Brooks, M. R., Multimodal Transport Rules, (Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p.76; Glass, D. A. and Cashmore, C., Introduction to the Law of Carriage of Goods 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 1989), pp.106, 110-113; Theunis, J. (ed.), International Carriage of Goods by 
Road (CMR), (Lloyd’s of London Press, 1987), p.80-85. 
91
 Articles 17(1), 17(2). 
92
 Article 17(3). 
93
 Some authors use the word ‘negligence’ instead of the expression ‘lack of exercising due 
diligence’. See for example, Murray, C. et al., Schmitthoff: The Law and Practice of International 
Trade (Sweet & Maxwell, 12
th
 ed., 2012), p.356. 
94
 See the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; Working Group III (Transport 
Law) Ninth session (NY, 15-26 April 2002); Transport Law: Preliminary draft instrument on the 
carriage of goods by sea, Note by the Secretariat, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, para. 52, comments 
on Article 4.2.1. It was stated that the “[p]rovisions in other conventions that may indirectly affect 
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may merely indirectly affect liability, do not supersede the provisions of the 
Rotterdam Rules and that Article 14 continues to apply, as it will not be in direct 
conflict with any provisions of other international inland transport instruments.96 
It should not be overlooked that the obligation of cargoworthiness is measured 
by the exercise of due diligence, as opposed to the obligations under the central 
liability provisions of other inland transport conventions. The proposed 
contention, nevertheless, does not consider the potential interplay of such 
indirect conflicts and disregards the close interrelationship between, on the one 
hand,97 the carrier’s obligations of providing a cargoworthy container, and on 
the other, his liability.98 Taking the hypothetical example of cargo damage as a 
result of the unfitness of a container where the damage was determined to have 
occurred during the land transport, by virtue of Article 26 of the Rotterdam 
                                                                                                                                          
liability, such as jurisdiction provisions or notice of loss, should not supersede the Rotterdam 
Rules.” 
95
 Rasmussen U., ‘Additional Provisions Relating to Particular Stages of Carriage’ cited as 
Chapter 6 in von Ziegler, A. (ed.), The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by 
Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), p.147, stating that Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules is not affected 
by Article 26; van der Ziel, G. ‘Multimodal Aspects of the Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) 4 Uni. L. 
Rev., pp.981-995, p.984, stating that the provisions which prevail must be directly related to 
liability. Therefore, the provisions on limitation of liability and time for suit are included, but all 
provisions that may have an indirect impact on carrier liability are excluded. Cf. Sturley, M. et al. 
(ed.), The Rotterdam Rules - The UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of 
Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomas Reuters, 2010), at para.5.020, at f.n. 58, suggesting 
that the approach followed is entirely opposite to that of the rest of scholars. It was stated that 
when the ‘limited network’ principle requires the carrier liability to be determined according to 
the mandatory provisions of another international instrument (such as CMR or CIM-COTIF), 
those provisions rather than the specific provisions, i.e. Article 13(1), define the carrier’s 
obligations.       
96
 Berlingieri, F., ‘Multimodal Aspects of the Rotterdam Rules’, presented at a Colloquium on the 
Rotterdam Rules held on September 21, 2009, at p.8, cited at http://www.rotterdamrules2009. 
com/cms/index.php?page=text-speakers-rotterdam-rules-2009, expressing the notion that 
Article 14 encompasses specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea. 
97
 The differences in the transport systems were not considered to complement each other as 
regards coverage of claims. As a result, this would lessen the predictability of the carrier’s 
liability, and the cargo-interest’s indemnity respectively, with regard to claims arising out of an 
unseaworthy container. UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/4, ‘United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development - Commentary by UNCTAD Secretariat on Draft Instrument on Transport Law’, 13 
March 2002, p. 19. 
98
 The same proposition might apply to other duties of the carrier, e.g. under Article 13; see 
Nikaki, T., ‘The Carrier’s Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know?’ (2010) 
35 Tul. Mar. L. J., 1-44, p.39. 
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Rules, the CMR provisions would apply provided that the parties had entered a 
separate and direct contract for such inland carriage. As a result, the carrier’s 
liability for the above damage would be dealt with by Articles 1799 and 18100 of 
the CMR. Furthermore, assuming that Article 14 is applicable to the land 
carriage (given the proposition that this Article does not compete with the 
provisions of the CMR), there is a strong possibility of misinterpreting the 
standard of seaworthiness required by the carrier. 
Thus, following a claim for localised damage, Article 26, which gives way to the 
provisions on liability, limitations and time for suit of other inland transport 
conventions, might have an impact on the obligation of container 
cargoworthiness, due to the absence of provisions similar to the obligation of 
seaworthiness in those other conventions. It follows therefore that the 
application of general liability provisions of an applicable inland transport 
convention will demand a different (in a significant practical sense) degree of 
care in providing a fit container as opposed to the due diligence standard 
required under Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules. A commentator has argued 
that this obliges the carrier to prove101 that the loss, damage or delay caused by 
the unseaworthiness of the container would have occurred without fault on his 
part, essentially strict liability.102 Another contends that proving proper care or 
                                               
99
 Article 17 of the CMR reads: “1. The carrier shall be liable for the total or partial loss of the 
goods and for damage thereto occurring between the time when he takes over the goods and 
the time of delivery, as well as for any delay in delivery; 2. The carrier shall however be relieved 
of liability if the loss, damage or delay was caused by the wrongful act or neglect of the claimant, 
by the instructions of the claimant given otherwise than as the result of a wrongful act or neglect 
on the part of the carrier, by inherent vice of the goods or through circumstances which the 
carrier could not avoid and the consequences of which he was unable to prevent.” 
100
Article 18 of the CMR reads: “1. The burden of proving that loss, damage or delay was due to 
one of the causes specified in Article 17, paragraph 2, shall rest upon the carrier.” 
101
 The burden of proof expressly lies with the carrier under Article 18(1), CMR. 
102
 Cf. Haak, K. F., The liability of the carrier under the CMR (The Hague, Stichting 
Vervoeradres, 1986), pp.123-125; Glass, D. A. and Cashmore, C., Introduction to the Law of 
Carriage of Goods (Sweet & Maxwell, 1989), pp.110-113. 
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diligence to provide a fit container would suffice to relieve the carrier from 
liability,103 notwithstanding that the application of the liability articles of other 
transport conventions, for example, Articles 17 and 18 of the CMR, impose a 
different standard of care over the cargo than that of due diligence required 
under Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules.104 
Whatever construction is adopted in respect of the standard of reasonable care 
over cargo required under the CMR or other inland transport conventions, the 
standard might possibly differ from that of due diligence. In respect of the above 
examples, one might easily identify the conflict in the interplay between Article 
14 of the Rotterdam Rules when read in conjunction with Article 17(2) of the 
CMR. A potential implication of such an interplay is that Article 17(2) of the 
CMR, in light of Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules, might be construed as 
requiring the carrier to provide a seaworthy container by exercising the same 
due diligence that is required to be exercised by a reasonable carrier. The net 
result of such a joint interpretation might demonstrate the application of the 
standard of liability, i.e. that benchmarked by due diligence, of the Rotterdam 
Rules to the other inland transportation instruments, even when the loss, 
damage or delay was localised at the transport stage in question.105 
Although there are no provisions in the Rotterdam Rules for dealing with the 
potential indirect problems mentioned above, the solution to this dilemma may 
                                               
103
Kindred H. M. and Brooks, M. R., Multimodal Transport Rules, (Kluwer Law International, 
1997), p.76. 
104
 See J. J. Silber Ltd and Others v Islander Trucking Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243, where 
Mustill J stated that if the drafters of the CMR intended to equalise the standard under the CMR 
with reasonable care, he could have borrowed ‘due diligence’ from the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules or could have used words such as ‘care’ or ‘neglect’, at p.247.  
105
 It is readily apparent that such an outcome would be contrary to the intentions of the drafters 
of the Rules who, through the operation of Art. 26 selected the ‘limited network’ system in order 
to retain the incorporation of the other transport instruments. Further, such an outcome would 
defeat the purpose of Art. 26 in resolving the potential conflicts with other transportation 
instruments.   
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lie in the broad meaning of the provision. There is incentive, however, for an 
argument that the wording “specifically provide for the carrier’s liability” can be 
construed in such a way as to include all the duties inferred from the general 
liability rules.106 Whether in such instances the problem relating to the exercise 
of due diligence in providing a seaworthy container would be solved, as the 
liability provisions of Article 14 will give way to the general liability provisions of 
the applicable international transport instruments, will depend upon the national 
court’s approach in construing this provision. 
 
5.5 The Effect of Article 82 that deals with Localised/Unlocalised 
Damage on the Seaworthiness Obligation107 
- What was the purpose behind drafting Article 82? 
Article 82 of the Rotterdam Rules gives priority to other transport 
conventions,108 which conflict with the Rotterdam Rules.109 
The applicable convention will assess the actions or omissions of the 
contractual parties. For example, a carrier’s selection of the appropriate 
standard of care will certainly be based, in a great part, on its potential 
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 Nikaki, T., ‘The Carrier’s Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know?’ 
(2010) 35 Tul. Mar. L. J., 1-44, p.41. 
107
 As mentioned above, Article 82 covers localised damage as well. However, we are 
concerned with unlocalised damage in this Chapter. It is out of the theme of this thesis to 
consider the wording of Article 82 in detail. 
108
 When the damage is not localised, the general liability provisions still apply. Therefore, the 
Rotterdam Rules collide with the CMR in respect of which provisions of liability between the two 
competing conventions should apply. Further, in rail transport law, there are liability provisions 
dealing with unlocalised damage, regardless of whether another carriage convention, such as 
the Rotterdam Rules, is involved. This is found in URCIM Article 1(4) of the COTIF Convention. 
However, Rule 82 will apply to localised damage at sea, even if the provisions of the Rotterdam 
Rules conflict with another international convention.    
109
 It must be noted that Article 82 refers merely to conventions already in force at the time the 
Rotterdam Rules came into force. Unlike Article 26, it is not limited. See van der Ziel, G., 
‘Multimodal Aspects of the Rotterdam Rules’, (2009) 4 Uni. L. Rev., p.985. 
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liability.110 One might say that the aforementioned international conventions are 
designed to govern the legal aspects of carriage other than ocean carriage, i.e. 
carriage by land, air or inland waterways. In this respect, a question may arise 
as to the required standard of care in comparison to the duty imposed under 
Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules, or, as to the impact of the other international 
conventions on the duty of seaworthiness under Article 14 of the Rotterdam 
Rules.111 
 
5.6 The Standard of the Duty 
The continuing duty imposed on the carrier to exercise due diligence before, at 
the beginning and throughout the whole voyage to provide a seaworthy vessel 
and seaworthy containers might raise issues in relation to the standard of care 
required under other international transport conventions when the Rotterdam 
Rules give way to such other conventions.112 It is arguable that the standard of 
due diligence may be subject to alteration. This argument can be supported by 
two propositions. First, by applying the relevant provisions of other conventions, 
the requisite standard of due diligence to be exercised when providing a 
seaworthy vessel might be lessened as a result of the indirect impact of the 
residual duty of care provided expressly or by implication under the central 
                                               
110
 On the other hand, the shipper or the maritime performing party will be less motivated to 
insure the cargo if he knows that he will not be liable for loss. 
111
 This point will be dealt with at a later stage. See Sturley, F., ‘Transport Law for the twenty-
first Century: an introduction to the preparation, philosophy, and potential impact of the 
Rotterdam Rules’, in Thomas, R. (ed.), A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - 
The Rotterdam Rules (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), pp.1-33.  
112
 The Rules will also give way to provisions on limitation of liability and time of suit. 
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liability provisions of another international transport convention.113  Secondly, 
and it is submitted more significantly, the applicable provisions of the CMNI 
Convention114 may expunge the seaworthiness duty required under Article 14, 
when the Rotterdam Rules regime governs the contract of carriage. It is worth 
discussing separately these potential implications.    
 
5.6.1 The Cancellation of the Extended Seaworthiness Obligation  
In the specific circumstances115 of combined sea and inland waterway carriage 
where no container trans-shipment takes place, the CMNI Convention 
provisions would be applicable to the entire contract of carriage including the 
international sea leg. Take, for instance, the example of container transportation 
with no intervening trans-shipment from Turkey to Hungary where the parties 
agreed on a single short sea voyage combined with a lengthier upriver voyage 
on the Danube and where the containerised cargo arrived at Hungary (a party 
to the CMNI Convention) in a damaged condition due to either the vessel’s or 
the container’s unfitness. The court in Hungary is allowed by virtue of Article 
                                               
113
 Clark, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (2009, 5
th
 ed.), p.79; Clarke, M. & 
Yates, D., Contracts of Carriage by Land and Air (2008, 2
nd
 ed.), at para. 2.291-2.307, 2.535, 
3.591 (the latter publication includes the care of cargo). 
114
 The CMNI convention applies to contracts concerning the carriage of goods solely by inland 
waterways but it is also applicable if the purpose of the contract is the carriage of goods without 
trans-shipment, both on inland waterways and in waters where maritime regulations apply, 
unless a marine bill of lading has been issued in accordance with the maritime law applicable, or 
the distance to be travelled in waters to which maritime regulations apply is greater. 
115
 A State that is party to both the CMNI and the Rotterdam Rules could face a conflicting 
obligation to apply the provisions of both conventions at the same time, if conditions under 
Article 2(2) of the CMNI are fulfilled. Article 2(2) provides: “This Convention is applicable if the 
purpose of the contract of carriage is the carriage of goods, without trans-shipment, both on 
inland waterways and in waters to which maritime regulations apply, under the conditions set 
out in paragraph 1, unless: (a) a maritime bill of lading has been issues in accordance with the 
maritime law applicable, or (b) the distance to be travelled in waters to which maritime 
regulations apply is greater.” 
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82(d) 116  to apply the provisions of the CMNI Convention 117  instead of the 
Rotterdam Rules. Unlike some of the other international transport conventions, 
Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention contains a provision which imposes an 
obligation on the carrier ‘to exercise due diligence to ensure the vessel is in a 
state to receive the cargo, is seaworthy and is manned and equipped as 
prescribed by the regulations in force and is furnished with the necessary 
national and international authorizations for the carriage of the goods in 
question.’118 
As seen in the previous chapter, this obligation of seaworthiness is in line with 
that imposed by the existing regime of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.119 One 
can therefore infer that the prevalence of Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention 
over Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules is to the effect that not only would the 
extended obligation of providing a seaworthy vessel be cancelled, but also that 
the container cargoworthiness requirement under Article 14(c) would be ruled 
out. The application of the CMNI Convention is also to the effect that the carrier 
of a chartered vessel is not liable for loss or damage caused by the vessel’s 
unseaworthiness as a result of a defect120 provided that ‘such defects could not 
have been detected prior to the start of the voyage despite due diligence.’121 
 
 
 
                                               
116
 Article 82(d) provides: “Any convention governing the carriage of goods by inland waterways 
to the extent that such convention according to its provisions applies to a carriage of goods 
without trans-shipments both by inland waterways and sea.” 
117
 This is because the distance of the river to be travelled is longer than the sea voyage. 
118
 Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention. 
119
 See para 2.5, at p.89. 
120
 Article 25.2(c). 
121
 Articles 3.2 and 25.2(c). 
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5.6.2 The Potential  Impact on Container Cargoworthiness 
As the obligation to exercise due diligence in providing a fit container under 
Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention is not mentioned, a carrier will not be liable 
for unlocalised damage caused during a combined inland water and sea 
carriage voyage by the container’s unfitness due to, for instance, lack of the 
container’s water-tightness or defective refrigeration. In addition, Article 12(3) of 
the CMNI Convention provides that ‘if the goods are placed in a container…and 
sealed by other persons than the carrier [i.e. a shipper] if their container or seals 
are damaged or broken when they reached the port of discharge, it shall be 
presumed that the loss or damage to the goods did not occur during carriage.’ 
It has been submitted that the carrier’s duties and liabilities are inseparable122; 
the potential absence of a container cargoworthiness obligation might influence 
the actions taken by the carrier. A carrier’s decision as to his adherence to the 
appropriate standard of due diligence will inevitably be based on the duties 
imposed and the consequent liabilities under the applicable legal regime. This 
would influence the carrier as to the precautions (in other words, the standard of 
care) to be taken, not merely before and at the beginning of the carriage but 
also during the carriage. Such precautions might extend to supplying the vessel 
with the spare parts or other equipment necessary to fix, for example, a 
container’s defective gasket rubber sealant or refrigeration mechanism of a 
reefer container. The level of care required has an impact upon the carrier’s 
potential liability for an uncargoworthy container, even upon the assumption that 
the relevant liability provisions of the CMNI Convention (Article 16(1)) would 
                                               
122
 Nikaki, T., ‘The Carrier’s Duties Under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know?’, 35 
(2010) TMLJ 1-44, p.41 
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have imposed a duty to provide a cargoworthy container. Even upon such an 
assumption, however, a carrier is not to be held liable for cargo damage123 
caused by a failure of, for example, the refrigeration mechanism of a reefer 
container, when ‘the loss was due to circumstances which a diligent carrier 
could not have prevented and the consequences of which he could not have 
averted’.124 In such a case, the carrier would be diligent, even if he had not 
supplied the vessel with the tools or spare parts necessary to repair the 
defective container en route (at sea or inland waterway),125 as this would not be 
within the ambit of his due diligence obligation under Article 3.3 of the CMNI 
Convention. The matter would be treated differently under the Rotterdam Rules, 
where the obligation of seaworthiness regarding the vessel and the container is 
ongoing. As mentioned in Chapter Two,126 the ongoing obligation under the 
Rotterdam Rules might impose a duty of supplying extra or at least an adequate 
number of spare parts and the failure to do so may render the vessel 
unseaworthy on the basis that the carrier is unable to repair the defective 
refrigerated container that causes cargo damage during the voyage.  
One might argue that the gap between the CMNI Convention and the 
Rotterdam Rules is small, as there is no management exception, such as Article 
IV, r.2(a) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, so that damage to cargo that 
resulted from any failure in taking steps to resolve the defective condition of the 
container could still render the carrier liable. However, the standard of diligence 
                                               
123
 Where the unfitness or failure of the refrigeration mechanism has caused cargo damage 
during both sea and inland water carriage or where the damage of the cargo is unlocalised. 
124
 Article 16(1) of the CMNI Convention. 
125
 Unlike loss or damage caused by the lack of the adjustment of the refrigerated container’s 
controls, as this would be required by the customs of carriage of containerised cargo. The 
carrier in such a case would be liable due to inadequate care of cargo. See De Wit, R., 
Multimodal Transport, (1995, LLP), para.11.6. 
126
 See discussion, para. 2.14.1, at pp.128 and 133. 
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expected from the carrier as regards the ongoing obligation of seaworthiness 
under the Rotterdam Rules is not similar to the standard of diligence expected 
from the carrier under the CMNI Convention. The carrier may not be able to 
take additional steps to resolve the defective condition of a container if the ship 
was not supplied with the necessary spare parts to effect the repair. For 
instance, if the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules give way to the provisions of 
the CMNI Convention, there will not be a continuous obligation of seaworthiness. 
For this reason, if the defective condition of a container that emerged during the 
voyage is repairable on board but such spare parts are not available, the duty 
usually imposed on the carrier by Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention to take 
further steps, e.g. to pick up spare parts from an intermediate port, may not 
apply.127 Even the absence of the management exclusion would not guarantee 
the fact that the carrier will be required (or at least encouraged) to act above 
and beyondthe normal practice that is required under the obligations imposed 
on the carrier by the provisions of the CMNI Convention. The provisions of the 
CMNI Convention regarding the obligation and liability of seaworthiness do not 
equate to the ongoing obligation of due diligence where the carrier may be 
obliged to take further steps, depending on the circumstances of the care.128 
Alternatively, if the defect is unrepairable on board the ship, the ongoing due 
diligence obligation, if imposed, may require that the carrier discharges the 
container from the ship in order to seek a replacement container.       
 
                                               
127
 Although it may be said that there is not much one can do with a defective container during 
the voyage. Note for instance a defective container that results from a failure to stack the 
containers properly. However, depending on the type of defect and the availability of spare parts, 
certain defects can be repaired on board, such as a defective refrigeration system of a reefer 
container. The ongoing obligation is one of due diligence as opposed to an absolute duty. 
128
 Save for the situation explained above when picking up spare parts from an intermediate port. 
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5.6.3 The Potential Influence on the Vessel’s Seaworthiness 
As can be seen, the carrier cannot, under Article 3(3) of the CMNI Convention, 
be rendered liable for damage caused by the vessel’s unseaworthiness after the 
commencement of the voyage. This is, of course, in direct contradiction to the 
position under the Rotterdam Rules where the carrier would have been held 
liable had the Rules applied to the carriage contract. Obviously, this would 
jeopardise the balance of fairness sought by the drafters of the Rotterdam 
Rules with the extension of the due diligence obligation and would leave the 
cargo-claimant uncompensated for his loss. The application of the CMNI 
Convention to a contract of carriage could possibly lead to a situation where, 
depending on the port of loading, two containers on board a vessel stowed next 
to each other might be subject to a different set of rules and, consequently, to a 
different finding as to the issue of the carrier’s liability.129 
                                               
129
 The potential outcome above can be very succinctly illustrated by the following example. 
Two containerised cargoes are loaded at two different ports; ports A and B, with cargo A and B 
respectively, for discharge at port C. Both cargoes are subject to the same contract of carriage 
which combines sea and inland waterway carriage and does not involve trans-shipment. In the 
entire voyage from port A to port C, the sea leg is longer than the inland waterway leg, whereas 
for the entire voyage from port B to port C, the inland waterway leg is longer than the sea leg. 
The Rotterdam Rules would apply to the carriage of cargo A because the distance of the ocean 
carriage is longer than the inland waterway carriage (see Article 2(2) of the CMNI Convention), 
whereas the CMNI Convention would apply to cargo B because the transport distance of the 
ocean carriage is shorter than the distance of the inland waterway carriage. If the carrier has 
exercised the same degree of due diligence before and at the beginning of the voyage at both 
ports and yet both cargoes A and B sustained damage before arrival at port C due to the 
vessel’s unseaworthiness, the carrier may be found liable for cargo A under the Rotterdam 
Rules due to the ongoing duty to exercise due diligence, whilst he will not be liable for cargo B 
as the liability for cargo B will be determined on the basis of the CMNI Convention, under which 
the carrier needs to exercise due diligence only before and at the beginning of the voyage. In 
accordance with Article 2(2), “This Convention is applicable if the purpose of the contract of 
carriage is the carriage of goods, without trans-shipment, both on inland waterways and in 
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5.7 The Potential Interpretation of the CMNI Convention 
The language of Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention has not yet been tested in 
court. However, it should be noted that Article 3.3 refers merely to ‘regulations 
in force’130 as opposed to ‘international’ regulations in force. The wording of 
Article 3.3 suggests that the reference to regulations in force is related to the 
manning and equipment of the ship rather than her seaworthiness, but, as 
explained in Chapter One (para.1.4.2-1.4.3), manning and equipment are two 
aspects of seaworthiness which, if inadequate or insufficient, will render the ship 
unseaworthy. Accordingly, the absence from Article 3.3 of the word 
‘international’ before the word ‘regulations’ 131  may cause interpretation 
difficulties as it may lead to an inference that the carrier is only obliged to adopt 
local or regional regulations governing the scope of seaworthiness (in relation to 
the ships’ manning and equipment) for vessels132 designed to navigate only 
                                                                                                                                          
waters to which maritime regulations apply, under the conditions set out in paragraph 1, unless: 
(a) a maritime bill of lading has been issued in accordance with the maritime law applicable, or 
(b) the distance to be travelled in waters to which maritime regulations apply is the greater.” 
130
 “[The carrier] shall be bound, before and at the beginning of the voyage, to exercise due 
diligence to ensure that, taking into account the goods to be carried, the vessel is in a state to 
receive the cargo, is seaworthy and is manned and equipped as prescribed by the regulations in 
force and is furnished with the necessary national and international authorisation for the 
carriage of the goods in question” (emphasis added). 
131
 It can be observed that the word ‘international’ has been used later in the same Article 
(Article 3.3) in relation to the ‘authorizations for the carriage of the goods in question.’ It is 
obvious that the word used in this context is for the purpose of having an adherence to an 
international system. 
132
 The sea stage of the carriage is described in the CMNI Convention as the distance travelled 
in waters to which the maritime water regulations apply. This point is debatable, because it is 
unclear whether this means maritime regulations concerning transport or traffic only, or whether 
it also includes international conventions of the shipping industry, such as SOLAS and STCW 
95, etc. For instance, the relevant certificates of competency require that the crew serving on 
board an inland-sea going vessel to collaborate with either the European Commission or 
Danube and Rhine legislations. Minimum manning requirements, as well as working and rest 
hours of the crew in inland navigation, are compatible with Central Commission for Navigation 
on the Rhine (CCNR) rules. 
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through inland waterways and coastal (albeit sea) areas.133 The justification for 
this notion has apparently been the existence of several regional regulations 
and national legislation, which have already been implemented by the 
industry.134 A reason might be that the drafters of the CMNI Convention aimed 
not to disturb the existing regional and national framework with a view towards 
an international standard which, had they not done so, would arguably have 
created an obstacle to adopting the Convention. Further to that, the CMNI 
Convention reflects the recommendation of the inland-waterways industry in 
their effort to maintain their transport competitiveness amongst other inland 
modes of transportation, i.e. haulage. 135  The inland-waterways industry 
recommended that implementation of specific technical requirements rather 
than international requirements, 136  such as the IMO technical regulations, 
continued in order to lower the cost of this mode of transport.137 As a result, the 
carrier is not required to adhere to international shipping regulations. 
                                               
133
 In Turnbull and others v Janson (1877) 36 LT 635; (1877-1878) LR 3 CPD 264, the vessel 
was found to be unseaworthy when her preparation was inadequate to make her able to 
withstand the perils of the ocean. 
134
 The European Code for Inland Waterways (CEVNI) was revised in 2002 and applies to all of 
Europe. CEVNI serves as a model for national and international (within river commissions) 
legislation relating to rules of the road, signalling on inland waterways, night and daytime 
marking of vessels, as well as waterway signs and marking. The Recommendations on 
Minimum Manning Requirements and Working and Rest Hours of Crews of Vessels in Inland 
Navigation were adopted in 2004. The Recommendations are compatible with relevant rules of 
CCNR and, at the same time, take into account national legislation of other UNECE member 
countries in this field. The Recommendations on limitation of exhaust and pollutant particulate 
emissions from diesel engines used on inland navigation vessels were adopted in 2004. They 
are compatible with both EU and CCNR provisions but not with SOLAS. The Technical 
Requirements for Inland Navigation Vessels are in line with the draft revised Directive 
82/714/EEC, but not with MARPOL or SOLAS. 
135
 Given, however, the importance of safety standards, the Recommendations of the industry 
should not be overstated as this would arguably delay or prevent market integration. See 
Reference document for the Council of Ministers containing conclusions of the seminars ‘The 
inland waterways of tomorrow on the European continent’, held in Paris, 30 January 2002, 
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 See the recommendation proposed by the industry in Woehrling, J-M. ‘Is the legal framework 
of European inland navigation suitably adapted?’ cited as Chapter 1, Part II of the European 
Conference of Ministers of Transport, ‘Strengthening inland waterway transport’, at p.45. 
137
 See Reference document for the Council of Ministers containing conclusions of the seminars: 
‘The inland waterways of tomorrow on the European continent’, held in Paris, 30 January 2002, 
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Accordingly, national courts will be required to examine a claim of 
unseaworthiness in light of obligations under the relevant national or regional 
regulations and the carrier will not be liable for non-compliance with 
international regulations.138 Therefore, a court or tribunal might find the vessel 
to be seaworthy, even if the carrier acted on the basis of a lower standard of 
due diligence in comparison with the corresponding international standard. 
Consequently, the carrier will not be liable for damage or loss caused by the 
vessel’s condition which, under the Rotterdam Rules, if applicable, would be 
considered to fall short of the standards required under the international 
shipping conventions; that is, damage or loss caused by unseaworthiness.  
For instance, a river or coastal vessel not constructed in accordance with 
international shipping standards when sent to open sea or the ocean might be 
unable to withstand the sea or ocean conditions.139 This may relate, for instance, 
to the river or coastal vessel’s shell plate thickness, freeboard, reserve 
buoyancy, ability to withstand green seas on her deck, subdivision, floodable 
length and survivability and the like, which an open sea or ocean merchant 
vessel provides for in order to withstand the ordinary perils of the open sea.140 
Such a vessel would not usually be fit and able (at least to the same degree as 
                                               
138
 The carrier might be adhering to local, regional or national regulations. Such was the case in 
The Kapitan Sakharov where the carrier was adhering to MOPOG, which is a Russian 
instrument similar to the IMDG Code. See, in general, Chapter Four on the ‘effects of shipping 
standard on the obligation of seaworthiness’. 
139
 Such a problem is likely to occur, as the word ‘sea carriage’ is not expressly defined by the 
Rotterdam Rules and is likely to confuse the parties where the phrase will be given a broad 
commercial interpretation covering ocean carriage and carriage over connected waters leading 
to and from ports and other loading/unloading terminals. As a result, the term ‘sea carriage’ 
might come into question as regards the boundaries between sea carriage and carriage by 
inland waterways, i.e. CMNI. See Thomas, R., ‘The emergence and application of the 
Rotterdam Rules’, cited as Chapter 1 in Thomas, R. (ed,), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under 
the Rotterdam Rules (Lloyd’s List, 2010), pp.7-8. 
140
 The International Load Line Convention 1966 (LL 1966); See Alman, P., Clearly, W. A., Dyer, 
M. and Pauling, J., ‘The International Load Line Convention: crossroads to the future’ (Oct 
1992), Vol. 29(4) Marine Technology. 233-248; Lighter Loads, (27 Oct., 1995) Lloyd’s List.  
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an open sea vessel) to withstand the stresses of high winds and waves 
reasonably expected when sailing open seas and oceans.141 Therefore, the 
obligation of seaworthiness for such a vessel is confined solely to the perils 
expected during a journey within inland waterways and if the vessel is sent out 
to the open seas, she might be seaworthy for the purposes of the local 
regulations but not seaworthy for the purposes of carrying the particular cargo in 
the open seas.142 Sending a ship out to the open sea without compliance with 
international regulations might be possible, but one can argue that the 
obligation of seaworthiness under the CMNI Convention presumably takes into 
account the expected conditions of the contractual journey. Nevertheless, 
Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention expressly states that when exercising due 
diligence, the carrier shall “take into consideration the goods to be carried” but 
nothing is mentioned regarding the condition of the contemplated contracted 
voyage. It might be the case that the CMNI Convention requires that the 
obligation of seaworthiness be tested against the conditions to be encountered 
during the contracted voyage, as is the case under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. If so, then much of the above discussion in this section will be redundant. 
It must be remembered that under the contract of carriage governed by the 
current regime, the carrier, when exercising due diligence, must take into 
consideration the preparation of the ship, staff and equipment as regards the 
potential conditions to be encountered during the voyage in relation to the 
international shipping industry regulations, e.g. SOLAS, STCW etc., as a 
benchmark. However, reference to equipment and manning in Article 3.3 of the 
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 Boisson, P., Safety at Sea: Policies, Regulations and International Law, (Edition Bureau 
Veritas, 1999). See Section IV (Classification Standards), p.207. 
142
 In Turnbull and others v Janson (1877) 36 LT 635; (1877-1878) LR 3 CPD 264, the vessel 
was found to be unseaworthy when her preparation was not enough to make her able to 
withstand the perils of the ocean. 
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CMNI Convention is made to non-international regulations as opposed to 
international regulations. 143  That is to say, even if the carrier takes into 
consideration the conditions likely to be encountered during the contractual 
voyage, the preparation for such a voyage will be made in light of national or 
local regulations rather than international regulations. This might render the 
equipment or the standard of manning of the ship unfit for the open sea.  
In conclusion, in circumstances such as those explained above, it seems that 
the change brought about by the application of other international conventions 
in general and the CMNI Convention in particular is likely to create an unfair 
balance for t cargo-interests in terms of seaworthiness should the consequent 
obligations and liabilities of the carrier be lessened.  
 
5.8 The Indirect Impact on Article 14: The Example of CMR 
The current law, that is the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, is limited to maritime 
carriage and the scope of application is limited to ‘tackle-to-tackle’ carriage.144 
Given that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not refer to any special kind of 
multimodal carriage such as the reference, for example, made by Article 2 of 
CMR to activities outside their scope of application, i.e. the period before 
loading and after discharge, such activities are not covered. This limited scope 
of application has a particular impact on the carrier’s potential liability following 
                                               
143
 For instance, the inland carrier’s care of the container and goods will be assessed by 
reference to the standard set by the ADR to which the court will refer. See, Clarke, M., 
International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (LLP, 2013), at para. 73. The same point was 
mentioned at paragraph 5.4.2, at p. 369. 
144
 Article 10, Article 1(e) and Article 3(8) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. A further reason for 
their limited scope is that HVR are applicable only when certain documents are issued, i.e. they 
do not apply unless a bill of lading or other similar document of title has been issued for the sea 
carriage.   
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a seaworthiness incident.145  It creates gaps between the mandatory liability 
regimes applicable to the different stages of carriage. The Rotterdam Rules, a 
single liability regime covering potentially the whole period of the maritime and 
land/air/rail transport,146 were intended to solve this problem and to create a 
system whereby the same set of rules are applicable to the other means of 
transport, provided that there is a sea leg where the rules will also be 
applicable.147 However, there is an unresolved problem, as provisions in other 
transport conventions, such as CMR, which are unique in nature and make 
sense to the particular transport mode on general principles of construction, will 
not be applicable to the sea carriage leg and are therefore, disregarded.148 For 
example, if the Hague Rules or the Rotterdam Rules (if ratified) are held to 
apply to the road leg of carriage, it is doubtful whether the provisions of Article 
III, rule 1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules (or Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules) 
could be applied to a lorry, in spite of Article III, rule 2 (or Article 13 of the 
Rotterdam Rules) being capable of adaptation (although Article IV, rule 2 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, to which it is subject, is not).149  
By analogy, the overriding application of other international transport 
conventions raises the question as to whether their general liability provisions 
                                               
145
 For a detailed discussion, see Hoeks, M., Multimodal Transport Law - The law applicable to 
the multimodal contract for the carriage of goods, (2009, Proefschriftmahen), pp.240-262. 
146
 Door-to-door coverage does not automatically apply under the Rotterdam Rules. The 
applicable period of responsibility depends on the agreement within the contract, i.e. ‘tackle-to-
tackle’, ‘port-to-port’, or ‘door-to-door’. 
147
 This section does not cover the conflicts created between the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and 
other transport conventions. It is only intended to deal with the problems potentially created by 
the multimodal nature of the Rotterdam Rules, which, if left unaddressed, would potentially 
create problems as regards other transport conventions. 
148
 See Glass, D. & Cashmore, G., Introduction to the Law of Carriage of Goods, (Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1989), p.106. CMR does not regulate every aspect of a carriage contract so some 
liabilities of a carrier may fall outside its scope. This might result in the application of national 
law, however, the situation under the Rotterdam Rules would differ because they do not allow 
national law to apply. 
149
 It will be shown below that the package limitation in Article IV rule 5 and the time bar 
provision in Article III rule 6 are both always readily applicable. 
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could be applicable to a vessel’s seaworthiness. 150  This would defeat the 
purpose of the necessary separation between the obligations relating to the 
care of the cargo and those relating to the seaworthiness of the vessel and her 
equipment. Such differentiation between the two obligations is important, even 
in relation to the application of other transport conventions by reference to the 
‘door-to-door’ scope of application of the Rotterdam Rules.151 
 
5.8.1 Standard of Checking the Fitness of the Container in Door-to-Door 
Carriage 
The tendency is that the existing international transport conventions are seen to 
allow for the application of the carrier’s duties to all modes of transport, i.e. 
either a vehicle, vessel, aircraft or rail wagon; modes that are used in the 
modern carriage of goods.  
Indeed, if it is to be assumed that there is a seaworthiness duty imposed on the 
carrier, this would be upon the basis of general liability provisions which impose 
on the carrier a duty in relation to the goods, which would in turn impact upon 
the carrier’s obligations in relation to the vessel.152 It goes without saying that 
the carrier’s duty to provide an adequate and fit for carriage vessel and/or 
container will be inferred from the central liability provisions.153 Thus, the liability 
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 Aikens, R. et al., Bills of Lading, (2006, 1
st
 ed.) at para.11.67. Cf. Nikaki, T. ‘The Carrier’s 
Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know?’ (2010) 35 Tul. Mar. L. J., 1-44, 
p.37, where reference was made to Walek & Co. [1980] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 279 (Q.B.). As this case 
does not cover carriage by sea, no analogy is given to the concept of seaworthiness. 
151
 Berlingieri F., ‘Carrier’s Obligation and Liabilities’ - a paper delivered in Part II of The Work of 
the CMI (2007-2008) in Athens. Cited at http://comitemaritime.org/Yearbook. 
152
 Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (2009, 5
th
 ed.) para. 75f (i); 
Clarke, M. & Yates, D., Contracts of Carriage by Land and Air (Informa, 2
nd 
ed., 2008), para. 
1.98, 2.146, 2.291-2.307. 
153
 Article 17 of the CMR Convention. Such a duty will be applied during the carrier’s entire 
period of responsibility under the relevant convention and will be judged in the same manner as 
the duty of the carrier to care for the cargo. 
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for damaged cargo due to an unfit container is not clear,154 but it can be inferred 
as Clarke states that ‘[c]ontainers and any other things which are neither vehicle 
nor special equipment but are provided by the carrier for the purpose of carriage, 
there is no special regime, if loss, damage or delay caused to the cargo by a 
defect in the container, the carrier will be liable under Article 17.1, unless the 
carrier can prove a defence under Article 17.2 [i.e. damage or delay was 
unavoidable.’ 155  Where CMR applies, the standard of liability for an unfit 
container is not defined. The standard to be imposed may be that under the 
carrier’s general duty of care,156 which imposes a higher duty and thus different 
liability than the benchmarked of Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules.   
Generally, with regard to the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier is put on inquiry 
depending on the circumstances; for example, if there is a defect or a container 
is leaking, by exercising due diligence this would be visible to the carrier, 
suggesting that a repair or even a temporary repair must be carried out to avert 
damage to the cargo. In other words, the carrier is required to exercise due 
diligence in detecting a defect. As regards CMR, the duty of utmost care under 
CMR is said to be higher,157 therefore the standard of checking the container 
under CMR is at the least similar to the standard under the Rotterdam Rules.158 
In light of the above, a question inevitably raised is whether it would be 
preferable for the Rotterdam Rules to regulate the obligation of providing a 
seaworthy vessel and the consequent liability for not doing so on a multimodal 
basis, as compared to the current unimodal regimes. Alternatively, the question 
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 The word ‘container’ is not mentioned in the CMR Convention.    
155
 Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (2009, 5
th
 ed.), para. 75f(i). 
156
 Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (2009, 5
th
 ed.), Ch.6, para. 75f(i). 
157
 Clarke, M. et al, Contracts of Carriage by Land and Air, (Informa, 2008), at para. 1.5 and 
1.98 
158
 Cf. Article 40 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
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would be whether the desired improvement of the law in relation to the carrier’s 
duty or obligation of providing a seaworthy vessel would be achieved by the 
Rotterdam Rules if the Rules were to cover merely the sea leg (port-to-port) or if 
they were to operate on a multimodal basis (door-to-door). The answer to the 
above questions might help address the issue as to whether it would be more 
logical and fair for the rights and liabilities consequent to the carrier’s 
seaworthiness obligation under the carriage contract to be governed by the 
Rotterdam Rules and their scope of applicability enlarged so that they also 
embrace events of damage or loss occurring during transportation by modes 
other than the sea transport. 
Do we really need the Rotterdam Rules as a uniform law to regulate the 
obligation of container cargoworthiness in a multimodal carriage contract?159 
The following section (paragraph 5.9) will address the above inquiry. 
 
5.9  The Implication of the Rotterdam Rules on Unlocalised or Localised 
Containerised Cargo 
5.9.1 Disregarding the Application of the Container Cargoworthiness 
Obligation 
It should be noted that the extension of the scope of the Rotterdam Rules to 
inland carriage is not to the advantage of the cargo-interests where, by virtue of 
Articles 26 and 82 of the Rotterdam Rules, some other applicable international 
transport conventions through their liability or obligation provisions would rule 
                                               
159
 At various instances, a question has been raised as to whether there is actually a need for a 
uniform law to regulate contracts of multimodal carriage. This, however, has not been discussed 
in the context of the obligation of seaworthiness or container cargoworthiness. See Faghfouri, 
M., ‘International Regulation of Liability for Multimodal Transport’, WMU of JMA (2006), Vol.5, 
95-114, at p. 95 
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out or reduce160 the scope of the container cargoworthiness obligation to the 
period before or at the commencement of the vessel’s sailing because the 
‘carriage by sea, particularly over long distance in the deep trade, is very 
different from carriage by land and is different also from carriage on the short 
sea trades… therefore, different basis of duties thus liability should not be 
applied to the sea transit.’161 
 
5.9.2 Trans-shipment: Not to the Benefit of the Cargo-interests? 
Currently, contracts of carriage of goods by sea are mostly governed by the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. When trans-shipment of a container at an 
intermediate port takes place, the container is left for a period at the trans-
shipment port and is subsequently loaded onto another vessel for onward 
carriage to the final destination port. The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules will 
continue to govern the relationship of the contractual parties for the entire 
period including the period of the container’s storage at the intervening port. 
One might think that there is no need for a ‘new’ ‘door-to-door’ regime because 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules could be, if the parties agreed, contractually 
applied to other modes of carriage despite the limiting words of Article I(e) and 
Article II. 162  It should be noted in this respect, however, that ‘on general 
principles of construction, provisions which are meaningless outside the context 
of the sea and which cannot be rendered meaningful by permissible verbal 
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 See the above discussed points at para. 5.6, at p.358. 
161
 Selvig, E., ‘The background to the convention’, conference paper delivered at Multimodal 
Transport the 1980 U.N. Convention at Southampton University (12 September 1980) 1-15, at 
p.2; Melo, ‘Replies of the Mexican Maritime Law Association’ Containers, II, p.33; Wong, J. 
‘Container Transportation and Anomalies in the Law’, 23 [1995] Aus. Bus. L. Rev., 340. 
162
 See The OOCL Bravery [2000] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 394. 
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manipulation will be inapplicable and disregarded.’163 Thus, for example, it is 
doubtful whether the provisions of Article III, r.1 could be applied to a lorry or 
container if the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules were to apply to a road transport leg. 
By analogy, the effect of the Rotterdam Rules is the same. Further, when 
damage or loss occurs during sea carriage or when it is unlocalised, with a 
‘door-to-door’ contract of carriage, the precedence of other international 
transport conventions over the Rotterdam Rules has the same effect as the 
general principles of construction. This, effectively, means that provisions which 
are meaningless outside the context of the inland carriage and are incapable of 
being rendered meaningful will be inapplicable and disregarded. Arguably, 
therefore, the Rotterdam Rules, compared to the current system, have not 
solved problems occurring during multimodal carriage. 
 
5.9.3 Limiting the Carrier’s Liability: To the Benefit of the Carrier 
Insofar as the seaworthiness obligation is concerned, the Rotterdam Rules 
strike a balance between the interests of the carrier and the cargo-interests. 
However, this balance may be disturbed if the scope of application of the 
Rotterdam Rules is to be extended to the inland carriage leg. For instance, if, 
under the contract, the carrier has agreed to carry containers through inland 
water and open sea without transhipment, the provisions of the CMNI 
Convention, in certain conditions explained above,164 will apply instead of the 
provisions of the Rotterdam Rules. The provisions of the CMNI Convention, e.g. 
Article 3.3, do not provide an ongoing obligation of seaworthiness nor is any 
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 Aikens, R., Bills of Lading  [2006] Informa, para. 11.67. 
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 See para. 5.6.1, at p.359. 
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obligation to provide a fit container imposed. As a result, the ongoing obligation 
of seaworthiness and the obligation of providing a fit container imposed where 
the Rotterdam Rules govern the contract, will now be cancelled. Consequently, 
the balance between the contractual parties will be disturbed and the carrier will 
not be liable even where he did not exercise due diligence in respect of a defect 
that emerged during the voyage, which in turn damaged the cargo. 
The Rotterdam Rules may not be suitable for all types of carriage. Therefore, it 
is important to distinguish between the types of sea carriage, e.g. whether sea 
and inland carriage or only sea carriage.  
On the one hand, there is carriage that is limited to ‘port-to-port’ or ‘tackle-to-
tackle’, such as the carriage of bulk cargoes, where the Rotterdam Rules (with 
the extended doctrine of seaworthiness in contracts of carriage governed by 
them) may be seen as an improvement. On the other hand, there is 
containerised sea carriage or multimodal carriage, which may be extended to 
‘door-to-door’, where the scope of the Rotterdam Rules might not be said to 
effectively improve the balance between the carrier and the cargo-interests.  In 
order to achieve a better balance between the parties, some modifications are 
proposed. Apart from and in addition to such an imbalance, problems such as 
the increased cost of investigating the causes and circumstances of unlocalised 
loss and litigating the matter are to be expected.165 
 
5.10 Recommended Solutions  
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 Haak, K., ‘The Harmonization of intermodal liability arrangements’, (2005) 40 European 
Transport Law, 11-51, at p.18. 
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5.10.1  Recommendations to Modify Certain Provisions of the Rotterdam 
Rules    
Contracts of carriage based on the international inland transport conventions do 
not contain a unique maritime obligation, 166  such as seaworthiness, so, as 
explained above, confusion may arise when the Rotterdam Rules give way to 
the provisions of the inland conventions. The confusion created may result in 
the seaworthiness obligation being excluded or limited and this may 
consequently impact upon the standard of care owed by the carrier. This is 
likely to occur when courts or arbitration tribunals take a different view as to 
which provisions of each convention are to take precedence over the Rotterdam 
Rules and to which party of the contract those provisions apply.167 This concern 
may become even more serious when, under Article 82, the applicable 
convention takes precedence over the Rotterdam Rules, as in the example of 
Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention given above, and the obligation of providing 
a seaworthy vessel is either derogated or ruled out. In order to avoid such 
confusion, it is suggested that an express provision be added to Article 82 to the 
effect that ‘when the provisions of other conventions/instruments are applicable, 
a claim of seaworthiness must not be reduced to a standard below the minimum 
standard applicable under Article 14(a) and (c).’ 
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 Faber, D. and Diamond, A. (ed.), Multimodal Transport: Avoiding Legal Problems (Lloyd's of 
London, LLP, 1997), p.3; compare it with the opposing view of Francesco Berlingieri 
commenting that “…seaworthiness of the vessel should be made continuous, while the carrier in 
a door-to-door contract should not be allowed to exclude specified services from the scope of 
the contract”; Berlingieri, F., ‘Basis of liability and exclusions of liability’, [2002] LMCLQ 336, 
p.336; the same view was expressed during the International Sub-Committee on Uniformity of 
the Law of Carriage of Goods by Sea (Uniformity ISC) by the Delegation of Canada, France and 
Italy, CMI Yearbook 1995, p.186. 
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 UNCTAD/SDTE/TLB/4, 13 March 2002, ‘UNCTAD Commentary on the Draft Instrument on 
Transport Law’, cited in www.unctad.org; Hoeks, M., Maritime Plus and the European Status 
Quo: The current framework of international transport law, ‘maritime plus’ and the EU (2010) 
Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law Yearbook, 159-221, p.208. 
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A question which might arise would be as to whether it is possible to overcome 
the above problems by following the trend of other inland transport conventions; 
that is by providing a central, uniform liability provision. 
 
5.10.1.1 A Central Liability Provision in All Modes of Carriage vs a Specific 
Seaworthiness Provision 
One might be tempted to suggest 168  that in order to overcome the above 
problems, the Rotterdam Rules should follow the trend of other inland transport 
conventions and merely include a central liability provision. 169  Drafting a 
provision influenced by the language used in regimes of cargo carriage by 
air,170  rail171  and road172  might seem proper for the purposes of creating a 
unified standard of care applicable to the carrier in multimodal cargo 
transportation.173 However, such an approach  would potentially create other 
problems. For instance, the use of language similar to that in the 
aforementioned conventions 174  is a move away from traditional maritime 
language,175 which uses terms and concepts tested through history and clarified, 
particularised or exemplified by a vast body of case law in many jurisdictions, 
which may be used to interpret Article 14.  
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 Nikaki, T., ‘The Carrier’s Duties under the Rotterdam Rules: Better the Devil You Know? ’ 
(2010) 35 Tul. Mar. L. J., pp.1-44, p.42. 
169
 This approach of implied duties, which has not been tested extensively, was adopted by the 
Hamburg Rules. However, it did not receive extensive support. 
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 I.e. the Warsaw Convention. See Articles 18(1) and 20(1). 
171
 I.e. CMI Convention. See Articles 27(1) and (2). 
172
 CMR Convention. See Articles 17(1) and 17(2). 
173
 Zamora, ‘Carrier Liability for Damage or Loss to Cargo in International Transport’, (1975) 23 
A. J. Comp. L., 391, at 395. 
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 I.e. CMI, CMR, Warsaw Convention. Or even similar to the model that is adopted in the 
Hamburg Rules, which has not received widespread support. It was previously explained that 
Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules was based on the approach of Article III r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
175
 That is used in the current law such as Article III r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.  
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It would appear, therefore, difficult to change the well-established practice of 
using specific legislative provisions. Furthermore, whilst the use of a uniform 
liability provision in all modes might seem to solve the problem of unifying the 
liability between the carrier and his sub-contractors, it would not completely 
eliminate the uncertainty or unpredictability of liability (though the use of the 
network system 176  does solve the problem). 177  This is because under a 
uniform liability provision scheme, the obligation of seaworthiness should be 
inferred on the basis of the uniform (central) liability provision. In such 
circumstances, however, there would probably be no assurance as to 
whether all the facets178 of seaworthiness would be implied or inferred. This 
is particularly so when new elements of seaworthiness, such as container 
cargoworthiness, are considered which, unlike a purported general liability 
provision scheme, has been expressly included by Article 14(c) as one of the 
elements of the carrier’s due diligence obligation in relation to 
seaworthiness.179 Then, the matter of container cargoworthiness would be 
decided differently, depending on the jurisdiction and, as far as English law180 
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 R. De Wit, Multimodal Transport, (LLP, 1995). It was stated that ‘the (pure) network system 
of liability creates an infrastructure in which each of the liability systems governing a certain 
mode of transport co-exist with the others’, at p.138.  
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 See Hellawell, R., ‘Allocation of Risk between Cargo Owner and Carrier’, (1979) 27 A. J. 
Comp. L., 357-357, at p.359.  
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 A vessel is considered to be seaworthy for the purpose of Article 14(a) of the Rotterdam 
Rules (equivalent to Article III r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) if her structure is adequately 
fit to encounter the ordinary perils of the voyage and includes her machinery and aspects of 
loadings and stowage. Article 14(b) of the Rotterdam Rules (equivalent to Article III r.1 of the 
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certificated and documented and sufficiently bunkered. Finally, Article 14 of the Rotterdam 
Rules requires that the vessel’s holds must be cargoworthy. The element imported by Article 
14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules is that ‘containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which goods 
are carried’ must be seaworthy.  
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 See Aladwani, T., ‘The Supply of Containers and ‘seaworthiness’ - The Rotterdam Rules 
Perspective’, (2011) 42 JMLC; Margetson, N. J. ‘Liability of the Carrier Under Hague (Visby) 
Rules for Cargo Damage caused by Unseaworthiness of Its Containers’, (2008) 14 J. In. Mar. 
Law 153.  
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 See, Andrew Nicholas, ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and 
seaworthiness’ cited as chapter 6 in R. Thomas (ed), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the 
Rotterdam Rules, (Lloyd’s List, 2010), stated that “It is perhaps an oddity of carriage of goods by 
380 
 
is concerned, the position regarding the obligation of providing a fit container 
is unclear.181   
Nevertheless, the clear advantage of a uniform liability provision is that the 
carrier’s liability vis-à-vis a cargo-claimant would be uniform for all modes of 
transport.182 On the other hand, however, a simple reason for not choosing the 
approach of a uniform liability provision is that ‘the commercial needs…seem to 
be satisfied by the maintenance of the traditional approach, as the language of 
due diligence under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules’183 and to disturb or discard 
such a clear and significant body of case law that has established a standard as 
regards the obligation of seaworthiness would create ambiguity and more 
uncertainty over an area of law where it did not exist before. Arguably, a 
significant number of cases, together with the associated cost, would be 
required to establish a well-structured interpretation of such a new provision. 
A further point worth noting is that during the drafting of the Rotterdam Rules 
there was a majority view to retain the provision (that is now Article 14) similar 
to Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules rather than using provisions 
similar to the Hamburg Rules.184 The reason being that Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules (similarly Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules) “spells 
out not only the carrier’s obligations with regard to the carriage, but also those 
                                                                                                                                          
sea authorities in English law that the exact position of containers, that is, whether they are to 
be considered as a part of the ship or not, has never been subject to judicial scrutiny” at p.114. 
181
 See Chapter 6, also, see above, the introduction regarding the supply of containers at para. 
5.1.1, at p. 330. 
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 UNCTAD Multimodal transport: The Feasibility of an international legal instrument UNCTAD/ 
SDTE/ TLB/2003/1, 13 January 2003, p.17. 
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 Honka, H., ‘The Legislative Future of Carriage of Goods by Sea: Could it not be the 
UNCITRAL draft?’ (2004) in Scandinavian Studies in Law, 93, p.119. 
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 Article 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules provides “The carrier is liable for loss resulting from loss of 
or damage to goods, as well as from delay in delivery, if the occurrence which caused the loss, 
damage or delay took place while the goods were in his charge as defined in Article 4, unless 
the carrier proves that he, his servants or agents took all measures that could reasonably be 
required to avoid the occurrence and its consequences.” 
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with respect to the ship, which are consistent with its public law obligations 
regarding safety and preservation of the environment [such as SOLAS, 
MARPOL etc.]”.185 It is unknown why the majority held that a general duty of 
care provision would have a different result had it been adopted instead of a 
provision with a specific obligation.186 This thesis does not cover the provisions 
of the Hamburg Rules. However, one can suggest a slightly obvious reason for 
not adopting a central liability provision similar to Article 5.1 of the Hamburg 
Rules,187 because the ‘Hamburg Rules might increase uncertainty as it [would 
not be] clear how the provision would be interpreted’188 as there was ‘no clear 
guidance as to the relevant standard of care to be adopted.’189 
5.10.2  A Non-mandatory Approach  
The mandatory scope of application of the Rotterdam Rules is not negotiable by 
the parties. The Rotterdam Rules are no different from other rules; they can be 
seen as rigid tools, hardly possible to change or adapt to new developments of 
the industry. The Rotterdam Rules have a mandatory application in covering 
both the obligations and the liabilities of the carrier (and the maritime performing 
carrier party) pursuant to Article 79(1)(a) and (b). The Rotterdam Rules, in term 
                                               
185
 See, UNCITRAL documents A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, 8 January 2002, Preliminary draft 
instrument on the carriage of goods by sea, p.25.  
186
 E.g. Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
187
 The Common Understanding adopted by the United Nations Conference on the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea provides: “It is the common understanding that the liability of the carrier under 
this Convention is based on the principle of presumed fault or neglect. This means that, as a 
rule, the burden of proof rests on the carrier but, with respect to certain cases, the provisions of 
the Convention modify this rule.” 
188
 A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.32, p.21, para(c). See also, UNCITRAL documents A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21, 
8 January 2002, Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea, p.26; “a provision 
[similar to Article 5.1 of the Hamburg Rules] would also preserve the benefit of much existing 
case law.” 
189
 Thomas, R., ‘An analysis of the liability regime of carriers and maritime performing parties’ 
cited as Chapter 3 of Thomas, R., (ed.) A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - 
The Rotterdam Rules: An Analysis of the UN Convention on Contracts for the International 
Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), p.59.  
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of freedom of contract, have a one-way nature 190 ; they allow mandatory 
obligations and liabilities imposed on the carrier to be increased by contract 
pursuant to Article 79(1), but the rules do not allow the obligations and liabilities 
of the shipper to be increased nor reduced, pursuant to Article 79(2).  
In light of Article 79(1), one might think that there is nothing in the Rotterdam 
Rules that restricts the parties from agreeing on a term in the carriage contract 
(including inland carriage) that restricts the carrier from reducing his obligations 
or liabilities relating to seaworthiness from the minimum standard, e.g. 
cancellation of the obligation of seaworthiness to cover the period before and at 
the beginning of the voyage.191 For example, as shown in this Chapter, there is 
potential for conflicting regimes where the carriage involves inland carriage 
between the applicable international inland regime and the Rotterdam Rules, 
where the provisions of the international inland regime will take precedence 
over the Rotterdam Rules. As a result, the obligation of seaworthiness might be 
derogated or cancelled.192 In order to prevent the obligation of seaworthiness 
from being cancelled or derogated, parties can agree on a term in the contract. 
The author suggests the follow provision, ‘If more than one international 
convention applies to loss, damage or delay of the cargo, provided that the 
unfitness of the ship or containers is the cause or the partial cause to the loss, 
damage or delay, the provisions regarding the carrier’s obligation (Article 14) 
and liability (Article 17) relating to seaworthiness must govern such a claim.’ 
A similar term would reduce the potential limitation or exclusion of liability when 
the inland transport conventions are applicable. However, there are two 
                                               
190
 Honka, H., ‘Validity of the contractual terms’ cited as Chapter 17 in Ziegler, A., The 
Rotterdam Rules 2008 - Commentary to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), at p.334. 
191
 See para. 5.6.1, at p.359. 
192
 See para 5.6.1, at p.360. 
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problems as regards contractual terms. First, as stated by one commentator,193 
if the Rotterdam Rules govern the contract of carriage, any contractual 
agreement between the parties is likely to create problems; one of the parties 
might be put in an unfair situation, or, as the terms of the contract have not 
been tested as to their effect before a court, this may create an imbalance as 
regards the carrier’s liability. Take for an example a contractually agreed 
provision to prevent derogation of the obligation of seaworthiness should an 
international convention prevail, which the parties have added to the contract. 
Where the provision has not been judicially tested, it may be that it is ultimately 
found (by a court) to be working against the shipper, as derogation of the 
seaworthiness obligation continues to be allowed when the international 
convention takes over. 
Second, any term that works for the benefit of the shipper only. This may arise 
in a situation where the parties have unequal bargaining powers and the 
shipper, for example, has a stronger negotiating power than the carrier.194 On 
the other hand, allowing freedom of contract does not reduce the room for 
adopting a less protective approach in countries where the carrier has the 
stronger negotiating power. Thus, an opposite approach restricting freedom of 
contract would in fact prevent the carrier from using his negotiating power to his 
favour in reducing his obligations and liability. This might not be possible in light 
of the restriction imposed on the carrier by Article 79(1). The carrier and 
                                               
193
 Because either there is a contractual agreement which might put one of the parties in an 
unfair situation or because there is a contractual agreement, where the terms of which have not 
been tested as to their effect before a court (i.e. creating an unbalanced situation as to the 
carrier’s liability). See, e.g. Honka, H., ‘The Legislative Future of Carriage of Goods by Sea: 
Could it not be the UNCITRAL draft?’ (2004) in Scandinavian Studies in Law, 93-120, p.93. 
194
 Honka, H., ‘Validity of the contractual terms’ cited as Chapter 17 in Ziegler, A., The 
Rotterdam Rules 2008 - Commentary to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), at p.333.  
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maritime performing parties are precluded from excluding or limiting their 
seaworthiness obligation(s) and liability that may result from a breach of their 
seaworthiness obligation(s). For instance, any term incorporated in the contract 
of carriage which reduces or cancels any of the carrier’s obligations and/or 
liabilities in relation to seaworthiness would be void and null. 195  It must be 
remembered that if the Rotterdam Rules apply as a matter of law, Article 79(1) 
will render void any term which purports to provide the carrier with more 
protection than that which is allowed under Article 17. However, if the 
Rotterdam Rules apply as a matter of contract or agreement, as they will when 
incorporated in relation to charterparties by virtue of a clause paramount, it 
cannot be argued that statute or Convention law will override contractual 
provisions and it is a matter of construction of the paramount clause or other 
clause which is to override.196 
5.11 Conclusion 
The provisions of the Rotterdam Rules differ from the current regime, which 
does not answer the liner and commercial needs of carriage. However, it is 
apparent that when drafting the Rotterdam Rules, no additional efforts were 
made to ascertain the impact of the multimodal aspect of the Rules on the 
obligation of seaworthiness. This should not be overlooked, as seaworthiness is 
the only obligation that is unique to the sea carriage leg and, when the 
                                               
195
 It must be remembered that Article III, r.8 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules provides that the 
carrier is not allowed to use any other clause or exception in the contract which purports to 
provide him with more protection than the standard of protection he is given by Article IV, r.2. 
Thus, clauses limiting or lessening the carrier’s obligation to that which is provided by the Rules 
shall be ‘null and void and of no effect’. 
196
 It might be the case that the Rotterdam Rules will be incorporated by agreement in a 
modified form. For example, see Tasman Discoverer [2004] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 647 “[Liability is 
governed by] the Hague Rules…if the loss or damage is proved to have occurred at sea or on 
inland waterway; for the purpose of his sub-paragraph the limitation of liability under the Hague 
Rules shall be deemed to be 100 Sterling, lawful money of the United Kingdom per package or 
unit.” Further see Varnish v The Kheti (1949) 82 Ll. L. Rep. 525. 
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obligation is required to interrelate with other inland carriage conventions, 
certain problems will arise, especially if the provisions of the Rotterdam Rules 
give way to the other conventions. Thus, one expects to see only a limited 
extension of the seaworthiness obligation, e.g. an obligation prior to the 
commencement of the voyage, or perhaps cancellation of the container 
cargoworthiness obligation. 
It can be suggested that a clause could be added to the contract of carriage 
where the shipper has sufficient bargaining power (as explained above) or, as a 
long-term approach, a provision could be added to Article 82 and Article 26 on 
the first revision of the Rotterdam Rules, to the effect that the obligation of 
seaworthiness and the responsibility of the contracting carrier, is continuing 
throughout the entire transport. Consequently, the multimodal carrier will be 
subject to the responsibilities imposed and the liabilities entailed under Article 14 
of the Rotterdam Rules. The market is in need of a single regime to govern the 
multimodal carriage of containers. The Rotterdam Rules were seen as a 
legislative step to solve the many problems produced by the past patchwork of 
transport law. This is not being achieved, at least not to the degree aspired to by 
their draftsmen. The Rotterdam Rules appear to be a step in the right direction, 
but they should not be used in multimodal transport without dealing first with all 
the potential difficulties that might arise in respect of the vessel’s and containers’ 
seaworthiness. Considerable improvement is suggested through either reform of 
the Rules or through the engagement of contractual provisions that may, if the 
shipper has sufficient bargaining power, close the gaps created by the drafting 
imperfections of the Rules. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE SUPPLY OF CONTAINERS AND 
‘SEAWORTHINESS’: THE ROTTERDAM RULES 
PERSPECTIVE 
 
“And there are (other) advantages in them for you (besides); that ye may through them 
attain to any need (there may be) in your hearts; and on them and on ships ye are carried” 
(Ghafir, Chapter 40, Verse 80) 
 
Introduction 
The carrier, under the common law, is under a strict obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel. Under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, however, the carrier is 
required to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel before and at 
the beginning of the sea voyage. The obligation of due diligence, as regards 
supplying containers, is interpreted differently in different countries. However, 
unlike other jurisdictions, the question of whether the container is part of the 
ship or not, has not been considered by the English courts.1   
The Rotterdam Rules, in particular, Article 14(c) impose upon the carrier duties 
additional to those under the current law.  
This Chapter intends to clarify, in the first instance, the legal position of 
container sea carriage under English law by particular reference to sea carriage 
                                               
1
 Nicholas, A., ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seaworthiness’, cited as 
Chapter 6 in Thomas, R (ed.), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules, 
(Lloyd’s List, 2010), at p. 114; See Margetson, N., ‘Liability of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) 
Rules for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness of its containers’, (2008) JIML 153, 
indicating that “research in English and Australian cases does not yield any cases in which an 
English or Australian court held that a container is part of the ship or that the container should 
be cargoworthy and that therefore the mandatory provisions of the H(V)R will govern the 
question of liability,” at p. 156. 
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under bills of lading and how, under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in the UK 
and in other jurisdictions, a container could possibly constitute part of the vessel. 
It will also demonstrate how due diligence is to be exercised by the carrier 
under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and how the position is different under the 
Rotterdam Rules. This Chapter is divided into two parts; Part One deals with the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and Part Two deals with the Rotterdam Rules. 
While considering this Chapter, the reader may benefit from recalling the 
discussion in Chapter Five (para.5.1.1) as to the liability of the party who 
supplied the container. As previously mentioned, containers are usually 
supplied by the carrier or the shipper. While the party who supplies the 
container will be generally liable for any damage caused by a container’s 
defective condition, there are many instances where liability could fall to the 
other party, e.g. the carrier, where he fails to remedy a minor defect that was 
apparent upon a reasonable inspection of the container that was supplied by 
the shipper.   
 
-  Practical Implications of the Carriage of Containers 
Containerised cargo is susceptible to damage by a variety of causes: improper 
stowage of the container; improper stowage of the cargo stowed within the 
container; inherent vice of the cargo inside the container; uncleanliness of the 
container; or, from a defective condition of the container.2 Thus, damage of the 
                                               
2
 See Gard AS, Container Carriage (2011), pp.14-15, 20 and 22 cited online: http://www.gard. 
no/ikbViewer/Content/134070/Containers%20March%202011.pdf. 
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cargo inside the container does not negate the fitness of the container3 in all 
situations.4  
The extent of liability (if any) for cargo damaged as a result of an unfit container 
that was supplied by the carrier, 5  will be influenced by the way the court 
interprets the contract of carriage and bills of lading and whether it considers 
that the fitness of the container falls within the obligation of seaworthiness or not. 
This will be briefly analysed next.   
 
Part I: Supply of Containers
6
 and “Seaworthiness” 
under the Current Regime 
 
6.1 The Legal Status of Containers under the Current Law7 
                                               
3
 Prior to stuffing, a fit container should possess a valid Container Safety Approval Plate and the 
re-examination date should not have passed. Once this has been established, the following 
aspects should be checked: (1) no previous holes or tears; (2) no broken or distorted door 
hinges, locks, or door seal gaskets; (3) any placards or markings remaining on the outside of 
the empty container which refer to the previous cargo should be removed; (4) no serious 
structural defects such as torn or cracked corner fitting or side rails (ISO, IMO CSC/ Cir. 134 
containers guidance); (5) the inside of the container should be clean, dry, without infestation, 
untainted, watertight and without dust. Industry Guidance for Shippers and Containers Stuffers, 
‘Safe Transport of Containers by Sea’, (ICS, 2009) cited in: http://www.ics-shipping.org/docs/ 
default-source/resources/safety-security-and-operations/safe-transport-of-containers.pdf?sfvrsn 
=10, para. 3.1. 
4
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course Between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed.), Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (2013, 
Informa Law). Stevens stated that the standard of fitness requires only a container that is 
‘weather-tight’, but not watertight, at p.26; The Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence, 9 December 
1999, B.T.L. no 2833 of 7 February 2000, at p.93. A container was loaded with cargo and was 
damaged due to the stranding of the container in water for several days. The court held that the 
container, although it has to be fit, is not required to remain sealed when immersed in water.  
5
 Some shippers own or lease their own containers. In such a case, the container will, almost 
inevitably, be stuffed by the shipper. It goes without saying that the supplier of the container is 
the party who bears the risk and liability for cargo that is damaged by an unfit container. 
However, the shipper will often instruct the carrier to stuff the cargo inside the container, e.g. 
because the shipper does not have experience with stuffing containers. 
6
 See the definition of container in Article 1(26): ‘Container means any type of container, 
transportable tank or flat, swap-body, or any similar unit load used to consolidate goods and any 
equipment ancillary to such unit load’; see UN Doc. A/CN.9/645.  
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It was introduced in Chapter Five8 that, generally speaking, responsibility for the 
supply of containers and/or the stuffing of cargo inside the container will fall to 
one of two parties, the shipper or the carrier. Accordingly, liability for a defective 
container is likely to fall upon the party who has provided the container and/or 
the party who has stuffed the container.9 However, one may ask whether the 
supply of the container by the carrier can be treated as a separate agreement 
outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Answering this question 
will indicate whether responsibility for a defective container may shift from one 
party to the other. 
When the obligation of exercising due diligence to make the ship seaworthy 
(required by Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) is extended to the 
container, the supply of containers by the carrier would not constitute a 
separate agreement outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Thus, 
liability for cargo that is damaged asa result of a defective condition of the 
container will be governed by the provisions of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
and, as a result, the carrier is likely to be liable for not exercising due diligence 
to provide a fit container before and at the beginning of the voyage. For 
instance, in The NDS Provider,10 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands held 
that the obligation of exercising due diligence to make the ship seaworthy 
extends to containers provided by the carrier. It was also held that the clause in 
the bill of lading stating that “the carrier shall be under no liability in the event of 
                                                                                                                                          
7
 See the introduction to the supply of containers in para. 5.1.1, at p.330. 
8
 See para. 5.1.1, at p. 330. 
9
 Stevens,F.,  ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 
Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p. 26. 
10
 C06/082HR, 1 February 2008. See Margetson, N., The system of liability of Article III and IV 
of the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Partis Legal Publishing, 2008), at p.48. 
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loss of or damage to any of the goods directly or indirectly caused by … 
unsuitability or defective condition of the container” was null and void pursuant 
to Article III, r.8 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.11 The carrier was held liable 
for the entry of seawater into the container through rusty patches and could not 
rely on the clause excluding liability for damage caused by a defective container. 
The judgment in The NDS Provider was not based on the presumption that the 
container is part of the hold of the ship. Some authors are of the view that a 
container is part of the ship’s hold and, therefore, responsibility for a defective 
container could be placed on the shipowner, whether or not the container is 
supplied by him. 12  This means that the obligation of Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules should apply to the supply of containers. The carrier, 
even where he was not the supplier of the defective container that damaged the 
cargo, will also be responsible for any damage caused by the container’s 
condition.   
Alternatively, if the supply of containers is considered as part of the packing 
arrangements, the carrier will not be liable for damage caused by a defective 
condition of the container. The supply of containers by the carrier can be treated 
as a separate agreement outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
For instance in the US case, Cigna Insurance Company of Puerto Rico v The 
                                               
11
 The court also held that the obligation of due diligence prevented the carrier from relying on 
the exceptions of Article IV, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The obligation of due diligence 
under Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is seen as an overriding obligation under 
Dutch law. See N. Margetson, ‘Liability of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo 
damage caused by unseaworthiness of its containers’, (2008) JIML 153, at p. 154. Regarding 
the overriding obligation under Dutch law, see N. Margetson, The system of liability of Article III 
and IV of the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Paris Legal Publishing, 2008), at p.73. 
12
 See Stevens, F. ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting A Course between 
Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer 
and A. Tettenborn, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal 
Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p.26; Margetson, N. ‘Liability of the 
Carrier under the Hague-Visby Rules for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness of its 
containers’, (2008) JIML 153, at p.154. 
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M/V Skanderborg,13 the carrier was not responsible where tins of olive oil, which 
were packed into the container by the shipper, were damaged by rust as a 
result of the unsuitability of the unventilated container provided by the carrier. 
The unsuitability of the container was treated as defective packing. COGSA 
imposes no duty on carriers regarding their packing arrangements with shippers, 
so that liability for defective packing can be excluded under the contract.14 If the 
container is considered as part of the packing arrangements then the carrier will 
not liable for its condition, and it will not matter if the carrier supplies the 
container. 15  However, one would in general expect to see a difference in 
responsibility depending on the supplier of the container. This is true as any 
separate contract that requires a fit container could only be relevant if the carrier 
supplies the container. For instance, in a case heard before the Court of Appeal 
of Aix-en-Provence, 16  cargo had been damaged in a container that was 
supplied and stuffed by the carrier. The damage occurred while the container 
was waiting on the loading jetty. The carrier argued that at the time when the 
cargo was damaged, he was not liable on the basis of the ‘period of 
responsibility’ clause incorporated into the bill of lading. The court held that the 
supply of containers was a separate contract and the carrier did not accept 
responsibility over the goods by stuffing them into the containers. The claim was 
rejected because of the period of responsibility defence. However, even if 
                                               
13
 Cigna Insurance Company of Puerto Rico v The M/V Skanderborg [1996] A.M.C. 600 
(U.S.D.C. Puerto Rico 1995). See the discussion of this case in Glass, D., Freight forwarding 
and multimodal transport contracts, (LLP, 2013), at para. 4.126; also in Tetley, W., ‘Properly 
Carry, Keep and Care for Cargo - art. 3(2) of the Hague/Visby Rules’, [2001] ETL 9-35, at f.n. 63. 
14
 Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (LLP, 2013), at para. 4.126. 
It is stated that: “where there is no evidence that provision of the container went beyond the sea 
carrier’s obligation as a sea carrier it is COGSA and not state law which governs the case 
especially where COGSA is extended by the bill of lading to pre-loading and post-loading 
operations”, at para. 4.126, f.n. 398. 
15
 See The M/V Skanderborg [1996] A.M.C. 600 (U.S.D.C. Puerto Rico 1995). 
16
 CA Aix-en-Provence, 9 December 1999, B.T. No. 2833 of February 2000, 93. 
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damage to containerised cargo occurs outside the period of the sea carriage, 
the carrier might be rendered liable if the supply of containers by the carrier is 
considered as a separate agreement outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules. It was held by the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence in the M/V 
Matisse case,17 that the carrier was liable for damage that was caused by a 
defective container supplied by the carrier, even though the damage occurred 
outside the period of the maritime carriage. The court held the agreement to 
supply reefer containers as a rental contract accessory to the contract of 
carriage. A claim for damage resulting from a defective container could not be 
based on maritime transport law, as liability under maritime transport law had 
ended with the discharge of the container from the ship. Instead, the carrier was 
liable on the basis of the rental agreement. The court held that under the rental 
agreement, the carrier was obliged to supply fit containers. After the container 
was discharged from the ship, outside the period of the carrier’s responsibility, 
the cargo inside the reefer container became damaged as a result of the 
temperature inside the container rising. This was enough proof for the court to 
find the reefer container defective and the carrier liable for breach of the rental 
agreement.18 It has been stated that “The claim, however, was filed by the 
consignee, whom the court confirmed was not a party to the rental agreement 
between the carrier and the shipper. Undaunted, though, the court then held 
                                               
17
 CA Aix-en-Provence, 15 February 2007, (2007) DMF (M/V “Matisse”) cited in F. Stevens, 
‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting A Course between Seaworthiness, Care for the 
Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed.), Carriage of Goods by 
Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa Law, 
2013), at pp.28-29. See also Bordahandy, P., ‘The Liability Attached to the Supply of Containers 
by A Maritime Carrier: A Comparative Analysis of the French Decision M/V Matisse’, (2007) 
A&NZ MLJ 178. 
18
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed.), Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa 
Law, 2013), at p.29.  
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that the carrier’s breach of its rental contract with the shipper to be a tort vis-à-
vis the consignee, and granted the latter’s claim against the carrier.” 19  A 
difference in responsibility, such as a separate fitness requirement like that in 
the M/V Matisse case, could only be relevant if the carrier supplies the container.  
One can argue that there is no sensible reason not to impose on the carrier an 
obligation of due diligence to not load an unseaworthy container on board a ship. 
The supply of a fit container should be imposed on the carrier regardless of 
whether the container is considered as part of the ship or merely considered as 
a package or cargo.20  
However, it does not matter whether the container is considered as part of the 
ship or cargo, should a container develop a defect or if the carrier supplies a 
defective container, as a defective container should also fall within Article III, r.2 
and the carrier’s duty to care for the cargo throughout the voyage.21 Even if the 
container is considered as part of the ship, where a defect emerges during the 
voyage, the carrier cannot argue that he has discharged his obligation of 
exercising due diligence in providing a seaworthy container before and at the 
beginning of the voyage and, at the same time, choose to not repair a defect 
that may cause damage to the cargo on the basis that he has exercised due 
diligence at an earlier stage. The carrier will still be rendered liable for failing to 
                                               
19
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed,), Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa 
Law, 2013), at p.29. 
20
 Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Cavendish, 2010), at p. 136. 
21
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed), Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa 
Law, 2013), at p.28-29. It is not relevant whether the container was supplied by the carrier or by 
the shipper. 
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care for the cargo.22 In a similar situation, if the Rotterdam Rules govern the 
contract, under the ongoing obligation imposed by the Rules, the carrier is likely 
to be rendered liable for not exercising due diligence to repair the defect in the 
container, provided that the defect is easily repairable on board. The carrier 
might also be liable even if the necessary spare parts are not available on board 
the ship but the ship has called at an intermediate port to discharge other 
containers.23 With a duty of care, there can be a division of performance so that 
part of the responsibility can be placed on each party to the contract, e.g. the 
shipper or a party acting on his behalf. 
A question may arise as to what would be the effect on liability of a defective 
container where the shipper takes responsibility for stuffing the container as 
with analogous ‘Free In Out Stowed’ (FIOS) clauses. 
  
- Shipper Stuffing Cargo inside the Containers 
The FIOS clause allocates responsibility for the loading, stowing and discharge 
of cargo to the shipper and receiver. In the US,24 the Court of Appeal, with 
regard to the obligation in Article III, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, held 
that the bill of lading containing a FIOS clause, which purported to relieve the 
carrier of liability for negligent cargo stowing and discharging, was void under 
s.3(8) of U.S. COGSA 1936, as s.3(2) created a non-delegable duty on the 
                                               
22
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed.), Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa 
Law, 2013), at p.28-29. It is not relevant whether the container was supplied by the carrier or by 
the shipper.  
23
 See the discussions at p.234 and p.323. 
24
 Demsey & Assc, Inc v SS Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1972) cited in A. Tettenborn, 
‘Freedom of contract and the Rotterdam Rules: framework for negotiation or one-size-fits-all?’ 
cited as Chapter 4 in R. Thomas, Carriage of Goods under the Rotterdam Rules, (Lloyd’s List, 
2010), at para.4.22, f.n. 68. 
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carrier. 25  Accordingly, under American law, where cargo is stuffed inside a 
container that is then carried by the shipper and bad stowage results in damage 
to the cargo, the carrier will still be liable for that damage even if the stuffing 
was carried out by the shipper. Proper stowage is one of the duties under 
Article III, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and English law is the same as 
American law in respect of any express exception relieving the carrier of liability 
for bad stowage such that the clause will be rendered null and void by Article III, 
r.8.26 However, a distinction should be made as regards FIOS clauses when the 
obligation under Article III, r.2, e.g. stowage, is undertaken by the shipper rather 
than the carrier. In this case, the FIOS provision transfers not only the cost, but 
also the liability to load, discharge etc. to the cargo-interest. So, under English 
law, the carrier might not be liable for damage that was caused by improper 
stowage of cargo inside the container where it was stuffed by the shipper. In a 
non-container carriage case, the House of Lords in The Jordan II held that the 
FIOS clause constitutes a valid obligation clause, which is, outside the scope of 
Article III, r.8 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.27 In this case, a cargo of steel 
was carried under a bill of lading that incorporated the terms of a STENMOR 
                                               
25
 See Nichimen C In v MV Farland [1972] 462 F 2d 319, at p.330 (2
nd
 Cir 1972); Dempsey & 
Assoc Inc v S. S. Sea Star [1972] 461 f 2d 1009, at pp.1018-1019 (2
nd 
Circ 1972).  
26
 A clause such as clause 8 of the P&O Containers Bill provides: “if the container has not been 
packed by or on behalf of the carrier, the carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the 
goods caused by: … (c) the unsuitability or defective condition of the container or the incorrect 
setting of any refrigeration controls thereof, provided that, if the container has been supplied by 
or on behalf of the carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition could have been apparent 
upon inspection by the Merchant at or prior to the time when the container was packed.” This 
clause attempts to define in agreed terms how the obligations specified by the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules are to be construed or performed or treated, e.g. clauses stating that a container is 
to be treated as a package in all circumstances, see de Wit, R., Multimodal Transport, (LLP, 
1995), at p.416-417, where the effect of the exemption clauses on a defective container is 
discussed. 
27
 Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Cavendish, 2010), at p.116 
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ore charter. Although, no reference was made to stowage,28 the court held that 
the carrier incurred no liability under the bill of lading in respect of bad stowage. 
However, if the stowage was such as to endanger the safety of the ship, the 
carrier would then be in breach of his obligation under Article III, r.1.29   
- Carrier Stuffing Cargo inside the Container 
If the carrier supplies and stuffs the containers, difficulties may arise as to 
whether such operations fall within the scope of Article II of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules.30 If the process of stuffing the container, supplied by the carrier, is 
carried out away from the ship, the stuffing and the supply of the container 
might be regarded as outside the scope of control of the carrier and would be 
subject to the “freedom of the carrier”31 within Article VII.32 Then, the carrier 
could rely on an exclusion clause in the contract of carriage.33 Further, in the 
event of damage to cargo inside the container as a result of bad stowage by the 
shipper, the carrier might rely on an exclusion clause to the effect that the 
                                               
28
 Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Cavendish, 2010), at p.116. ‘Clause 3 provided that the charter 
was FIOST term, while clause 17 provided that ‘Shipper, charterer, receiver’ were to load and 
trim and discharge the cargo.’ 
29
 Baughen, S., Shipping Law, (Cavendish, 2010), at p.96. As for the Rotterdam Rules, 
Tettenborn in ‘Freedom of contract and the Rotterdam Rules: a framework for negotiation or 
one-size-fits-all?’ cited as Chapter 4 in R. Thomas, Carriage of Goods under the Rotterdam 
Rules, (Informa Law, 2010), at para.4.22, states that English law is put beyond doubt. Article 13 
explicitly allows for an arrangement whereby loading, handling, stowing or unloading is to be 
done by those appointed by someone other than the carrier; and elsewhere it is ensured that 
where this happens the carrier will not be liable. One can see that Article 17(3)(i) of the 
Rotterdam Rules provides an exception for loading that was done under a FIOS clause. 
30
 Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (LLP, 2013), at para.4.124. 
31
 Glass, D., Freight forwarding and multimodal transport contracts, (LLP, 2013), at para.4.124. 
32
 Article VII of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules provides that “Nothing herein contained shall 
prevent a carrier or a shipper from entering into any agreement, stipulation, condition, 
reservation or exemption as to the responsibility and liability of the carrier or the ship for the loss 
or damage to, or in connection with, the custody and care and handling of goods prior to the 
loading on, and subsequent to the discharge from, the ship on which the goods are carried by 
sea.” 
33
 In Comalco Aluminium Ltd v Mogal Freight Service Pty, Ltd (The Oceanic Trader) (1993) 113 
A.L.R. 677. The Federal Court of Australia held that the failure of the carrier-forwarder to secure 
the goods properly in the container was outside the period envisaged by the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules. As a result, the carrier, by virtue of Article VII, was able to rely on the exclusion 
clause in his consignment note. Cited in D. Glass, Freight forwarding and multimodal transport 
contracts, (LLP, 2013), at para.4.124. 
397 
 
stuffing was an ‘act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods, his agent 
or representative’ pursuant to Article IV(2)(i). Alternatively, if the container was 
not regarded as part of the ship but as part of the packing, Article III, r.2 applies. 
So, where a defect in a container produces problems during the voyage, the 
carrier can use the defence of defective packing under Article IV, r.2(n).   
 
The legal qualification given to a container may influence the extent of liability 
for damage caused by a defective container. There may be a shift of 
performance obligations so that some of these obligations are placed on the 
shipper. If the container is not regarded as part of the vessel’s hold and thus no 
cargoworthiness obligation is imposed on the carrier pursuant to Article III, r.1(c) 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, such as FCL shipment,34 the carrier then has 
a duty under Article III, r.2 to “properly and carefully load” and stow the goods. 
Such obligations may thus be transferred to the shipper as an extended packing 
responsibility. 35  Accordingly, one can argue that this shift may validate an 
exemption clause by protecting the carrier from liability for cargo loss or 
damage due to negligent container-stuffing by the carrier before loading.36  
                                               
34
 Full Container Load (FCL). FCL/FCL Term used to describe a container freight rate whereby 
the shipper is responsible for the packing of the container and the shipper or receiver, as the 
case may be, is responsible for the unpacking. FCL/LCL Term used to describe a freight rate 
whereby the shipper is responsible for the packing of the container and the carrier is responsible 
for the unpacking. Brodie, P., Dictionary of Shipping Terms, (2013, Informa). 
35
 This redefinition of the scope of the carrier’s obligation seems unaffected by Article III, r.8. 
See Berry, S., Eder, B., Foxton, D. and Smith, C. Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of 
Lading,(Sweet & Maxwell, 22
nd
 ed., 2011), para.20-051; also see Margetson, N. J. ‘Liability of 
the Carrier under the Hague-Visby Rules for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness of its 
containers’, (2008) JIML 153-161. See, for instance, The M/S “Zim Iberia”, CA Paris, 19 
December 1979, D.M.F. 1980, 731 at p.734; Nile Dutch Africa Line B.V. v Delta Lloyd 
Schadeverzekering (The “NDS Provider”) C06/082HR, 1 February 2008. 
36
 Thus proper stowage and securing of the goods in a container and its fitness as an article of 
transport have become a new facet of cargo packing, pursuant to Article III, r.2.; see Wong, J., 
‘Container Transportation and Anomalies in the Law’, (1995), 223 Aus. Bus. Law Rev. 340, 
p.341. See the French decision of the Cour d’Appel de Rouen, 7.2.1985, [1987] DMF 510. The 
court held that the exclusion of liability for the supply of a defective container was not null and 
398 
 
 
One might ask whether the shipper is obliged to inspect a container that was 
supplied by the carrier.  
Liability for an unfit container, in the context of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, 
may not be excused for not inspecting and not refusing to carry a defective 
container that it is not fit for sea carriage where this is ‘apparent upon inspection’ 
before loading. There are two reasons in support of this.  
If the container is considered as part of the ship and thus the exercise of due 
diligence is extended to cover the container, it might be true to say that as 
inspecting the ship is part of the obligation to exercise due diligence, then the 
inspection of containers is not delegable. 37  In practice, a container can be 
stuffed and prepared from an inland point by the shipper or by the carrier’s 
forwarding agent. The carrier will not be relieved of the obligation to inspect the 
ship and container even though he has asked those parties to check the 
condition of the container. Should the carrier prove that the container’s defect 
was visible to the shipper by routine inspection at the time of packing, he will 
still not be relieved as regards his seaworthiness obligation although he may 
seek an indemnity from the shipper on a contractual or tortious basis. In 
addition, the shipowner/carrier might not be able to disch/arge his due diligence 
                                                                                                                                          
void by reason of Article III, r.8. Cf. Federated Department Stores v Brinke 450 F. 2d 1223 (5
th
 
Cir. 1971). 
37
 The Muncaster Castle [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57; The Nicholas H [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 492, 
p.498-499 (CA), where it was the shipowner but not the ship classification society who owed a 
duty of care to the cargo owners; J. Lowices, ‘Independent contractor’ [1960] CLJ 17, p.20; 
Villareal, ‘The Concept of Due Diligence in Maritime Law’ [1971] 2 JMLC 763, p.769.   
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obligation by showing that he employed competent experts to perform and 
supervise the task of making the container cargoworthy.38 
The second is that where loss or damage arises from a failure to exercise due 
diligence to make the container cargoworthy at some point prior to loading the 
container, the carrier may be liable on the basis of actual knowledge of defects 
or failure to use due diligence in inspecting the container prior to stuffing, even if 
the inspection took place well in advance of loading.39 This is true at least as far 
as the periodic examination of containers is concerned. 40  Containers are 
regularly subjected to “thorough examinations organised by the owner in 
connection with major repairs, refurbishments or on/off-hire interchanges.”41 
Such inspections may not reveal the status of the container as defective at any 
stage of carriage or handling prior to being loaded onto the ship. 
Stevens has concluded that if the container is regarded as part of the ship and 
thus the seaworthiness obligation is extended to containers provided by the 
carrier, clauses such as Clause 11 of the MSC Bill of Lading,42 would not shift 
                                               
38
 Stevens, F. ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer (ed.), Carriage of 
Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa 
Law, 2013), at p.37.  
39
 Huo International v Daisy Shipping (The Yamatogawa) [1990] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 39, where the 
investigation went back to the vessel’s previous Special Survey. 
40
 Contracting States to the International Convention on Safe Containers (CSC) must set out 
‘periodical examination schemes’ and ‘Approved Continuous Examination Programmes’. See 
Booker, M., Containers Conditions, Law and Practice of Carriage and Use, (Derek Beattie 
Publishing, 1987, Vol.1), see Chapter 1, at p.2. 
41
 See, Container Carriage, a selection of articles previously published by Gard AS (March, 
2011) Gard News 151, ‘Inspection and certification of cargo containers’, (September/November 
1998), at pp.16-17. 
42
 MSC Bill of Lading, cl.11. Merchant-Packed Containers 
“If a Container has not been packed by or on behalf of the Carrier 
11.1 The Merchant shall inspect the Container for suitability for carriage of the Goods before 
packing it. The Merchant’s use of the Container shall be prima facie evidence of its being sound 
and suitable for use. 
11.2 The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the Goods caused by: 
(a) the manner in which the Goods have been packed, stowed stuffed or secured in the 
Container, or 
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the responsibility of inspecting and ensuring the suitability of the container to the 
shipper, as the seaworthiness obligation is an overriding operation that cannot 
be delegated or contracted out of. Thus any clauses that intend to shift the 
responsibility for, or risk of, a defective container would be invalid.43   
Qualification in the bill of lading concerning the container’s defect by way of a 
printed clause44 may not suffice to position the risk on those referred to in the 
relevant clause (e.g. the shipper) where a defect is obvious to the carrier, until a 
                                                                                                                                          
(b) the unsuitability of the Goods for carriage in the Container supplied or for carriage by the 
Container between the ports or places specified herein, or 
(c) the unsuitability or defective condition of the Container or the incorrect setting of any 
refrigeration controls thereof, provided that, if the Container has been supplied by or on behalf 
of the Carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition would have been apparent upon inspection 
by the Merchant at or prior to the time when the Container was packed, or 
(d) packing refrigerated Goods that are not properly pre-cooled to the correct temperature for 
carriage before the refrigerated container has been properly pre-cooled to the correct carrying 
temperature. 
11.3 The Merchant is responsible for the packing and sealing of all Merchant-packed Containers 
and, if a Merchant-packed Container is delivered by the Carrier with an original seal as affixed 
by the Merchant or customs or security control intact, or the Carrier can establish bona fide 
circumstances in which the original seal was replaced, the Carrier shall not be liable for any 
shortage of Goods ascertained upon delivery. 
11.4 The Merchant shall indemnify the Carrier against any loss, damage, liability or expense 
whatsoever and howsoever arising caused by one or more of the matters referred to in clause 
11.2, including but not limited to damage to Container, other cargo and the Vessel.” 
43
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 
Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at pp. 40-41. 
44
 See Maersk Line Multimodal Transport Bill of Lading clause 11  
11. Shipper-packed containers  
“If a Container has not been packed by the Carrier: 
11.1 This bill of lading shall be a receipt only for such a Container; 
11.2 The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the contents and the Merchant shall 
indemnify the Carrier against any injury, loss, damage, liability or expense whatsoever incurred 
by the Carrier if such loss of or damage to the contents and/or such injury, loss, damage, liability 
or expense has been caused by all matters beyond his control including, inter alia, without 
prejudice to the generality of this exclusion: 
(a) the manner in which the Container has been packed; or 
(b) the unsuitability of the Goods for carriage in Containers; or 
(c) the incorrect setting of any thermostatic, ventilation, or other special controls thereof; or 
(d) the unsuitability or defective condition of the Container provided that, if the Container 
has been supplied by the Carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition could have been 
apparent upon reasonable inspection by the Merchant at or prior to the time the Container 
was packed. 
11.3 The Merchant is responsible for the packing and sealing of all shipper-packed Containers 
and, if a shipper-packed Container is delivered by the Carrier with any original seal intact, the 
Carrier shall not be liable for any shortage of Goods ascertained at delivery. 
11.4 The Shipper shall inspect Containers before packing them and the use of Containers shall 
be prima facie evidence of their being sound and suitable for use.” 
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clear and specific qualification incorporated into the bill of lading is made.45 If 
the carrier supplies the container and the defect was obvious to him on loading, 
the carrier most probably cannot shift the risk of the defective container onto the 
shipper. The carrier in this scenario should not allow the container to be loaded 
on board the ship; he should seek a replacement. 
Furthermore, provisions, such as Clause 15(2) of the Mitsui OSK Lines 
Combined Transport Bill 1993,46 deal with the failure of refrigerated containers 
and the vessel’s cargo equipment. The language of the provision seems to 
impose an obligation on the carrier, before and at the beginning of the voyage, 
to exercise due diligence similar to the duty under Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. However, the duty under this Clause seems to limit 
the exercise of due diligence to the refrigerated plant and the apparatus of the 
container that relates to the refrigerated system. This type of Clause may 
relieve the carrier from a failure of the refrigeration system provided that the 
carrier exercised due diligence at the beginning of the voyage, although it 
probably does not intend to shift the responsibility of due diligence to inspect the 
container to the shipper, nor is the carrier relieved from damage that was 
caused by any other defective condition of the container, e.g. holes in the 
container.   
                                               
45
 Compare Glass, D., Freight Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts, (LLP, 2
nd
 ed., 
2012), para. 4.129, where reference is made to the duty of the carrier when packing is obviously 
damaged under the CMR Convention; Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: 
CMR (LLP, 2009), at para.84. Containers are not considered under the CMR as special 
equipment or a trailer, it is sui generis, para.75f(i). (Cases are concerned with the shipper’s 
packing)  
46
 15. Specialized Carriage: 
“(2) The Carrier shall not be liable for any loss or damage to the Goods arising from latent 
defects, derangement, breakdown, defrosting, stoppage of the refrigerating, ventilating or any 
other specialized machinery, plant, insulation and/or any apparatus of the Container, vessel, 
conveyance and any other facilities, provided that the Carrier shall before and at the beginning 
of the Carriage exercise due diligence to maintain the Container supplied by the Carrier in an 
efficient state.” 
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Even if, under Clause 15(2) of the Mitsui OSK Lines Combined Transport Bill 
1993, the obligation of due diligence to provide a seaworthy container is 
imposed on the supplying carrier, the level of inspection required to determine 
whether a container is in apparent good order and condition may not be 
possibly ascertainable. The level of due diligence in checking the fitness of the 
container is discussed below.  
 
6.2  The Standard of Due Diligence in Checking the Fitness of the 
Container  
In practice, there are a number of checks that carriers should carry out in order 
to ascertain the proper stowage of goods inside the container. In addition, prior 
to loading the cargo inside the container (stuffing), the supplier of the container, 
must also ascertain the fitness of the containers supplied in accordance with the 
International Convention for Safe Containers 1972 (CSC 1972), which sets out 
test procedures and strength requirements that should be carried out by an 
authorised officer.47 These are explained below. 
 
6.2.1 Thoroughness of the Inspection 
The containers should be cargoworthy, i.e. in sound, safe and weatherproof 
condition, properly certificated (usually by a Classification Society) and 
physically fit to withstand the expected sea carriage conditions. For example, 
                                               
47
 Entered into force on 6 September 1977. Amendments to the Convention came into force 
after the ninety-first session of the Maritime Safety Committee in November 2012. Although, this 
Convention does not deal with the matter of the container’s cargoworthiness, it provides a 
unified international safety regulation and compliance or non-compliance with that regulation 
would affect the cargoworthiness of the container and/or the vessel. See IMO, International 
Convention for Safe Containers, 1972, (2012, IMO Publishing), at p.5.  
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checking that they are fitted with adequate door gaskets, sealed doors, proper 
ventilation or cooling mechanisms and that they comply with CSC,48 TIR, ISO49 
and AQIS requirements50 according to the relevant shipping standards. The 
container should be checked to ensure that it is weatherproof and that its 
exterior does not show significant damage that would result in the container 
being deemed unsuitable by way of allowing entry of water, insects or 
contaminants that could potentially damage the cargo. This can be done by 
thoroughly looking at the exterior of the container’s walls; they should be in 
good condition and not significantly distorted. The doors, including hinges, 
latches, seals and gasket, should work properly and be capable of being 
securely locked and sealed.51 The fitness of a container does not merely relate 
to its ability to withstand the rigours of transit and handling, but also to the 
strength of its securing points with other containers where any weakness may 
not damage the cargo but may render the vessel unstable and unseaworthy by 
causing stacks of containers to collapse.52 If the container is of the refrigerated 
type, it is important that the refrigeration system is checked by considering 
                                               
48
 International Convention on Containers (CSC, 1972) primarily deals with the safety of 
containers rather than the particular cargoworthiness of containers. CSC was drafted following 
an IMO session promoting safety of containerisation in maritime transport. The purpose is to 
maintain a high level of safety in the carriage and handling of containers by imposing strength 
requirements, test procedures, etc.  
49
 Refer to current standard ISO 6346, Freight containers - coding, identifying and marking. 
50
 See Shipping Australia Ltd Standards for food quality shipping containers (Pink Booklet, 
1998), p.9. 
51
 Examination of containers, commonly, includes: (1) exterior examination: inspecting the 
interior surface of the container and setting a mark on the part where damage, distortion, 
leaking or any other damage lies, if any; (2) interior examination: inspecting the interior surface 
of the container and finding out whether it is watertight, light-leaking, or contaminated; (3) 
examination of the doors: inspecting whether the doors are watertight, the locks are intact; (4) 
examination of cleanness: clearing the inside of the container from the remainder, rust, wet, 
odour or other contamination left from the preceeding cargo. See Zhigang Yang, The Practice 
and Regulations of Container Intermodal Transport, International Shipping Dept., Shanghai 
Maritime University. http://www.carecprogram.org/uploads/events/2011/CFCFA-Logistics-
Training-Mongolia/Practice-and-Regulations-of-Container-Intermodal-Transport.pdf 
52
 A sound container should withstand stacking weight of less than 192,000 kg. See, IMO, 
International Convention for Safe Containers, 1972 (CSC), (2012, IMO Publishing), pp.54 and 
56. 
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indications of temperature on the outside of the refrigeration container. An 
examination can involve, at the least, a detailed visual inspection of the exterior 
of the container to detect defects which would render the container unfit. This 
would include ensuring that any damaged parts or components have been 
adequately and safely repaired or replaced.53 A container’s lifting lugs or eye 
bolts require particular attention to ensure that parts are not rusty and can 
handle the weight of the container during loading/unloading, as well as when 
the container is secured to other containers. Cargo containers or specialised 
containers, i.e. tank containers, should be inspected and maintained according 
to industry guidelines and recommendations.54 
The above raises the question of what type of skills the carrier’s inspector 
should possess, as well as for how long such an inspection should take place. It 
is not entirely true to say that the carrier is ‘an unskilled person’.55 He is, in fact, 
expected56 to possess some knowledge as regards the suitability and durability 
of packing in general and the container’s fitness in particular.57 However, in 
practice, the carrier has no time to have the containers inspected by his crew,58 
as the containers’ movement and stowage onto the vessel can take a few 
                                               
53
 Maheshwar, C., Container Refrigeration, (2008, Whitherby Publication), para.12.1-12.7. 
54
 See Booker, M., Containers Conditions, Law and Practice of Carriage and Use, (Derek 
Beattie Publishing, 1987, Vol.1). 
55
 CN Vascongada v Churchill & Sim [1906] 1 K.B. 237, p.245, per Channel J. 
56
 Unless that is a custom and practice between the shipper and the carrier implied in the 
contract. See Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 2008), p.2169-2170. According to 
the International Convention on Safe Containers (CSC) only a ‘competent person’ may carry out 
the examination. This is someone who has sufficient knowledge and experience of containers to 
enable him to perform his duties satisfactorily so as to be capable of determining whether the 
container is cargoworthy or not. 
57
 Silver v Ocean Steamship Co. [1930] 1 K.B. 416, p.440, per Slesser LJ: “the capacity of the 
goods safely to travel was part of their order and condition.” However, the carrier is not 
expected to have the highest expertise; such knowledge that is possessed by the shipper who 
provides the cargo. See Westcoast Food Brokers Ltd v The Hoyanger (The Hoyanger) [1979] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 79, at p.89 (Canadian Federal Court). The Court held that: “… no legal justification 
for fixing liability on a carrier based on the lack of knowledge or expertise of an expert which the 
carrier was not by law nor by duty to the consignee about to engage.” 
58
 Gaskell, N. et al., Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, (London: Informa, 2000), p.216, 
para.7.30. 
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seconds. This is particularly the case in modern container terminals. Thus, in 
practice, the carrier must rely on his agents at the receiving depot to note any 
defects on arrival and have them recorded in a received for shipment bill.59 
In The TNT Express,60 the carrier handed a container to the shipper so that the 
latter could use it to stuff cargo. A ‘Container Interchange Receipt’ 61  was 
provided which required the shipper to clearly mark all damages or defects 
found using a sketch of the container. No specific notifications were put down 
yet the shipper recorded ‘good condition-dirty’ on the bill of lading. The carrier 
delivered the cargo damaged by water and the question was whether the 
clause62 relieved the carrier of liability on the basis that the defective condition 
of the container would have been apparent upon reasonable inspection by the 
shipper. In fact, after delivery, the survey revealed that there were recent rust 
patches on the inner walls of the container and a small gap behind the door 
gasket, which was only apparent when the doors were fully dogged (firmly 
closed). It was agreed that, under the clause, the carrier would carry the burden 
                                               
59
 As part of his duty to provide a seaworthy vessel, the carrier may refuse loading any container 
that endangers the safety of the vessel. It might not be obvious whether a defect of the 
container would potentially endanger the safety of the vessel or merely damage the cargo inside 
it. The carrier may not want to take the risk of loading a defective container and can therefore 
refuse to allow the container to be loaded. The safety of the vessel is the carrier’s responsibility 
as operations, including loading etc., if transferred to a third party such as the shipper, still 
require the master to supervise such operations and to intervene when stowage can affect the 
seaworthiness of his vessel. See Court Line v Canadian Transport (1940) 67 Ll. L. Rep. 161, 
p.166; see also Lord Wright at p.168, and Lord Porter at p.172. Transocean Liners Reederei 
G.m.b.H. v Euxine Shipping Co Ltd (The Imvros) [1999] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 848, p.851. 
60
 Marbig Rexel Py Ltd v A.B.C. Container Line N.V. (The TNT Express) [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 
636 (Sup. Ct. N.S.W.). 
61
 In combined transport operations, a number of different intermodal carriers will be used and, 
between themselves, they will issue receipts which are called ‘equipment interchange receipts’ 
or ‘container interchange receipts’. The contents vary but there is a diagram of the container 
and at each stage the goods passed on, e.g. from road carrier to container depot, the receiver 
will be asked to mark on the interchange receipt any damage or defect of the container. 
62
 A port to port bill was issued in respect of the container and the bill provided inter alia: 
“10(i) If a container has not been filled, stowed, packed, stuffed or loaded by … the carrier the 
carrier shall not be liable for … damage to the goods caused by ... (c) the … defective 
condition of the container provided that where the container has been provided by … the 
carrier … paragraph (c) shall only apply if the … defective condition arose without any want of 
due diligence on the part of the carrier or would have been apparent upon reasonable 
inspection by the merchant at or prior to the time when the container was filled.”  
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of proof in demonstrating that the defective condition of the container would 
have been apparent upon reasonable inspection by the shipper when it was 
consolidated. However, the defects to the door gaskets would not have been 
obvious. The carrier was not able to succeed in his claim under the clause 
because the phrase ‘defective condition of the container’ must refer to the 
particular carriage under consideration.  
There can be defects such as ‘microholes’ that are not visible upon normal 
inspection and require an expert’s survey to discover them. Thus, they should 
not render the carrier liable if he is not able to reveal the defect by a normal and 
careful inspection of the container.63 It is also submitted that if the shipper is 
given a container by the carrier to stuff, the carrier is not required to inspect the 
container in detail for a defect, e.g. a manufacturing defect or weakness due to 
the steel structure of the container that is only discoverable by detailed technical 
analysis.64   
Inevitably, one can ask, on some occasions, is it necessary for the carrier to 
inspect the inside of the container? 
The carrier is normally not obliged to inspect the container from the inside if the 
container is sealed by the shipper.65 Thus, the inspection is obviously limited to 
                                               
63
 See De Wit, R., Multimodal Transport, (LLP, 1995), at p.418.  
64
 Stevens, F. ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 
Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p. 38. R. De Wit has stated that “whether or not the consignor 
is under a duty to inspect the containers (including inspection for ‘microholes’), this cannot be 
used as an exception against a third party holder of a negotiable document, who relies on the 
carrier for the performance of certain essential duties such as the use of fit container,” 
Multimodal Transport, (LLP, 1995), at pp.418-419. 
65
 Insurance Company of North America v Dart Container Line 629 F.Supp. 781, 1987 A.M.C. 
(42) 44 (E.D.Va. 1985) where the court stated (in footnote 3): “While opening a sealed container 
to inspect its content may not be convenient for the carrier, it does not have the right and 
opportunity to do so…” 
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its outside appearance.66 However, the position differs if for a strong reason an 
inspection is required. For instance, if the container’s exterior indicates that 
there is something wrong inside, such as a gas leak or suspicious dangerous 
cargo,67 as the latter may affect the seaworthiness of the vessel. This approach 
is nowadays believed to be possible if the situation raises some doubts for an 
internal inspection that is related to security matters, i.e. requirements of the 
ISPS Code.68 For instance, in one reported incident, lemons from Venezuela to 
the USA were stored in five refrigerated containers. The American Coastguard 
received some information that the cargo inside was not lemons. Goods may be 
‘dangerous’ within this principle for, if owing to legal obstacles regarding their 
carriage or discharge, they may involve detention of the vessel.69 The vessel 
prior to entry to the port of discharge had the container investigated by the 
Coastguard. 70  The carrier may therefore be required to avoid not only the 
uncargoworthiness of cargo that endangers the vessel71 but also to avoid the 
expense of delays and other costs incurred as a result of denial of the vessel’s 
                                               
66
 De Wit, R., Multimodal Transport, (LLP, 1995), para.9.24. 
67
 Clarke, M., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, (Informa, 2013). It was suggested 
that at common law, as regards carriage by sea, “there may be a duty to inspect the contents of 
a container, if there is (a) a trade custom to do so, e.g. in the case of certain hazardous goods, 
(b) a special agreement to do so, or (c) if the carrier is put on inquiry by circumstances (such as 
a visibly damaged container or leaking contents) suggesting that the goods have been or will be 
damaged”, para. 25a(i). 
68
 On a national level, the United States, following the events of September 2001, introduced a 
set of measures to minimise the risk of terrorist attacks, including the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI). See Michel, K., War, Terror and Carriage by Sea, (LLP, 2004), p.745. 
69
 Mitchell v Steel [1916] 2 K.B. 610; Effort Shipping Co Ltd v Linden Management SA (The 
Giannis N.K.) [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171; [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 337 (HL). Ground extraction 
meal pellets loaded on the ship were infested with insects. As a result, the vessel was refused 
entry to a number of countries and was ordered to dump its cargo of wheat at sea. It was held 
that the pellets were dangerous cargo. 
70
 The incident was reported in TT Talk Edition 57, 23.11.04. http://www.ttclub.com/file 
admin/uploads/ttclub/PublicationsResources/TT%20Talk%2057.pdf (last visited 29.9.2014). 
71
 Suspicious containers may not successfully be loaded on a US-bound vessel, and ships with 
suspicious containers of cargo are kept out of US waters. For such reasons, the obligation of 
providing a cargoworthy container may require the carrier to screen or check (by opening) the 
container if there are any doubts about its contents. See Block, S., ‘The Container Security 
Initiative: Pushing out the Front Lines in the War on Terrorism ’, cited in http://www. 
forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=686&highlight=container.  
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entry 72  or of an inspection of the container before loading it on board the 
vessel.73 
 
6.3 Imposing the Container ‘Seaworthiness’ Obligation under English Law  
One can say that the purpose of the two major obligations imposed on carriers 
(under Article III, rr.1 and 2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules)74 is to protect the 
cargo carried on board against the perils of the sea in the contemplated voyage. 
Thus it would be illogical to exclude the obligation to exercise due diligence 
from the carrier for the reason that it is not expressly mentioned in Article III, r.1 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules,75  considering that the seaworthiness of a 
container ship clearly depends on, inter alia, the condition, weight and contents 
of each container.76 Moreover, in some cases, the cargo-claimant can do better 
than establishing a prima facie case. Sometimes, it may be easier for the 
claimant to prove that the carrier was in breach of his seaworthiness obligation 
and that this breach caused the loss or damage to the goods.77 This will create 
                                               
72
 Especially if any doubts are raised by the carrier as regards the content of the container. The 
Court of Appeal, in Daewoo America v Round the World Corporation (1998) 32 F. Supp. 2d 705 
(US 2th Circuit CA), confirmed the dismissal of the claim on the grounds that “a bill of lading is 
not prima facie evidence of the contents of a sealed container because the contents are not 
discoverable from an external examination”, at pp.708-709. 
73
 The charterer will be liable for the cost of discharging and reloading the cargo if properly and 
reasonably incurred. See, e.g. Micada Cia Naviera v Texim [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 59. 
74
 The author is of the opinion that both obligations should be imposed upon the carrier. For 
example, a carrier who fails to supply a sound refrigerated container should be liable for not 
exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. On the other hand, where the carrier 
has failed to maintain adequate ventilation or to maintain the required temperature, this can be 
equated to a failure to fulfil the obligation under Article III, r.2. See in Chapter Two, sub-para. 
‘The importance to make the distinction’, the advantageous difference for the claimant when his 
claim is based on the failure to provide a seaworthy vessel, at p. 152  
75
 Note that the obligation under Article III, r.2 can be excluded by Article IV, r.2. 
76
 See Aladwani, T., ‘The Supply of Containers and “Seaworthiness - The Rotterdam Rules 
Perspective’, (2011) JMLC, 185-209, pp.188-189. The structure of the containers would directly 
affect the structural safety of the vessel. 
77
 The shipper may, in some situations, find it easy to prove the unseaworthiness of the 
container rather than proving failure to care for cargo, especially when he (the shipper) packed 
the container and noticed the defective condition and notified the carrier of it. In this case, the 
409 
 
another approach for the claimant to seek compensation for his damaged 
cargo.78 
In order to include the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel for the carriage of containers, the containers must be included 
into the facets of seaworthiness.79 However, due to the reason that containers 
have emerged following the drafting of the Hague Rules, it can be found that 
neither the carrier’s obligation in Article III, r.1, nor the Travaux Preparatoires, 
provide a clear answer as to whether a container is part of the vessel or her 
equipment.80 To impose the obligation of seaworthiness on the carrier, the court 
must be persuaded that a container should be regarded as part of the vessel or 
her equipment. One might presume that there is an argument that the container 
is analogous to some equipment.81 In some circumstances, it will be quite clear 
that there is unseaworthiness. For example, failing to exercise due diligence to 
prevent unsafe cargo from being loaded will make the ship unseaworthy.   
As mentioned above, it is unclear under English law whether there is an 
obligation on the carrier who supplies the container to exercise due diligence in 
supplying a cargoworthy container. However, it could be argued that a container 
                                                                                                                                          
shipper may seek to claim full compensation for the damage caused by the defective condition 
of the container, which could be prevented if the carrier relies on an exclusion list or clause 
when the claim is based on failure to care for cargo. This might be useful in countries where the 
exercise of due diligence is part of the overriding principle (i.e. where the carrier is not allowed 
to rely on an excluded peril if he did not exercise due diligence). The shipper might then claim 
the full amount of compensation and prevent the carrier from relying on the excluded peril or 
exclusion clause. 
78
 In some common law systems, the carrier’s liability for a defected container would emanate 
either from the general warranty of fitness in bailment or from the statutory provisions on 
cargoworthiness: see Shachar, Y., ‘The Container Bill of Lading as a Receipt’, 10 (1978) JMLC 
39-78, p.76. 
79
 See Chapter Two for the elements of seaworthiness: vessel seaworthiness, cargo-hold 
cargoworthiness, equipment seaworthiness, bunker seaworthiness, crew seaworthiness, etc. 
80
 Cf. Margetson, N. J., ‘Liability of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo damage 
caused by unseaworthiness of its containers’, (2008) JIML 159. 
81
 In some circumstances it will be quite clear that there is unseaworthiness. For example, 
loading anything that is unsafe along with a failure to exercise due diligence to prevent it being 
loaded will make the ship unseaworthy. 
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might, in a practical way, be part of the vessel. One can argue that the container 
is (a) part of the vessel superstructure, or (b) part of the vessel’s equipment. 
This is discussed below. 
 
6.3.1 (a) The Container as Part of the Vessel’s Superstructure and 
Seaworthiness 
It is a known fact that containers loaded onto certain container vessels 
contribute to the overall strength of the vessel’s superstructure as well as the 
stability of the vessel.82 Thus, without having containers on board, the stability 
of such vessels will be lessened to the extent that the vessel cannot trade on 
the High Seas.83 Furthermore, containers are used not merely to accommodate 
cargo but to secure other containers when stacking them vertically.84 It could be 
presumed, therefore, that container vessels cannot perform the duty of loading, 
stowing, securing and lashing on board without the use of containers. In other 
words, the container does not merely serve the cargo that is carried within it, but 
also the vessel,85 as it is part of the superstructure that provides the vessel with 
buoyancy. At least, to some extent, it would seem likely that liability will arise if a 
                                               
82
 See Gard A., Container Carriage, (2011), pp.14-15, 20 and 22 cited online: http://www. gard. 
no/ikbViewer/Content/134070/Containers%20March%202011.pdf. 
83
 This is a custom-built vessel for the carriage of containers. Containers are loaded one on top 
of the other and guided into position by the means of vertical guides at each corner of the 
container. The guides are part of the vessel for the purpose of joining the containers to the 
vessel’s structure. See Bugden, P. and Lamont-Black, S., Goods in Transit, (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2
nd  
ed., 2010), p.375; see Branch, A., Elements of shipping, (Routledge, 2007), pp.45 and 352.  
84
 See Aladwani, T., ‘The Supply of Containers and ‘Seaworthiness’ - The Rotterdam Rules 
Perspective’, (2011) 42 JMLC, 185, p.188. 
85
Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, p.6, presented at the Eighth Annual International 
Colloquium on Carriage of Goods - Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7 September 2012, Swansea 
University. It was stated that: “even if containers are not a part of the ship from a technical point 
of view, they have to be assimilated to a part of the ship from a legal point of view.” Citing the 
approach of the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 1 February 2002, case C06/082HR (The 
NDS Provider). 
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defective container prevents the proper stowage of other containers and 
consequently imperils the safety of the vessel. This might be the equivalent of a 
vessel that has a faulty design that leads to damage of the cargo carried on 
board.86  
In some cases, construction or design fault in any part of the vessel could be 
adequate to render her unseaworthy if it affects her ability to encounter the 
ordinary perils of the sea.87 For example, in USA v Charbonnier,88 a defective 
vent design of vent pipes caused a build-up of pressure and was held to render 
the vessel unseaworthy. 
The structural state of the containers, which are being vertically stacked on top 
of each other, may affect the ambit of exercising due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy. For example, the collapse of a stack of containers may 
endanger the safety of the vessel89 and the structural (defective) state of one or 
several containers, e.g. weak structure, may also damage the cargo inside 
it/them.90 This can happen if the statutes and rules of classification societies 
                                               
86
 See JJ Lloyd Instruments Ltd v Northern Star Insurance Co Ltd (The Miss Jay Jay) [1987] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 32. (Marine Insurance case). 
87
 See, e.g., The Miss Jay [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 32 (CA), where a design malfunction occurred 
by using material which was not suitable for the purpose and was held to render the vessel 
unseaworthy. 
88
 USA v Charbonnier [1930] AMC 187. 
89
 See the S. S. Red Jacket [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300 (American case). Uncargoworthy 
container caused a whole stack of containers to collapse and be washed overboard. 
Bordahandy, P-J., ‘Containers: a conundrum or a concept?’ (2005) 11 JIML, 342-371, p.369. 
See also Booker, M., Containers: Conditions, Law and Practice of Carriage and Use, (Derek 
Beattie Publishing, 1987), p.111; Bugden, P., ‘The Supply of Containers and Seaworthiness’ 
(2002) accessed at www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/conworth.htm; Bugden, P. and Lamont-
Black, S., Goods in Transit, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2
nd
 ed., 2010), p.375. For the opposite view that 
containers should not be considered as part of the vessel, see Margetson, N. J., ‘Liability of the 
carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness of its 
containers’, (2008) JIML, 153-161. 
90
 There is a difference between a container damaging the cargo inside it because of a defect 
and damaging the cargo in other containers. The first is cargoworthiness, the second comes 
under unseaworthiness since that is a matter of general safety of the ship and cargo. In our 
example, the weak structure of container(s) is said to affect the first, the cargo inside the 
defective container; that is cargoworthiness. Second, it affects the general safety of the ship, 
that is, unseaworthiness. 
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related to the container’s construction, design and lashings are not observed. 
As a result, the container might be defective. The purpose of using containers is 
paralleled to the purpose of the tank on an oil tanker or a cargo hold similar to 
the hold of a bulk carrier. On the basis that they are clearly a receptacle for the 
carriage of cargo, containers play a great role in the transportation of cargo. 
Without them, the execution of the contract of carriage by a container vessel 
would be impossible and their defects would likely cause damage to the cargo 
or potentially endanger the safety of the vessel or her crew.91 
Furthermore, it follows that some courts 92  have treated a carrier-supplied 
container as part of the structure of a cellular containership which cannot carry 
break bulk cargo and has extended the duty to make the vessel seaworthy to 
such containers. In The NDS Provider,93 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
held that if the container was supplied or owned by the carrier, it should be 
cargoworthy and therefore the obligation to exercise due diligence under Article 
III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules applies to the container as well.94 This 
view imposes a duty on the carrier to ensure that the containers are not only 
suitable to carry the cargo inside it, but also to provide a container which is safe 
                                               
91
 In relation to latent defects in containers see Article IV r.2(p) of the Hague Visby Rules. The 
exception is most likely to relate to cargo-handling gear and equipment which are not 
considered to be part of the vessel such as shore or floating cranes and containers. See Treitel 
and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet and Maxwell, 3
rd
 ed., 2011), para.9-228. 
92
 Shanghai Maritime Court in Zhejiang Branch of Chinese People’s Insurance Co v Guangzhou 
Ocean Shipping Corp & Shanghai Branch of China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp 
[1994] Sup. Ct. LR, Issue 1 for case notes and comments on this decision. See Guo Yu, 
‘Responsibility for unsuitable container in China’, [1995] LMCLQ 15. See also District Court of 
Rotterdam in NDAL v Premium Tobacco, SCN 1 February 2009, C06/082 HR, The NDS 
Provider. For case notes on this decision, see Margetson, N., ‘The Liability of the carrier under 
the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo damage caused by unseaworthiness of its containers’, (2008) 
Available at: http://www.pomorci.com/Skole/Pomorsko%20pravo/Liability%20of%20the%20 
carrier%20under%20the%20Hague%20(Visby)%20rules.pdf; American Supreme Court in 
Gutierrez v Waterman S.S. Corp 373 US 20682, S. Ct. 1185, 1963 AMC 1649, 10 L. Ed. 2d 297; 
(USSC 1963).  
93
 Nile Dutch Africa Line B.V. v Delta Lloyd Schadeverzekering (The “NDS Provider”) 
C06/082HR, 1 February 2008. 
94
 Nile Dutch Africa Line B.V. v Delta Lloyd Schadeverzekering (The “NDS Provider”) 
C06/082HR, 1 February 2008. 
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to be carried and does not endanger the safety of the vessel or its crew, as well 
as the suitability of the container to carry dangerous cargo.95  
Another example is the case of Houlden & Co v S. S. Red Jacket,96 where the 
carrier was responsible for an incident where a defective container loaded with 
ingots collapsed during a storm causing the loss of 50 containers. The court 
held97 that the carrier had failed to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy. In addition, the carrier had failed to provide a fit container because 
the collapsed container was old and, prior to loading, a visible inspection 
indicated some defects of the container. The carrier cannot himself add, in the 
bill of lading, a clause98 that concerns the liability of specialised carriage, such 
as a dangerous cargo container or a refrigerated container, to exclude liability 
for latent defects of a container, if hehas not exercised due diligence before and 
at the beginning of the carriage to provide a suitable seaworthy container.99 
                                               
95
 In brief, it requires containers to be designed and structured by a competent authority, similar 
to a classification society. For further information see Luddeke, C., Marine Claims - A guide for 
the handling and prevention of marine claims, (1996, 2
nd
 ed., LLP), p.158. Containers 
themselves should be structured in compliance with the Container Safety Convention (CSC). 
96
 Houlden & Co v S. S. Red Jacket [1977] AMC 1382 (SDNY, 1977), [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300. 
There is an older case, decided by the 2
nd
 Circuit in 1968, where the Court held: “The 
seaworthiness doctrine is in essence that things about a ship, whether the hull, the decks, the 
machinery, the tools furnished, the stowage, or the cargo containers, must be reasonably fit for 
the purpose for which they are to be used. As a ship that leaks is unseaworthy; so is a cargo 
container that leaks. Although cargo containers are normally furnished by shippers, a container 
is equated with the ship”, Nobel v Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 388 F. 2d 532 (USDC SDNY 
1977) cited in F. Stevens, ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between 
Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer 
and A. Tettenborn, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal 
Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p.30, f.n. 22.  
97
 Although the shipper had caused the tinned fish to be stowed in a negligent manner, this was 
not the proximate cause of the loss and damage. “The Court, therefore, cannot find that 
improper stowage of the ingots in the container CMLU 122590 was a proximate cause of the 
loss and damage to the plaintiffs” at pp.308 and 311. As per Motley, D. J. in Nile Dutch Africa 
Line B.V. v Delta Lloyd Schadeverzekering (The “NDS Provider”) C06/082HR, 1 February 2008. 
98
 P & O Containers Bill of Lading 1989, Clause 17 (2), “The Carrier shall not be liable for any 
loss of or damage to the Goods arising from any defect of any specialised Container, provided 
that the Carrier shall, before and at the beginning of the Carriage, exercise due diligence to 
maintain the Container in an efficient state.” 
99
 For more information, see Glass, D., Freight Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts. 
(Informa, 2
nd
 ed., 2012), para.4.98. 
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Finally, in the early days of the emergence of containers, it was argued that any 
container used for the carriage of goods by sea should be considered a part of 
the carrying vessel. 100  This idea came about even before the purpose-built 
containerships, when containers were carried together with traditional general 
cargo. At that time, containers were no means of stability nor did they contribute 
toward the strengthening of the vessel’s superstructure. Under the 
circumstances of carrying containers on board a purpose-built containership, 
one can indeed see that the containers provide safety to the cargo and the 
vessel. Consequently, the containers should be regarded as part of the 
vessel.101 
Depending, however, on the container’s type, 102  some containers are more 
likely to be regarded as equipment of the vessel. This would be the case for an 
integral reefer container that is connected to a power source or to the vessel’s 
cooling plants.  
 
                                               
100
 Bugden, P., ‘The supply of containers and seaworthiness’, (2002) cited in 
www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/ conworth.htm, “If, as is probably the case, the container does 
fall within the definition of a ship, hold, refrigerating or cool chambers within Article III, it may 
mean that the carrier has a liability for its condition even if it was not originally supplied by him”, 
f.n. 17; see also Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between 
Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer 
and A. Tettenborn, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal 
Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p.29 citing Noble v Lehigh Valley Railroad 
Co 388 F.2d 532 (USCA 2
nd
 Cir. 1968), “Although cargo containers are normally furnished by 
shippers, a container is equated with the ship.” 
101
 See Bannister, J. E., and members of the Insurance Institute of London, Containerisation 
and Marine Insurance, (The Institute of London, 1972), p.26. It was stated that “new 
containerships … led to longer opening of deck … result to much greater exposure to the 
hazards of the sea. The potential reduction in hull strength has been met by hatch cover and 
sound containers.”. see also Bannister, J. E., ‘Containerisation and Marine Insurance’, JMLC 
(1974) pp.463-482. It was stated that “container ship has much greater exposure to the hazards 
of the sea. The need for access to container cells along most of the length of the ship has led to 
longer hatches. The potential reduction in hull strength has been met by heavier scantlings. 
Hatch cover are much stronger to carry the container deck load” at p.465. 
102
 Such as dry freight containers, insulated containers, refrigerated containers, bulk containers, 
ventilated containers, flat rack containers and platform flats, open top containers, tank 
containers, SeaCell containers, etc. For the purpose and use of each containers, see Branch, A., 
Elements of Shipping, (Routledge, 2007), pp.361-372. 
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6.3.2 (b) Container as Equipment 
Even if the container that is supplied by the carrier is not taken to be part of the 
vessel’s superstructure, it might fall within the carrier’s obligation to exercise 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel in Article III, r.1(b), i.e. to ‘properly 
man, equip and supply the ship.’ Therefore, it can be assumed that the fitness 
of the equipment that is used for, or to assist, the carriage of the cargo, i.e. 
vessel’s derrick, cranes, ‘tween decks or subdivision bulkheads103 is included in 
the exercise of due diligence. This would lead to the conclusion that the carrier 
has a duty to exercise due diligence in respect of containers when providing a 
seaworthy vessel, and the failure to ‘properly equip’ the vessel with suitable 
containers could amount to a breach of the duty to exercise due diligence,104 
even if the equipment is not rigidly connected to the vessel’s structure and does 
not form part of the vessel.105 For example, dunnages, shifting-boards or spare 
parts are often used on board a vessel and their presence in correct order and 
condition is important,106 as they may affect the seaworthiness of the vessel. 
Due to the design of the vessel, this equipment can be dismantled for 
maintenance or to provide more space for cargo to be loaded. 107 Dunnage 
                                               
103
 See Parsons Corp v CV Scheepvaartonderneming Happy Ranger (The Happy Ranger) 
[2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 649. The vessel, despite the fact that it was new, was held to be 
unseaworthy because of faulty derrick cranes that caused damage to the cargo. 
104
 The Kamsar Voyager [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. Failure to supply the proper piston for a main 
engine rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
105
 It is not necessary to keep equipment, such as ship’s sails, masts, dunnages, etc., on-board 
the vessel at all times. The technicality of similar equipment was explained in Claude Bouillon et 
Cie v Lupton (1863) 143 E.R. 726. 
106
 See Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines (The Ciechocinek) [1975] Lloyd’s Law Rep. 170; Upper 
Egypt Produce Exporters and Others v Sanatamana (1923) 14 Ll. L. Rep. 159. Damage to the 
cargo was caused by the growth of bacterial organisms and this was due to a lack of sufficient 
ventilation for not supplying a proper dunnaging. The court held that there was bad stowage, 
namely, the lack of any insufficient bottom dunnage rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
107
 Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines (The Ciechocinek) [1976] Q.B. 893. The plaintiff chartered the 
defendants’ ship to carry potatoes from Egypt to England. The ship’s master considered that 
although the cargo capacity was 1,400 tonnes, only 1,000 tonnes of potatoes should be carried 
and should be ventilated by dunnage. The charterparty requested that the stowage and 
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material, for instance, does not form part of the vessel, and is not usually kept 
on board the vessel unless a specific cargo has to be loaded and international 
regulations require the shipowner to use them for safe stowage. However, if the 
carrier supplied defective dunnage and as a result caused damage to the cargo, 
it would render the vessel unseaworthy on the basis of defective equipment.108 
A similar example can be found in The Standale,109 where the owner was held 
liable and the vessel was found unseaworthy. In this case, the vessel was not 
adequately fitted for the carriage of cargo because dunnage or shifting-boards 
were not used.110 
                                                                                                                                          
dunnage instructions of the charterer were to be carefully followed and be executed under the 
supervision of the master who was to remain responsible for proper stowage and dunnage. The 
charterer’s agent in Egypt, notwithstanding the master’s advice, insisted that the ship carry 
1,400 tonnes of potatoes and expressly stated that the potatoes were so packed as to make 
dunnage unnecessary. The charterer had, by his agent, accepted responsibility for the stowage 
and had thereby relieved the master of the responsibility under the charterparty. 
108
 Compare, Aladwani, T., ‘The supply of container and ‘seaworthiness’ - The Rotterdam Rules 
perspective’, (2011) 42 JMLC 185, pp.191-192, with Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective 
Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of 
Shippers’, p.6, presented at the Eighth Annual International Colloquium on Carriage of Goods - 
Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7 September 2012, Swansea University. It goes without saying 
that it is logical that the dunnages are not considered as part of the vessel. Stevens’ analogy is 
not logical. Vessel’s equipment is never to be regarded as part of the vessel, but it is equipment 
of the vessel that requires the exercise of due diligence.  
109
 The Standale (1938) 61 LI. L. Rep. 223, p.230. Out of three thousand two hundred tonnes of 
grain, a portion was stowed in five thousand bags without separation. Consequently, the cargo 
shifted, the vessel developed a list and became unmanageable. As a result, the vessel sank. 
110
 Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, 
Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer and A. Tettenborn, 
Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal Transport in the 21
st
 
Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p.30, f.n 23, citing Belgium: Comm. C. Antwerp, 8 March 1999, 
Transportrechtspaak BVZ no 295a. See also Comm. C. Antwerp, 10 January 1973, R.H.A. 1973, 
60 (MS Mormacrigel). The court seems to consider the container as a piece of equipment that 
the carrier issues, but rejects the claim against the carrier on the ground that the due diligence 
had been exercised. Stevens, at p.34, argues in favour of the application of Article III, r.2 to the 
supply of defective containers. Note that the care of cargo under Article III, r.2 is limited only 
from the time of loading to the time of discharge. Thus, this limitation would miss an essential 
part of preparing the container prior to its loading into the ship. It can be suggested that 
container cargoworthiness (Article III, r.1) is an essential obligation to be imposed on the 
(supplier) carrier along with the care of cargo under Article III, r.2. See also Stevens, F., ‘Liability 
for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and 
Liabilities of Shippers’, p.1, presented at the Eighth Annual International Colloquium on Carriage 
of Goods - Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7 September 2012, Swansea University; see also 
Aladwani, T. ‘The Supply of Containers and ‘Seaworthiness’ - The Rotterdam Rules 
Perspective’, (2011) 42 JMLC 185, pp.188-190.  
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Part II: Supply of Containers and ‘Seaworthiness’ under 
the Rotterdam Rules 
 
Turning to the Rotterdam Rules, important points need to be addressed. 
Providing a seaworthy container is now one facet of the seaworthiness 
obligation and the obligation is ongoing until the vessel arrives at the discharge 
port. Arguments have been advanced regarding the interpretation and/or 
application of Articles 14(c) and 17(5)(a) of the Rules. However, it is unknown 
how courts will determine liability for an unfit container. This part of the Chapter 
deals with this issue and will introduce Article 14(c).  
 
6.4 The Potential Liability of the Supplying Carrier for Cargo Damage 
Caused by a Faulty Container 
The position insofar as the supply of containers is concerned under English law 
is unclear. Namely, whether a container is part of the vessel or not, 111  or 
whether the carrier will be liable for damage caused by not exercising due 
diligence to supply a seaworthy container.112 In determining the question of 
liability under the Rotterdam Rules, the starting point for the courts must be to 
interpret the Rotterdam Rules on their own basis without reference to the 
previous approach. However, it might not be possible for the courts to come to a 
clear view on the proper interpretation of the Rotterdam Rules and the courts 
may find it necessary to refer to previous international case law. It is assumed 
that the court will refer to previous case law on the interpretation of the 
                                               
111
 See f.n. 1 of this Chapter, at p. 386. 
112
 The opposite to the due care obligation under Article III, r.2. 
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Hague/Hague-Visby Rules when interpreting the Rotterdam Rules in the 
absence of clear wording. Thus, a special reference to case law of the previous 
regime might be made when interpreting the new regime e.g. the Rotterdam 
Rules. 113  One can assume that courts will adopt one of two potential 
approaches. The first, and arguably the most likely, is the usual approach of 
drawing analogies from past case law on vessels’ seaworthiness and 
subsequent application of those principles to questions on container 
cargoworthiness. The second approach is one where liability for the defective 
containers would be regarded differently depending on how the containers are 
considered vis-à-vis their status as part of the vessel along with decisions under 
the previous law, e.g. the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, in each particular 
jurisdiction. One can assume that an English court would resort to consulting 
decisions of courts in other jurisdictions where the issue of container 
cargoworthiness has already been considered and decided under their national 
system. This will be discussed next. 
 
6.4.1 Interpreting Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules by Special 
Reference to Earlier Case Law - The English Court 
When deciding on liability for a defective container, especially in relation to 
untested Rules, the court’s starting point, as mentioned above, will be to 
interpret provisions of the Rotterdam Rules which are related to the obligation 
and liability for a defective container. For instance, the court will look at Article 
                                               
113
 It was discussed in Chapter One that, in the absence of clear wording, special reference to 
case law of the Harter Act was made when interpreting the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Further, 
it was stated that the overriding nature of the due diligence obligation to make the vessel 
seaworthy derived from the development of pre-convention case law in this area in the UK. See 
para.1.6.1.1, at p. 71. 
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14(c),114 which provides that “The carrier is bound before, at the beginning of, 
and during the voyage by sea to exercise due diligence to: 
(c) Make and keep the holds and all other parts of the ship in which the goods 
are carried, and any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the 
goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.”  
The obligation of exercising due diligence to provide and maintain a seaworthy 
container extends only to those containers that are supplied by or on behalf of 
the carrier. If the container115 is supplied by somebody else other than the 
carrier, then the container will be regarded as ‘goods’116 rather than a container. 
This means that the obligation relating to the seaworthiness/cargoworthiness of 
the container is not imposed on the carrier, as he is not the supplier of the 
container.117  
It was mentioned in Chapter Two118 that the language used in Article 14 of the 
Rotterdam Rules is the same familiar language used in Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Article III, r.1(c)119 covers facets of seaworthiness 
related to the ship, crew, cargo holds, equipment and bunkers but it does not 
cover the carriage of containers. The text of Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam 
                                               
114
 It is likely that the court in their research would also interpret other provisions, which relate to 
liability for a defective container. For instance, the courts are likely to refer to Articles 17(5)(a)(iii) 
and 80(4) of the Rotterdam Rules. 
115
 Article 1(26) provides that “container” means any type of container, transportable tank or flat, 
swapbody, or any similar unit load used to consolidate goods, and any equipment ancillary to 
such unit load. 
116
 Article 1(24) provides that “Goods” means the wares, merchandise, and articles of every kind 
whatsoever that a carrier undertakes to carry under a contract of carriage and includes the 
packing and any equipment a container not supplied by or on behalf of the carrier. 
117
 Thus, the discussion in this Part assumes that the container was supplied by the carrier. 
118
 See para. 2.11, at p.123. 
119
 Article III, r.1(c) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules provides that: “The carrier shall be bound 
before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to: (c) Make the holds, 
refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit 
and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” 
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Rules covers equally, in addition to seaworthiness, the containers in which the 
goods are carried.120 
Following a proposal by delegates from the Netherlands, the words ‘including 
containers’ in the previous draft of the Rotterdam Rules were replaced by ‘and 
any containers’ in Article 14(c) in order to avoid the container being regarded as 
an intrinsic part of the ship.121 Some courts have reached that result under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules by regarding the container as a part of the ship.122 
The Travaux Preparatoires are an important tool to assist in the interpretation of 
the Rules. However, a thorough study of the Travaux Preparatoires does not 
reveal whether an unfit container, e.g. a holed container, would be rendered 
uncargoworthy for merely damaging the cargo stuffed inside it even though the 
safety of the ship was not endangered by the defective condition of the 
container. 
6.4.1.1 Unseaworthiness without Endangering the Safety of the Vessel  
A possible approach that may be adopted by the English courts in respect of the 
seaworthiness obligation under Article 14 and its application to containers is to 
render the defective container that has caused damage to cargo stuffed inside it 
uncargoworthy or unseaworthy under Article 17(5), even if the defective 
condition does not endanger the safety of the ship. This approach may be 
adopted without considering the container as part of the cargo hold (in which 
                                               
120
 Delebeque, P., ‘Obligations of the Carrier’, cited as Chapter 4 in von Ziegler, A. et al (eds.), 
The Rotterdam Rules 2008: Commentary to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Wolters 
Kluwer, 2010), at p.89; Sturley, M. et al. (eds.), The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on 
Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters 
Limited, 2010), at para.5.020. 
121
 UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN.9/658/Add.9, at para.10. 
122
 Sturley, M. et al. (eds.), The Rotterdam Rules: The UN Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea, (Thomson Reuters Limited, 2010), at 
f.n. 60, para. 5.020. 
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case the unfitness of the container would render the vessel unseaworthy). This 
is analogous to earlier case law where the unfitness of the cargo holds rendered 
the vessel herself unseaworthy.123 In The Dimitrios N. Rallias,124 the cargo was 
damaged by water ingress through a fracture on an air pipe gooseneck on deck 
leading to the cargo hold. The court held that the vessel was unseaworthy and 
that the carrier was liable for his failure to test the pipe prior to the 
commencement of the voyage. If an English court adopted the same approach 
to a container, where the container’s unfitness, e.g. a blown gasket or a crack, 
caused damage or loss to the cargo stowed inside it, the container would be 
deemed uncargoworthy or unseaworthy and as a result, the carrier, if he also 
failed to discharge the due diligence obligation, would be held liable for damage 
caused by such unseaworthiness of the container.  
 
6.4.1.2  No Unseaworthiness or Risk to the Vessel’s Safety 
At the other end of the spectrum is the potential that the English courts will not 
hold the vessel to be uncargoworthy or unseaworthy if the container’s unfitness 
causes damage only to the cargo but does not endanger the safety of the 
vessel.125 In other words, the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel is only 
breached if there is something endangering the safety of the vessel. Although 
this approach appears to go against case law relevant to cargoworthiness only, 
                                               
123
 The structure or condition of the hold can make a ship unseaworthy. See para. 1.4.5, at p.63. 
124
 The Dimitrios N. Rallias (1922) 13 Ll. L. Rep 363; see also Sewaram v Ellerman Lines Ltd 
(1930) 37 Ll. L. Rep. 97, where a vessel was rendered unseaworthy for a fractured pipe and the 
carrier failed to defend the case on the grounds of a latent defect; see also the American case 
The Otho [1944] A.M.C 43, where a crack on the plating rendered the vessel unseaworthy). 
125
 The Arianna [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 376, per Webster J, p.389. It has been said that there is 
“an inevitable presumption of fact’ that a vessel is unseaworthy only if there is something about 
it which endangers the safety of the vessel or its cargo”; Elder, Dempster & Co v Paterson, 
Zochonis & Co [1924] A.C. 522, p.562. 
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there is potential for the carrier to escape liability if the container is seen as a 
means of stowing and/or securing cargo. For instance, if the twist-locks 
connecting and securing a container stack failed, causing the container stack to 
collapse or fall over and crash onto other containers in such a way as to 
damage the cargo without however endangering the safety of the vessel, the 
carrier will not be held liable for uncargoworthiness of the container.126 The 
court in such a case might be justified to draw analogies from stowage127 cases 
rather than from cases relating to the unfitness of the cargo holds. Such was the 
ruling in Elder, Dempster & Co v Paterson Zochonis & Co,128 where a general 
cargo vessel was held by the House of Lords to be seaworthy notwithstanding 
the lack or non-use of ’tween decks that were necessary to prevent the lower 
cargo from crushing,129 even though the cargo was found to be damaged on 
arrival.130  
Another example is where a reefer container is supplied by the carrier, thus 
rendering the carrier bound, pursuant to Article 14(c), to ensure that the reefer 
                                               
126
 The difference would be relevant if the liability of the carrier depended on the distinction, e.g. 
if he could exclude liability for bad stowage that cause cargo damage but not unseaworthiness 
as at common law. 
127
 Stowage as referred to in this Part must be distinguished from the stowage (stuffing) of the 
goods within the container itself. This Part is considering the stowage of the container on-board 
the vessel. 
128
 Elder, Dempster & Co v Paterson, Zochonis & Co [1924] A.C. 522, p.561. Lord Sumner 
stated: “Bad stowage, which endangers the safety of the ship, may amount to unseaworthiness, 
of course, but bad stowage, which affects nothing but the cargo damaged by it, is bad stowage 
and nothing more, and still leaves the ship seaworthy for the adventure, even though the 
adventure be the carrying of that cargo”; see also The Arianna [1987] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 376, per 
Webster J. There is one approach where the vessel can be rendered unseaworthy when “the 
cargo [inside a container] might cause significant damage to its cargo or which renders it legally 
or practically impossible for the vessel to go to sea or to load or unload its cargo…”, p.389. 
129
 One could draw an analogy between a situation where there were no tween decks at all and 
a situation where tween decks were used but were unfit, causing damage to the cargo without 
endangering the safety of the vessel. 
130
 The distinction was necessary in that case because of a stowage exception, which is why the 
court needed to make the point. 
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unit of the container is in good working order and capable of maintaining the 
required temperatures throughout the period of carriage.131 
 
It is arguable that liability for a container should not be tested against the safety 
of the vessel. Otherwise the position, as outlined above, would be contrary to 
English law and, arguably, against the underlying policy of the drafters of the 
Rotterdam Rules, as the policy is not confined to safety aspects alone. One 
may suggest that in order to avoid this, it is preferable to follow an approach 
similar to that adopted by most courts in other jurisdictions, where the container 
is supplied by the carrier and is held to be part of the vessel’s hold.132  
  
However, this suggestion may cause another problem. The approach that 
considers the container as part of the vessel or her equipment133 would create a 
rather strange result if the contract of carriage was made on the basis of a 
volume contract.134 This is because, pursuant to Article 80(1), a volume contract 
provides that the carrier is allowed to derogate from his obligations and liabilities 
imposed under the Rotterdam Rules, e.g. the obligation of exercising due 
                                               
131
 See Springall, R., ‘The transport of goods in refrigerated containers: an Australian 
perspective’ [1987] LMLCQ, 216, p.220. In order to reject liability for a latent defect (Article IV, 
r.2(p) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules opposed to Article 17(3)(g)) of the Rotterdam Rules, the 
sea carrier would have to explain how the defect of the reefer container which caused the 
damage occurred, and demonstrate how much defect was latent and not discoverable when 
exercising due diligence. In other words, the defect would be required to be of a type which 
could not be discoverable by a person of competent skill using ordinary care. 
132
 Suggested in the Report of UNCITRAL Working Group III on the work of its twelfth session 
(document A/CN.9/544, para.152. 
133
 It was shown in the introduction chapter that the English courts are often reluctant to 
consider the case law of other jurisdictions when applying international regimes. The Rotterdam 
Rules may not be an exception. See f.n. 88, at p.72. 
134
 Baatz, Y. et al., The Rotterdam Rules - A Practical Annotation, (2009, Informa). It was stated 
that pursuant to Article 1(2) of the Rotterdam Rules, ”There are three elements which make a 
contract of carriage into a volume contract: (a) specification of the quantity or range of cargo to 
be carried; (b) more than one shipment throughout; (c) a specified period of time.”, para. 80.1, at 
p.247. 
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diligence. However, pursuant to Article 80(4), the carrier is only allowed to 
derogate from his duty in providing a cargoworthy vessel or container but not in 
making the ship and her crew seaworthy. Thus, the approach that considers the 
container as part of the vessel or her equipment would be at odds with Article 
80(4) of the Rotterdam Rules.  
Further, Article 79(1) regards any clause limiting or opting out of any of the 
carrier’s obligations, i.e. seaworthiness, null and void. 135  Thus, insofar as 
containers may be considered as a mobile hold of the ship, the clause that 
exempts the cargoworthiness of the container can be considered null and void. 
The result would be surprising, as Article 79 would clash with the intentions 
behind Article 80; it would destroy the purpose of the volume contract to ensure 
free negotiating powers between the parties.136  
Thus, the correct interpretation of the Rotterdam Rules is that137 the container 
should not be considered as part of the vessel or her equipment but to make the 
liability of the carrier subject to the applicable contract of maritime carriage 
and/or to the contract for the supply of containers agreed between the 
                                               
135
 Article 79(1) reads that: “Unless otherwise provided in this Convention, any term in a contract 
of carriage is void to the extent that it: (a) Directly or indirectly excludes or limits the obligations 
of the carrier or a maritime performing party under this Convention; (b) Directly or indirectly 
excludes or limits the liability of the carrier or a maritime performing party for breach of an 
obligation under this Convention; or (c) Assigns a benefit of insurance of the goods in favour of 
the carrier or a person referred to in Article 18.”    
136
 The same effect is applicable under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. See Wijffels R., ‘Legal 
aspects of carriage in containers’, (1967) Transportrecht, 331-349, p.339. This means that even 
if there is an applicable exclusion of container cargoworthiness, the exclusion would be unlawful 
if the damage occurs within the ambit of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. If the damage occurs 
outside the ambit of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, i.e. before or after the sea carriage, the 
exclusion may still be valid. See Bugden P., ‘What if a container is unsuitable for the intended 
cargo?’ Available at: http://www.forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?article_id=138&highlight= 
container. 
137
 This point is not limited to volume contracts. It reinforces the argument that the correct 
interpretation of the Rotterdam Rules is that a container should not be regarded as part of the 
ship. See para. 6.4.1 the interpretation made on Article 14(c). 
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parties.138 This would offer the advantage of giving a clear solution and a clear 
legal framework to the operation of containers in respect of, for example, issues 
such as the extension of the carrier’s liability (if the parties to the contract 
agreed) in order to cover door-to-door transportation in a volume contract rather 
than liability for sea carriage only. Furthermore, one cannot argue that the 
container should be regarded as a cargo hold on the basis that the legal 
obligation of the carrier relating to the cargoworthiness of the container supplied 
by him is placed on the same footing as a cargo hold (Article 14(c)). Such 
context does not by any means provide similarities in relation to the cargo hold’s 
practical use, i.e., being temporary, but it merely imposes, on the carrier, an 
obligation to exercise due diligence equal in a legal aspect to the cargo holds. 
 
6.4.2 The Supplying Carrier’s Responsibility for Damage to Containerised 
Cargo Caused by Defective or Unsuitable Containers; Judgments from 
Other Jurisdictions on Container Unseaworthiness 
The requirement relating to container seaworthiness is new and there is no 
guidance from previous case law for courts and lawyers on this point. It follows 
that there is no knowledge as to what is to be reasonably expected from the 
carrier.139 It will take time for the courts to test this new statutory requirement.140 
                                               
138
 It can be argued that this is the approach of the common law countries. Bordahandy stated 
that: ”[a]t common law countries, in cases of difficulty it is the contractual provision, namely the 
clauses of the bill of lading, that will have primacy and which will be subject to a scrupulous 
analysis by the court in order to resolve a dispute between parties.” French cases cited in 
Bordahandy, P-J., ‘The liability attached to the supply of containers by a maritime carrier’, (2007) 
21 A&NZ Mar LJ, 178-182, p.180. 
139
 For cases concerning unseaworthy containers, the English courts might, to a certain extent, 
look at cases decided by foreign courts; see e.g. Zim Israel Navigation Ltd v The Israeli Phoenix 
Assurance Company Ltd (The Zim Marseilles), [1999] ETL 535, pp.547-548 (Supr. C. of Israel). 
The district court held that the standard of examination was not sufficient for the shipowner to 
discharge his obligation. Each individual container had not been inspected, even though it was 
known that the container in question suffered from manufacturing defects and had undergone 
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Additionally, even if the English courts sought to follow the route of applying 
cases decided in other jurisdictions, which would allow for the harmonised 
interpretation of international conventions, it would not be a straightforward 
exercise. The question of whether the carrier should be liable under the 
Rotterdam Rules for cargo damage caused by the unsuitability of his container 
may have been answered differently under various legal systems. 141  Some 
jurisdictions have applied to the supply of suitable containers the same due 
diligence test under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, Article III, r.1(a) or (c), to 
the equipment of the vessel, a part of the vessel and/or her cargo hold. In other 
words, the obligation of due diligence is applied differently in different countries. 
Contrasting examples are given below. 
6.4.2.1 The American Approach to Unfit Containers: Endangering the 
Safety of the Vessel 
Although not often, in some early cases, the principle of container 
cargoworthiness was raised in the American Supreme Court.142 Subsequently, 
                                                                                                                                          
repairs and that the container, just prior to its loading, was subjected to strengthening repairs. 
The court found that such repairs and the standard of inspection of defects was not adequate. It 
should be noted that Israel’s law (like US, French and Dutch law) imposes on the carrier under 
the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, i.e. the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules obligation to provide a cargoworthy container. 
140
 This is usually the case with every unknown or new piece of legislation (e.g. the changes 
from common law duty to merely a duty to exercise due diligence). Each new provision needs to 
be tested by the courts and they will need time to familiarise themselves with new concepts or 
principles and delineate a convention’s boundaries and applicability. 
141
 Bordahandy, P-J., ‘The liability attached to the supply of containers by a maritime carrier: a 
comparative  analysis of the French decision M/V Matisse Cour d’Appel D’Aix-en Provence 
2eme Chambre-15 Fevrier 2007’, (2007) 21 A&NZ Mar LJ, 178, p.181. The assumption is that 
although the discussion here is of an older case law, the situation may arise if the Rotterdam 
Rules are adopted by several countries; some may apply the provisions on liability for defective 
containers differently depending on the way the defective container has been considered under 
the previous regime of a given jurisdiction. This, however, is not a justifiable approach as the 
Rotterdam Rules represent a new direction. Therefore, it would not be necessary or appropriate 
to refer to pre-existing case law, as this will defeat the potential harmonisation of the provisions 
on liability under the Rotterdam Rules. 
142
 Gutierrez v Waterman S.S. Corp 373 US 20683, S. Ct. 1185, 1963 AMC 1649, 10 L. Ed. 2d 
297; (USSC 1963). “The high court then reiterated that seaworthiness was not limited to fitness 
for travel, but extended to fitness for loading and unloading. Furthermore, the high court ruled 
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the court in The S. S. Red Jacket143 held that the sea carrier supplier of a 
defective container was liable for the entire cargo damage attributed to the 
uncargoworthy container.144 The unfitness of the container in The S. S. Red 
Jacket had endangered the vessel’s safety.145 If the uncargoworthiness of the 
container had not endangered the safety of the vessel, the carrier would not 
have been held liable for the damage caused by the container given that the 
container would not be considered as part of the vessel’s equipment.146 In this 
case, the unfit condition of the container resulted in the failure of the container 
stacks, which consequently endangered the safety of the vessel and was not 
merely damaging to the cargo. As far as the author is aware, there is no 
American case that renders the carrier liable for an unfit container where the 
container did not endanger the safety of the vessel. 
6.4.2.2 The Chinese Approach to Unfit Containers: The Vessel’s Safety is 
Irrelevant 
In contrast to the American approach, a Chinese court in Chinese People’s 
Insurance Co. v Guangzhou Ocean147 held that the container was unseaworthy 
                                                                                                                                          
that when shipowners accept cargo in faulty containers or allow containers to become faulty, 
they owe a duty to those who are injured.” The case and note are cited in Bordahandy P-J, 
‘Containers: a conundrum or a concept?’ (2005) II JIML 342, p.369 and f.n. 156. 
143
 Houlden & Co v S. S. Red Jacket and American Export Lines Ltd and Others (The S. S. Red 
Jacket) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300 (US Southern Dist. Ct. N.Y.). 
144
 It was held that: “The defendants had not exercised due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy as required by the United States COGSA, for they should not have permitted the 
container, which was part of her equipment, to be loaded on board.” Houlden & Co v S. S. Red 
Jacket and American Export Lines Ltd and Others (The S. S. Red Jacket) 1977 AMC 1382 
(USDC SDNY 1977), [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300. 
145
 Houlden & Co v S. S. Red Jacket and American Export Lines Ltd and Others (The S. S. Red 
Jacket) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300 (US Southern Dist. Ct. N.Y.). A defective container was 
supplied to the shipper who packed it prior to it being loaded onto the vessel. During the voyage, 
it broke loose during heavy weather and, as a consequence, a total of 43 containers were swept 
overboard. 
146
 Houlden & Co v S. S. Red Jacket and American Export Lines Ltd and Others (The S. S. Red 
Jacket) [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300 (US Southern Dist. Ct. N.Y.), p.311. 
147
 Zhejiang Branch of Chinese People’s Insurance Co v Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Corp & 
Shanghai Branch of China National Foreign Trade Transportation Corp [1994] Sup. Ct. L.R. 
Issue 1. See the English translation of the full case at www.lawinfochina.com. 
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without the stipulation that the unfitness of the container should endanger the 
safety of the vessel. In other words, it is immaterial for Chinese courts whether 
or not the unfitness of the container endangered the safety of the vessel. The 
container in this case was regarded as part of the vessel despite the fact that 
the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China says nothing about 
containers provided by the carrier.148  
In this case, three containers of black tea, which were supplied by the carrier 
and stuffed by the forwarder, were carried to Hamburg from Shanghai. One of 
the containers was not properly cleaned before stuffing the cargo and, as a 
result, the cargo inside the container was damaged due to the residual smell 
from previously carried cargo. The insurer raised a claim against the carrier and 
the forwarder. In the first instance, both the carrier and the forwarder were liable 
for providing an uncargoworthy container. 149  On appeal, both defendants’ 
appeals were dismissed. The carrier and the forwarder were held liable for 60 
per cent and 40 per cent of the total loss respectively.  
There are some points in the case which indicate that such an approach may 
show inconsistencies with English law and would thus be difficult for an English 
court to follow. First, the Chinese export regulations150 impose duties beyond 
those of statutory inspection, namely to inspect the container as part of the due 
diligence obligation and thus to inspect the containers and cargo before stuffing 
                                               
148
 Article 42 of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China regards containers 
supplied by the cargo-interests as ‘Goods’. 
149
 Article 47 of the Chinese Maritime Code provides that: “the carrier shall, before and at the 
beginning of the voyage, exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy, properly man, 
equip and supply the ship and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other 
parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation.” This provision is presumably based on Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. 
150
 The State Administration for the Inspection of Import and Export Commodities (SAIEC). 
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takes place.151 Both the carrier and forwarder had failed to inspect the container 
before stuffing. Secondly, insofar as the duty of inspecting containers is 
concerned (care must be exercised by the forwarder and the carrier should 
exercise due diligence), it is considered by the court to be partially a duty of the 
forwarder. However, this is not possible under English law where the obligation 
of due diligence is under no circumstances delegable. Thirdly, one point worth 
mentioning is that a clause in the bill of lading of this particular case,152 requiring 
cargo-interests to inspect other parts of the vessel (the container in this case is 
considered part of the vessel), attempted to shift the obligation of due diligence 
to provide a cargoworthy container to the cargo-interests.153  Such a clause 
would be null and void and so it cannot be relied upon to ascertain the liability of 
the cargo-interests under English law.154 Accordingly, apportionment of liability 
is allowed under Chinese law but not under English law.  
6.4.2.3 Another Approach from France   
There are further inconsistencies and complexities in this area of law that have 
been added by judgments in certain French cases. In one case, the carrier was 
                                               
151
 Article 5 of the Provisions for Inspection of Containers formulated by SAIEC provides that 
beside statutory inspections, “the parties involved in foreign trade may, if necessary, apply to 
the local commodity inspection authorities for inspection of container stuffing and unstuffing”. It 
is believed that such an obligation may be enough to render the carrier liable for unfit containers. 
However, such liability may be incurred from violating the local port regulations. See for instance, 
Cheikh Boutros Selim El-Khoury and Others v Ceylon Shipping Lines Ltd (The Madeleine) 
[1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 224, where the court held that the carrier (shipowner) failed to deliver a 
vessel in a seaworthy condition by the delivery date. Thus, the charterer had the right to cancel 
the charter. By analogy, the carrier may be liable for not supplying a cargoworthy container that 
did not comply with port regulations. 
152
 A clause stated: “If a container has not been filled, packed, stuffed or loaded by the carrier, 
the carrier should not be liable for loss of or damage to the contents and the merchant shall 
indemnify the carrier if such injury, loss, damage liability or expense has been caused by the 
unsuitability or defective condition of the container which would have been apparent upon 
reasonable inspection by the merchant at or prior to the time the container was filled, packed, 
stuffed or loaded.” 
153
 Riverstone Meat Co. Pty. Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co. Ltd (The Muncaster Castle) [1961] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 57.  
154
 Article III, r.8 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
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held liable on the basis of a rental agreement for any containers supplied by the 
carrier rather than as a carrier per se, as the principles of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules are statutorily applicable under French maritime transport law.155 
 
6.5 Conclusion  
By way of a postscript, it might be desirable to deem that all containers be 
hypothesised legally as part of the equipment or structure within the vessel’s 
hull. On that basis, there would no longer be any question regarding the 
application of the common law which in turn would give the advantage of an 
apparent legal solution on issues such as exercising due diligence to supply a 
seaworthy/cargoworthy container by the carrier rather than the shipper or 
consignor.156 Otherwise, there is a need for a new regime to solve all of the 
above problems. 
As mentioned above, the various jurisdictions and legal systems apply different 
standards of container cargoworthiness depending upon which legal principle 
the court follows, i.e. whether the container is considered as part of the vessel’s 
hull or equipment, or where the obligation does not exist at all; that is, under the 
                                               
155
 CA, Aix-en-Provence, 15 February 2007, D.M.F. 207, p.346 (MS Matisse). The carrier had 
supplied and loaded several reefer containers. On their arrival, they had been discharged by the 
stevedoring company. Five days after discharge from the vessel, the temperature readings 
showed that the temperature inside the containers had started to rise. Consequently, the cargo 
of meat inside the container suffered damage. The court regarded the supply of the container by 
the carrier as a rental agreement which obliged the carrier to supply a fit container and thus the 
carrier had breached his obligation of supplying a fit container. The claim was pursued by the 
consignee, who is not a party to the rental agreement between the shipper and the carrier. 
However, the court held the carrier liable under the rental contract with the shipper to be a tort 
vis-à-vis the consignee, and awarded the latter’s claim against the carrier. Comments and notes 
on this case are cited in Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course 
between Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. 
Soyer and A. Tettenborn, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal 
Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at pp. 28-29, where Stevens references 
Bordahandy, P-J., ‘The liability attached to the supply of containers by a maritime carrier’, (2007) 
21 A&NZ Mar LJ, pp.178-182, at f.n.15.  
156
 Or other limitation problems. 
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English legal system or when the law of renting a container applies. 157 
Therefore, when applying the Rotterdam Rules, the courts in different 
jurisdictions might rely on the description of the carrier’s duties contained in the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules as inherited from their case law. If they do so, the 
results would be unpredictable. 158  To avoid this problem, courts must 
endeavour to interpret Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules without reference to 
previous approaches. It can be assumed here that it might not be possible for 
the courts to come to a clear view as to the proper interpretation of the 
Rotterdam Rules so that the courts might refer to previous case law. The text of 
the Rotterdam Rules indicates all facets of seaworthiness, which concern all 
areas of the vessel. However, the text does not seem to consider the container 
as an intrinsic part of the ship. This is justifiable on the basis of the usage of the 
word ‘and’, which replaced the phrase ‘including the container’ in the previous 
draft of the Rules.159 
Although the obligation of exercising due diligence to provide a cargoworthy 
container under the Rotterdam Rules is not always required, it is required when 
the carrier is the supplier of the container. In other words, the carrier is not liable 
for an unfit container that is not supplied by him. Thus, courts, such as the 
Chinese courts, should not use their pre-existing case law which treats the 
                                               
157
 Bordahandy, P-J, ‘Containers: a conundrum or a concept?’, (2005) II JIML, p.370 
158
 See Wong, J., ‘Container Transportation and Anomalies in the Law’, [1995] 23 Australian 
Business Law Review, 340, pp.342-343. 
159
 On a proposal by the Netherlands, the words ‘including any container supplied by the carrier’ 
were changed to ‘and any containers supplied by the carrier’. The previous version of the 
seaworthiness obligation is included in Article 15, until the final redrafting when that article 
became Article 14. ‘Article 15. Specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea.’ The current 
text of subparagraph (c) may easily be read as if “any containers supplied by the carrier in or 
upon which the goods are carried” are an intrinsic part of the ship. This is clearly not the 
intention. Therefore, a better text would be: 
“(c) make and keep the holds, and all other parts of the ship in which the goods are carried and 
including any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon which the goods are carried, fit and 
safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.” See UNCITRAL Doc. A/CN.9/658/Add.9, at 
para.10. See the last section at the end of para. 6.4.1. 
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container as an intrinsic part of the vessel, as Article 14(c) is inconsistent with 
the idea that the container is part of the ship. If the container is not supplied by 
the carrier, it would be considered as a piece of cargo and thus not within the 
scope of Article 14(c), rather, Article 13. Consequently, the standard of care 
imposed by Article 13 (Article III, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) is 
different from the obligation of due diligence required by Article 14 (Article III, r.1 
of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules). Therefore, applying the law of different 
jurisdictions would create different standards of container due diligence and 
would not exactly serve the goals of unification and predictability. As a result, as 
far as container cargoworthiness is concerned, the provisions on the obligation 
in Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules should not be taken as useful 
guidelines for courts when establishing whether or not the carrier has exercised 
due diligence to provide a cargoworthy vessel.160 This discussion leads to the 
view that the Rotterdam Rules do not regard the container as part of the vessel. 
In reference to the intention of the drafters of the Rotterdam Rules, the 
interpretation of Article 14(c) is sufficiently clear, because of how Article 14(c) 
and Article 80(4) should be regarded, and one should not regard the container 
as an intrinsic part of the ship. Thus, reference to previous case law or any 
differences in approach is unjustifiable.  
Some jurisdictions take the approach that the supply of the container imposes a 
duty on the supplier as part of the rental agreement. Applying such case law 
would not be justified under the Rotterdam Rules. The Rotterdam Rules have 
                                               
160
 Some authors have concluded that the majority view of the courts were probably not entirely 
correct. See Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting A Course between 
Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, cited in Eighth Annual 
International Colloquium on Carriage of Goods - Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7 September 
2012, Swansea University. 
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clarified161 the position and previous approaches are now irrelevant to the basic 
underlying liability in Article 14. The obligation of cargoworthiness imposed on 
the carrier should not be construed differently by reference to previous case law. 
However, the position may be less clear in respect of volume contracts when 
considering the container as part of the ship.  
One may take the approach that applying an ongoing obligation of container 
cargoworthiness on the carrier until the end of the voyage would be 
unreasonable if the container’s defect cannot be repaired. This notion should 
not be applied because the obligation is not absolute. It is merely to exercise 
due diligence to provide a cargoworthy container. So, if the refrigeration unit 
breaks down in circumstances where repairs cannot be carried out on board or 
at a port of refuge, the master of the vessel, as a last resort,162 is bound to act in 
the best interests of the cargo owner; for example, by selling the goods to save 
their value or some part thereof.163 
It is not clear whether the supply of containers by the shipper, in those countries 
which extend the seaworthiness obligation to the container, allows the 
obligation to shift to the carrier. Despite the fact that the shipper is often in a 
position to verify the condition of the container,164 some legal systems suggest 
                                               
161
 Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules makes it clear that there is an independent rule 
concerning container fitness so that any previous approach depending upon whether there was 
an obligation of container cargoworthiness is irrelevant to any question of liability under Article 
14. 
162
 In the same sense, see Lekas and Drivas v Basil Goulandris (1962) AMC 2366 (American 
case), at p.2373. It was held that the situation might arise “when the master of the ship has not 
merely the authority but, under s 3(2) of COGSA, the duty to sell cargo that is at risk of further 
deterioration, communicating with the owner if that is feasible, but still having both the authority 
and duty to if it is not”; the principle is believed to be similar for the obligation of container 
cargoworthiness.  
163
 See Colinvaux, Carver’s Carriage by Sea, (Stevens & Sons, 13
th
 ed., 1982), Vol. 2, 
para.1229-1235.  
164
 See Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between 
Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’, at p.12, presented at Eighth 
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that the obligation of seaworthiness is an overriding obligation that is non-
delegable165 and cannot be contracted out of by the inclusion of clauses166 that 
exclude the liability of the carrier for the unsuitability or the defectiveness of the 
container.       
The Rotterdam Rules may be regarded as a success in resolving the ambiguity 
of the current international convention that has caused different applications to 
the standard of due diligence in relation to the supply of containers. Alternatively, 
one may argue that extending the obligation of container cargoworthiness to 
cover the entire voyage does not prove to be of any significant success. 
Because of this, the carrier does not have many choices when the container, for 
some reason, becomes uncargoworthy during the sea carriage. However, the 
carrier would be under the duty to ensure that the refrigerated container unit is 
                                                                                                                                          
Annual International Colloquium on Carriage of Goods - Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7 
September 2012, Swansea University. 
165
 The Muncaster Castle [1961] AC 806 (HL). See Bordahandy, P., ‘Containers: a conundrum 
or a concept’ (2005) JIML, 342, p. 370. Contrast with Northern Shipping Co. v Deutsche 
Seereederei G.m.b.H. And Others (The Kapitan Sakhrov) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, where 
Brooke LJ stated that: “Those responsible for the manufacture, stuffing and shipping of 
containers are plainly not carrying out any part of the carrier's function for which he should be 
held responsible. I can find nothing in the Hague Rules or at common law to make a carrier 
responsibility for the unseaworthiness of its vessel resulting from a shipper's misconduct of 
which it, the carrier, has not been put on notice”, at p.273. 
166
 Bill of Lading Clauses; see for example:  
“11 Merchant-Packed Containers: If a Container has not been packed by or no behalf of the 
carrier;  
11.1 The Merchant shall inspect the container for suitability for carriage of Goods before 
packing it. The Merchant’s use of the container shall be prima facie evidence of its being sound 
and suitable for use; 
11.2 The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the Goods caused by: 
(a) The unsuitability or defective condition of the Container or the incorrect setting of any 
refrigeration controls thereof, provided that, if the Container has been supplied by or on 
behalf of the Carrier, this unsuitability or defective condition would have been apparent 
upon inspection by the Merchant at or prior to the time when the Container was packed” 
(MSC B/L). 
See also “9. Containers: 
(1) Goods may be stuffed by the Carrier in or on Containers and goods may be stuffed with 
other goods; 
(2) The Merchant shall carefully inspect any Container supplied by the Carrier to ensure 
that it is suitable and satisfactory in all aspects for the goods being shipped. The 
Merchant shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the carrier against any loss, 
damage, claim, liability or expense whatsoever caused by packing, checking, stowage 
and securing of the goods stuffed in a container, or by failure to inspect the container 
properly, by or on behalf of the Merchant” (ACL B/L). 
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operating correctly and with the limited on-board resources of men and 
equipment, he still should be able to “take steps to rectify the malfunction”.167 It 
is sufficient to say that once the obligation of cargoworthiness is applied to the 
container, it will complement the standard of care required by Article III, r.2,168 to 
prevent the cargo from being damaged, as, in practice, most of the container’s 
unfitness arises from the time prior to stuffing the container with the cargo.169 
 
 
                                               
167
 See, Springall, R., ‘The transport of goods in refrigerated containers: an Australian 
perspective’, [1987] LMLCQ, 216, p.220. It is suggested that there could be an issue of whether 
there is liability under Article 14 even if the carrier is regarded as having satisfied Article 13. 
Chapter Two suggests that the ongoing obligation of due diligence might increase the level of 
due diligence. Thus, under Article 14, the carrier will be required to equip his ship with more 
spare parts than that which was required under the limited obligation in Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. See para. 2.14.1, at p.128. It must be noted that this does not mean 
that there cannot be situations when there could be liability under both Rules. For instance, if 
the carrier commits a failure to rectify an obvious and easily remedied defect in a container 
which is causing damage to the cargo during the voyage, it is assumed that there would be 
liability under both Articles 14 and 13 of the Rotterdam Rules. 
168
 Cf. Stevens, F., ‘Liability for Defective Containers: Charting a Course between 
Seaworthiness, Care for the Cargo and Liabilities of Shippers’ cited as Chapter 2 in B. Soyer 
and A. Tettenborn, Carriage of Goods by Sea, Land and Air: Uni-modal and Multimodal 
Transport in the 21
st
 Century, (Informa Law, 2013), at p. 34. Some writers regard providing a 
defective container as a potential breach of Article III, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. This 
suggests that overlap might possibly occur between the seaworthiness and general care 
obligations. For instance, Stevens is not regarding the supply of a defective container as an act 
of management for which the carrier would not be liable (apart from unseaworthiness) under 
Article IV, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules but as a breach of Article III, r.2 of the same 
rules. Overlap would now seem to be much more likely under the Rotterdam Rules. 
169
 The carrier should take the necessary precautions to “… properly and carefully receive, load, 
handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, unload and deliver the goods” as per Article 13.1 of the 
Rotterdam Rules. Similar language is used in Article III, r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 
For example, when carrying sensitive cargo, precautions and care should be taken for 
temperature changes (e.g. Imperial Commodities Corp v Maria Auxiliadora [1988] A.M.C. 568 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (American case). See also Mayhew Foods Limited v Overseas Containers Ltd 
[1984] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 317, where the carrier had set the temperature at 2°- 4°C instead of the 
required -18°C. The Commercial Court found that on the form of the bill of lading in question, 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules did not apply during the period prior to shipment or after 
discharge. As the ocean carrier was unable to show that the loss occurred outside the period 
covered by the Rules, he was held liable for the out-turn damage in accordance with the Rules. 
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Chapter Seven  
Conclusion 
“The advances in technology unavoidably outpace prescriptive regulation. Ships should 
be built to meet demands and challenges, and the innovation inherent in their design 
today will find its way into the mainstream design of tomorrow. As such, there is a need 
to devise a regulatory framework that will evaluate and regulate designs for safety.” 1 
1. Introduction 
Throughout the previous chapters it was shown that in recent decades there 
have been tremendous technical changes (mainly in the construction and 
operation of ships) that have driven carriage of goods and commercial changes. 
These developments demand constant changes to the international regime.2 
The Rotterdam Rules seek to modernise and update the existing legal regimes 
that govern the carriage of goods by sea and which for decades have been 
criticised for being generally out of date, fragmented and uncoordinated with 
other inland-based transport regimes. 3  They are intended to supersede the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules by establishing uniform international rules to allocate 
liability for the risk of loss of or damage to goods carried by sea. This chapter 
summarise the discussion in previous chapters.    
It has been demonstrated in the previous chapters that the Rotterdam Rules 
made changes to the current law (presently the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules). 
                                               
1
 Koji Sekimizu, Secretary-IMO, ‘Future Ship Safety Symposium’, International Maritime 
Organization HQ, 10-11 June 2013. 
2 The initiative for changes also derived from the criticism on the unbalance bargaining 
power of the carrier, a cargo-interest generally has little discretion in negotiating the 
terms of bills of lading.   
3  United Nations Resolution 63/122: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
transport_goods/Rotterdam_status.html  
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Under the latter, the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy and cargoworthy must be exercised only before and at the beginning 
of the voyage. Under the former, the obligation is extended to the entire sea 
voyage and the carrier’s obligation is to ensure that every place in which goods 
are carried is ‘cargoworthy’ including not only the traditional cargo holds, but 
also containers supplied by the carrier.  
It has been demonstrated that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not contain an 
express detailed provision in relation to liability. Article IV provides the carrier’s 
exonerations from liability for breach of the carrier’s obligation of seaworthiness 
provided that he exercised due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. 
However, the allocation of burden of proof is not clearly regulated, except that 
Article IV, r.1 provides that if the unseaworthiness of the vessel caused loss or 
damage to the goods, the burden is on the carrier to prove that he exercised 
due diligence. Similarly, under Article IV, r.2, the burden is on the carrier to 
prove that the loss or damage was caused by an excepted peril. In Article 17 of 
the Rotterdam Rules, beside the exonerations from liability, the navigational 
fault and management of the vessel are removed. The allocation of the burden 
of proof and the basis of liability of the carrier are codified to create a link 
between the (breach of) the seaworthiness obligation of the carrier and his 
liability. Furthermore, unlike the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Rotterdam 
Rules allow for a proportion of liability for loss caused by incidents arising from 
a combination of causes, one of which may fall outside of the carrier’s control.  
Furthermore, one of the most advanced improvements in the shipping industry 
is the transportation of cargo by containers. It is the extension of the liability 
regime to multimodal transport that makes the Rotterdam Rules reach beyond 
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the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.4 This study analyses how the wide scope of the 
Rotterdam Rules, pursuant to a contractual approach, covers the inland 
carriage of goods in addition to sea carriage (door-to-door carriage). Such an 
extension means that the Rotterdam Rules and other (non-sea) inland unimodal 
conventions overlap. As such, a direct/indirect impact on the obligations and the 
liability related to seaworthiness under the Rules is likely. 
Finally, it is important to note that seaworthiness is intimately associated with 
public law (the prevailing standards of maritime safety consist of STCW, 
MARPOL, SOLAS and so on). It is therefore essential to identify their potential 
impact on the standard of seaworthiness. Whether the continuing obligation of 
seaworthiness will improve safety standards is a point addressed in this study. 
This raises the following question: as a legal framework, are the Rotterdam 
Rules sufficiently appropriate to govern the law related to seaworthiness? Have 
they accommodated the changes in technology and the development of 
commercial practice? Have updates in the Rotterdam Rules met the changes in 
the shipping industry? Alternatively, would the adoption of a similar approach to 
the Rotterdam Rules, without the ratification of them, be a better solution to 
govern the obligation of seaworthiness? 
This study and others5 demonstrate that there are several gaps in the present 
law in respect of seaworthiness. The law is dated and a lack of uniformity exists 
regarding the rules governing seaworthiness. The Rotterdam Rules seek to 
close those gaps, especially in light of the failure of the Hamburg Rules, and the 
                                               
4 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules apply to ‘tackle-to-tackle’ transport operations, Art. I(e). 
5
 Nicholas, A., ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seaworthiness’ cited as 
Chapter 6 in R. Thomas (ed.), The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules 
(Informa, 2010), p.117. See para. 2.14.1, at p.132.  
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subsequent increase in national hybrid regimes that aim to update the law in 
this area have contributed largely to the present problematic situation.6 
This study demonstrates the potential implementation of the new Convention 
and question whether its provisions would serve as a better solution as regards 
the development of seaworthiness (rather than ratifying a totally new regime) . 
There have been several studies attempting to address the effect of the 
Rotterdam Rules on different areas of the law of carriage of goods by sea. Yet 
no particular study seeks to address the laws in detail with respect to 
seaworthiness under the Rotterdam Rules in relation to the current regime. The 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules might have been sufficient when they were first 
introduced, although it can be said that on some occasions, as far as the cargo-
interests are concerned, the Rules are not fair, e.g., the duration of exercising 
due diligence, burden of proof, liability for unfit container, apportionment of 
liability, and so on. Those problems were in the minds of the drafters when 
drafting the convention, and as a result, they introduced those changes in the 
context of the Rotterdam Rules. Whether such changes meet the current and 
future development of shipping, is one objective of this study. This Chapter 
(Seven) summarises, both under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and the 
Rotterdam Rules, the obligation to exercise due diligence, the inclusion of 
container carriage that facilitates multimodal carriage also being covered, the 
burden of proof, the liability of the carrier and the resulting effect of shipping 
standards on seaworthiness.  
 
                                               
6 
See, for example, Sturley, M., ‘The development of cargo liability regimes’ cited in H. Tiberg 
(ed.), Cargo Liability in Future Maritime Carriage, (Hasselby 1997), at pp.60-64. 
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7.1 The Obligation to Exercise Due Diligence under the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
It was discussed in Chapter Two that, under charterparty contracts, e.g. where 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated,7  and, in a practical legal sense, 
bills of lading, the carrier is under a duty to exercise due diligence while the 
vessel is on her way to the loading port.8 However, this is not always the case, 
especially under liner voyage contracts where the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
are applicable.9  Hypothetical examples were given to demonstrate the logic 
behind the phrase ‘before the voyage’ in liner voyage carriage as being the time 
of actual commencement of the loading.10 
As discussed, the period of the duty to exercise due diligence ends, according 
to Article III, r.1, ‘at the beginning of the voyage’, however, the law does not 
define the exact moment when the voyage begins. Accordingly, a carrier would 
not be liable for cargo damage because his obligation to exercise due diligence 
under Article III, r.1 would be presumed to have been fulfilled in some cases, i.e. 
when damage occurs after the port control has instructed the vessel to sail to 
the anchorage area before her final sailing. Thus, the carrier would be able to 
invoke the exemption under Article IV, r.2(a). Arguably, the carrier has not 
fulfilled all the pre-departure activities, e.g. trimming the cargo, which are 
required under the duty to exercise due diligence and, therefore, should not be 
excused from liability for unseaworthiness.11 Also, if the damage that is caused 
by not fulfilling the Article III, r.1 obligation is traceable to the beginning of the 
                                               
7
 See para. 2.3, p.84. 
8 
For the origin and the definition of the words ‘Due diligence’, see para.2.3, at p.82 and para.2.4, 
at p.85.  
9
 See para. 2.5, pp. 89-90, for the differences between in the commencement of the voyage 
between voyage and time charters. 
10
 See, para.2.6.1, at p.98. 
11 
It must be noted that some other matters which would relate to the act of management if they 
cause damage and the carrier may still be allowed to rely on the defence. 
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voyage but the damage occurred after the ship had sailed, it would render the 
vessel unseaworthy.12 
The author does not agree with the argument put forward by Carver that the 
‘beginning of the voyage’ is a period of time encompassing the process of 
entering into a new action. Carver’s notion implies a voyage by stages, which is 
restricted under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The author also disagrees with 
Clarke’s opinion that the voyage should no longer be beginning but underway 
when the vessel has no further purpose at port. Instead, the author opines that 
the commencement of the voyage must be determined by the satisfaction of all 
requisite conditions for sailing such that the vessel is completely ready for sea.13 
 
7.1.1 What can be done to improve the current situation? 
In determining when the voyage begins, it is necessary to consider all of the 
relevant factors in order to be fair to the cargo-interests. Accordingly, in Chapter 
Two, factors were suggested in line with Tetley’s point of view, 14  that the 
authorities which determine the commencement of the voyage can be 
separated into two schools of thought. First, the operational requirements,15 
which embrace (i) undocking, e.g. a vessel is considered not to have begun her 
voyage when the lines of the vessel are ashore; (ii) breaking ground and 
manoeuvring, e.g. when the vessel is able to swing around; and, (iii) the 
command or control of the vessel, e.g. a vessel is not considered to have begun 
its voyage if the shore personnel have control of the vessel or have restricted 
                                               
12
 See para.2.6.2, at p.100. 
13 
See the argument put forward by Clarke at Chapter Two, para.2.7.2, at p.115. 
14
 See Chapter Two, para.2.7, at p. 104, for factors determine the commencement of the voyage. 
15
 See Chapter Two, para.2.7.1, at p.104. 
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the vessel to sail at night. The second school of thought focuses on legal 
requirements, 16  e.g. when the vessel has all its necessary certificates and 
clearance. The argument put forward in Chapter Two concerning these factors 
concludes that the vessel should not be considered to have begun her voyage 
until all the operational and legal requirements are fulfilled. 
Improving current laws relating to seaworthiness does not require changing 
legal precedents. Rather, one should consider all the practical requirements 
referred to in the case law. It should be noted that it is not really a matter of 
what is left undone. It is a question of fact and intention as to whether the vessel 
has sailed. It can be said that the timing of an event may make the vessel 
unseaworthy rather than the simple question of whether further preparations 
need to be completed. So, if preparations are incomplete and, as a result, the 
cargo is damaged, the damage is due to unseaworthiness. In contrast, if 
preparations are incomplete and the ship sails and then an unrelated event 
occurs that causes damage, such damage can come within Article IV, r.2(a)) of 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.    
Alternatively, by extending the obligation of due diligence to the entire voyage, 
the termination of the obligation is not tied to the time at which the voyage 
begins. This position has been adopted in the Rotterdam Rules. Whether the 
Rotterdam Rules have completely solved the problem without creating another, 
was discussed in Chapter Two, Part II.  
                                               
16
 See Chapter Two, para.2.7.2, at p.112. 
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7.2 The Obligation to Exercise Due Diligence under the 
Rotterdam Rules 
Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules is similar to Article III, r.1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, however new words, such as ‘during’, ‘keep’, and 
‘container’ in Article 14 may raise questions regarding the potential effect they 
have on the obligation of seaworthiness. 
 
 
The main difference in language between the Rotterdam Rules and the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules that is expected to change the risk of liability on the 
carrier is the addition of the word ‘during’ to the carrier’s obligation to exercise 
due diligence. Arguably, the Rotterdam Rules remove the uncertainty as to the 
moment at which the obligation ends at the loading port, namely ‘before and at 
the beginning’ of the voyage. However, the grey area may now have shifted to 
the ‘end’ of the voyage. This raises a question: When is the exact moment at 
which the duty comes to an end?  
 
7.2.1 The New Uncertainty under the Rotterdam Rules 
In Chapter Two, Part II, it was argued that the Rotterdam Rules do not define 
when the obligation ends. Accordingly, courts (and at the least, scholars) will 
need to deal with the word ‘end’, as they previously dealt with the word 
‘commencement’.17 In Chapter Two,18 the author doubted whether the ‘end’ of 
the obligation coincides with the end of the cargo discharge. While discharge of 
                                               
17 
Whilst case law on ‘due diligence’ has traditionally no connection with any issue relating to the 
‘end’ of the voyage, charter party cases relating to a ship’s ‘arrival’ may now become relevant.  
18
 See para. 2.13, at p.124 
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the cargo is one of the aspects of cargo management in Article 13 of the 
Rotterdam Rules, the word ‘discharge’ was not mentioned in Article 14. Further, 
discharge of cargo from the container, e.g. de-stuffing, can take place far away 
from the port. It was suggested by analogy to decided cases on the Hague/ 
Hague-Visby Rules as to ‘commencement’ of the voyage, that the voyage may 
be said to come to an end once the vessel enters the ‘commercial limits’ of the 
discharging port.19   
 
It was further discussed in Chapter Two20 whether an act of the carrier which 
caused damage to the cargo should be classified as a failure to fulfil his 
obligation under Article 14, e.g. negligence as regards the management of the 
ship, or as a failure to fulfil his obligation under Article 13 of the Rotterdam 
Rules, e.g. negligence as regards the cargo. It was suggested that acts such as 
failing to observe safety rules and regulations during the voyage which could 
make the ship unseaworthy or acts which endanger the safety of the vessel and 
not merely damage the cargo, can now be regarded as falling within Article 14 
of the Rotterdam Rules. In comparison, acts which only affect the carried cargo 
and do not endanger the safety of the vessel, can fall within Article 13. The 
                                               
19
 One might argue that the voyage ends when the ship is moored and under the control of 
shore personnel. It is a well-known practice that the minute the vessel enters the port limit, she 
would be subjected to the control of the port authority. Thus, the master would not have the full 
control of his vessel. Further, the vessel may be subject to the port authority regulations which 
differ from the regulations governing the open sea voyage. Such regulations would impose 
some restrictions on the vessel, e.g. the maximum speed should not exceed 6 nautical miles. 
Thus, arrival of a vessel is considered when the ship is under the control of the port authority; 
that is, when the ship enters the commercial limit of the port.   
20 
See Chapter Two, sub-para. ‘Act of the carrier on voyage: Exercising due diligence or care of 
cargo’, at p.145  
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importance of making such a distinction 21  was made clear because, if the 
preconditions of Article 19.1 are met, the carrier and any maritime performing 
party will be jointly and severally liable to the limit provided in the Rotterdam 
Rules.22 This will enable the court to determine the extent to which they may 
hold the sub-contracted inland carrier liable. Second, it is important to know 
whether a contract of carriage was a volume contract, as parties to volume 
contracts are allowed to agree upon greater or lesser obligations and liabilities 
than those provided by Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules and a carrier may 
therefore agree to derogate from his cargoworthiness obligation.23   
Then,24 in Chapter Three, it was argued that the standard of proving damage 
caused by unseaworthiness would be easier than proving damage caused by a 
failure to care for cargo.25 This may mean that the claimant bears a lesser 
burden when proving the causal link between loss and unseaworthiness, as 
compared to proving the causal link between loss and a breach of the duty to 
care for the cargo. 
 
7.2.2 Solution to the New Uncertainty 
Assuming that the obligation ends on the completion of discharging the cargo, a 
suggestion for completely avoiding the uncertainty as to when the obligation 
                                               
21
 See Chapter Two, sub-para. ‘The importance to make distiction’, at p.152. 
22 
The Rotterdam Rules allow a maritime performing party to carry out or undertake to carry out 
any of the carrier’s responsibilities during the port-to-port leg of the transport operation. 
23
 See, sub-para. ‘The importance to make distiction’, at p.152. 
24 
See Chapter Three, sub-para. ‘The Importance to make Distiction’, at p.153 
25
 The text ‘probably caused’ in Article 17(5) is intended to give a somewhat lower standard than 
the normal causation standard in proving seaworthiness by the carrier. 
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ends was put forward in Chapter Two 26 ; that is, for the parties to agree 
contractually on this point, as long as there is genuine agreement for discharge 
to be performed by the cargo-interest.27 The Rotterdam Rules acknowledge 
some industry practices e.g. free-in-free-out-stowed, 28  and the parties may 
agree to the cargo-interests (shipper or consignee) 29  being in charge of 
performing the loading, handling, stowing or unloading operations.  
 
7.2.3 The Strictness of the Obligation 
Further, as highlighted in Chapter Two,30 the on-going duty might impose extra 
activities for the fulfilment of the due diligence obligation that the carrier must 
bear in mind when planning the voyage before its commencement. In deciding 
whether the carrier exercised the required pre-voyage due diligence, the court, 
arguably, should bear in mind the post-commencement obligation.  
Although the pre- and post-commencement due diligence obligations appear to 
be the same, there are significant differences in practice. Their exercise by the 
carrier is dictated by factors such as (i) the nature of the defect, 31  (ii) the 
                                               
26
 See, sub-para. ‘Rebutting the Existence of the Peril’, at p.192 
27
 It depends on terms of the contract of carriage whether the obligation ends at the arrival to the 
port limit or when the cargo is fully discharged. However, for the latter, it also depends on the 
terms of the contract of carriage whether the discharge is the ship’s rail, quay or warehouse or 
whether lighters are involved. (See, i.e. Fitzgerald v Lona (Owners) (1932) 49 T.L.R. 77). 
Similarly, this would also depend on the custom of the port regulations where the custom of the 
port may extend the actual work of discharge to be performed by one of the parties beyond the 
ship’s rail. This might be agreed upon by contract to be handled by the receiver or the charterer. 
(See, i.e. Palgrave, Brown & Son v S.S. Turid [1922] a A.C. 397). 
28
 See, para. ‘The End of the Obligation’, at p.126. 
29 
The Rotterdam Rules, Article 13(2). 
30
 See para. 2.14.1, at p.130 
31
 See para 2.14.2.1, at p.135 
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possibility of causing damage to the cargo,32 and (iii) access to a necessary 
facility to remedy the defect and reinstate the vessel’s seaworthiness.33  
The carrier, most likely, will be held liable if he did not exercise due diligence in 
relation to a defect that manifested during the voyage and either (i) it was not 
repaired even though it was repairable with use of the limited resources on 
board; or, (ii) he did not obtain the spare parts or summon the services of expert 
technicians by calling at the nearest supply station or port,34 provided that the 
ensuing delay35 would be reasonable.36 The position, however, would be the 
same as that under the Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules when a defect manifests 
itself after the beginning of the voyage but is not repairable during the voyage. 
To conclude, the test for the on-going due diligence obligation under the 
Rotterdam Rules should be ‘Would a prudent shipowner, if he had known of the 
defect, have continued the voyage without effecting any possible repairs?’37 
In practice, whether the carrier has exercised due diligence to ‘keep’ the vessel 
seaworthy during the voyage will be left entirely for the courts to decide on a 
case-by-case basis. There may be numerous situations, and four potential 
(hypothetical) scenarios were examined in Chapter Two in respect of the 
                                               
32
 See para. 2.14.2.2, at p.136 
33
 See para. 2.14.2.3, at p.139 
34
 See para. 2.14.2.3, at p.139 
35
 Under contracts of carriage by sea, where cargo loss has been caused by delay, there have 
been reasonably direct discussions on whether to impose liability on the carrier or not. However, 
in the context of pure economic loss caused by delay in sea carriage, the position is different. 
The Rotterdam Rules, as part of the ‘general’ liability regime, seek to address this issue by 
adding a separate limit of liability for pure economic loss resulting from delay.  
36 
Maintenance is part of exercising due diligence and it is equal to the limited due diligence 
pursuant to Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. When discharging due diligence 
prior to sailing, most of the burden of seaworthiness is considered fulfilled, and what is left 
during the voyage is considered less burdensome. For further details, see Aladwani, T., ‘The 
Supply of Containers and “Seaworthiness - The Rotterdam Rules Perspective’, (2011) JMLC, 
185-209, pp.206-207. 
37
 See para. 2.14.2.3, at p.141 
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exercise of due diligence for defects that manifested themselves after the 
commencement of the voyage and which, by definition, were not discoverable 
by exercise of due diligence before and at the commencement of the voyage.  
These hypothetical scenarios concern (a) a defect repairable at sea38; (b) a 
repairable defect that would take too long to be repaired and would cause 
unreasonable delay39 ; (c) a defect repairable only temporarily 40 ; and, (d) a 
defect repairable only if the vessel is at port.41    
 
7.2.4 A New Obligation on the Carrier 
The on-going obligation of due diligence under Article 14 arguably makes the 
Rotterdam Rules a stricter system; however, they demand further action to 
mitigate and minimise the consequence of a defect caused by unseaworthiness 
alongside exercising due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel.42 
Although the current law can cover mitigation requirements,43 as far as the 
unseaworthiness cases are concerned, mitigation efforts have not been 
                                               
38
 See para. 2.16.1, at p.143. 
39
 See para. 2.16.2, at p.145. 
40
 See para. 2.16.3, at p.157. 
41
 see para, 2.16.4, at p.158 
42
 See para. 2.16.1, at p.144. 
43 
See Notara and Others v Henderson (1872) LR 7 Q.B. 225 (Ex Ch.). A cargo of beans was 
wetted by salt water after a collision which was not the fault of the carrier. The cargo was 
offloaded while repairs were effected but no action was taken to dry the water from the cargo 
before the ship resumed the voyage. The court held that the master became an ‘agent of 
necessity’ who should have minimised rot by drying the beans, and then charged such 
expenses to the cargo-interests. Since the master failed to do so, the carrier was liable for the 
extra damage suffered. If the carrier had dried the beans, he would have been reimbursed for 
the particular charges from the cargo underwriters under the sue and labour clause in the cargo 
policy, as damage caused by a collision is an insured risk. Case cited in M. Cohen, ‘Particular 
charges in carriage of goods by sea and marine cargo insurance’, (2004) LMCLQ 453, at 
pp.454-455. It must be noted here that in the same article, it was concluded that “Of course, if 
the owners have breached the contract of carriage, say, by improperly stowing the cargo or by 
failing to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, and extra expenses are incurred 
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subjected to judicial consideration. The author is of the opinion that,44 if the 
contract is governed by the Rotterdam Rules, the court might distinguish 
between a loss caused by not mitigating and a loss that occurred despite the 
exercise of due diligence during the voyage, in order to decide how much the 
carrier will be liable for. The carrier would not be responsible for inevitable 
damage caused by a defect that emerged during the voyage provided that due 
diligence is exercised before and during the voyage without delay. However, the 
carrier would be liable for not mitigating the damage while repairing the defect, if 
such mitigation would prevent further damage than that inevitably occurred until 
a repair is completed.  
Finally, it was mentioned above45 that in deciding whether the due diligence 
obligation has been exercised when a defect emerged at sea depends on 
several factors, including the extent of defect (i.e., leakage) and the possibility 
of causing damage to the cargo etc. If mitigation is also taken as a facet of the 
obligation, then it should be considered when deciding the seaworthiness of the 
vessel.   
If mitigation is regarded as part of the due diligence obligation, the impact of the 
extension of the obligation would potentially be greater on the carrier.46 It is 
probably accurate to say that an additional obligation to mitigate 47  shifts a 
                                                                                                                                          
in overcoming these problems in order to protect the cargo from injury, the funds spent are not 
recoverable from the cargo interests” at p.454. 
44
 See para. 2.16.1, at p.144. 
45
 See para. 2.14.2, at p. 135. 
46
 In Baatz, Y. et al., The Rotterdam Rules, A practical annotation, (2009, Informa), the authors 
argued that the obligation of due diligence under the Rotterdam Rules is arguably stricter than 
the Hamburg Rules, para.14.05. 
47 
Knud Pontoppidan, the Executive Vice-Precedent of Moller-Maersk AP, discussed such point 
in the final text of the Rotterdam Rules at the CMI’s conference in October 2008. He expressly 
acknowledged some of the principal ways in which the Rotterdam Rules impose greater 
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portion of the risk involved in the carriage of goods towards the carrier because 
a carrier is more likely now to be liable for loss, damage or delay caused by his 
failure not only to exercise due diligence to maintain the vessel in a seaworthy 
condition throughout the voyage, but also for cargo damage that would have 
been prevented if due diligence was exercised in mitigating such damage.48 
Consequently, the conclusion can be drawn that extending the exercise of due 
diligence should not create an extra burden on the carrier as it is being 
familiarised throughout the shipping industry. This raises the following question: 
Are the prevailing standards of maritime safety an alternative to the on-going 
obligation of due diligence?  
 
7.3 Effect of Shipping Standards on Seaworthiness 
7.3.1 The Relevance of Shipping Industry Standards on the 
Obligation of Seaworthiness 
The discussions in the preceding Chapters raised the question: Are the 
prevailing standards of maritime safety an alternative to the on-going obligation 
of due diligence? In answer to this, reference to two of the most important IMO 
shipping conventions, SOLAS and the STCW convention, was made in Chapter 
Four. SOLAS sets out rules and regulations that are principally concerned with 
the strength of a vessel and the reliability of its machinery and equipment, as 
                                                                                                                                          
responsibility on carrier (as compared to the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules), including the loss of 
the navigational fault exception and the larger increase…etc. 
48
 The court may arrive at the conclusion that the defect is repairable on board (using the basic 
available tools and without the need for expert) but the carrier has chosen to call on to nearest 
port of call to effect a repair. If that was the case, the carrier would be liable for the damage that 
could have been save should minimal (temporary) repairs is made to mitigate the damage while 
steaming toward the port of repair.  
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well as the management and security of the vessel,49 and the STCW convention 
provides minimum standards for formal qualifications including training, 
certification and watchkeeping capabilities.50 It can be optimistically concluded 
that shipping industry standards are proving to be of considerable importance 
as the seaworthiness of all types of vessels is, to some extent, a result of good 
seamanship and proper shipping practices, which form a benchmark to 
determine the standard of seaworthiness.51      
That being said, Member States apply these conventions with varying degrees 
of strictness.52 Due to poor resources, supervision, enforcement, or inefficiency 
of the convention standards themselves, some Member States are more lax in 
applying these conventions. Consequently, the benchmark that ascertains 
seaworthiness is lowered, and thus, seaworthiness cannot be guaranteed, at 
least by the relevant conventions alone. Further, those regulations, especially 
technical ones such as those involving safety equipment, are reactive rather 
than proactive.53 As a result, in following them, the carrier will exercise a lower 
                                               
49
 See para. 4.3, at p.279. 
50
 See para. 4.4, at p.292. 
51
 See para. 1.2, at p.53, f.n. 12. Further, see the introduction of Chapter Four, at p.274. 
52 
See para. 4.5.1, at p.309.
 
Shipping companies might be encouraged to register their vessels 
in flag states which have neither administration nor independent surveyors, which have 
promulgated no laws, decrees, orders or regulations and have set no standards for 
seaworthiness. See Sass, C. A., ‘The Enforcement of Safety Standards on Board Merchant 
Vessels’, pp. 66-77, delivered as a paper in the Fitness at Sea: An International Conference on 
Seaworthiness, (9-10, 1980) held at Newcastle University.  
53 
See sub-para. ‘What can
 
a shipowner do to overcome the inefficiencies of SOLAS?’ at p. 291. 
The Secretary of the General International Chamber of Shipping said: ‘It is often said that 
advances in the technical regulation of shipping tend to follow a casualty - that the maritime 
sector responds to, rather than anticipates its problems.’ Horrocks, C., ‘Challenges Facing the 
Shipping Industry in the 21st Century’, Sixth Annual Cadwallader Memorial Lecture (15 Sep. 
2003), pp. 3-4. 
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standard of due diligence than that which should have been followed in the first 
place.54  
 
7.3.2 The Potential Legal Implications of the Industry 
Standards on Seaworthiness 
- The Example of SOLAS 
If SOLAS or its implementation proves to be deficient, despite the fact that the 
carrier has complied with it, he will, as a result, still not have exercised due 
diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel even though the inadequacy was a 
result of the deficiency of the Convention and not of the shipowner’s action or 
omission.55  
The consequence for non-compliance with industry regulations is unclear; thus, 
their legal bearing and practical effectiveness on the obligation of due diligence 
to provide a seaworthy vessel will vary from one carrier to another and from one 
State to another.56 
 
7.3.3 What can be done to improve the current situation? 
                                               
54
 See sub-para. ‘What can a Shipowner do to Overcome the Inefficiencies of SOLAS?’ at p. 
291. The same point was explained in Aladwani, T., ‘Effect of Shipping Standards on 
Seaworthiness’, (2011) EJCCL, 33-45, p.37. 
55 
See sub-para. ‘The Impact of the Limitation of SOLAS on the Obligation od Due Diligence’, at 
p.285, for discussion of The Eurasian Dream case. See further for The Kapitan Sakhrov case at 
p.287. 
56
 It was demonstrated that SOLAS allows the carrier some discretion in deciding on the amount 
of safety equipment for each particular ship. It was suggested that the carrier and his crew 
should exercise their seamanship knwldge in order to overcome the deficinecies of SOLAS.see 
sub-para. ‘The Impact of the Limitation of SOLAS on the Obligation od Due Diligence’, at p. 289. 
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As argued above that in Chapter Four, SOLAS is not sufficient to govern 
physical matters of the vessel that relate to her seaworthiness. The carrier 
should continuously draw on his specialised knowledge regarding the fitness of 
his vessel and, by doing so,57 will know the standard of care necessary in order 
to fulfil the obligation of due diligence. It was suggested that an owner, when 
appointing new crewmembers on his ship, must exercise due diligence to 
ensure the competence of the crew by taking steps such as checking the 
appropriate certificate of competency and other training certificates. 58  The 
carrier should also inquire about his crewing experience and examine his 
seaman’s book. All of the above should be further explored and verified by 
taking up references of the interviewee and, in particular, by consulting his/her 
previous employers.  
It was suggested59 that exercising due diligence on a continuous basis will first, 
enable the carrier to identify the ‘risk’ of unseaworthiness that may be caused 
by, for example, an insufficient amount of safety equipment; and, secondly, 
allow the carrier to rectify any shortage that has arisen by mere compliance with 
the minimum amount of equipment required by industry regulations, e.g. 
SOLAS. Consequently, the carrier will establish safeguards that will, in turn, 
avoid loss or damage from unseaworthiness.  
                                               
57
 See sub-para. ‘What can a shipowner do to overcome the inefficiencies of SOLAS?’ at p.290. 
Knowledge is known exclusively to the carrier/shipowner, such as the stability of the vessel. See 
recent case, Onega Shipping & Chartering BV v JSC Arcadia Shipping (The SOCOL 3) [2010] 
EWHC 777. The improper stowage of cargo had affected the vessel’s overall stability on 
departure from the last loaded port in Finland. This was an aspect that only the chief officer and 
master would have known about, not the charterers. The Judge, Mr Justice Hamblen found that 
there had been a failure on the part of the master and chief officer to supervise the cargo 
stowage properly with the ship’s stability and ultimate seaworthiness in mind. See also Donaghy, 
T., ‘There goes the deck cargo’, (12 Nov. 2010), Maritime Risk International, 1-2, p.1. 
58 
See para. 4.4.1, at p. 295. See also, p.298. 
59 
See sub-para, ‘What can a shipowner do to Overcome the Inefficiencies of SOLAS?’ at p. 
291-292. 
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It was further argued60 that it is not very difficult for a court to inquire or obtain 
information regarding a particular crewmember or training institution and 
whether the crewmember has received the minimum training required by the 
STCW Convention. This information can be obtained from the ‘Direct access to 
certificate verification database’ that is maintained by Contracting States to the 
STCW Convention. Further information can be obtained by expert investigation, 
e.g. by visiting the marine institution where the crewmember in question 
allegedly received his training.61 
A point suggested in Chapter Four62 was that, although the standard of due 
diligence might be increased if shipping industry standards are developed and 
improved, the IMO still needs the authority to verify that Flag States actually 
implement the conventions fully and properly. A case in point is the so-called 
‘white list’ of Contracting States deemed to be giving full and complete effect to 
the revised STCW Convention’s provisions.63 Port State Control inspectors are 
expected to be increasingly targeting ships flying Flags of countries that are not 
on the ‘white list’.64 It was submitted that the ‘white list’ principle should be 
applied to other conventions, e.g. SOLAS. 
                                               
60 
See Chapter Four, para.4.4.1, at p.300. 
61 
See Chapter Four, para.4.4.1, at p.300. See, the discussion regarding The Patraikos 2 [2002] 
4 SLR 232 (Singapore High Court, Admiralty Division) where an expert witness visited the 
Marine School of the crew member in question.  
62 
See para.4.5.2, at p.313. 
63
 The White List was published by IMO following the 73rd session of the Organization’s 
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) meeting from 27 November to 6 December 2000. Cited on 
IMO website: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/Pages/STCW-
Convention.aspx (last visited 18.9.2014). 
64  
Cited on IMO website: http://www.imo.org/OurWork/HumanElement/TrainingCertification/ 
Pages/STCW-Convention.aspx (last visited 18.9.2014). See para. 4.5.1, at p. 311. 
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In the final paragraph of Chapter Four, 65  the implications of the extended 
obligation and whether it involves a non-delegable duty were discussed. If the 
on-going obligation of due diligence does involve a non-delegable duty, this 
means that simple crew negligence rendering a ship unseaworthy, for example, 
would be sufficient to make the shipowner liable, quite apart from any failure to 
comply with regulations directed at the employer or operator. This means that 
greater emphasis should be placed on risk rather than the direct operation of 
particular standards.   
It remains to be seen whether the advent of the Rotterdam Rules and the on-
going due diligence obligation, will lead to shipowners being proactive in 
furnishing their vessels to a higher standard, i.e., adopting new regulations of 
the industry voluntarily and immediately, rather than at a later stage and only 
where obligatory.  
 
 
7.3.4 Potential Effect of the Rotterdam Rules on the 
Obligation of Seaworthiness in Light of Shipping Industry 
Standards 
For newly emerged regulations, there is usually flexibility as regards 
compliance, 66  and shipowners are given unnecessary time to comply with 
regulations, especially during the non-compulsory phase, e.g. regulations 
                                               
65 
See the hypothetical example given in sub-para., ‘The Implication of Shipping Standards and 
Crew Negligence’, p. 323, in support of this suggestion. 
66 
For example, during the phasing out of single hull tankers, category 2 and 3 vessels built in 
1984 or later were allowed to sail until 2010. See ‘IMO to avoid flag sanctions’, Lloyd’s List, 1 
September 1998. 
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related to fitting of radar equipment, which later become compulsory.67 Further, 
the IMO does not penalise shipowners for failing to comply.68 
As argued in Chapter Four,69 the case would be different under the Rotterdam 
Rules. The ongoing obligation will improve the position of cargo-interests for 
many reasons. On the one hand, the effect of the Rotterdam Rules, if 
incorporated into the bill of lading or carriage contract, will set aside any 
flexibility in shipping industry regulations as regards their compliance. The 
obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy ‘at the 
beginning of, and during the voyage’ will amount to an express clause such as 
clause 52 of Shelltime 4 and the due diligence obligation ‘during the voyage’ 
may surpass the granted flexibility to comply with regulations, as seen in The 
Elli and The Frixos.70  Accordingly, the ongoing seaworthiness obligation under 
the Rotterdam Rules might equate to clause 52 of Shelltime, which imposes a 
warranty on the carrier that implicitly applies to the future as regards compliance 
with shipping industry regulations and their amendments. In addition, the 
seriousness of the consequences of a particular kind of non-compliance with a 
regulation that has not yet been enforced raises the question of whether the 
shipowner would be keen to comply in advance of the regulation becoming 
compulsory. It was suggested that a vessel in dry dock can be modified for 
compliance more easily than a vessel performing her duty under the 
                                               
67
 See para. 4.5.2, p.312. At the outset, new regulations are merely recommendations and 
therefore optional during this period. By making them immediately compulsory with certain 
allowances, the safety standards that affect the obligation of seaworthiness will increase. 
68
 See para.4.5.1, at p.312. Stating that there should be a provision for sanction and penalties in 
the IMO conventions, e.g. SOLAS.   
69 
See para. 4.6.1, at p.318.  
70 
[2008] EWCA Civ 584. For a detailed discussion of this case, see para. 4.6.1, at pp.315-318 
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charterparty contract. 71  Thus, it might be easier and less costly for the 
shipowner to anticipate and pursue changes according to the regulations prior 
to the date of enforcement rather than taking steps to comply during the 
charterparty. At a later stage, during the course of performing the contract of 
carriage, the owner might incur further costs if he is required to divert the ship 
far from the trading ports in order to reach a port that can provide facilities to 
comply with new regulations. It is worth stressing72 that the court in The Elli and 
The Frixos 73  alluded to the ongoing obligation. The shipowner, being 
contractually responsible, would raise the standard of the seaworthiness 
obligation by investing in earlier compliance with the relevant regulations.74  
The ongoing obligation of seaworthiness would result in the shipowner having to 
establish a proper system of compliance with the regulations. As a result, the 
shipowner would be in compliance with regulations in advance, in order to avoid 
any unseaworthiness of his vessel75 and any non-compliance with regulations, 
which might result in a breach of the contract of carriage.76  
 
7.3.5 The Example of the STCW Convention 
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See sub-para. ‘The Impact of the Shipping Standards and Crew Negligence’, at p.325. The 
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See Chapter Four, para.4.6.1, at pp.315-318.  
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Golden Fleece Maritime Inc and Others v ST Shipping & Transport Inc (The Elli and The 
Frixos) [2008] 2 Lloyds Rep 119.  
74
 See para.4.6.1, at p.317.   
75 
The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 40, p.50. Clarke J held that the shipowner had failed to 
exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel before the vessel commenced her voyage. 
He also added that a reasonable shipowner would have set up a proper system for the 
inspection and ascertainment of the internal damage or problems which caused the 
unseaworthiness. 
76 
See Chapter Four, para.4.6.1, at p.315. See also the example of containers at p.320.   
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According to the general view taken in Chapter Four, accidents can also 
happen to modern vessels that are built and equipped to the latest shipping 
standards but manned by incompetent or inadequate seafarers who have 
inadequate training from substandard marine schools or are suffering from 
fatigue. It was stated77 that the ruling in The Eurasian Dream78 is to the effect 
that fully certified crew can be found incompetent if they are not provided with 
proper or adequate training in addition to any training that a Flag State requires 
for certification purposes.  
The IMO has attempted to address the widely recognized problem of crew 
fatigue through the latest revision of the STCW Convention, by providing for 
recorded and verifiable minimum rest periods.79 However, even this may prove 
inadequate. As discussed in Chapter Four,80 there is room for the provision 
being rendered ineffective if the expression ‘emergency, drill or in other 
overriding operational conditions’, which affords legitimate grounds to disregard 
the minimum rest period, is misused or abused (sometimes consistently) by the 
owner/carrier.  
 
7.3.6 What can be done to improve the current situation? 
As suggested in Chapter Four,81 the owner/carrier, as part of an on-going due 
diligence obligation, should constantly assess the workload of the crew and 
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increase the crew’s number beyond the vessel’s statutory minimum if her size, 
type, area of work, and more importantly, her age dictate this.  
It was mentioned above that Chapter Four suggested82 that IMO should create 
a scheme of sanctions applicable to all Contracting States of the relevant 
convention. Such a scheme might include creating a blacklist of shipowners, 
vessels, marine institutions and even Member States as opposed to white list 
members, 83  along with withdrawal of the right to issue certificates. 84 
Furthermore, documentation showing that Member States are giving ‘full and 
complete effect’ to the relevant provisions of the convention should be checked 
by IMO personnel85 or the task should be assigned to a reputable entity to 
check that standards are strictly applied.  
Further, Member States should establish a penalty or detention86 scheme for 
shipowners, shipping management companies or charterers who do not comply 
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with industry conventions. 87  However, it was also mentioned that 
implementation of the IMO regulations if left entirely to States, the standard of 
applying those conventions and regulations varies, which may result in the 
reduction of the effectiveness of such instruments.88 
The above demonstrates that shipping industry practice conflicts with the 
current law on seaworthiness in the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The current law 
obliges a shipowner to exercise due diligence before and at the beginning of the 
journey, whereas industry conventions, particularly SOLAS and the STCW 
Convention,89 in spite of leaving gaps, provide obligations that are not limited to 
the time of sailing. There is a contradiction in this respect that can be easily 
understood with the hypothetical example, in Chapter Four,90 of two containers 
loaded at different ports but stowed adjacently and suffering the same damage 
from the same cause. The applicable industry standard would equally cover 
both containers but liability under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules may be 
different. In this respect, it is argued that there is an inverse lack of 
harmonisation between the industry standards and carrier’s due diligence 
obligation during the period before and at the commencement of the voyage. 
The Rotterdam Rules seek to cure this position with the introduction of the on-
going due diligence obligation.  
Nonetheless, to minimise the adverse effect of the gaps left by shipping industry 
conventions on the standard of seaworthiness, the shipping industry framework 
itself should be proactive rather than reactive to marine incidents. This may 
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involve undergoing a continuous long-term and comprehensive review of the 
regulations.91  
7.4 Supply of Containers and Seaworthiness 
The extent of liability (if any) for cargo damage, as a result of an unfit container 
that was supplied by the carrier, will depend on the way the court construes the 
contract of carriage and bills of lading. A court may consider the duty of keeping 
the container fit to fall within the obligation of seaworthiness or care of the cargo 
etc.92 
It was introduced in Chapter Five93 that, generally speaking, responsibility (and 
thereafter liability) for the supply of containers and/or the stuffing of cargo inside 
the container will fall to one of two parties, the shipper or the carrier. It was 
further discussed that the supply of the container by the carrier can be 
considered as a separate agreement outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules.94 Chapter Six subsequently discussed the following.  
When the obligation under Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is 
extended to the container, the supply of the container by the carrier would not 
constitute a separate agreement outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. Thus, liability will be dealt with by Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. This was 
obvious from the ruling of the Dutch court in The NDS Provider, which was not 
based on the presumption that the container is part of the hold of the ship.95 
Alternatively, the supply of the containers by the carrier can be treated as a 
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separate agreement outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and 
thus the unsuitability of the container is considered as a defective packing.96 No 
duty was imposed on the carrier so there can be no liability for defective 
packaging.97 If the carrier’s supply and stuffing of the container is considered as 
a separate contract, the carrier will not be liable if the duty of supplying the 
container is outside the period of responsibility.98  
If damage to containerised cargo occurs outside the period of the sea carriage, 
the carrier might be rendered liable. Liability is not based on maritime transport 
law if the supply of containers by the carrier is considered as a separate 
agreement, e.g. a rental contract, outside the scope of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules. 99  It was argued that it does not matter whether the container is 
considered as part of the ship or cargo if the carrier supplies a defective 
container, liability should also fall within Article III, r.2.  
Chapter Six provided an answer as to the effect on liability of a defective 
container where the shipper takes responsibility for stuffing the container by 
drawing an analogy with the ‘Free in Out Stowed’ clause.100 
In the US,101 if the stuffing carried out by the shipper resulted in damage to the 
cargo due to bad stowage, the carrier will still be liable for the damage as the 
stuffing is not delegable and is one of the duties under Article III, r.2.102 A 
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distinction must be made, as under English law, if stuffing the container is 
carried out by the shipper, then the carrier may not be liable for damage that 
was caused by improper stowage of cargo inside the container.103 
It was discussed that, if the carrier supplies and stuffs the containers, difficulties 
may arise as to whether such operations fails within the scope of Article II of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. If the supplying and stuffing of the container is 
carried out away from the ship, then such operations might be regarded as 
outside the scope of control of the carrier and would be subject to the ‘freedom 
of the carrier’ proviso within Article VII. In this case, the carrier can rely on an 
exclusion clause in the contract of carriage.104 
Another question that was discussed in Chapter Six was whether the shipper is 
obliged to inspect a container that was supplied by the carrier. 
The carrier may still be liable for not inspecting and not refusing a container 
before loading where the defect in the container was ‘apparent upon inspection’. 
This is because, first, if the container is considered as part of the ship, then the 
exercise of due diligence by inspection is not a delegable duty, as it falls within 
the exercise of due diligence as regards the entire ship. 105  Second, if the 
damage to cargo was caused by a failure to exercise due diligence to make the 
container cargoworthy prior to loading, the carrier may be liable on the basis of 
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actual knowledge of defects or failure to use due diligence in inspecting the 
container prior to stuffing cargo.106 
 
Further, as discussed in Chapter Six, 107  the standard of inspection prior to 
stuffing the container requires the supplier of the container to ascertain the 
fitness of the container in accordance with the CSC and other international 
obligations. The container should be cargoworthy, weatherproof, properly 
sealed and certified so that it can withstand the roughness of sea perils. 108 
Defects such as microholes that are not visible upon a normal inspection and 
require an expert survey to discover them will not render the carrier liable if he 
is not able to reveal the defect by a normal and careful inspection of the 
container.109 If the shipper is given a container by the carrier in order to stuff the 
cargo, the latter is not required to inspect the container in detail. If the container 
is sealed by the shipper, the carrier is not required to inspect the inside of the 
container unless the outside of the container raises an assumption that the 
inside requires further attention.110 
It was argued that the purpose of the two major obligations imposed by Article 
III, r.1 and r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules is to protect the cargo carried on 
board against the perils of the seas. Thus it would not be logical to exclude the 
obligation of due diligence by the carrier for the reason that the container is not 
expressly provided for under Article III, r.1.111 Also, in some cases, it is easier 
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for the claimant to prove that the carrier was in breach of his seaworthiness 
obligation and that this breach caused the loss or damage to the goods. 
It is unclear under English law whether there is an obligation on the carrier who 
supplies the container to exercise due diligence in supplying a cargoworthy 
container.112 It was suggested that the way for the court to include container 
cargoworthiness as an obligation under Article III, r.1 is if the container is 
deemed analogous to (a) the superstructure of the ship, as the container would 
enhance the stability of the carrying vessel, as well as protecting the cargo from 
perils of the seas113; or, (b) the vessel’s equipment. A container is analogous to 
equipment which is not rigidly connected to the ship, e.g. dunnage, and their 
presence in correct order and condition is important.114  
The second part of Chapter Six115 turns to discuss the position of the container 
in Article 14(c) of the Rotterdam Rules. It was suggested that the courts should 
interpret the Rotterdam Rules on their own basis without reference to any 
previous approach.116 It was however suggested that the courts may refer to 
previous case law on the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in the absence of clear 
wording. Thus, courts are likely to adopt one of two potential approaches. 
First,117 and arguably the most likely to be followed by an English court, is to 
draw analogies with previous case law on vessels’ seaworthiness and to apply 
those principles to questions on container cargoworthiness. In respect of the 
seaworthiness obligation under Article 14 and its application to a container, the 
courts may deem the defective container that has caused damage to cargo 
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stuffed inside it uncargoworthy or unseaworthy under Article 17(5), even if the 
defective condition does not endanger the safety of the ship. 118  Another 
possibility is that the vessel will not be hold uncargoworthy or unseaworthy if the 
container’s unfitness caused damage only to the cargo without endangering the 
safety of the vessel.119  The second approach120 depends on whether containers 
are considered as part of the vessel, along with decisions under the previous 
law, e.g. the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, in different jurisdictions. It was 
assumed that the English court would resort to consulting decisions of other 
jurisdictions, which have already assessed the issue of container seaworthiness 
as part of the due diligence obligation. The question of whether the carrier 
should be held liable under the Rotterdam Rules for cargo damage caused by 
the unsuitability of his container may have been answered differently under 
various legal systems. Thus, even if the English courts sought to follow the 
route of applying cases decided in other jurisdictions, it would not be a 
straightforward exercise.121  
The American approach to unfit containers does not regard the supplying carrier 
of a container liable for an unfit container, unless the container had endangered 
the safety of the vessel.122 As for the Chinese Approach to unfit containers, the 
carrier is rendered liable even if the unfit container caused damage to the cargo 
without endangering the safety of the ship. However, the forwarder who stuffed 
the container has been held partially liable for damage caused to the cargo from 
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an unfit container.123  Further inconsistencies in this area of law have been 
added by certain French cases where the carrier was held liable on the basis of 
a rental agreement for containers supplied by the carrier, rather than as a 
carrier. Applying such case law would not be justified under the Rotterdam 
Rules.124 
It was discussed in Chapter Six that the container should not be considered as 
part of the vessel or her equipment as this would create a rather strange result 
as regards Article 80(4).125 This is because a volume contract under Article 80 of 
the Rotterdam Rules does not allow derogation from the obligation to provide a 
seaworthy vessel or equipment. Thus, the approach that considers the 
container as part of the vessel or her equipment would be at odds with Article 
80(4) of the Rotterdam Rules.126 Thus, the correct interpretation of the legal 
position of the container under the Rotterdam Rules is that it should not be 
considered as part of the vessel or her equipment. Further, it was suggested 
that containers should not be regarded as part of the cargo hold on the basis 
that containers merely impose on the carrier a legal obligation equal to the legal 
obligations regarding the cargo holds but differs in relation to the cargo holds 
practical use.127 
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7.5 The Implication of the Multimodality of the Rotterdam Rules 
on Seaworthiness  
The Rotterdam Rules are designed to take into account a wider door-to-door 
scope of coverage that is needed for multimodal container carriage when the 
carriage involves at least one international sea leg.128 The opening of Article 14 
specifies obligations applicable to the ‘voyage by sea’. This suggests that the 
obligation of container seaworthiness applies only when the container is on 
board the vessel.129 Also, as the Rules are silent on the obligation of container 
seaworthiness where the container is supplied by the carrier, the Rules seem to 
apply to the inland carriage where the contract of carriage is intended to be 
door-to-door. 130  This suggests that whilst the obligation of container 
cargoworthiness is applicable only to damage caused during the voyage, 
damage can also relate to acts or omissions causing the defect prior to the 
voyage, i.e. before and at the beginning of the voyage. Gertjan van der Ziel, a 
participant in the drafting process has expressed in private email 
correspondence with the author the opinion that the title to Article 14, namely, 
‘specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea’ places emphasis on the 
point that the duty is applicable only to damage caused by a defective container 
during the voyage. The obvious question that arises is whether it is important for 
the Rotterdam Rules to extend the obligation of seaworthiness to cover the land 
carriage leg. Any attempt to answer this question would inevitably lead to further 
questioning as to the legal implications of limiting the seaworthiness obligation 
to the sea carriage leg only. This will now be discussed in the next section. 
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7.5.1 The Importance of Extending the Obligation to Land 
Carriage 
The scope of the cargoworthiness of a container is limited to the sea carriage. It 
was suggested that there is no valid reason why such an obligation should be 
limited in scope in the same way as the carrier’s obligation to exercise due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.131 It was noted that even if the duty is 
extended, the Rotterdam Rules do not impose a direct duty on the sub-carrier, 
nor would it support recourse unless the carrier contracts to the higher standard. 
In order to achieve this, the head carrier must ensure that requirements for 
carriage by sea are followed by the sub-carrier.132 Arguably, this would benefit 
the cargo-interests, as well as the carrier. Further, the standard of care 
extended to the land carrier will and should be at a similar level to the standard 
of due diligence in keeping the container fit during the land carriage. As a result, 
the chance of a vessel becoming unseaworthy will be reduced.133 
It was further suggested with a hypothetical example that if the exercise of due 
diligence is not imposed on the maritime performing party prior to shipment, the 
cargo-claimant will not be able to seek an indemnity from the maritime 
performing party who was responsible for the safe transport of containers within 
the port even though his negligence has resulted in the container becoming 
defective.134 
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7.5.2 The Effect of the Multimodality on the Obligation of 
Seaworthiness 
Solutions provided by Articles 26 and 82 create three potential problems 
explained in detail in Chapter Five and summarised individually below. 
   
7.5.2.1 Unknown Standard of Care 
First,135 when Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules is read in conjunction with 
general liability provision of the inland conventions, e.g. Article 17(2) of the 
CMR, the net result hardly appears to be the one intended by the drafters; the 
liability system will be similar to the one under the Rotterdam Rules and, 
therefore, would defeat the purpose of Article 26 of the Rules. It has been 
suggested, in this respect, that the interpretation of the wording ‘specifically 
provide[d] for the carrier’s liability’136 would solve the problem if the wording is 
construed in such a way as to include all the duties inferred from the general 
liability rules of the inland regimes, e.g. Article 17 of the CMR.137  
The requisite standard of examining a container in order to satisfy obligations 
under the Rotterdam Rules is still unknown. It was argued in Chapter Five138 
that potential adherence to safety standards other than widely used 
international safety codes, i.e. the IMDG Code, may result not only in damage 
to the cargo inside the container but may also affect the vessel’s seaworthiness. 
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In Chapter Five, 139  it was noted that during inland carriage, national safety 
regulations, e.g. ADR,140 provide standards of checking containers and tank 
containers but it was also questioned whether the standard of care required is 
similar to that required by the IMDG Code. Even if the safety standards of ADR 
are presumed to be equal to the IMDG Code, the crew on board the carrying 
ship may not be familiar, e.g. with the labelling and marking provisions of ADR. 
Thus, accidents are likely to occur. The solution put forward in Chapter Five 
was to label and check the fitness of the container according to the IMDG Code 
during the inland transit by applying its provisions to the inland operator/carrier 
(if the contracting sea carrier is in control of the entire carriage), instead of 
applying ADR.141 
 
7.5.2.2 Cancelling Out the Ongoing Obligation of Seaworthiness142 
If an inland water carriage regime takes precedence over the sea carriage 
regime and, in accordance with the conditions mentioned in Chapter Five, the 
provisions of CMNI were held to be applicable rather than the Rotterdam Rules, 
the effect would be to cancel out the extended obligation of seaworthiness, as 
well as the obligation of container cargoworthiness. 143  This is because the 
obligation of seaworthiness under the CMNI Convention is not extended to the 
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entire voyage and there is no obligation of cargoworthiness in respect of 
containers supplied by the carrier.144  
 
7.5.2.3 Derogation of the Standard of Seaworthiness Obligation 
Assuming further that the CMNI Convention governs the contract, a problem 
might emerge from the untested language of the Convention. The phrases 
‘regulation in force’ in Article 3.3 of the CMNI Convention might be construed in 
different jurisdictions to constitute, for example, national or regional regulations 
rather than international regulations.145 This may have the implication that the 
carrier would be obliged to adopt only local regulations governing the scope of 
seaworthiness of the vessel and containers. As a result, the standard of 
seaworthiness would be lessened as the resulting standard would not be 
pursuant to the international shipping standards, which set the prevailing 
standards of maritime safety. Further, it was doubted in Chapter Five146 whether 
the obligation of seaworthiness should be tested against the condition of the 
contemplated contracted voyage as there is nothing in the CMNI Convention 
obliging the carrier to do so. However, this notion will be redundant if the CMNI 
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Convention requires the obligation of seaworthiness to be tested against the 
conditions to be encountered during the contracted voyage.147 
The multimodality of the Rotterdam Rules has opened the door to a number of 
potential problems. The lack of the application of the container cargoworthiness 
concept,148 the uncertainty of conflicting laws,149 the multimodal trans-shipment 
problems and the uncertainty as to the applicable regime on the carrier’s liability 
may disturb the balance of fairness that is meant to arise from the extension of 
the carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence to provide both a seaworthy 
vessel and container during the voyage.150  
In summary, it seems from the above analysis that the Rotterdam Rules are far 
from being free of juridical or political problems. The end conclusion is that the 
Rotterdam Rules cannot be favoured as a transport regime to govern 
multimodal carriage, 151 unless further modification of their provisions are 
effected or certain contractual terms are used by parties to resolve the 
uncertainties created by the Rules. 
7.6 Suggested Modification 
Insofar as the first proposal is concerned, a suggested addition to both Articles 
26 and 82 would be a provision to the effect that  
                                               
147 
See para.5.7, at p.368. 
148 
See the example of the CMNI Convention para. 5.6.1, at p. 359, also see at para.5.9.1, at 
p.373. 
149
 See the example para.5.4.3, at p.352. 
150 
See para 5.6.3, at p.364.
 
The multimodality of the Rotterdam Rules may affect the continuing 
seaworthiness obligation if one of the inland regimes, e.g. the CMNI Convention, took over the 
obligation of seaworthiness, as the extended seaworthiness obligation could be cancelled out 
with a similar potential impact on the container cargoworthiness obligation, as explained in 
para.5.6.1, at p.359. 
151
 See para.5.9.3, at p.376.   
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‘when the provisions of other conventions and/or instruments are 
applicable, a claim for unseaworthiness must not be reduced to a 
standard below the minimum standard applicable under Article 14(a)-
(c).’152   
This modification is essential to prevent the cancelling out of the seaworthiness 
obligation and consequential liability, for the reasons explained above. 
A second approach that was suggested in Chapter Five153 is the non-mandatory 
use of contractually agreed terms in the contract of carriage. Obviously, this can 
only be done where contractual modification is allowed and could be used in 
order to set a minimum liability amount in accordance with the minimum 
benchmark set by the Rotterdam Rules. Such an approach might help parties to 
solve many of the multimodality generated problems, e.g. derogation from or 
cancellation of the obligation of seaworthiness and/or container 
seaworthiness.154  
However, there are some downsides to the non-mandatory approach, where, 
for example, the contractual carrier’s recourse against sub-contractors cannot 
be known. Thus, the addition of a small contractual provision to include the right 
of a third party to claim against the sub-contractor for a similar amount would 
assist parties in directing any action against the party actually at fault. 155 
However, as explained, freedom of contract may not reduce the chance of 
                                               
152 
See para.5.10.1, at p.377. 
153 
See 5.10.2, at p.381. 
154 
See proposals below, para.7.7, at p.476. 
155 
If there is no control of the contract between the cargo-interest and the carrier, the carrier 
could match the claimant’s right to his recourse position which might be set at a low level. The 
network approach depends on the application of mandatory rules in the contract with the 
contracting carrier. 
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adopting a less protective approach in countries where the carrier has a 
stronger negotiating power.156  
A solution157 to most of the above problems is to use a general and uniform 
provision which removes the need for a separate rule of seaworthiness and is 
applicable to all the modes of transport that might be used in door-to-door 
carriage.158 However, in doing so, there may be no assurance as to whether all 
the facets of seaworthiness are adequately addressed. The shipping industry is 
constantly developing. Future inventions and technological developments in 
respect of a vessel’s hull or cargo holds are not envisaged to create difficulties 
insofar as the obligation of seaworthiness pursuant to Article 14(a) is 
concerned.159  
This obligation is now extended to a cargoworthy container. The balance is 
tipped in favour of the cargo-interests, creating an apparently fairer relationship 
between carriers and cargo-interests. Nevertheless, as it has been shown 
above, the position is far from clear in respect of the multimodal aspect of the 
Rotterdam Rules that is regulated by Articles 26 and 82.160 The result may be 
that the scope of the seaworthiness obligation is limited to the period before and 
at the beginning of the voyage.161 Accordingly, and further to Article 3.3 of the 
CMNI Convention, the carrier cannot be held liable for the unfitness of a 
                                               
156 
See Chapter Five, para.5.10.2, at p.383. 
157
 See para. 5.10.1.1, at p.378. 
158 
Unlike the suggestion to use a general liability provision, such as Article 5.1 of the Hamburg 
Rules, this general liability provision is not a uniform liability provision.  
159
 It might be a reason for not adopting a central liability provision similar to Article 5.1 of the 
Hamburg Rules because there is no clear guidance as to the relevant standard of care to be 
adopted. See para.5.10.1.1, at p.379. 
160 
As indicated in para. 5.3, at p.338-339, Article 82 is not confined to unlocalised damage. 
161 
Article 79(1) cannot protect cargo-interests from the lessening of the recognised duty by the 
application of the relevant set of rules. It is merely to protect cargo-interests from an express 
agreement in derogation of the recognised duty, as any such attempt is rendered void. 
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container he supplied.162 In this respect, a suggestion is that either a clause 
could be added to the contract of carriage or, as a long-term approach, a 
provision could be added to Article 82 on the first revision of the Rotterdam 
Rules to the effect that the obligation of seaworthiness and the responsibility of 
the contracting carrier are continuing throughout the entire transportation.163 
Consequently, the multimodal carrier would be subject to the responsibilities 
imposed and the liabilities entailed by Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules.      
Finally, the Rotterdam Rules, as far as door-to-door carriage is concerned, do 
not improve the position of cargo-interests. Under the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules, a provision in a contract of container carriage excluding liability for the 
non-sea carriage leg would be valid,164 depending on the construction of the 
contract and whether the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules were overridden by other 
express terms. 165  The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules allow exclusion of liability 
during the non-sea stages by the use of express terms, which defeat the 
application of Article III, r.8 that would otherwise apply.166 By analogy, one could 
surmise that the Rotterdam Rules do not provide a better regime as to the 
application of other transport conventions that reduce or rule out the obligation 
of seaworthiness, or are unclear as to particular aspects of liability, such as 
container fitness under the CMR Convention.167 Although, it seems unlikely that 
it would be possible to treat the supply of the container as involving a separate 
                                               
162 
See the potential impact on container cargoworthiness, para.5.6.1, p.359, c.f. Article 16 of 
the CMNI Convention and the absence of any management defence in Article 18.   
163
 See para. 5.11, at p.385. There is a difference between responsibility being divided among 
different persons and the liability of a single person changing according to the mode of transport.  
164 
See para.5.10.2, at p.381. 
165 
See Aikens et al., Bills of Lading, (1
st
 ed., 2006), para.11.68; Finagra v O.T. Africa Line[1998] 
2 Lloyd's Rep. 622. 
166 
See f.n. 195, at p.384. 
167
 See para.5.9.3, at p.375. 
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contract, it might be possible to exclude liability for damage occurring during a 
land section for which the carrier had not contracted but where the damage was 
due to a defect in a container which he had supplied.168  
As solutions to the above problems, the following paragraphs contain proposed 
provisions.  
 
7.7 Proposals 
 
7.7.1 Provision for Vessel Seaworthiness and Container Cargoworthiness 
‘If more than one international convention applies to loss, damage or delay of 
the cargo provided that the unfitness of the vessel or containers is the cause or 
the partial cause to the loss, damage or delay, the provisions regarding the 
carrier’s obligation (Article 14) and liability (Article 17) relating to seaworthiness 
must govern such a claim.’169 
or 
‘Any provision of any inland intentional convention that derogates from or rules 
out the obligation and liability of the carrier in respect of container 
cargoworthiness will be null and void.’ 
 
                                               
168 
There is a greater chance perhaps that responsibility for inspection of container could be 
passed to the sender or liability shared. 
169 
See para.5.10.2, at p.382. 
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7.7.2 Provision to Include the Obligation of Container 
Cargoworthiness to the Inland Carriage when Supplied by the 
Sea Carrier 
‘[The] [any] inland carrier has a duty to exercise due diligence to keep 
containers which are provided by the sea carrier, cargoworthy (seaworthy) 
during the inland carriage.’170 
 
7.7.3 Provision for Chemical Container Cargoworthiness 
‘Any exercise of due diligence by the carrier or inland carrier in respect of the 
fitness of a container must comply with the international shipping standards 
including, at least, those provided in SOLAS and the IMDG Code.’171 
So long as a regime fails to remove uncertainty as to liability for 
unseaworthiness, the danger looms that large exporting countries, such as 
China, will excessively concentrate on the economic impact of such 
imperfection of the rules, which might distract attention from their ratification. 
This may be the fate of the Rotterdam Rules.  
Whether the Rotterdam Rules are the right or wrong choice for regulating 
liability for unseaworthiness on a multimodal basis depends on the balance of 
risks and fairness between parties being improved in relation to the current law 
with regard to both the imposition and the limitation of liability for 
unseaworthiness. In most of the situations observed above and, particularly in 
                                               
170 
See para.5.4.1, at p.344. As explained above, this duty can only be imposed if the head 
carrier imposed it in the contract, see Chapter Seven, para.7.5.1, ‘Importance of extending the 
obligation to inland carriage’.  
171
 See the discussion under para. 5.4.1, at p.340. 
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jurisdictions that have ratified none of the inland transport conventions, the 
regime created by the Rotterdam Rules would be better and fairer as regards 
liability for unseaworthiness. 
 
7.8 The Burden of Proof and Commercial Risk Allocation 
In Chapter Three,172 the burden of proof under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
was explained in four phases as follows. First, in a seaworthiness (or any other) 
claim, the burden is on the claimant to establish a prima facie case of loss or 
damage against the carrier.173 Secondly, the carrier may choose to disprove the 
loss alleged by the claimant or to prove that the damage was caused by one of 
the exceptions available under Article IV, r.2. At this stage, the carrier does not 
need to prove that he provided a seaworthy vessel in order to rely on one of the 
exceptions under Article IV, r.2.174 
Thirdly, the claimant may defeat the carrier’s reliance on Article IV, r.2 by 
providing evidence to demonstrate that the defect that caused the damage 
resulted from unseaworthiness.175 
Finally,176 if the claimant succeeds in rebutting the carrier’s defence, the carrier 
may still be able to challenge the claimant’s allegation by proving that the defect 
that caused the damage emerged in spite of his exercise of due diligence 
pursuant to Article III, r.1.177 
                                               
172 
See generally para. 3.2, at p.174. 
173
 See para. 3.2.1, at p.175. 
174
 See para. 3.2.2, at p.176. 
175
 See para. 3.2.3, at p.178. 
176
 See para. 3.2.4, at p.193. 
177 
See in Chapter Three, para. 3.3, at p.193, the carrier is not required to prove that he had 
exercised due diligence in all aspects of seaworthiness, i.e. the exercise of due diligence in 
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7.8.1 Problems under the Current Law 
The current English case law on the burden of proof is undoubtedly far from free 
of difficulties. For instance, the claimant has the burden of proving the 
unseaworthiness and he should also prove the unseaworthiness as a cause of 
loss. Such difficulties were discussed in Chapter Three.178 
First,179 the carrier is the one who has access to all of the relevant information 
about the vessel.180  
Secondly,181 the limited obligation of due diligence clearly indicates that in order 
to prove that the vessel was unseaworthy, the evidence must demonstrate that 
the defect that caused unseaworthiness must be related to the time before the 
commencement of the voyage. This may require the claimant to carry out 
expensive, impractical and lengthy procedures in order to review an excessive 
                                                                                                                                          
respect of hull, machinery, equipment, etc. but merely in the aspects relevant to the allegation 
by the cargo-claimant. 
178 
See para. 3.2.3.1, at p.178. 
179
 See para. 3.2.3.1, at p.178. 
180 
The claimant may search for evidence that may be irrelevant or inadmissible because he 
does not know what exactly went wrong or what caused the unseaworthiness, and he may 
therefore lose his case. The unseaworthiness may be caused by a chain of events, which may 
prove the unseaworthiness if put together. However, it may be difficult for the claimant to prove 
all of the omissions or acts especially if they were exercised at different times, well before the 
unseaworthiness ought to be discovered. See the definition of relevance as a test for 
determining whether one fact should be regarded as ‘relevant’ evidence or should be backed up 
with other fact(s) to form evidence in Digest of the law of Evidence (12
th
 ed.) art.1. This test was 
approved in R v Nethercott [2001] EWCA Crim 2535, [2002] 2 Cr App Rep 117; Tapper, C., 
Cross and Tapper on Evidence, (11
th
 ed., 2007), pp.69-74; Anderson, P., The Mariner’s Role in 
Collecting Evidence, (2006, The Nautical Institute). In this book, the Rt Hon. Lord Clarke, former 
admiralty Judge and now Justice of the UK Supreme Court, says: “Courts depend upon 
evidence. Contemporary evidence is of the utmost importance. It is vital to make a note or 
report of any incident immediately”. 
181
 See para. 3.2.3.1, at p.180. 
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list of evidence.182 Thirdly,183 it is unclear as to what extent the claimant must 
prove the unseaworthiness as a cause of loss, although it may be true to say 
that the law does not demand proof of causation, only proof of probable 
causation.184     
The above demonstrates that the current law does not balance the difficulties of 
proof fairly. It should be, in an ideal world, easier and more logical for a court to 
mitigate the standard of proof on the claimant, who has little or no means of 
access to the facts required to prove the unseaworthiness or the cause of 
unseaworthiness. 185  Changes to the current law are not impossible as the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not make specific stipulations as to who bears 
the burden of proof of fault. Thus, one can draw suggestions from the approach 
or the obiter dicta of the court. This takes us to briefly demonstrating the 
potential solutions that can be adopted by the court. 
 
7.8.2 How can the current principle be ameliorated in order to 
improve current law?  
                                               
182 
See the difficulties faced by the claimant in collecting evidence and whether such evidence is 
evaluated or not. Anderson, P., The Mariner’s Guide to Marine Insurance, (The Nautical Institute, 
1999), pp. 69-78.   
183
 See para. 3.2.3.1, at p.178. 
184 
Gregg v Scott [2005] 2 A.C. 176, [2005] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 130, on appeal, the House of 
Lords held that even if the qualification of future losses was coincidentally decided on the 
evaluation of risks and chances, the plaintiff had to show that the loss was consequential on 
injury caused by the defendants’ negligence. Causation had to be shown on the balance of 
probabilities. 
185
 In a recent case, CHS Inc Iberica SL and Another v Far East Marine SA (The Devon) [2012] 
EWHC 3747 (QBD)(Comm), despite the fact that the claimant has to make out its case on 
evidence as to the vessel’s causal unseaworthiness, Mr Justice Cooke stated that the case was 
not a case where an inference of unseaworthiness could be drawn from the timing of the 
breakdown. However, he said that: “I am entitled to bear in mind the timing of the engine 
breakdown and the absence of material evidence adduced by the owners,” para.21.  
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One suggested solution is that the common law principle should no longer be 
applied.186 Instead, the carrier, who knows what he did or did not do towards the 
discharge of his obligation to exercise due diligence, should be, in the first place, 
burdened with proving seaworthiness in connection with the cause of the loss or 
damage and, failing that, with proving that he exercised due diligence. This is 
the bailment approach.187 The court can follow the approach of McHugh J in the 
Australia High Court.188 As the judge put it, the fact that the cargo reached its 
destination in a damaged condition or never arrived amounts to evidence of 
breach of the seaworthiness obligation and it is, therefore, incumbent on the 
carrier to prove the contrary.  
Another suggested solution 189  relates to the court’s readiness to infer the 
vessel’s unseaworthiness. This approach was suggested by Scrutton LJ, 190 
where he stated that it is enough for the court to feel that the ship had been 
seaworthy and, on the balance of probabilities, that the claimant had discharged 
his burden of proving this point. However, one cannot consider this approach of 
the court as a complete solution, as the courts need to consider certain factors 
                                               
186
 See sub-para. ‘Shifting the burden to the defendants - the bailment approach’, at p.186. 
187  
This is also a common law concept but should not be confused with the common law 
principle applied by courts in the absence of specific provisions or guidance in the HVR in 
relation to the burden placed on the cargo-claimant to prove the vessel’s unseaworthiness in the 
first place.    
188  
Great China Metal Industries Co. Ltd v Malaysian International Shipping Corp Bhd (The 
Bunga Seroja) (1998) 72 ALRJ 1592, p.1611, per McHugh J. In non-seaworthiness cases, see 
Pendle & Rivett Ltd v Ellerman Lines Ltd (1927) 29 Ll. L. Rep. 133, p.136, per MacKinnon J. 
The carrier is virtually required to negate the fault on his part. Briefly discussed in para. 3.6, at p. 
199.  
189 
See sub-para. ‘The inference of unseaworthiness- a life buoy for the claimant’, at p.183.  
190 
See Cosmopolitan Shipping v Hatton & Cookson (1929) 35 Ll. L. R 177, cited in M. Clarke, 
Aspects of The Hague Rules: A comparative study in English and French Law, (Martinus Nijhoff 
- The Hague, 1976), at p.177. See sub-para. ‘The inference of unseaworthiness - a life for the 
claimant’, at p.185. 
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in order to determine whether such an inference can and will be drawn.191 Each 
case will be determined on its particular facts and circumstances which may 
lack those factors that would avail the court of the reasons to draw the inference 
by the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.192  
The above, however, should be addressed by means of expressed provisions 
or adopting a new set of rules.     
It was suggested in Chapter Three193 that, in order to strike a better balance 
between the parties, when the burden is on the carrier who invokes an excepted 
peril, the cargo-claimant should be allowed to simply disprove the existence or 
causal connection of the excepted peril invoked by the carrier rather than 
showing that the vessel departed in an unseaworthy condition. This is important 
in situations where it would be easier for the cargo-claimant to rebut either the 
existence of the peril or the causal connection between the peril and the loss, 
rather than proving unseaworthiness.194  
If the above propositions are not considered as applicable, it could be 
suggested that a term can be agreed between the parties in the contract of 
carriage to oblige the carrier to disclose material information, e.g. charts, 
                                               
191 
This approach is limited as the inference of negligent causation by the defendant is possible 
only if (1) in the type of situation the defect that caused unseaworthiness does not occur by itself 
unless there is negligence; and (2) other possible responsible causes are sufficiently eliminated 
by the evidence. For further information, see Wright, R., Proving Causation: Probability versus 
Belief, cited as Chapter 10 in R. Goldberg, Perspectives on Causation, (2011, Hart Publishing), 
p.219. Further, see carriage of goods by sea cases: Anderson v Morice (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 609. 
In this case, Blackburn J stated that: “During the argument we gave our judgment that the 
evidence was such as to make it a fair question for the jury whether the ship was or was not 
unseaworthy, and was or was not lost by perils of the seas, and therefore that the rule to enter 
the verdict for the defendants on those issues was properly discharged. The question whether 
the verdict was against the weight of evidence was not before us,” at p.615. 
192
 See p.184, f.n. 64. 
193
 See sub-para. ‘Rebutting the Existence of the Peril’, at p.189.  
194
 See a similar approach in the American case New Rotterdam Insurance Co. v S.S. 
Loppersum 215 F. Supp 563, 1963 AMC 1758 (S.D.N.Y 1963). See sub-para. ‘Rebutting the 
Existence of the Peril’, at p.190. 
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loading plan, log books, which may help the claimant disprove the 
seaworthiness of the vessel.195 
 
7.8.3 The Apportionment of Liability 
It was discussed in Chapter Three that it would be arguably fairer if the carrier 
was not allowed to rely on any of the excluded perils/causes unless he had 
proved first that he exercised due diligence in respect of the matter in question. 
However, it is also arguable that fairness and practicality dictate that the 
defendant carrier should not be answerable for the entire damage if he adduced 
evidence that gives an indication about the extent to which he was responsible 
for.196 It was therefore argued in Chapter Three197 that the court should be 
allowed to exercise discretion in apportioning the loss between the contributing 
causes and the carrier should not be held answerable for the entire damage 
that is caused by more than one causes, e.g. damage caused partially by 
unseaworthiness and partially by an excluded peril, e.g. the fault of shipper. The 
extent of loss of each party may be determined by using a court’s own system 
to apportion liability.198 Thus, the carrier may be liable for only part of the loss 
even if the carrier cannot establish the extent to which a loss was due to 
                                               
195
 See sub-para. ‘Rebutting the Existence of the Peril’, at p.192. 
196
 The obligation under Article III, r.1 has been construed as an ‘overriding obligation’ and if the 
carrier has failed to fulfil this obligation, he cannot rely on a defence listed in Article IV, r.2. See 
the discussion on this point in para. 3.6, at p.200. 
197
 See para. 3.5, at p.197.  
198
 Asariotis, R., ‘Burden of proof and allocation of liability for loss due to a combination of 
causes under the new Rotterdam Rules’, (2008) JIML 537-554, at p.543; same point in  
Asariotis, R., ‘Loss due to combination of causes: burden of proof and commercial risk 
allocation’, cited as Chapter 6 in R. Thomas (ed.), A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea  - The Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), at p.148. 
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something other than his own negligence.199 It is arguably fairer to apportion the 
loss if the possible defence is the fault of the shipper rather than, e.g. perils of 
the seas.  
The counter argument to this suggestion is that this approach might lead to non-
harmonised decisions by national courts as each court would apply their own 
rules and this might lead to forum shopping by the parties.200 
Generally, the commercial world is dissatisfied with the current state of the law 
on liability for unseaworthiness and there have been calls in this respect for 
reform in favour of the cargo-interests.201 Part Two of Chapter Two assessed 
whether the Rotterdam Rules provide a solution.  
 
7.9 Burden of Proof under the Rotterdam Rules 
 
It has been mentioned that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are silent as regards 
who should prove what. What has been provided by the Rotterdam Rules? 
 
7.9.1 The Impact of Codification on Allocation of Risk  
                                               
199
 Asariotis, R., ‘Loss due to combination of causes: burden of proof and commercial risk 
allocation’, cited as Chapter 6 in R. Thomas (ed.), A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods 
by Sea  - The Rotterdam Rules, (Lawtext Publishing Limited, 2009), at p.152; at p.210. 
200
 See para. 3.5, at p.198. 
201
 Treitel, G. and Reynolds, F., Carver on Bills of Lading, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), para. 
9.243; Tetley, W., Marine Cargo Claims, (Blais, 4
th
 ed., 2008), p.889; Margetson, N., The 
system of liability of articles III and IV of the Hague [Visby] Rules, (Paris Legal Publishers, 
2008), p.180; Ezeoke, C., ’Allocating onus of proof in sea cargo claims: the contest of conflicting 
principles’, [2001] LMCLQ, 261; Wijffels, R., ‘Legal aspects of carriage in containers’ (1967) 
Transportrecht, 331-349, p.345. 
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The codification of the burden of proof in the Rotterdam Rules follows the 
current general practice in many jurisdictions. 202  In the US, for example, 
COGSA is, in terms of the burden of proof and liability, to a large extent203 the 
same as the new Rotterdam Rules.204 Potentially, the extent of changes will 
depend on how the courts in different jurisdictions will interpret Article 17 of the 
Rotterdam Rules. Part of such changes will depend on the way that the court 
had interpreted the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
the Rotterdam Rules has codified the initial hurdle for the claimant in respect of 
proving his case. It is suggested that this codification brings certain advantages 
in that205 (a) it might provide an alternative way to adduce prima facie evidence 
which solves the difficulties in proving that unlocalised damage occurred during 
the period of responsibility;206 and, (b) codification makes easy the difficulties in 
discovering the delay, i.e. reference made to the words ‘events or 
circumstances’ in Article 17(5)(b) would make it possible to prove a delay that is 
caused by unseaworthiness rather than proving the delay itself. One useful 
outcome of the codification of the burden of proof is that the burden is now 
applicable to inland transportation modes. Thus, a claim might be raised for loss 
that occurred during the sea carriage (where the sea carrier is responsible only 
for damage caused within his period of responsibility and not damage that 
                                               
202
 There have been arguments from some States that the new burden of proof is complicated 
and imposes a significant change compared to current international law. See Hooper, C., Book 
Review, (2010) 41 JMLC 145, p.150, whereas many others believe that the new convention 
simply codifies the current practice of the Chinese Maritime Code. On this point, see Tuzhou, S. 
and Li, H. H., ‘The New Structure of the Basis of the Carrier’s Liability under the Rotterdam 
Rules’, (2009) 14 Uni. L. Rev. 931, p.942. 
203
 With the exception that the Vallescura rule was not included in the Rules. 
204
 Sturley, M., ‘Modernizing and reforming US Maritime law: The impact of the Rotterdam Rules 
in the United States’, (2009) 44 T.I.L.J. 427, p.9. 
205
 See sub-para. ‘The potential advantage / disadvantage in codifying the claimant’s prima facie 
evidence’, at p.207. 
206
 See sub-para. ‘a) The inference raised from the prima facie loss of, or damage to, the cargo 
that occurred outside the period of respobility/carriage of the container by the sea carrier’, at p. 
207. 
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caused during the inland carriage) and for loss that was caused during another 
carriage leg (i.e. where the inland carrier is responsible for such damage).207 As 
regards the second stage of a claim,208 it is clear that the Rotterdam Rules took 
into account both the civil and common law regimes. The carrier must either 
prove that at least one of the causes of the loss was caused by something not 
attributable to his fault (Article 17(2)), or alternatively, that one or more of the 
listed excepted perils caused or contributed to the loss (Article 17(3)). This 
separation is important to provide a choice under Article 17(2) similar to that 
under Article IV, r.2(q), which has been used by mainly civil law countries, e.g. 
France, where their systems have, historically, not used the exclusion list under 
Article IV, r.2(a)-(p) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules (similar but not identical to 
Article 17(3)).209 However, Article IV, r.2(q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
differs from the Article 17(2) of the Rotterdam Rules. The catch-all exclusion 
(Article IV, r.2(q)) under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, may be interpreted as 
an ejusdem generis to the rest of the exclusion list in Article IV, r.2(a)-(p) of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. 210  Whereas, the language of Article 17(3) in the 
Rotterdam Rules is clear to lend itself to being an alternative means of liability 
exemption to the approach of Article 17(2)) in the system of liability provided for 
by the Rotterdam Rules.211 It was argued that it seems easier for the carrier to 
invoke Article 17(3) than Article 17(2).212 
Further, a close reading of Article 17(2) with Article 18 finds that, although the 
burden of proof appears to be easier (for instance, the carrier’s defence is not 
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 See sub-para. ‘(b) The inference raised from the prima facie delay occurred during the sea 
carriage’, at p.208. 
208
 See para. 3.9.2, at p.209.  
209
 See para. 3.9.2, at p.209. 
210
 See para. 3.9.2, at p.210. 
211
 See para. 3.9.2.2, at p.217. 
212
 See sub-para. ‘(a) The language of Article 17(3)’, at p.218. 
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subject to the overriding seaworthiness obligation), the carrier is liable at all 
times even if the stevedore’s acts are outside of the delegated tasks. How does 
the inconsistency between Articles 17(2) and 18 affect the liability of the 
carrier?213  
One can state that, under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, in order for the carrier 
to succeed under the Article IV, r.2(q) exception in circumstances such as in 
The Chyebassa, the carrier will need to prove that the theft was without his fault 
and for this purpose, essentially, without the fault or neglect of his agents, that 
is, the port’s stevedoring company. If the act causing the unseaworthiness 
(which, in turn, caused the loss or damage) is not within the scope of the 
employee’s delegated task (in these circumstances stealing), the carrier will be 
successful.214 The Rotterdam Rules, under a continued obligation to exercise 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel, would reverse the ruling and 
render the carrier liable for the action of the stevedores under Article 18. Under 
Article 18(d) of the Rotterdam Rules, the carrier will be liable for the acts or 
omissions of his employees (or others within Article 18) even if they perform an 
obligation which is unrelated to the receipt, loading, handling, stowage, carriage, 
care, unloading or delivery of the goods.215 For example, the carrier will still be 
liable for fault of the stevedores, even if their act was outside the course of 
employment, if the act makes the ship unseaworthy and causes damage to 
cargo during the voyage.216 By comparing the two sets of rules, under Article IV, 
r.2 (q) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier’s burden of proof is heavier 
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as he must first overcome the hurdle of the overriding seaworthiness obligation, 
but the carrier can escape liability in the absence of fault or neglect on his part 
and on the part of his employees and agents even if the act caused 
unseaworthiness.217  
At stage three of Article 17(5),218 if the carrier has pleaded one of the listed 
exception perils, the claimant can prove, pursuant to Article 17(5)(a), that the 
loss, damage or delay was ‘probably’ caused or contributed to by the 
unseaworthiness of the vessel. The carrier can then prove, pursuant to Article 
17(5)(b), that none of the events relied on by the claimant caused the loss or 
that it exercised due diligence as to seaworthiness. What is the significance of 
the world ‘probably’? How does this provision differ from the approach of current 
law? 
 
7.9.2 The ‘Probable’ Standard of Causation 
Chapter Three put forward arguments as to the potential interpretation of the 
word ‘probable’.219 Article 17(5) is silent regarding the word ‘probably’. This 
suggests that the standard of causation is left to the national court to decide. 
One cannot judge precisely whether Article 17, in general, has shifted the 
responsibility towards the carrier. For that reason, each new phrase or word will 
need to be re-tested at great expense, 220  but also, the outcome of the 
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interpretation might not shift the balance towards the claimant. For example, it 
may result in the English court regarding the word as indicating balance of 
probability rather than a lowering of the standard of causation. 221 Comparing 
the language of paragraph (5)(a) with (5)(b)(i) of Article 17, the latter has 
excluded the word ‘probability’ that relates to the word proof. This suggests that 
the standard of proof, i.e. the standard of evidence, required by the claimant is 
somehow less than that required by the carrier to prove causation. If this is 
followed by the court, a relatively lesser level of evidence is acceptable when 
comparing it with the level of evidence required from the carrier. This should 
prevent an English court interpreting the word ‘probability’ as referring to the 
‘balance of probability’. 222  A question automatically emerges: What will the 
standard of ‘probability’ be dependent on? Alternatively, what is the potential 
approach of the court in deciding the level of evidence? 
Chapter Three223 discussed that the court is likely to set a benchmark that may 
affect the standard of causation based on case law, on which it will decide the 
standard of probability. The first factor224 that the court may consider is that it is 
even more difficult for the claimant to prove the unseaworthiness of the vessel 
as a cause of damage when she is at sea as opposed to when she is at port.225  
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The second factor226 is that the dynamic standard of due diligence required by 
the carrier might determine the standard of causation. For example, when a 
defect that causes unseaworthiness during sea carriage emerges, the carrier 
may be required to demonstrate that there were no further necessary actions, 
e.g. preventing water flow from spreading to other cargo holds, other than 
exercising due diligence in repairing the defect to keep the vessel seaworthy. 
The claimant might need to prove that, in addition to the defect that caused the 
damage, the crew were incompetent to stop the flow of water from reaching 
other cargo-holds where cargo could have been saved. The level of due 
diligence imposed on the carrier for a particular time and for a particular ship 
may determine whether the vessel is seaworthy or not, and thus change the 
level of the burden of proof required by the claimant to discharge his burden. 
The third factor227 would be that the court may treat the word ‘probable’, in 
reference to both ‘caused’ and ‘contributed’ differently, so that the standard of 
probability for causation is not the same and may be higher than the standard of 
probability for concurrent events, one of which being unseaworthiness. 
Hypothetical examples were given to support the conclusion that it is easier, at 
least theoretically, for the claimant to prove damage that was caused partially 
by unseaworthiness in comparison to proving damage that was caused solely 
by unseaworthiness.228  The relevant evidence and facts that are needed to 
prove causation are likely to be fewer and easier to collect. Thus, it might be 
                                               
226
 See sub-para. ‘The level of probability might dependo n the standard of due diligence on the 
the part of the carrier during the voyage’, at p.232. 
227
 See sub-para. ‘(c) Differentiation between proving the ‘cause of’ or ‘contribution to 
unseaworthiness’, at p.235. 
228
 See sub-para. ‘(c) Differentiation between proving the ‘cause of’ or ‘contribution to 
unseaworthiness’, at p.235. 
492 
 
logical if courts assume that the word ‘probably’ should apply to the word ‘cause’ 
only. 
The fourth factor229 could be that the court might consider the act or omission of 
the carrier that increased the peril that caused the unseaworthiness as a factor 
to bridge any evidentiary gap regarding causation. This means that the court 
may lessen the standard of probability and treat the omission that increased the 
risk as an adequate probability of unseaworthiness as a cause of or contribution 
to the damage and, in turn, the loss. 
Regarding the fifth factor, 230  the court might view the word ‘probably’ as 
superfluous if the provisions of Article 23(6)231 impose an obligation to disclose 
material information to the other party where there is loss or damage to the 
goods.  
 
The Time of Occurrence of the ‘event or circumstance’ that caused the 
Unseaworthiness: Is Proof required? 
The rules are silent on whether the claimant, to prove unseaworthiness, should 
be required to prove the time at which the unseaworthiness occurred. There are 
three potential approaches that a court may adhere to. First, 232  one might 
suggest that inasmuch as the obligation of due diligence is required to be 
exercised for the entire voyage, then it is sufficient that the claimant proves the 
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unseaworthiness and that it caused or contributed to the loss, regardless of the 
time of its occurrence. Support for the above proposition can be given by 
reference to the language of Article 17(5)(a), which does not include any 
requirement to prove when the causative unseaworthiness occurred. A second 
approach is presumed to be more realistic233; on the presumption that the court 
will apply a different standard of due diligence for the period before and after the 
commencement of the voyage, this will require that the time of the causative 
unseaworthiness be proved. It was argued with support of a hypothetical 
example that the claimant will not be required to prove the timing at which 
unseaworthiness occurred. Any burden in respect of the timing will be borne by 
the carrier. It was discussed that the timing issue becomes more acute when 
seen from a multimodal transport viewpoint, where differing regimes of inland 
and sea carriage, e.g. Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, apply. Mainly, the emergence 
of containerised transport, as a result of which it is difficult to prove the stage of 
carriage (whether sea or inland) that the damage has occurred inside a sealed 
container.234  
Thus, some courts may be of the opinion that a claimant should prove, along 
with unseaworthiness and causation pursuant to Article 17(5)(a), the time at 
which the unseaworthiness occurred.235 Otherwise, a court may infer that the 
time at which the unseaworthiness occured was later than the actual time that it 
occured for example, from an evidential perspective, if the claimant has not 
adduced evidence demonstrating when a defect arose, e.g. at an early stage of 
carriage, it could be difficult to say what could have been done about it and 
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whether due diligence was exercised sufficiently and without unreasonable 
delay. From some evidence, the court would know that due diligence was not 
sufficiently exercised, e.g. stopping the flow of water while fixing a defect, and 
the claimant, as a result, would be compensated for the added damage caused 
from not stopping the flow of water or maybe from not acting promptly.236 It may 
be that where the issue is whether the exercise of due diligence may not have 
been sufficient to detect a developing unseaworthiness, some evidence of when 
the defect arose might be necessary to test whether due diligence was 
exercised and was sufficient. It might be logical to put a potential evidential 
burden on the claimant in testing the carrier’s evidence of due diligence. 
A third approach was also discussed, 237  suggesting that in the context of 
damage caused partially by an excluded peril and partially by unseaworthiness, 
it is imperative for the claimant to prove the timing at which the unseaworthiness 
occurred, e.g. whether before or after the unseaworthiness. The sequence of 
the occurrence of each of the two causes (the seaworthiness and the excluded 
peril) is important, as the court in deciding the respective liability will decide the 
proportion of the loss or damage attributed to unseaworthiness on the basis of 
the point in time at which the ‘event or circumstance’ causing the 
unseaworthiness occurred before or after the excluded cause. It was suggested 
that Article 15(b) provides that the burden is on the carrier to prove the exercise 
of due diligence, which might indirectly create a requirement to prove the time of 
the occurrence of the causative unseaworthiness on the carrier.238 
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Once proof of seaworthiness and the probable causation is successfully shown, 
the onus is then shifted to the carrier to either, pursuant to Article 17(5)(b)(i), 
prove the lack of causation or, alternatively, prove that due diligence was 
exercised, according to Article 17(5)(b)(ii).239  
An overall reading of Article 17 shows a shift of risk and liability towards the 
claimant under the Rotterdam Rules; the carrier has, at all stages of liability, 
been encouraged to exonerate himself from liability. On the one hand, the 
doctrine of the overriding obligation of seaworthiness does not exist anymore 
under the Rotterdam Rules where the lack of due diligence defeats an 
exception. In other words, the overriding effect is to defeat a potential applicable 
defence when it is a cause of damage. On the other hand, it is sufficient to say 
that the overriding effect of the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy does not make the carrier liable if unseaworthiness is not a 
cause of the damage.  
To conclude on the above points, the Rotterdam Rules seems to not fully solve 
the problem of liability under the current law and the claimant still faces a heavy 
burden to prove unseaworthiness. Only the court can take into consideration 
that the word ‘probability’ is there to reduce the burden on the claimant in terms 
of a lesser standard of probability of causation, which makes it easier to shift the 
burden to the carrier, who is required to disprove the causation under Article 
17(5)(b)(i). Alternatively the carrier may choose to prove, pursuant to Article 
17(5)(b)(ii), that due diligence was exercised.240  
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However, it was discussed that it may be more convenient for the carrier to 
disprove the fact that unseaworthiness caused the damage under Article 
17(5)(b)(i) than proving the exercise of due diligence under Article 17(5)(b)(ii).241 
One point to support this suggestion is that the imprecise drafting of Article 
17(5)(b)(ii) might cause confusion as to whether the carrier is required to prove 
that he exercised due diligence generally or just in relation to the suggested 
unseaworthiness.242  
7.10. The Apportionment of Liability under the Rotterdam Rules 
The draftsmen of the Rotterdam Rules considered the apportionment problem 
under the current law and, thus, had the intention to qualify that the carrier 
should be liable only for the loss for which he is responsible. There are different 
types of causal combinations,243  such as concurrent causes and competing 
causes.244 In short, if it is a matter of different causes causing part of the loss, 
then Article 17(6) of the Rotterdam Rules only relieves the carrier for the liability 
known to have been caused by the excepted peril. Whether Article 17 of the 
Rotterdam Rules covered the system of the apportionment of damage is a 
matter summarised in the next two paragraphs.245   
 
- Concurrent Causes, One of which is Unexplained 
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It was discussed 246  that, if the matter is left to the court to decide, each 
jurisdiction would exercise its own methods to allocate the burden of proof. 
Nonetheless, the courts must be careful when finding the responsible party. The 
carrier might refrain from showing evidence that renders him liable for any 
negligence or fault of exercising due diligence and allege that the cause of loss 
is unexplained. 247  Different views were given regarding who should be 
responsible for unexplained losses. It may be a solution to impose, on the 
carrier, the burden to prove the cause of the loss. 
 
 - Concurrent Causes, One of which is Unseaworthiness 
Article 17(2)-(5) is not explicit as to who must prove what and to what extent the 
events or circumstances of the excepted peril contributed to the loss, in relation 
to which the carrier can be excluded.248 It is also not clear at which stage this 
would be considered. It was suggested in Chapter Three that courts in different 
jurisdictions might adopt different approaches.  
One possible approach249 might be that proving the extent of liability should be 
connected with the burden of proof that is imposed on each particular party at a 
particular stage of the burden of proof. Another interpretation could be that if the 
carrier proves that one or more of the events or circumstances (the excluded 
perils) caused or contributed to the loss, courts could also impose on the carrier 
the burden of determining the extent of the loss. Similarly, when the burden is 
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reverted to the claimant, as in the example under Article 17(5), the court may 
impose the burden of determining the extent of liability on the claimant.250  
Another possible approach251 would involve giving the court the flexibility in 
determining the apportionment of liability between the two parties (carrier and 
cargo-claimant) where both jointly contributed to the damage of the cargo. This 
approach is closer to the intention of the drafters when most of what was 
proposed in WG III has not persisted. It was discussed252 in Chapter Three that 
for many reasons one should not, due to the imprecise wording of Article 17, 
assume that Article 17(5) could be read to mean that a court in its discretion 
could apply either one of two consequences, i.e. relief from all liability or relief 
from part of the carrier’s liability if either one of two scenarios was the sole 
cause of the loss or a contributory cause of the loss is proven. One reason 
could be that, as far as English law is concerned, the carrier is responsible for 
the whole loss even if an excepted peril is operative, but this has no place under 
the Rotterdam Rules.253 Another reason is that the drafters of the Rotterdam 
Rules stated that liability must be apportioned on the basis of the previous 
paragraph, e.g. Article 17(1)-(5).254 Thus, Article 17(6) should not be considered 
as the stage of apportionment if it is being taken on its own.255 
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7.11 Concluding Remarks 
In the previous Chapters of this study, the provisions relating to liabilities and 
obligations connected with seaworthiness were examined to ascertain their 
satisfactory and unsatisfactory aspects. This investigation has concluded that 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules do not meet the needs of dealing with 
seaworthiness for the following reasons in brief: 
1. As Chapter Two, Part One has demonstrated, the obligation of due 
diligence is limited to the commencement of the voyage, and the risk is 
imbalanced between parties.256 
2. In the same Part, it was demonstrated that courts have not considered 
most of the elements, which determine the exact time at which the 
obligation ends. 257 This creates unbalance between interests due to the 
uncertainty of time at which the potential risk of the contemplated voyage 
starts. 
3. As Chapter Three, Part One has demonstrated, due to the fact that the 
burden of proof is on the claimant to prove unseaworthiness, the 
claimant faces difficulties, i.e. in collecting evidence, to discharge the 
burden of proving the vessel’s unseaworthiness.258 
4. It was demonstrated that the obligation under Article III, r.1 has been 
construed as an ‘overriding obligation’, and if the carrier fails to fulfil such 
an obligation, he cannot rely on a defence listed in Article IV, r.2. As a 
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result, the apportionment of liability for concurrent causes is not allowed 
under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.259 
5. It was demonstrated that, in view of technological advances over the last 
90 years, the exclusion of a carrier from nautical fault would be rendered, 
as reducing the degree of care, unjustifiable.260 
6. As Chapter Four demonstrated, the criteria of ascertaining the 
seaworthiness of the vessel is, to some extent, determined by shipping 
industry regulations (the STCW Convention, SOLAS, MARPOL, and so 
on). Those regulations have, in themselves, some gaps and, on their 
reliance in determining the seaworthiness of the vessel, the risk between 
the parties would be imbalanced and tipped further towards the carrier.261   
7. As Chapter Six demonstrated, the obligation of exercising due diligence 
to provide a seaworthy vessel under Article III, r.1 of the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules is not clear among different States in relation to the supply of 
fit containers, thus, the carrier would be less committed to supply fit 
containers.262 
8. Chapter Five illustrated that the Rotterdam Rules take into account 
transport by other modes and provide the option to extend the scope of 
the Rules to cover land carriage. Should the Rotterdam Rules be 
enforced internationally, a problem will arise in that the door-to-door 
scope of the Rotterdam Rules would impact on the container and thus 
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the seaworthiness of the vessel. 263  This would defeat the object of 
contracts for multimodal transport. Until amendments to the multimodality 
part of the Rotterdam Rules are made, the Rules should not govern door-
to-door contracts.264 
 
During the debates around the Rotterdam Rules, it was mentioned that the 
majority of States are so concerned about the failure of the current international 
carriage conventions to cope with modern shipping practices that if an 
international solution is not found, a regional European one might be 
promulgated. Should the Rotterdam Rules become the law to govern the 
obligation and liability relating to seaworthiness instead of redrafting the 
provisions of the existing regime? Would they suffice to create a sound regime? 
Throughout the thesis, it was demonstrated that the Rotterdam Rules bring 
about the following changes: 
1. Chapter Two, Part Two illustrated that the obligation of exercising due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is continuous under the 
Rotterdam Rules. This will surely balance the risk between the parties.265 
2. In the same Part, it was illustrated that the extension of due diligence to 
the entire voyage has solved the problem of ascertaining the end of the 
due diligence obligation in respect of ‘before and at the beginning of the 
voyage’. However, this problem seems to emerge again when deciding 
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whether the end of the due diligence obligation is at the end of the 
voyage or when the cargo is totally discharged.266  
3. Chapter Six illustrated that the supply of containers is included in the 
obligation to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. This 
will result in harmonisation with regard to container cargoworthiness 
amongst the different jurisdictions.267 Also, further care would be paid in 
supplying containers that will result in balancing the risk between the 
parties. 
4. Chapter Three, Part Two illustrated that the effect of Article 17(5)(a) of 
the Rotterdam Rules is to reduce the burden of proof on the claimant by 
requiring the claimant to prove merely the ‘probable’ cause of 
seaworthiness. However, this will be dependent on how a national court 
interprets the word ‘probable’.268  
5. In the same Part, it was illustrated that Article 17 has qualified the 
apportionment of liability; however, the matter needs to be tested at 
court.269 
6. In the same Chapter, it was illustrated that the ‘navigation fault’ is deleted 
under the Rotterdam Rules. As a result, a better balance has been 
brought about as carriers will be more committed to the disciplines of 
maritime safety and training of crew.270 
7. Chapter Four illustrated that the potential result of extending the exercise 
of due diligence to the entire voyage would put the standard of 
                                               
266
 See para. 2.13, at p.124. 
267
 See para. 6.4.1.2, at p.425. 
268
 See para. 3.12.1.1, at p.264. 
269
 See para. 3.9.4, at p.252. 
270
 See sub-para. ‘(c) Deletion of the error in navigation exception’, at p.219 
503 
 
seaworthiness in line with the latest developments of the industry.271 Also, 
it would not restrict the standard of seaworthiness to match the outdated 
standard of some shipowners. Enhancing this result may require the 
Member States to take on policing measures to ensure adequate 
implementation with the regulations.272 
8. Chapter Five illustrated that the Rotterdam Rules take into account 
transport by other modes and allows the choice of extending the scope of 
cover to land carriage. Should the Rotterdam Rules be enforced 
internationally, despite the problems that emerge under the door-to-door 
scope, they would impact on the standard of the container and thus the 
seaworthiness of the vessel.273 The solution is to conclude the contract of 
carriage with regard the sea carriage only, which is an option available to 
the parties. 274  However, this would defeat the object of contracts for 
multimodal transport. Therefore, there should be an amendment to the 
multimodality part of the Rules, in particular those provisions, which 
potentially allow to derogate from or cancel out the obligation of 
seaworthiness in general and the container cargoworthiness obligation in 
particular.275 
 
From the foregoing analysis of the problems surrounding the law of 
seaworthiness, it is believed that a case for revising standard terms and 
conditions to meet the new legal standards is essential not merely to solve 
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problems, but also to gain considerable steps towards improving the standards 
of the 21st century shipping industry.  
The recent changes in German law276 and standard forms,277 alongside the 
moves of some States to ratify the Rotterdam Rules,278 provide examples that 
demonstrate the inclination for some States to reform the current carriage of 
goods regime and the law relating to seaworthiness.279 However, it is essential 
that any revised or reformed law provides a comprehensive and modern legal 
framework without losing sight of the modern shipping technology that made an 
urgent need for an international regime rather than producing a model law. 280 A 
model law perhaps is a useful short-term or temporary solution to pave the way 
for unification and lower the threshold for fairness between parties in front of a 
long-term solution of amending and adopting the Rotterdam Rules. This is to 
say that when amending the current law or the Rotterdam Rules, one should 
aim to facilitate the balance of justice and enable uniformity in its applications.  
As a result of the above discussions, the author is of the view that the 
Rotterdam Rules should not be adopted to govern the rights and obligations of 
                                               
276
 The new German Maritime Trade Law (came into force on 21 April 2013). Some significant 
changes in the German Law are similar to the Rotterdam Rules; (1) the law abolishes the 
exclusion of liability for damages due to error in navigation or fire, and (2) extends the period of 
responsibility beyond the tack-to-tackle stage. Under the new law, the carrier cannot exclude his 
liability by virtue of individual agreements and the incorporation of general terms and conditions 
into the contract. The carrier remains liable for loss of and damage to goods while they are in 
his (or his subcontractors) custody. 
277
 Such as Exxonmobile Voy2012, provide the Rotterdam Rules into the paramount clause, in 
which the bill of lading shall have effect subject to the Rotterdam Rules. 
278
 Moves are under way to introduce a bill into Parliament by mid-2014 designed to accelerate 
the process of ratification by the Netherlands of the Rotterdam Rules. Further, in July 2013, the 
US State Department has completed its ‘ratification package’ for the Rotterdam Rules. It is 
believed that the Rotterdam Rules have now cleared a significant hurdle on their way to 
ratification by the US. 
279
 See Chuah, J., The New German Act on the Reform of Maritime Trade Law, [2013] 19 JIML, 
p.6. 
280
 Hashemi, S., “The Rotterdam Rules: A blessing?” (2012) LMLJ, 227-267, p.227. It was 
stated that: “It can be argued that adoption of uniform rules to harmonise and bolster 
international trade will not only enhance legal certainty, but also play a fundamental role to 
facilitate new access opportunity, reduce legal obstacles to the flow of international trade among 
all states, and improve efficiency, both domestically and internationally.” 
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parties in general and the seaworthiness obligation in particular. The Rotterdam 
Rules should be sent back to the drafters with comments and constructive 
criticism in order for amendments (such as those discussed in this Chapter and 
those raised by academics) to be made. On balance, the Rules do not improve 
the current law, nor do they balance the parties’ relationship. The Rotterdam 
Rules do not provide a comprehensive and modern legal framework, especially 
as regards the multimodality provisions and liability of the carrier provisions. 
If the current law is not reformed by the legislature, it is hoped that judges in this 
and other jurisdictions appreciate that it might be time for courts to react 
accordingly. It is hoped that courts in various jurisdictions act in a way that 
provides a harmonised approach, which balances fairness between the parties. 
Nonetheless, this might only be achievable in common law countries where 
judges are not restricted in their actions by the legislator.  
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Effect of shipping standards on the charterparty obligation of 
seaworthiness; the example of SOLAS 
Talal Aladwani

 
Introduction 
Laws relating to the Carriage of Goods by Sea have emerged from policies of customs of 
practice, precedents and ships’ operators. For example, the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and 
Hamburg Rules
1
 were contrived from the common law to properly regulate the commercial 
interests of a contract at the relevant time. Law is changeable, which means that it can be 
reformed according to the development of the shipping industry. This development results from 
the practice of good seamanship, quality customs, scientific researches, and so on,
2
 which make 
a major involvement in setting the shipping sector to form codification in regulations, codes, 
conventions and so on, whereby constituting the standard of the shipping industry. This is the 
standard that courts take into consideration in deciding their cases
3
 and the benchmark for 
measuring and distinguishing prudent and diligent shipowners from negligent ones who do not 
perform their obligations prudently and diligently when they exercise their obligations, i.e. in 
providing a seaworthy vessel.  
It is known that there is no formal obligation for the decision-maker to accept such standards. 
For example, despite what has been said above that the law is a dynamic, international 
                                               

 I should like to thank Dr Gotthard Gauci (University of Plymouth) for his helpful comments on an 
earlier draft to this paper. It was published in EJCCL 3:2 (2011). 
1
 Before that, there was the Harter Act. 
2
 Numerous groups and associations (of non-governmental origination) have contributed to the process of 
developing safety regulations, such as: shipbuilders and equipment manufacturers; shipping companies 
including shipowners, charterers, fleet operators and managers; seafarers; shippers and cargo owners; 
insurers; classification societies and standard-setting bodies; port authorities; and navigational aid 
services. The rise in marine incidents led to extensive research funded by governments: The UK 
Department of Transport, in 1988, funded research carried out by the Tavistock Institution. This research 
resulted in the report The Human Element in Shipping Casualties 2 (HMSO, London, 1988) ISBN 0 11 
551004 4. This report was then taken to the IMO. In 1992, the House of Lords Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, chaired by Lord Carver, issued a report on the Safety Aspects of Ship Design 
and Technology House of Lords Session 1991-92, HL Paper 30-II and HL Paper 75. 
3
 The shipping industry’s conventions, codes, regulations, and so on are the standards which create the 
force behind nearly all the technical standards and legal rules for safety at sea and prevention of accidents, 
pollution, loss of life and cargo at sea. See P. Boisson Safety at Sea (Bureau Veritas, 1999), 137. 
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convention, i.e. Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, they do not usually maintain all of the recent 
developments of the industry; for example, the emergence of new regulations or 
recommendations which would influence directly or indirectly the carrier’s 4  obligations to 
provide a seaworthy vessel if they did not comply. The need to adopt new standards to cope 
with the thrust of new technologies and developments applying to vessels and their equipment 
has caused the shipping industry to experience numerous developments, starting with the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention and the Convention on Standard of Training, Certification 
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention). And as part of the solution to keep 
abreast of new development, such development must be taken into consideration, i.e. standard 
form charterparties.   
This article sheds light, in general, on these conventions as well as their problems which affect 
the obligation of seaworthiness. It is therefore essential to deal with the current Carriage of 
Goods by Sea law (under common and Hague/Hague-Visby Rules) which is of crucial 
importance to the industry’s standards, and that may influence a carrier in complying with the 
obligation of seaworthiness. 
The objective concept of seaworthiness in statutory regulations and charterparty  
Shipowners
5
 have to comply with a number of requirements required by the charterparties. 
These obligations, ordinarily, are set out in the statutory regulations and often are mentioned in 
the contract of carriage, in general terms, and in standard form charterparty.
6
 
(a) Statutory regulations 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules bind the carrier before and at the beginning of the voyage to 
exercise due diligence to:
 7
  (a) make the ship seaworthy;
8
 (b) properly man,
9
 equip
10
 and supply 
the ship,
11
 and to encounter the contemplated perils of the voyage.  
                                               
4
 This word is used for the entire paper referring to shipowners or demise charterer.  
5
 The term shipowner is used throughout this paper in its widest meaning. This includes the bareboat 
charter and ship manager; in other words, is the sea carrier excluding the time or voyage charterer. 
6
 Although the word ‘seaworthiness’ may well not be present. (see i.e. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v 
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 Q. B. 26; [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 478), for instance the New York 
Product Exchange form 1946, lines 21-24, expressly provides that on her delivery, the ship shall be ‘ready 
to receive cargo with clean swept holds and tight, staunch, strong and in every way fitted for the 
service…with a full complement of officers, seamen, engineers and firemen - for a vessel of her tonnage.’ 
See also NYPE 1993 cl.6. 
7
 Article III r.1. 
8
 The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 40: damaged plating and deformation of the bracket rendered the 
vessel unseaworthy; Southern Sugar & Molasses Co Insurance v Artemis Maritime Co Insurance [1950] 
AMC 2054: loose rivets rendered the vessel unseaworthy; Huilever SA v The Otho [1943] AMC 210: a 
crack in one of the ship’s hull plates rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
9
 The Roberta (1938) 60 Ll Rep. 84: the court held the ship to be unseaworthy because the shipowners 
employed an engineer who proved to be incompetent. The Eurasian Dream [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719: 
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(b)  Charterparty 
The vessel and her equipment must be reasonably fit to withstand the perils which may 
foreseeably be encountered on the voyage and also fit to keep the contracted cargo. This 
approach is taken in both voyage and time charter. This is often mentioned in general terms in 
standard form charterparty. Alternatively, the word ‘seaworthiness’ may well not be present;12 
for instance, the New York Product Exchange form 1946, lines 21-24,
13
 whereas, some forms 
are requesting further details in additional typed clauses.
14
 Other forms may impose a continuing 
obligation to maintain the vessel and a clause paramount which incorporates the Hague/Hague-
Visby Rules; similarly the US COGSA.
15
 If no mention is included in the charterparty, the 
seaworthiness will be implied on the basis of the term from the English law or on the basis of 
legislation in the Scandinavian countries. 
The impact of the industry on the standards of seaworthiness 
The drafting of the statutory regimes, such as the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, is a 
codification of old laws, precedents and customised conditions, which were gathered in 
one set of rules to meet the standards of the industry. This shows that when drafting 
such rules, they are reflecting the industry at the time of their codification. Therefore, 
with the improvement of sea carriage and the development of the industry, it emerges 
that the legal question which determined the required level of seaworthiness has 
                                                                                                                                          
the master’s ignorance of fire hazards, supervising stevedores and particular characteristics of the fire 
fighting on the ship constituted incompetence consequently rendering the vessel unseaworthy due to 
improper manning. 
9
 Project Asia Line Inc v Shone (The Pride of Donegal) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 659: defects in the 
generators which amounted to a real risk that the ship might have been left without power during the 
course of voyage rendered the vessel unseaworthy; Haracopos v Mountain (1934) 49 Ll. L. Rep. 267: a 
defect in the steering gear rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
10
 Project Asia Line Inc v Shone (The Pride of Donegal) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 659: defects in the 
generators which amounted to a real risk that the ship might have been left without power during the 
course of voyage rendered the vessel unseaworthy; Haracopos v Mountain (1934) 49 Ll. L. Rep. 267: a 
defect in the steering gear rendered the vessel unseaworthy. 
11
 A Turtle Offshore SA v Superior Trading Inc (The A Turtle) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 177: there was a 
breach of the exercise of due diligence in providing inadequate bunker at the commencement of the 
voyage which rendered the tug unseaworthy; however, the defendants were protected from liability by an 
exemption clause; Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Makedonia v Owners of the Makedonia 
(The Makedonia) [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 316: contaminated bunker fuel rendered the vessel unseaworthy.  
12
 See i.e. Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd [1962] 2 Q. B. 26; [1961] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 478. 
13
 It expressly provides that on her delivery, the ship shall be ‘ready to receive cargo with clean swept 
holds and tight, staunch, strong and in every way fitted for the service…with full complement of officers, 
seamen, engineers and firemen for a vessel of her tonnage.’ See also NYPE 1993 cl.6.  
14
 See, i.e. NYPE 1993 cl.6. 
15
 See, i.e. NYPE 1993 cl.31. in such a case, if the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules are incorporated into a 
charterparty and if they provide an absolute obligation of seaworthiness, the obligation thus will be 
reduced to one to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. See Time charters, para. 34.5.  
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possibly reformed over time and will continue to change with the trends of the shipping 
industry.
16
  
 
It was noted that ‘the concept of seaworthiness both in contracts for the carriage of goods by sea 
and in chartering contracts includes evaluations by the shipping community as a whole.’17 
Therefore, seaworthiness, which might be in the form of an international convention or standard 
form charterparty, is judged by the standards and the practices of the industry.
 18 
 
 However, these same international requirements include the origin of the industry itself.  
Cresswell J. in The Lendoudis Evangelos II
19
 affirmed the words of Lord Sumner that 
‘[s]eaworthiness must be judged by the standards and practices of the industry at the relevant 
time, at least so long as those standards and practices are reasonable.’20 
These aspects of the industry’s standards are a yardstick for measuring and distinguishing good 
shipowners from those who do not comply with these standards, breaches of which might cause 
the unseaworthiness of their vessels.
 21
 
It was mentioned above that there are vast numbers of regulations governing the industry’s 
standards and it would be impossible to cover every one of them in this study.
22
 Despite that, 
there are several numbers of regulations relating to the industry’s standard. However, this paper 
will cover the international public standards of the industry which have a direct impact on 
obligation of seaworthiness. These particular standards of the industry, which govern the 
seaworthiness of vessels, are regulated primarily by IMO conventions, namely:
23
 
                                               
16
 Lord Sumner – Bradley & Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Co. (1926) 24 Ll. L. Rep. 446 (1927) 
27 Ll. L Rep. 395 as per Lord Sumner. Lord Sumner in a case prior to the emergence of the Hague-Visby 
Rules describes the situation: ‘In the law of Carriage of Goods by Sea, neither seaworthiness nor due 
diligence is absolute, both are relative among other things to the state of knowledge and the standards of 
[industry] prevailing at the time.’   
17
 Hannu Honka, ‘The Standard of the Vessel and the ISM Code’, cited as Chapter 4 in Johan Schelin, 
Modern Law of Charterparties (Axel Ax:son Johnson Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, 
University of Stockholm, 2003), at p.114. 
18
 Cooke, J., Young, T., Kimball, J., Lambert, L. & Martowski, D. Voyage Charter (3
rd
 edn, 2007), 
Chapter 11, para. 11,19.  
19
 The Lendoudis Evangelos II [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 304, at p. 306. 
20
 This exact approach is followed by the same judge in the Papera Trades Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai 
Merchant Co. Ltd and Another (The Eurasian Dream) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719 at para. 127. 
21
 Talal Aladwani, ‘The supply of containers and “seaworthiness”-The Rotterdam Rules perspective, 
Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce 42:2 (2011), p.185-209, at p. 194. 
22
 Although other regulations contribute to the industry’s standards, such as the Classification Society, 
they generally exclude the ship’s operational standards (i.e. manning, crew qualification, equipment 
management and lifesaving appliances such as lifeboats, life rafts and lifejackets), navigational aids 
(onboard equipment and navigational equipment such as radar, electronic charts and Gyro). 
23
 Susan Hodges has affirmed that safety of ships relates to seaworthiness, although it has a specific and 
precise meaning under the maritime law. Still, this particular aspect of safety is regulated primarily by 
IMO conventions, namely: SOLAS 1974, Load Lines Conventions 1966 and STCW 1978. 
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 International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 197424  
These industry regulations are determining the level of adequacy that the vessel’s structure and 
cargo holds must be designed thereof; also, they are necessary to define the required reliability 
of its machinery and equipment, which reflect the shape of the minimum standard of 
seaworthiness.  
This means that the required standard of care or due diligence set by law might be assessed by 
the reference to the standards of the industry that reasonable prudent shipowners would require 
such a standard to his vessel.
25
 For instance, when science produces new means or 
improvements to ensure safety at sea, their purpose is to develop the industry’s standard;26 for 
example, if international conventions require the vessel to be modified, the absence of them 
might render the vessel unseaworthy, even in the case that their usage has not become common 
practice.
27
 Non-compliance with these new means (regulations) might constitute the vessel 
unseaworthy in two ways: On the one hand, at least for UK vessels, if a vessel is not carrying 
certificates such as Load Lines
28
 or a radio equipment
29
 certificate then that declares that the 
vessel, among other matters, does not comply with the international regulations, so therefore the 
vessel will be unseaworthy.
30
 On the other hand, if the vessel’s construction does not comply 
with the industry’s standards, for example SOLAS, then the vessel will be rendered 
unseaworthy.
31
  
Therefore, considering the purpose of the SOLAS Convention which is a part of the shipping 
industry, ‘to specify minimum standards for the construction, equipment and operation of ships, 
                                               
24
 For example, certificates required by SOLAS are to be issued by the flag administrations including 
international tonnage certificate, passenger ship safety certificate, cargo ship safety certificate and load 
line certificates. 
25
 In due diligence case the judge in Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (The 
Eurasian Dream) [2002] EWHC 118, at p. 127 case said that ‘…seaworthiness must be judged by the 
standards and practice of the industry at the relevant time at least, so long as those standards are practical 
and reasonable…’ per Cresswell Judge; see The Subro Valour [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 at p.516; also 
the same point in The Kapitan Sakhrov [2000] C.L.C. 933, Auld LJ stated: ‘…the test to be objective, 
namely to be measured by the standards of a reasonable shipowner, taking into account international 
standards and the particular circumstances of the problem in hand,’ at p.947. 
26
 The common law implied undertaking requires that the vessel be a seaworthy vessel. There is no 
implied undertaking that the vessel be a ‘safe ship’ in UK law, though this is probably is in the USA for 
American cases; see Hutton v Royal Exchange Assurance [1971] N.Z.L.R. 1045 Sc.; The Fiona [1994] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep, 506; Woolf v Clagget [1800] 170 E.R. 607. 
27
 As far as British vessels are concerned  
28
 Schedule 3 of the MSA 1995, this schedule gives effect to the international convention on load lines 
signed in London on 5 April 1966. 
29
 These rules were adopted into English law by the Merchant Shipping (Safety of Navigation) regulations 
2002 SI 2002/1473, as amended by SI 2004/2110. 
30
 See Cheikh Boutros v Ceylon Shipping Lines (The Madeleine) [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 224 where the 
documentation for the voyage was inadequate and this was held to render the vessel unseaworthy. 
31
 See The Miss Jay Jay [1987] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 32 (C.A.), a design error; namely, using materials during 
design which were quite unsuitable for the purpose of navigation was held to render the vessel 
unseaworthy. 
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compatible with their safety,
32
  the industry’s standard of conduct is mandatory by virtue of 
SOLAS.   
SOLAS
33
 
The SOLAS Convention sets some rules for the minimum standards for safe construction of 
vessels and the basic safety equipment necessary to be on board. The Safety Convention, such 
as SOLAS, has an influence on the objective seaworthiness
34
 concept in chartering.
35
 The 
obligation of seaworthiness
36
 imposes on the carrier a duty to carry out all reasonable measures 
in the light of the standards in the industry for the purpose of providing a seaworthy vessel and 
to ensure the safe state of the vessel.
37
 SOLAS regulates these minimum standards for the 
construction of the vessels and her cargo holds.
38
 Materials used should have a particular 
standard and construction. It should also be designed in such a way to withstand the perils of the 
sea and the weight of the cargo so as to protect the lives of personnel and the cargo from 
damage and/or loss.
39
  As regards to the equipment of the vessel, they should be of an approved 
                                               
32
 The International Safety Organisation. Available: http://www.imo.org/conventions/contents.asp? 
Topic_id=257& doc_id=647.  
33
 The generally accepted international regulations, procedures and practices governing ship construction, 
equipment and seaworthiness which are required by Article 94 and other provisions of UNCLOS to 
observe are basically those contained in SOLAS, Load Lines Convention and MARPOL. 
34
 But only to the extent that safety rules and regulations intended to prove safety and protect the ship and 
cargo on board. 
35
 Hannu Honka, ‘The standard of the vessel and the ISM Code cited as Chapter 4 in Johan Schelin, 
Modern Law of Charterparties (Axel Ax:son Johnson Institute of Maritime and Transport Law, 
University of Stockholm, 2003), at p.114. 
36
 Whether implied seaworthiness by the common law or expressed by the carriage conventions, i.e. 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules or Hamburg Rules, or by the standard form charterparties. 
37
 Under the revision introduced by the Merchant Shipping Act 1974, there was a change of terminology 
from an unseaworthy ship as in the old s457 M.S.A. 1894 to a ‘dangerously unsafe ship’ under s44 M.S.A. 
1988 in respect of a vessel ‘unfit to go to sea’. This certainly seems to return it closer to the concept of 
seaworthiness than ambiguous term ‘unsafe’ which fails to specify safety regarding the ability to go to sea 
and safety for the crew, vessels and cargoes. The most recent section of M.S.A. 1995 has altered all the 
above section numbers. 
38
 See The Princess Victoria [1953] 2 Lloyd’s 619. Inadequacy in the stern doors were of a poor design. 
The vessel was not capable of coping with the ordinary perils of the sea and sank in the Irish Sea. The 
court of appeal upheld the lower court that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the inadequate construction 
of the stern doors which made her unable to cope with the peril of the sea, per Lord MacDermott, CJ. 
Also see The Marine Sulphur Queen [1973] 1 Lloyd’s 88. The court held that the vessel breached 
building regulations and was therefore unseaworthy. It is important to say that the construction 
regulations of merchant vessels are extracted from the regulations of SOLAS, Load Lines and 
classifications society of the vessel; see also Leonard v Leland (1902) 18 T.L.R. 727. During lifeboat drill, 
a hook fell off and a davit broke. The plantiff, the lifeboat and the hook fell into the water. The jury, due 
to a defective hook and davit of the lifeboat, has ruled for the plaintiff. The lifeboats, their hooks and 
davits are regulated nowadays by SOLAS regulation, Chapter III regulation 19-20.  
39
 See The Princess Victoria [1953] 2 Lloyd’s 619: inadequacy in the stern doors were of a poor design. 
The vessel was not capable of coping with the ordinary perils of the sea and sank in the Irish Sea. The 
Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s decision that the vessel was unseaworthy due to the inadequate 
construction of the stern doors which made her unable to cope with the perils of the sea, per Lord 
MacDermott, C.J. See also The Marine Sulphur Queen [1973] 1 Lloyd’s 88. The court held that the vessel 
breached building regulations and was therefore unseaworthy. It is important to state that the construction 
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type of machinery with enough spares on board in case of failure; for example, navigational 
equipment, there should be a spare or stand-by equipment ready to be used at all times. This 
indeed includes the electric insulations. Vessels should be fitted with adequate means of fire 
detection and protection along with different means of extinguishers to fight fire.
40
 Life-saving 
appliances should be adequate to ensure that the crew are prepared to save their life and others 
in case of emergency. 
SOLAS also contributes to preventing pollution of the environment. If its provisions are not 
properly observed, this might equally constitute a lack of due diligence. 
41
  
This again makes no difference when comparing SOLAS with the duty to exercise due diligence, 
which is the effort of a competent and reasonable carrier or any person working for him to 
provide a safe and seaworthy vessel to fulfil the requirements set out in Article III r.1.
42
     
Due diligence obliges the shipowner to carry out all reasonable measures in the light of the 
standards of the industry for the purpose of providing a seaworthy vessel and to ensure the safe 
state of the vessel.
43
 In this manner, the safety of shipping is, at present, governed principally by 
the international industry standards, i.e. conventions and regulations. SOLAS is therefore one of 
those standards.
44
 However, is SOLAS, being a standard bearer of the industry, adequate enough 
to govern the major part of aspects of seaworthiness? 
                                                                                                                                          
regulations of merchant vessels are extracted from the regulations of SOLAS, Load Lines and 
classifications society of the vessel. 
40
 This proposition is discussed below by the examples of Papera Trades Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai 
Merchant Co. Ltd and Another (The Eurasian Dream) [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719, as per Creswell J.; also 
see The Star Sea [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 651. (When the fire broke out in the engine room, the master did 
not know how to operate the CO2 system to fight the fire. Tuckey J. held that the vessel was unseaworthy 
due to an incompetent master). 
41
 Both Safety of Life at Sea and the Load Line Conventions deal with safety and seaworthiness of the 
vessel; see Carbett H. Spurin The Law of International Trade and Carriage Chapter 9, at p. 33. Available: 
electronic book cited in The National Academy for Dispute Resolution website: 
<www.nadr.co.uk/articles/ articles.php?category=4>. The same point was raised by Philippe Boisson 
Safety at Sea: Policies, Regulations & International Law (Bureau Veritas, 1999), 197. 
42
 W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 4
th
 edn. (Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), Chapter 15, p. 876. He defines 
due diligence as ‘genuine, competent and reasonable effort of the carrier to fulfil the obligations set out in 
subparagraph (a), (b) and (c) of Article III (1) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.’ See also, N. J. 
Margetson, The System of Liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague (Visby) Rules (Zutphen: Uitgeverij 
Paris 2008). 
43
 Under the revision introduced by the Merchant Shipping Act 1974, there was a change of terminology 
from an unseaworthy ship as in the old s.457 M.S.A. 1894 to a ‘dangerously unsafe ship’ under s.44 
M.S.A. 1988 in respect of a vessel ‘unfit to go to sea’. This certainly seems to revert more closely to the 
concept of seaworthiness than ambiguous term ‘unsafe’, which fails to specify safety regarding the ability 
to go to sea and safety for the crew, vessels and cargoes. The most recent section of M.S.A. 1995 has 
altered all the above section numbers. 
44
 W. Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims 4
th
 edn. (Éditions Yvon Blais, 2008), Chapter 15, p. 876. He defines 
due diligence as ‘genuine, competent and reasonable effort of the carrier to fulfil the obligations set out in 
subparagraph (a), (b) and (c) of Article III (1) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.’ See also, N. J. 
Margetson, The System of Liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague (Visby) Rules (Zutphen: Uitgeverij 
Paris 2008). 
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The effect of SOLAS’ deficiency on seaworthiness  
A carrier has equipped his vessel according to SOLAS, but due to the deficiency of SOLAS, the 
vessel is still regarded as unseaworthy despite the fact that such unseaworthiness is not a lack of 
the carrier’s action to provide a seaworthy vessel, but merely due to the inadequacy of 
regulations. Case law illustrates the point. 
For instance, in The Eurasian Dream case, the standard of the industry set by the SOLAS 
Convention was clearly questioned. In The Eurasian Dream, the court criticised the safety 
standards of the vessel, in particular the inadequacy of her safety equipment. SOLAS had set out 
the required amount of safety equipment to be placed onboard. A fire broke out causing the 
vessel and its cargo to be a totally lost. The court held that, inter alia, the vessel was 
unseaworthy for not being fitted with the adequate number of walkie-talkies as part of its safety 
equipment, which would have assisted the crew to communicate with each other in case of an 
emergency.
45
 Despite the owner of the Eurasian Dream having complied with the standards of 
SOLAS by providing the exact number of walkie-talkies required, the court nevertheless found 
that the owner had breached the obligation to exercise due diligence in providing an adequate 
number of walkie-talkies. The vessel, therefore, was unseaworthy. 
Even with the aid of the International Safety Management System (ISM) Code,
46
 such problems 
might not have been discovered and would contradict the statement that ISM ‘is a system used 
daily which is actually growing and developing through a process of continual improvement.’47  
Compliance with the SOLAS Convention does not guarantee the seaworthiness of a vessel in all 
respects because the compliance with the shipping industry’s conventions, such as SOLAS, does 
not have the same value in international law. For instance, the direct effect of the incompliance 
with the regulations of the industry by the shipowner may be prone to the vessel being refused 
to commence her voyage from the port in question by denial to provide the vessel with 
clearance certifications and documents, or due to incompliance of such regulations including the 
shipowner incurring a fine or being refused entry to the port of destination. The consequences of 
                                               
 
45
 Another example of SOLAS deficiency. For instance, SOLAS required a chart as a replacement of the 
regular paper chart. The same regulator might not have adequate or clear directions on the use of the new 
equipment. Eventually, it will result in a response by another regulator to produce guidelines promoting 
safe use of such equipment. 
46
 Hannu Honka, ‘The Standard of the Vessel and the ISM Code’ cited in Johan Schelin (ed) Modern Law 
of Charterparties (Jure AB, 2003). It was noted that some ISM Clauses, such as the BIMCO Standard 
ISM Clause: ‘seems to leave room for uncertainties. In any case, it is clear that the owner will not be 
liable on the basis of this clause, unless there is a causal link between the breach of the clause and the 
damage, expenses and delay.’ at p.112. 
47
 Philip Anderson ISM Code: A Practical Guide to the Legal Insurance Implications (2
nd
 edn, 2005), 
Chapter 1, para, 1.1.  
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incompliance/compliance with such regulations are not clear whether it amounts to a breach of 
seaworthiness or not. Subsequently, it may affect their legal bearing and the practical 
effectiveness on the obligation of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel. In other words, 
the shipowner on one hand will be reluctant to comply with such regulations if it is not enforced 
under the flag of the vessel or included in the terms of the particular contract. On the other hand, 
the judgement by the port state in regard to whether the vessel is unseaworthy/seaworthy, due to 
incompliance with SOLAS regulations, will be determined by the notion of the port inspector 
when having in mind that the SOLAS Convention is not a decisive evidence of seaworthiness. 
The judgment of such inspector,
48
 indeed, will be affected on the way that such a flag state 
implements SOLAS to its law.
49
  
For example, the English court in The Eurasian Dream held that the SOLAS Convention was 
not a decisive evidence of seaworthiness. When the fire started, the ship was offloading a cargo 
of cars in Sharjah. The crew were not able to contain the fire and as a result the vessel was 
abandoned and towed away from her berth. She was eventually lost. The cargo owners claimed 
for the cargo damage arguing that the vessel was unseaworthy. The court held that the vessel 
was unseaworthy, inter alia, due to the inadequacy of its safety equipment; The Eurasian 
Dream needed more walkie-talkies for communication and more sets of breathing apparatus to 
fight the fire, despite the fact that she had complied with the SOLAS Convention by possessing 
the required amount of safety equipment, i.e. walkie-talkies and fire-fighting equipment at the 
time of the incident.  
What can a shipowner do to overcome the inefficiencies of SOLAS? 
The judge in the Eurasian Dream case alluded to the point that the shipowner had exercised the 
required standard of due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel and to identify the ‘risk’ of 
unseaworthiness to ‘establish safeguards’ to avoid loss or damage from that unseaworthiness. 
Mere compliance with the one of the industry’s standards, i.e. the SOLAS Convention, is not 
conclusive as having exercised due diligence by the carrier, nor is it sufficient for the vessel’s 
physical seaworthiness. However, that suggests the following: the carrier needs to determine his 
vessel’s seaworthiness by assessing the standard of seaworthiness, not merely at the outset of 
the voyage, i.e. before and at the beginning of the voyage, but at all times and not merely 
relying on meeting the industry regulations or recommendations, such as SOLAS. He should 
draw on the inherent specialised knowledge that he possesses or ought to possess regarding the 
                                               
48
 This, in turn, might result in a dispute as to whether the refusal or delay of the vessel caused the failure 
of the carrier to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
49
 See Baris Soyer and Richard Williams (2005) Potential legal ramifications of the International Ship 
and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code on Maritime Law LMCQL 515. at 525. 
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fitness of his vessel and by so doing
50
 will know the standard of care necessary to fulfil the 
obligation of seaworthiness. The point that ‘the standard of seaworthiness must rise with 
improved knowledge of shipbuilding and navigation’51 is not fully embraced by SOLAS. That is 
to say, relying exclusively on the regulations of the shipping standards (such as SOLAS) to 
determine the satisfactory standard of seaworthiness is an erroneous approach.
52
 Those 
regulations, especially technical ones such as involving fire and safety equipment,
53
 mostly 
evolve from reactions
54
 to maritime incidents and are therefore the initiator or amendments to 
the regulation. As a result, the adherence to them by the carrier will not satisfy the obligation of 
seaworthiness. 
What can be done to improve the current situation and reduce malpractice regarding shipping 
standards? 
 
Maintaining the standard of shipping by the use of particular standard forms 
 
Since the introduction of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, there have been tremendous 
technological developments with regard to electronic aids and navigation. New methods of 
performing contracts of carriage have become possible. Thus, ‘the standard of due diligence [to 
provide a seaworthy vessel] required from the carrier gets higher and higher everyday’.55 It is 
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 Knowledge is known exclusively to the carrier/shipowner, such as the stability of the vessel. See Onega 
Shipping & Chartering BV v JSC Arcadia Shipping (The SOCOL 3) [2010] EWHC 777. The improper 
stowage of cargo had affected the vessel’s overall stability on departure from the last loaded port in 
Finland. This was an aspect that only the chief officer and master would have known about, not the 
charterers. The Judge, Mr Justice Hamblen, found that there had been a failure on the part of the master 
and chief officer to supervise the cargo stowage properly with the ship’s stability and ultimate 
seaworthiness in mind. See also Donaghy, T. ‘There goes the deck cargo’, Maritime Risk International 
(12 Nov. 2010). 
51
 Burges v Wickam (1863) 3 B. & S. 669, at p.693, per Blackburn J. 
52
 It is important to note that the private sector plays an important role nowadays in the enhancement of 
the safety and seaworthiness of vessels. The International Chamber of Shipping, for example, issues 
recommendations to reinforce precautionary measures during loading or discharging operations. See Long 
Campaign Lloyd’s List, 7 Sept., 1995; the international Cargo Handling Coordination Association 
(ICHCA), to ensure proper performance of operations. See ‘Pressure grows for action on 
overloading/discharging practices’ International Bulk Journal Dec. 1994, 99-101; Insurers also have large 
contributions to enhance the proper practice that failed  to reflect due diligence or due care. See for 
example Figures hide why bulk carrier sinkings are still a problem Lloyd’s List, 14 Aug. 1992. 
53
 Horrocks, C. Challenges Facing the Shipping Industry in the 21st Century Sixth Annual Cadwallader 
Memorial Lecture (15 Sep. 2003) at p. 3. 
54
 For example, the origin of the ISM Code was as a reaction from representatives of the UK during the 
15th session of the IMO in November 1987. They requested that the IMO immediately investigate designs 
to improve the safety of roll-on/roll-off ferries. The Secretary of the General International Chamber of 
Shipping said: ‘It is often said that advances in the technical regulation of shipping tend to follow a 
casualty - that the maritime sector responds to, rather than anticipates its problems.’ Horrocks, C. 
Challenges Facing the Shipping Industry in the 21st Century Sixth Annual Cadwallader Memorial 
Lecture (15 Sep. 2003) at pp. 3-4. 
55
 Hakan Karan (2005) The Carrier’s Liability under International Maritime Conventions: The Hague, 
Hague-Visby, and Hamburg Rules (Edwin Mellen Press) 282.  
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debatable whether seaworthiness requires the shipowner of an older vessel to upgrade its 
machinery and equipment in order to satisfy the existing standards of seaworthiness. A 
shipowner cannot be expected to constantly keep up with all the latest expensive advanced 
technology. However, the shipowner is to some extent required to furnish his vessel with some 
recent developments in the industry. The requirement of a ‘reasonable shipowner’ in preparing 
or providing a seaworthy vessel is determined objectively to change over time
56
 and with 
technological developments.
57
 Further, it was argued that the shipowner is obliged to implement 
such new technology that will affect the seaworthiness of the vessel, if it is directly related to 
the shipping industry as is the case with the International Safety Management System (ISM) 
Code
58
 which has become mandatory.
59
 Ignorance of the provisions of the International 
Maritime Organisation  (ISM, SOLAS, MARPOL and so on) may point to the violation of 
seaworthiness duty on the part of the shipowner in connection with safe operation of his 
vessel.
60
 That said, there has been judicial reluctance to include the development of machinery 
and equipment of the industry as part of the shipowner’s duty to provide a seaworthy vessel,61 
provided that those technological advances are not yet standard for a particular carriage.  
Nonetheless, an obligation in the current law on the part of the shipowner to provide a 
seaworthy vessel accompanied by a clause similar to Clause 52 of the Shelltime charterparty
62
 
would put the shipowner at risk of breach of due diligence (to provide a seaworthy vessel) as it 
puts a burden on him to exercise all the practicable precautions, i.e. modify or fit new equipment 
according to the shipping industry in order to bring it in line with the recently developed 
standards of the industry. For example, The Elli and The Frixos,
63
 although a recent case 
concerning not only SOLAS but also MARPOL. However, it illustrates the fact that a shipowner 
must modernise to meet the latest amendments of the standards of the industry. The owner of 
the two oil tankers, The Elli and The Frixos, time-chartered the vessels on a Shelltime 4 form. 
The tankers were described as ‘double-sided’. After approximately 20 months, and before the 
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 Sze Ping-fat, Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby Rules (Kluwer Law, 2000), 60. 
57
 See W. E. Astle Shipping and the Law (Fairplay Publication, 1980), 87. 
58
 See W. E. Astle Shipping and the Law (Fairplay Publication, 1980), 87. 
59
 W. Tetley, Admiralty Law, 84, Sze, Liability, 60. 
60
 Sze Ping-fat Carrier’s Liability under the Hague, Hague-Visby Rules (Kluwer Law International, 2000), 
60. It might be right to say that the ISM Code strengthened the connection between the shipping standard 
and seaworthiness, but does not create the view that the shipping standard is part of the seaworthiness 
evaluation. However, the code may provide the basis for deciding fault or lack of due diligence. 
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 President of India v West Coast Steamship Company (The Portland Trader) [164] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 443. 
(United States case); American Smelting & Refining Co. v S. S. ‘Irish Spruce’ and Irish Shipping Co. Ltd 
(The Irish Spruce) [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 63, at p. 68. (US District Court of New York). 
62
 Clause 52 of the Shelltime 4: ‘Owners warrant that the vessel is in all respects eligible under 
application (sic) conventions, laws and regulations for trading to and from the ports and places specified 
in Clause 4 of the Charter Party…but not limited to, MARPOL 1973/1978 as amended and SOLAS 
1974/1978 as amended and extended.’ 
63
 Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v ST Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 119; [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 908. 
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end of the charter period, new MARPOL Regulations 13F, 13G and 13H came into force which 
required all oil tankers to have the relevant documents relating to the physical condition of the 
vessel in order to carry heavy grade oil cargo. Vessels should be fitted with double bottoms or 
double sides, extending along the total length of the cargo tanks. The double bottom tanks of 
The Elli and The Frixos did not run the entire length of the cargo tanks. Instead, bunker tanks 
protected the last two tanks (slops tanks) rather than ballast tanks as required by the new 
MARPOL regulations. It was held that the warranty in Clause 52 of the charter applied to both 
upon and after delivery of the vessels to the charterer. Furthermore, the same clause explicitly 
applied to future sailings and expressly referred to the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions. 
Thus the vessel was unseaworthy for not complying with the new amendment of MARPOL as 
required in Clause 52.
64
 It is arguable as to whether the industry standards always meant that the 
standard of due diligence resulted in a seaworthy vessel.
65
 This statement would be beyond 
doubt if a clear obligation in the contract of carriage enforced the shipowner to adopt the new 
regulations. This is commensurate with saying that the obligation is an ongoing one. But is it 
enough to overcome the above problems and adopt future shipping industry and therefore add a 
provision in the charterparty to impose a continuous obligation on the carrier? 
Because the obligation of obtaining a document relating to SOLAS or other certificates of the 
IMO were not required prior to the commencement of the voyage or at least at the time of 
delivery, this does not equate to the obligation to ‘maintain the vessel in or restore her to’ her 
condition on delivery.  Therefore, the standard of seaworthiness does not render it to be 
adequate even if a provision in the charterparty is imposing a continuous obligation of 
seaworthiness for the entire voyage without a maintenance clause similar to Clause 3(a) in the 
Shelltime 4. For that reason, the seaworthiness standard will be based on a standard that was set 
at the time before and at the beginning of the voyage or at her delivery which is not an adequate 
standard if a new regulation is being enforced after the commencement of the voyage. Thus, it 
would not be regarded as a duty after the beginning of the voyage. Furthermore, not any 
maintenance obligation would be a solution. For example, a form such as NYPE
66
 would not 
impose adequate obligation of seaworthiness to solve the problem even if requiring the owner to 
maintain the vessel in ‘a thoroughly efficient state in hull and machinery during service’, 
                                               
64
 It is difficult to argue that obtaining a document which was not required at the time of delivery can be 
part of an obligation to ‘maintain the vessel in or restore her to’ the condition in which she was at delivery. 
65
 In some countries, they have taken the lead in promoting safety and seaworthy vessels by adopting new 
navigational and other safety requirements in advance of the international conventions. Ropner, W. G. D. 
Promoting High Standards at Sea - The Shipowners’ Contribution: a paper delivered in Fitness at Sea - 
The International Conference on Seaworthiness in 1980 organised by Newcastle University, at p. 44.   
66
 NYPE 1993 cl.6, also Clause 1 of the NYPE. It was said that ‘New York Product form differs from the 
Shelltime form in that it requires to maintain the efficiency of the ship for the service, rather than her 
fitness.'  
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because it omits the requirement that she be efficient for the service, rather than her fitness.
67
 
The same is relevant with the Shelltime 4
68
 combined with the obligation of due diligence. The 
carrier will be only required to exercise due diligence to maintain or restore the vessel to the 
original status as was prior to the commencement of the voyage, unless if Clause 3(a) is being 
added to the charter and is not confined to hull, machinery or equipment which has deteriorated 
since delivery. If a new SOLAS requirement came into force or it was suggested to fit new 
equipment or to modify the structure of the vessel, then the carrier has to take a diligence effort 
to restore such changes.
69
 
The standard is, however, said to be raised if a new regulation under the conventions comes into 
existence requiring the shipowner to carry out further tasks, such as modification to the hull, 
other than those previously required for maintaining the vessel. This is only possible if there is a 
clause in the charterparty contract obliging the shipowner to do so, i.e. Clause 52 of the 
Shelltime 4. Otherwise, the owner is obliged to carry out such modification before a new 
contract of carriage is agreed, when the regulation would be part of an initial obligation of due 
diligence.
70
  
The Elli and The Frixos case confirmed that the court will not take into consideration 
developments in the industry that might take place any time after the vessel commences her 
voyage during the course of the charter period as part of the seaworthiness obligation even if the 
obligation was a continuous one. Therefore, it was noted that considerations of expediency are 
already reflected in the charterparty contract and to add a clauses to them would indicate an 
extension of the shipowner’s obligation in maintaining the fitness of the vessel rather than the 
basic obligation of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules.  
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 See Terence Coghlin, Andrew W. Baker, Julian Kenny and John D. Kimball Time Charter (6
th
 edn., 
2008), para. 11.17. 
68
 Words appear in Line 6, introducing Clause 1 and is Line 45. See Time Charters, para.38.23. See The 
Fina Samco [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 153, in a report of the first instance court Colman J. stated that: ‘the 
clause expressly contemplates that in the course of the charter service the passage of time or wear and tear 
or an event make it necessary for the owners to take action so that the vessel is maintained in the 
condition which she was required to have on delivery or, having lost that condition, is restored to it. The 
clause directs itself to a need to act which arises after delivery. It assumes that at delivery the vessel did 
have the required characteristics but that after delivery something has happened which either has already 
caused the vessel to lose one or other of those characteristics or will in future do so unless the owners act 
to maintain that characteristic. It is in those circumstances that the owner’s duty to exercise due diligence 
arises.’ at p.153. See also The Trade Nomad [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57, upheld the court of appeal 
decision [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 723. 
69
 The Elli and The Frixos [2008] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 262 [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 119. 
70
 To that extent, the charterer will be prevented from trading to some parts of the world. Golden Fleece 
Maritime Inc v ST Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 119, at 
p.127. Sir Anthony Clarke MR concluding ‘at a particular South East Asian country suddenly required all 
fuel oil carrying vessels to be doubled hulled.’   
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If a contract of carriage is governed by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the shipowner tends to 
rely mainly on the case law that states: ‘It is not the duty of an owner to adopt or use the latest 
inventions or regulations’71 which seems to make the need for new equipment non-essential. In 
other words, the shipowner would be reluctant to adopt new provisions of SOLAS or any other 
regulations; for example, to fit new equipment when their presence is essential to the vessel’s 
seaworthiness,
72
 such as radar equipment
73
 or a Loran system.
74
  
Perhaps, if there is no binding system in the context of the contract of carriage, compliance with 
new non-enforced regulations will result in shipowners relying on the ‘slowness of the 
traditional procedure for adoption and entry coming into force of the international regulations 
and conventions.’75 Nonetheless, adherence to the new standards of an existing law will only be 
imposed during the initial obligation of due diligence. 
In order to arrive at a proper conclusion, one may have the notion that there is a close analogical 
point between, on the one hand, case law that rendered the carrier/shipowner liable for 
unseaworthiness due to damage caused by not providing their master and crew with diagrams or 
plans of the ship’s recently fitted equipment or modifications,76 or, on the other hand, the future 
readiness of the court to render the vessel unseaworthy for not fitting the equipment that is 
required by the industry.  
This section suggests that the current law in seaworthiness needs improvement. This will be the 
following point. 
Problems of the current law - the need for improvement 
The Hague/Hague-Visby Rules state that: 
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 F. C. Bradley & Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Company, supra , see Lord Justice Scrutton at 
pp. 454-455. See also Virginia Co. v Norfolk Shipping Co. 17 Com. Cas. 277 at p. 278.   
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 The T. J. Hooper 60 F.2d 737, 1932 AMC 1169 (2 Cir. 1932), Hand J. decided that tugs should be 
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Professor William Tetley Marine Cargo Claims (4
th
 edn, 2008), Chapter 15 Due Diligence to Make the 
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 In President of India v Coast S.S. Co (S.S. Portland Trader) 213 F. Supp 352 at pp.356-357, 1963 
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AMC 1686 at p.1702 (S.D. N.Y. 1980). Loran was not deemed essential. 
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 Sir Michael Wood: Lawmaking and implementation in International Shipping: Which Law Do We Obey? 
Tenth Cadwallader Memorial Lecture, 1 October 2008. Cited: <www.shippinglbc.com/content/uploads/ 
documents/cad10_mensah.pdf>. 
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 See Robin Hood Flour Mills Ltd v N. M. Paterson & Sons Ltd (The Farrandoc) [1967] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 
276. 
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“The carrier shall be bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence 
to: 
(a)  Make the ship seaworthy; 
(b)  Properly man, equip and supply the ship; 
(c) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all other parts of the ship in   
which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation;  
(d) The above article of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules illustrates that the obligation of 
due diligence expires upon sailing from the port of loading and does not apply at each 
stage of the voyage.
77
 Any new requirements under the regulations that govern the 
standard of the industry will not be adopted after leaving the load port. This is 
normally the case for an obligation under the Rules which starts and is ongoing until 
the time the vessel commences her voyage. As this shows, the Rules give no 
obligation on the part of the shipowner to imposing an ongoing exercise of due 
diligence, i.e. adopting new regulations during the sea voyage. This apparently avoids 
the important ongoing duty to keep the vessel in line with the latest regulations, 
especially those important regulations which, if contravened, will constitute 
unseaworthiness.  
 
 i) The need for new Rules - prospective of container shipping 
The English court has expressed the relevant test as being: ‘would a prudent shipowner, if he 
had known of the defect, have sent the ship to sea in that condition?’ Equally, the test to be 
applied under the Rotterdam Rules for a vessel that has not adhered to new regulations which 
may affect her seaworthiness is: ‘would a prudent shipowner, if he had known of the new 
regulations, have continued the intermediate voyage without affecting any possible compliance?’ 
In the age of containerised shipping, it seems that vessels are more than likely to call into 
intermediate ports.
78
 This is where the ongoing obligation of due diligence under the Rotterdam 
Rules becomes more important in solving the problems of unseaworthiness that might arise due 
to non-compliance with the new regulations, especially in the age of containerised vessels which 
were invented before the drafting of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Under the later Rules, it is 
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 Article III r. 1. 
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 It is common for container vessels to be involved with large numbers of loading/discharging ports. For 
instance, a container vessel may load cargo from the Far East destined to North Africa and en route she 
may call at two ports in the Middle East. 
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possible that one of two adjacently loaded containers could be subject to different findings on 
the question of the liability of the carrier, depending on the port of loading. 
For instance, assume a vessel commenced her voyage from Port A to Port C and called at Port B 
with perishable refrigerated cargo onboard. She loaded the container in Port A and was classed 
as being seaworthy at that time, and then sailed to Port B where she loaded another container 
destined for Port C. In the course of sailing to Port C, a new regulation came into force. When 
she arrived at Port C, the vessel was detained for some days by the port state for not having a 
valid certificate reflecting the compliance with the new regulation which resulted in the 
refrigerated cargo being damaged. Subsequently, the vessel would be regarded as seaworthy for 
the container loaded in Port A, whereas she would be considered unseaworthy for the container 
that was loaded in Port B. The shipowner,
79
 therefore, will incur the liability for 
unseaworthiness for breaching the overriding obligation, thus he is not allowed to use any of the 
exceptions under Article IV r. 2. On the other hand, for the container loaded in Port A, the 
shipowner is able to use exceptions under the Article IV r. 2 despite the damage to the cargo 
which resulted from the same reasons but the effect was different for each of the owners of the 
containerised cargo.
80
 Therefore, the change brought about by the context of Article 14 of the 
Rotterdam Rules is likely to lead to fairer consequences in such circumstances. If the Rotterdam 
Rules were incorporated into the charterparty, the court in a case similar to the above would, 
hypothetically, undoubtedly hold the shipowner in breach of exercising due diligence to provide 
a seaworthy vessel. There are reasons why an English court would reach a similar decision and 
would not find a less favourable compliance with a new regulation, such as SOLAS. Therefore, 
it is submitted that it would be impossible for a carrier to exercise due diligence mid-voyage or 
en route for the purpose of keeping the vessel seaworthy.
81
 First, the English court was not 
unfamiliar with the ongoing duty that was applied on certain occasions to time charterparties, 
which contained a clause obliging the shipowner to ensure the fitness of his vessel on an 
ongoing basis, even in the course of the voyage after the vessel had commenced her trip.
82
 This 
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 In Leesh River Tea Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193, it was held 
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and Transport Inc (The Elli & The Frixos) [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 119. 
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means that if a case of unseaworthiness occurred after leaving the port of loading, the shipowner, 
his servants or agents should exercise due diligence to bring the vessel to a seaworthy state.
83
 
Secondly, the law of doctoring of stages, under common law, is believed to be a good law. It 
provides some commercial flexibility for vessels to commence their voyage from their loading 
port without incurring superfluous delays by complying with charterparty obligations to provide 
a seaworthy vessel. This is, for example, when the condition of the vessel has a deficiency or 
cannot comply with the regulations at the loading stage which may not amount to a breach of 
the duty of seaworthiness, provided it is remedied by the sailing stage or at an intermediate 
stage.
84
 By analogy, the common law
85
 doctrine of stages with the maintenance of obligation 
means that the English courts would not find it difficult to adopt a system that renders the vessel 
seaworthy on calling in at intermediate ports, not only for loading/unloading, but in case of a 
container vessel exercising due diligence in complying to the latest regulations, such as fitting a 
small piece of equipment or adding an important publication to the documentations of the vessel, 
for the purpose of maintaining the obligation of seaworthiness during the course of the voyage. 
It is widely known that nowadays, ports are well-equipped with agents and ship chandlers who 
are able to provide the vessels with supplies and repair services during their loading/unloading 
operations.  
 ii) Potential effect of the Rotterdam Rules on the obligation of seaworthiness 
This raises the issue as to whether the advent of the Rotterdam Rules will lead to a rise in the 
standards shown by the shipowner and to be proactive in furnishing his vessel to a higher 
standard, i.e. adopting the new regulations of the industry, rather than to react to and adopt them 
at a later stage. Consequently, he will avoid the breach of the continuous due diligence 
obligation which is likely to occur. The ISM Code requires the shipowner to establish and 
maintain procedures for repairs and scheduled regular maintenance for his vessel and to ensure 
that she is fit and complies with the applicable rules and regulations in a timely manner in 
                                               
83
 Snia v Suzuki (1924) 17 Ll. L. Rep. 78, Greer, J. said: ‘though that does not mean that she will be in 
such a state during every minute of the service, it does mean that when she gets into a condition when she 
is not thoroughly efficient in hull and machinery they will take, within a reasonable time, reasonable steps 
to put her into that condition’ at  p. 88. 
84
 The Quebec Marine Insurance Company v The Commercial Bank of Canada (1869-71) L.R. 3 P.C. 234. 
Lord Penzance stated: ‘The case of Dixon v Sadler and the other cases which have been cited, leave it 
beyond doubt that there is seaworthiness for the port, seaworthiness in some cases for the river, and 
seaworthiness in some cases, as in a case that has been put forward of a whaling voyage, for some definite, 
well-recognised, and distinctly separate stage of the voyage.’ The Vortigern [1899], p.140. 
85
 The charterparty doctrine of stages, under which the vessel is required to be seaworthy at the 
commencement of each stage, is not applicable under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. See Leesh River Tea 
Co. v British India Steam Navigation Co. [1966] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 193. A vessel was held not to be 
unseaworthy within the meaning of Article III when the cargo was damaged by the surreptitious removal 
of a storm valve plate by a person unknown while the vessel was calling at an intermediate port. 
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respect of the trade, cargo and crew. However, the industry, for newly emerged regulations, 
allows some flexibility for the shipowner to comply.
86
      
The case would be different under a contract of carriage that incorporates the Rotterdam Rules. 
The additional words ‘and during the voyage by sea’ in context of Article 14 has addressed an 
ongoing due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy throughout the course of a voyage. The 
Rules are expected to raise the standard of due diligence and improve the position of the cargo 
interests for many reasons. On the one hand, the effect of the Rotterdam Rules, if it was 
incorporated to the bill of lading or carriage contract, will set aside flexibility in the regulation 
in regard to their compliance. The obligation to exercise due diligence to make the vessel 
seaworthy ‘at the beginning of, and during the voyage’87 will equally amount to an express 
clause
88
 that may be surpassed by the obligation ‘during the voyage’ over the granted flexibility 
to comply with the regulation instanced by The Elli and The Frixos when the Court of Appeal’s 
judgment stated that: ‘the vessel is in all aspects eligible under applicable conventions, laws and 
regulations for trading to and from the ports and place.’89 For this purpose, owners will need to 
comply with the amendments or extensions of the shipping industry, which might affect the 
trading of the vessel.
90
 In addition, the seriousness of the consequences of a particular kind of 
non-compliance with a regulation that has not yet been enforced brings up the question of 
whether the shipowner would be keen to prepare for a compliance in advance before the 
regulation had become compulsory bearing in mind that the ‘compliance with conventions such 
as MARPOL or SOLAS is [n]ot in itself a meaningless concept’ which ‘relates to compliance 
while performing the charterparty service …’ Clearly, a vessel in dry dock can be modified for 
compliance more easily than a vessel performing her duty under the charterparty contract.
91
 
                                               
86
 For example, the phasing out of single hull tankers for categories 2 and 3 built in 1984 or later to be 
allowed to sail until 2010. Also, the IMO does not have to penalise failure to comply. See ‘IMO to avoid 
flag sanctions’, Lloyd’s List, 1 Sept. 1998. 
87
 Article 14 (Specific obligation applicable to the voyage by sea) of the Rotterdam Rules: ‘The carrier is 
bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage by sea to exercise due diligence to: (a) Make 
and keep the ship seaworthy; (b) Properly crew, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so crewed, 
equipped and supplied throughout the voyage …’ 
88
 Clause 52 of Shelltime 4: ‘Owners warrant that the vessel is in all respects eligible under application 
(sic) conventions, laws, regulations and ordinances of any international, national, state or local 
government entity having jurisdiction including, but not limited to, the US Port and Tanker Safety Act, as 
amended; the US Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended; MARPOL 1973/1978 as amended 
and extended; SOLAS 1974/1978/1983 as amended and extended; and OPA 1990.’  
89
 Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v St Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli and The Frixos) [2008] EWCA 
Civ 548, para. 24.  
90
 See Golden Fleece Maritime Inc v St Shipping and Transport Inc (The Elli and The Frixos) 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 262. Where the inconsistency appears in clause 1(g) between the opening words in the heading ‘At 
the date of delivery of the vessel under this charter’ and the requirement within the wording in para. (g) to 
have ‘on board all certificates, documents … required from time to time’ was surpassed by the Court of 
Appeal by giving prevalence to the particular words in sub para. (g) over the general words in the heading 
of para. 1, on the basis that ‘the particular should prevail over the general.’  
91
 The nature of the intended voyage may affect the stringency with which the ship is examined before 
sailing. See for example The Assunzione [1956] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 468 at p.487. 
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Therefore, this will make the shipowner keen to comply with the regulations prior to the date of 
enforcement.
92
 On the other hand, commercially speaking, on some occasions it would be more 
convenient for the shipowner to comply with the regulations in advance of entering into a 
contract of carriage, such as a liner contract. At a later stage, during the course of performing 
the contract of carriage, the vessel might be constrained when trading between ports that have 
no facilities, such as a dry dock, from providing the services required for compliance. It is worth 
stressing that The Elli case alluded to the ongoing obligation. This will make shipowners the 
bearers of the cost of compliance as well as incurring any financial loss attributed from a delay 
in compliance.
93
 The shipowner, being contractually responsible (Rotterdam Rules), would raise 
the burden of the obligation by making him more conscious of investing in an earlier 
compliance with the relevant regulations.  
Furthermore, the standard of ‘due diligence of a prudent shipowner, as at the relevant act or 
omissions, must not be judged in light of hindsight.’94 It would not be necessary for a shipowner 
of container vessels to appreciate when a regulation comes into force if the prudent shipowner 
had complied with such a regulation in advance, prior to the date of enforcement. The 
shipowner would have set a proper system within the vessel’s SMS in order to maintain the 
regulations as part of the ongoing due diligence obligation and, therefore, comply with any 
potential regulations to avoid the unseaworthiness of his vessel.
95
 It is for this reason that 
constant regulations and observances are believed to have a similar effect on the normal routine 
on the vessel’s machinery to provide a seaworthy vessel.  
 iii) The differences in the standard of seaworthiness 
As mentioned above, the standard that courts should take into consideration in deciding whether 
the vessel is seaworthy is the shipping standard at the time of the incident. It has been held in 
                                               
92
 The duty of seaworthiness imposed on the carrier under the Rotterdam Rules is that of due diligence, 
therefore, the test is objective and taking into account international standards and the particular 
circumstances of the case. See The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, at p.266. (where 
stowage of container under deck is breach of SOLS and IMDG).  
93
 See Knowles, B. Who bears the cost of change? Vol.22 (6), (July, 2008). ISBN: 1742-9404. 
94
 The owners of cargo lately laden on board the ship Subro Valour v The owners of the ship Subro Vega 
(The Subro Valour) [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 509 at 516. Clark J. stated in this case: the plaintiff cargo-
interests claimed damages against the defendant shipowner in respect of loss to a cargo of peas sustained 
as a result of a fire on the vessel. The court held that the cause of the fire that made the loss was an 
electrical fault which was in turn caused by mechanical damage to the wiring. It followed that the vessel 
was unseaworthy at the commencement of the voyage. No one suggested that conditions during the 
voyage were in any way unexpected or out of the ordinary. 
95
 The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 40 at p.50. Clarke J. held that the shipowner had failed to exercise 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel before the vessel commenced her voyage, also he added that a 
reasonable shipowner would have set up a proper system for the inspection and ascertainment of the 
internal damage or problems which caused the unseaworthiness. 
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the USA
96
 that the standard of seaworthiness (that is determined by the shipping standard) is 
depending to the ports of the state to which the vessel belongs rather than by the needed 
standard for the contemplated voyage.
97
 In other words, the standard of the shipping industry 
deemed necessary for the seaworthiness of the vessel is not determined by the need to make the 
vessel fit for the peril of the contemplated voyage, but it is determined in relation to the standard 
of shipping and safety generally accepted in the trade or the custom and usage of the port or 
country from which the vessel sails.
98
 More importantly, this approach will render a variable 
standard of seaworthiness for two vessels on the same journey, depending on the port where the 
vessel starts the journey from. Thus, a British flag vessel could be rendered unseaworthy for an 
accident that occurred in the English Mediterranean Sea because, for instance, it is not fitted 
with the navigational equipment required by an international convention. Whereas, a Cyprus 
flag vessel involved in the same incident would not be considered unseaworthy.
99
 This 
hypothetical example shows that the countries consider differently the matters to which 
seaworthiness extends, according to the nationality of the vessel. This is another reason that 
charterparty, and particularly those with the SOLAS, ISM or MARPOL clauses, require that the 
vessel must be continuously maintained to keep abreast of new developments and technology. 
The effect of this clause would continuously keep the vessel seaworthy for the entire voyage. To 
overcome this problem the reduction of the standard of seaworthiness that might result from 
considering the standard according to the country where the voyage started rather than by the 
peril of the contemplated voyage. 
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that the Rotterdam Rules would turn up to be relevant; not 
only to circumstances where a defect in a vessel manifests itself requiring repair, but also having 
an influence on the shipowners to equip their vessels to a higher standard
100
 by implementing 
                                               
96
 See Tidmarsh v Washington Ins Co. (1827) 4 Mason 439 where Story J said that: ‘It seems to me that 
where a policy is underwritten on a foreign vessel, belonging to a foreign country, the underwriter must 
be taken to have a knowledge of the common usages of trade in such country as to equipment of the 
vessel of that class, for the voyage in which she is destined.’ Also, see Sir M. Mustill and Gilman, J. C. B. 
Arnould’s Law of Marine Insurance and Average (16th edn, 1981) para. 732.  
97
 This approach is inconsistent with the Marine Insurance Act, Section 39(4): ‘A ship is deemed to be 
seaworthy when she is reasonably fit in all respects to encounter the ordinary perils of the seas of the 
adventure  insured.’ 
98
 See Cocoa v S.S. Lindenbank [1979] AMC 283 SDNY. ‘Whether a ship is considered seaworthy 
depends on her state of repair and fitness of her equipment and crew in relation to the standard of safety 
generally accepted in the trade or the custom and usage of the port or country from which the vessel sails’ 
at p.296. 
99
 Another example is also relevant that a vessel in hot climatic countries is not required to be fitted with 
equipment for ice areas. Therefore, in applying the American approach, a vessel that sails from a hot 
climatic port would not be rendered unseaworthy for trading in the Northern Baltic, despite the fact of her 
incapacity to penetrate ice area in the Northern Baltic. 
100
 See Nicholas, A. ‘The duties of carriers under the conventions: care and seaworthiness’ cited as 
Chapter 6 in D. R. Thomas (ed) The Carriage of Goods by Sea under the Rotterdam Rules (Lloyd’s List, 
2010), para 6.13. 
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the latest inventions of equipment to avoid the unseaworthiness in a situation similar to the 
above hypothetical example.  
 iv) The nautical error 
So, as long as the carrier has exercised due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, he may rely 
on the exceptions in Article IV r.2 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Article IV r.2(a) exception 
reads that ‘an act of neglect or default of the Master, mariners, pilot or the servants of the 
owners in the navigation or the management of the vessel” is of great significance because the 
general exception clause in the charterparty might not embrace nautical negligence of the crew, 
whereas Article IV r.2(a) does.
101
 Therefore, if the carrier exercises due diligence in recruiting a 
second officer who holds the required certification and that second officer has the basic ability 
to perform his job properly but fails to carry them out, he is acting negligently in navigation 
during his alluded watch and the vessel, as a result, has collided. The carrier is exempted from 
liability relating to such navigational error.
102
 Despite the fact that there is a little chance that the 
carrier, in case of crew negligence in navigation, is not always exempted,
103
 therefore 
establishing that the crew were incompetent (and, in turn, the vessel unseaworthy) is paramount. 
A carrier may still have a defence to an unseaworthiness claim if he can prove that he exercised 
‘due diligence’ in providing a competent crew.104 Carriers must not enjoy the exclusion to 
navigational errors; they virtually always have control of the evidence at the inception of the 
case, which can make proving incompetence a daunting task on the part of the cargo-interest. In 
addition, the above argument suggests that part of keeping the vessel seaworthy is to keep 
abreast with all shipping standards, which, inter alia, enhance the safety of the vessel and thus 
prevent from rendering the vessel unseaworthy. A final point, it must be noted that the 
improvement of communication and navigational technology, i.e. GPS, radar and electronic 
charts, assist the officer of the watch in navigating safely and therefore, reduces the navigational 
fault. Therefore, it must be said that a similar increase in demand on the qualitative standard of 
the vessel must be demanded in the sphere of charterparty. 
Over what has been said above, one might ask whether it is fair and sound imposing on the part 
of the carrier in the charterparty an extended obligation of seaworthiness? 
Winn LJ in the court of appeal stated that: ‘The law must apply a standard which is not relaxed 
to cater for their factual ignorance of all activities outside brewing: having become owners of 
                                               
101
 See Yvonne Baatz Maritime Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 2011), at p.140. 
102
 Blackfriars Lighterage & Cartage Co. Ltd v R. L. Hobbs (The Landeer) [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 554. 
103
 Because, i.e. The ISM Code poses an obligation on the carrier company to ensure that all seamen 
serving on board the vessel must be competent to carry out their duties as well as that the crew as a unit 
must be in a position to perform as a team. This will provide the carrier with the necessary evidence to 
prove the exercise of seaworthiness. 
104
 See Roger White The human factor in unseaworthiness claims [1995] LMCLQ, 221, at p.239. 
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ships, they must behave as reasonable shipowner.’ A relaxed standard must not be permitted, 
where an unseaworthy vessel is not merely risking her safety and her cargo, but also risking 
other vessels and the personnel on board as well as the environment. The cost of keeping a 
vessel seaworthy is not necessarily more expensive than incurring a claim.
105
 One can suggest 
that avoidance of accidents, due to prolonged seaworthiness, helps to promote the adoption of 
the shipping industry, whereby an increase directly or indirectly of the safety of the vessel 
results in unnecessary costs incurred from accidents and their consequences on the insurance 
premiums would be avoided.  
The attitude of the court, on the one hand, moves slowly toward adopting a higher standard 
including the commercial considerations, i.e. cutting costs; on the other hand, it would affect the 
seaworthiness of the vessel. This would be stopped or reduced by imposing a continuous 
seaworthiness on the carrier for the entire voyage.  
Conclusion         
It can be concluded that, on the optimistic side, the shipping industry is proving to be of 
considerable importance for the vessels’ seaworthiness. The shipping industry can be said to 
increasing, to some extent, the standards of due diligence and eventually minimising the 
possibility of unseaworthiness of vessels operating at sea. Seaworthiness is a particular aspect 
that promotes safety and is regulated primarily by the shipping standard conventions, such as 
SOLAS, Loadline and STCW…etc.      
However, the downside is that it is left to the member states to apply these conventions. Some 
states might apply these conventions more strictly, while others may be more lax, due to poor 
resources, supervision, enforcement or even inefficiency of convention standards themselves. 
Consequently, seaworthiness cannot be guaranteed, at least by the relevant conventions. 
Consequently, standards may be lowered and differences appear between member states 
applying the conventions with varying degrees of strictness.
106
   
Furthermore, not only old vessels can be unseaworthy. Accidents can also happen to modern 
vessels built and equipped to the latest shipping standards but manned by incompetent or 
                                               
105
 Donaldson Reports, paragraph 8.12, which states: ‘[we] believe that it should be made abundantly 
clear that it is against the long-term commercial interest of shipowners for them to ignore safety 
considerations, as a few evidently do.’ 
106
 Shipping companies might be encouraged to register their vessels in flag states which have neither 
administration nor independent surveyors and who have promulgated no laws, decrees, orders or 
regulations and have set no standards for seaworthiness. See Sass, C. A. ‘The Enforcement of Safety 
Standards on Board Merchant Vessels’, pp. 66-77, delivered as a paper in the Fitness at Sea: An 
International Conference on Seaworthiness, (9-10 ?month?, 1980) held at Newcastle University.  
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inadequate seafarers who have inadequate training from substandard marine schools, or are 
suffering from fatigue. 
In order to improve the effectiveness of shipping industry standards, they should be applied 
effectively. This can be achieved if the IMO were to create a scheme of sanctions applying to all 
the states parties to the relevant convention. Such a scheme might include creating a blacklist of 
shipowners, vessels, marine institutions and especially member states and may withdraw the 
right to issue certification.
107
 Also, the relevant provisions of the convention should be checked 
by IMO personnel,
108
 or it should assign such a task to a reputable entity to check that the 
standards are strictly applied.   
It should be noted that the onerousness of the obligation of due diligence sometimes needs to be 
re-examined during the voyage. If, for example, the vessel encounters unusual problems then 
the shipowner should ‘engage staff of exceptional ability, experience and dependability’.109 This 
indicates a necessity to examine the existing law to extend the obligation of due diligence for 
the whole voyage, as is the case under the Rotterdam Rules. This might be a difficult route to 
follow. A clause in the charter party to impose a continuous obligation to make the vessel fit for 
the entire voyage would be a quicker choice. This should not be considered a problem as the 
industry had already adopted such an approach which can be seen in some recent charterparties. 
In fact, the continuous obligation is in line with the present and future practice of shipping 
industries utilising the burgeoning advances in communications and navigation. Common sense 
says that the development of new regulations and conventions, concurrent with the needs of 
development to some charterparties as a quick solution in case the Rotterdam Rules adoption is 
taking time or never to be adopted.  
Adopting the Rotterdam Rules is not a choice that can simply be made by the party of the 
contract; there are several elements that contribute in the process of their adoption, i.e. political, 
thus, their adoption, if it takes place, needs time. Adding a clause in the charterparty might be a 
better solution; imposing on the part of the carrier a continuous obligation of seaworthiness for 
the entire voyage rather than limiting it to the onset of the voyage.    
 
 
 
                                               
107
 Lord Donaldson of Lymington. ‘The ISM Code: The road to discovery?’ Lloyd's Maritime and 
Commercial Law Quarterly 4 (1998), 526-534 at p. 532. An example was given on the ISM Code. 
108
 In order for IMO to carry out such a task, the number of its personnel should be increased. 
Currently, there are only 300 staff. 
109
 The Hong Kong Fir [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 159 at p.169. 
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(Journal of Maritime Law & Commerce, Vol. 42, No.2, April, 2011) 
Supply of Containers and “Seaworthiness”- Rotterdam Rules Prospective 
 
 
Introduction 
Under the current law, represented by the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and common law, 
the carrier is under an obligation of providing a seaworthy vessel before and at the 
beginning of the sea voyage.110 The introduction of the Rotterdam Rules, in particular 
Article 14, imposes on the carrier additional duties from those under the current law in 
which to be fulfilled during the voyage by sea. This article will shed light on: first, the 
duty on the carrier to exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy container; and 
second, that the extension of the obligation of seaworthiness will cover the whole of the 
sea voyage rather than merely ‘before and at the beginning of the voyage’. In light of 
those extended duties under the Rotterdam Rules, this article will also shed light on 
their implication and their necessity for the presence to the shipping industry. The 
article establishes solutions to the extension of seaworthiness in regards to the 
container and the period of duty which is possible to be applied to the current law.   
The development and the use of containerisation  
One of the most important technological developments in the transportation of goods 
by sea since powered vessel replaced sail was the advent of the container revolution. 
Goods have been stowed in containers since 1950, These devices, in which goods are 
carried have: 1) encountered some outer risks such as thievery and larceny; 2) climate 
and sea damage; 3) decreased transhipment expenses by reducing the time of loading 
and unloading111; 4) lessened the cost of packing on the part of the shipper; and 5) 
reducing the conveyance of goods by more than one means.112 The cargo is separated 
                                               
110
 Article 3(1) of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules: The carrier shall be bound, before and at the 
beginning of the voyage, to exercise due diligence to 
(b) Make the ship seaworthy; 
(c) Properly man, equip and supply the ship; 
(d) Make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which 
goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. 
111 The stowing and trimming of a general cargo ship is a task which calls for highly 
skilled workmanship. For further information see De Wit, R. Multimodal Transport (LLP, 
1995) at p.9 
112 Simon, The Law of Shipping Containers 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 507, April 1974 at p. 
510; Tombari, H. Trends in Ocean-born Containerisation and its Implications for the US 
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inside the container by its consolidation in a container. A container is an article of 
transport containing goods to be loaded onto and off the vessel quickly and easily and 
to safeguard them from external risks. It is usually manufactured from metal for multiple 
uses.113  
 
 
The container has a double function. On the one hand and from the carrier’s viewpoint, 
it may be regarded as an extension or part of the vessel’s hold because it protects the 
cargo on its own; but, unlike the vessel’s hold, it is a mobile thing which can be 
transported to the carrier to be loaded, or to the cargo receiver to be discharged.114 On 
the other hand and by contrast, from the cargo interest’s view, it has a purpose and a 
character similar to a package securing cargo. 115  The question here is: Does the 
current regime correspond with the use of containerisation in the marine industry and if 
not, what is the possible solution?  
The current law excludes the seaworthiness with regards to the container which 
creates problems. An example of how this would happen will assist. A typical scenario: 
an unfit container on board a container vessel may either cause damage to the cargo 
inside, or to cargo in the adjacent containers. By so doing, the carrier is not only 
exposing the carried cargo to damage or loss, but might also be endangering the safety 
of the vessel. Furthermore, the requirement of due diligence does not only encompass 
safe cargoes and vessels, but it will also provide an objective liability rule for 
                                                                                                                                          
Liner Industry 10 J. Mar. L. & Com. 311 (1979) at p.311; Schmeltzer, E. and Peavy, R. 
A. Prospective and Problems of the Containers 5 J. Mar. L. & Com. 507, April 1974 at 
p.510 
113
 See the definition given by the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) adopted a 
general definition of a container which covers a wide range of equipment. A container is defined 
as an article of transport equipment:  
(a)  Of a permanent character and accordingly strong enough to be suitable for repeated  
use; 
(b) Specially designed to facilitate the carriage of goods by one or more modes of transport, 
without intermediate reloading; 
(c) Fitted with devices permitting its ready handling, particularly its transfer from one mode 
of transport to another 
(d) So designed as to be easy to fill and empty; 
(e) Having an internal volume of one cubic meter or more but excluding vehicles or 
conventional packing. 
114 Northeast Marine Term Co v Caputo 432 US 249, 271 (1977). Armstrong, T. J. 
Packing Trends and Implications in the Container Revolution 12 J. Mar. L. & Com. 427 
(1981) at p.428 
115 As distinct from package, a container saves expenses arising from conventional 
packing, and is manufactured in a shape appropriate to both cargo and the vessel 
618 
 
equipment.116 Therefore, the carrier must make sure that the containers are in good 
condition, are able to withstand the hardships of the journey, and appropriate for the 
kind of goods which will be loaded into them.117  The carrier should be liable on the 
basis of the contract of supply of equipment.118 In recent years, holding the carrier 
responsible for the seaworthiness of the containers on board, in fact, is not significantly 
larger than the level of responsibility that some carriers have already been prepared to 
take.119  
Although containers can be owned or leased by the shipper, in which case he, almost 
inevitably, will take charge of concealing them. Often, however, containers are usually 
supplied by the carrier, means the latter own or lease them. Whoever the supplier, 
empty containers may also concealed by a third party who will pack and load the 
containers at their own premises.120 Needless to say that liabilities of the parties will be 
affected from such differences. (…). 
 
                                               
116 If the carrier has effectively exercised due diligence, and he is able to prove this, 
then the risk for defects which could not be discovered is inevitably shifted to the cargo 
interest. At this moment in time, there is no established uniform liability standard in 
multimodal transport. The multimodal transport operator’s liability is, at present, always 
determined according to the rules of either some unimodal transport convention or 
some domestic legal system which happened to be applicable to a given case, or in the 
case of unlocalised loss or damage under a modified network system which is 
governed by the rules agreed between the parties which is usually limited in nature. 
See De Wit, R. Multimodal Transport (LLP, 1995) at pp.399 and 417 
117 Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims Montreal: International Shipping Publications at 
p.647. Also see De Wit, R. Multimodal Transport (LLP, 1995) at pp.413-414 
118  The issue of the legal nature and regime of supplying of containers has been 
already given rise to litigation under different jurisdictions. See Shanghai Maritime 
Court in Zhejiang Branch of Chinese People’s Insurance Co v Guangzhou Ocean 
Shipping Corp & Shanghai Branch of China National Foreign Trade Transportation 
Corp [1994] Sup. Ct. LR, Issue 1. See also in District Court of Rotterdam in NDAL v 
Premium Tobacco, SCN : NJ 2008, 505 SES 2008, 46; 1 February 2008 (The NDS 
Provider); American Supreme Court in Gutierrez v Waterman S.S. Corp 373 US 20682, 
S. Ct. 1185, 1963 AMC 1649, 10 L. Ed. 2d 297; (USSC 1963). See French Supreme 
Court Cour de Cass (Ch Com) (5 mars 2002), Navire Saint Georges - Sté CGM SUD v 
Sté Le Continent - (N° de pourvoi: 99-12852) – in Legifrance: www.Legifrance.gouv.fr 
119 See P&O Containers Bill of Lading 1989, Clause 17 (2): ”The Carrier shall not be 
liable for any loss of or damage to the Goods arising from any defect of any specialised 
Container, provided that the Carrier shall, before and at the beginning of the Carriage, 
exercise due diligence to maintain the Container in an efficient state” 
120
 Because the shipper may not have experience with stuffing containers or because the 
shipper’s cargo, fills part of the container (LCL) or special cargoes may need special dunnaging 
stuffing, handling, care etc. See Talal Aladwani, “The Supply of Containers and ‘Seaworthiness’- 
The Rotterdam Rules perspective”, (2011) 42 JMLC, at p.185, at p. 187; Frank Stevens, 
“Liability for defective containers: charting a course between seaworthiness, care for the cargo 
and shipper liabilities”, at p. 2, presented at Eighth Annual International Colloquium on Carriage 
of Goods- Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7, Sept. 2012, Swansea University.   
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 If it was approved that the container forms part of the superstructure of the vessel; or if 
it is considered as equipment121 as under Article III r.1 (b) of the Hague/Hague-Visby 
Rules; or if the carrier was the owner of the container, the use of the container 
therefore may have an impact on the carrier’s responsibility for due diligence in 
ensuring that the vessel is seaworthy.122 Liability from unseaworthiness of a container 
may make the carrier liable to the charterer or the cargo owner.  
Possible solutions on the carrier’s duty to provide a seaworthy 
container 
a) Container as part of the vessel’s superstructure and seaworthiness 
It is an arguable topic whether the container forms part of the vessel’s superstructure. 
In practice, it may be true that there are only two specific standards of containers in 
size which does make it easier for any container vessel to use any containers to load 
the vessel. It is known that the vessel can be navigated and run by any competent 
certified officers and in no case that a particular officer or master is required to run a 
vessel. Such analogy can be used to strengthen the view that containers may form a 
part of the vessel without the conceptual of being specific to the vessel. Nonetheless, 
containers may well be regarded as part of the vessel if the container vessel is 
deckless or a “non-cellular container vessel”123 where containers are being used not 
merely to accommodate cargo, but to secure other containers when stacking them 
vertically; thereby, it could be presumed that container vessels cannot perform her duty 
of loading, stowing, securing and lashing on board without the use of containers, which 
may form a basis of liability with regard to unseaworthiness of the container vessel if 
the defect of the container seized the proper stowage of other containers and imperilled 
the safety of the vessel.124  Some observers consider that the container should be 
                                               
121 The view here is when the duty contained in Article III (1) extends to containers. 
Where the carrier in this case cannot contract out because exercise due diligence is not 
delegable 
122 Article III of the HVR requires a carrier to exercise due diligence before and at the 
beginning of a voyage to make the ship seaworthy including a properly equipped and 
fully supplied vessel, ensuring that the holds, refrigerating systems and cool chambers 
and all other parts of the ship to which goods are carried, fit and safe for the reception, 
carriage and preservation of cargoes 
123 This is a custom-built vessel for the carriage of containers. The containers are 
loaded one on top of the other and guided into position by the means of vertical guides 
at each corner of the container. The guides are part of the vessel for the purpose of 
joining the containers to the vessel’s structure. See Bugden, P. and Lamont-Black S. 
(2010) Goods in Transit, 2nd edn. Sweet & Maxwell at p.375  
124 Bugden says: “At least to some extent the liability may arise when the carrier may 
have a liability for design faults in the ship leading, for example, to unacceptable strains 
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treated as part of the vessel.125 The purpose of using containers is paralleled to the 
purpose of the tank on an oil tanker or it might be regarded as a cargo hold similar to 
the hold of a bulk carrier. Knowing that it is clearly a receptacle for the carriage of cargo, 
containers play a great role in the transportation of cargo as without them the execution 
of the contract of carriage by a container vessel is impossible and their defects are 
likely to cause damage to the cargo or to an extent of endangering the safety of the 
vessel or her crew.126  
Furthermore, it follows under different legal systems 127  that the container, if it is 
supplied by the carrier, should be deemed as part of the vessel within the meaning of 
Article III r.1 (c), that is, “other parts of the ship in which goods are carried” which 
consequently imposes an obligation on the carrier to exercise due diligence to provide 
a seaworthy vessel. Such a solution was concluded by the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands in The NDS Provider. The court held that if the container was supplied or 
owned by the carrier, it should be cargoworthy and therefore the obligation to exercise 
due diligence as per Art III r.1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules applies to the container 
as well. 128 This view implies a duty on the carrier to ensure that the containers are not 
only suitable to carry the inside cargo, but it also imposes a duty to provide a container 
that is safe to be carried and does not endanger the safety of the vessel or its crew by 
way of the container’s fitness as well as the suitability of the container to carry 
                                                                                                                                          
upon the container lashing gear and immersion of the deckage at a relatively low angle 
of roll with consequent risk to the container stacks.” Bugden, P. (2002) The Supply of 
Containers and Seaworthiness Accessed at www.forwarderlaw.com/feature/conworth. 
htm 
125  Bugden, P. (2002) The Supply of Containers and “Seaworthiness Accessed 
www.forwarderlaw.com/ feature/conworth.htm; Bugden, P. and Lamont-Black, S. (2010) 
Goods in Transit, 2nd edn. Sweet & Maxwell at p.375. For the opposed view that 
containers should not be considered part of the vessel, see Margetson, N. J., “Liability 
of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for cargo damage caused by 
unseaworthiness of its containers”, (2008) JIML, p. 153-161; See Bordahandy, P-J. 
(2005) Containers: a conundrum or a concept? 11 JIML, pp.342-371 at p.369 
126 In relation to latent defects in containers see Article IV r.2(p) of the Hague Visby 
Rules; which exception is most likely to relate to cargo handling gear and equipment 
which are not considered to be part of the vessel such as shore or floating cranes and 
containers. See Treitel and Reynolds, Carver’s on Bills of Lading, (2001, Sweet and 
Maxwell), at p.511. 
127 Shanghai Maritime Court in Zhejiang Branch of Chinese People’s Insurance Co v 
Guangzhou Ocean Shipping Corp & Shanghai Branch of China National Foreign Trade 
Transportation Corp [1994] Sup. Ct. LR, Issue 1. See also in District Court of 
Rotterdam in NDAL v Premium Tobacco, SCN 1 February 2009, C06/082 HR, (The 
NDS Provider), American Supreme Court in Gutierrez v Waterman S.S. Corp 373 US 
20682, S. Ct. 1185, 1963 AMC 1649, 10 L. Ed. 2d 297; (USSC 1963)  
128 SCN 1 Feb 2008, nr. C06/082HR, published in RvdW NJ 2008/505 1 Feb. 2008, 
177 (The NDS Provider) 
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dangerous cargo.129 The fitness of the container is important to withstand the maximum 
loads of containers, otherwise the unfitness of the container will render the container 
unsafe and if it collapses the result will endanger the stability of the vessel when the 
cargo becomes unevenly distributed. Such problems are believed to be eliminated only 
by the duty of due diligence to supply a suitably fit container. In some jurisdictions,130 
there is little doubt that the context of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules imposes a duty to 
exercise due diligence to make sure that unsuitable containers are not loaded on board 
as part of the seaworthiness obligation. For example, in Houlden & Co v Red Jacket131 
case, the carrier was responsible when a defective container loaded with tinned fish 
collapsed during a storm losing 50 stow of containers. The court held132 that the carrier 
had failed to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. In addition, the 
carrier had failed to provide a fit container because the collapsed container was old and 
prior to loading, a visible inspection indicated some defects of the container. In many 
circumstances, cargoes may be damaged by seawater due to the presence of holes as 
a result of rusting.133 However, in the same circumstance, the safety of the vessel may 
be endangered if the cargo was stowed inside with a dangerous cargo which had 
broken packing,134 if that reacted with seawater it could result in an explosion. Hence, 
the carrier must protect themselves by adding in the bill of lading a clause135 that 
concerns the liability of specialised carriage, such as a dangerous cargo container or a 
                                               
129 In brief, it requires the containers to be designed and structured by a competent 
authority, similar to a classification society. Further information see Luddeke, C., 
Marine Claims - A guide for the handling and prevention of marine claims, 2nd Ed. (LLP), 
p.158. Containers themselves should be structured in compliance with the Container 
Safety Conventions (CSC) 
130
 Houlden & Co. v. S.S. Red Jacket, 1977 AMC page 1382, which decides that the standard of seaworthiness applies to”all of the 
ship’s equipment, including containers supplied to the shippers” (at page 1401). As to European legal theory on this subject, see 
respectively Lebuhn and Auren in the Norwegian maritime publications ”Arkiv for Sjørett” No. 8 (1966), page 520 and ”MarIus” 
No. 212 (1995), page 61. Reference is also made to the French decision in DMF 1983 page 531 (at page 539) which concluded that 
latent defects in the “ship” should be interpreted to include latent defects in containers supplied by the carrier. The decision was later 
upheld: DMF 1986, page 208. 
131 Houlden & Co v S.S. Red Jacket [1977] AMC 1382 (SDNY, 1977), [1978] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 300 
132 Although the shipper had caused the tinned fish to be stowed in a negligent manner, 
this was not the proximate cause of the loss and damage. “The Court, therefore, cannot 
find that improper stowage of the ingots in container CMLU 122590 was a proximate 
cause of the loss and damage to plaintiffs.” at pp.308 and 311. As per Motley, D. J.                                      
132 NDAL v Premium Tobacco, SCN 1 Feb 2009, C06/082HR (The NDS Provider) NJ 
2008/505. 
133
 Close observation of loading/unloading operation may provide good indications to holes or 
defects. 
134
 For tank containers, small holes, malfunctioned valves or sealant allow the hazardous gases 
contents to escape and create dangerous or flammable air mixture. 
135 P&O Containers Bill of Lading 1989, Clause 17 (2): ”The Carrier shall not be liable 
for any loss of or damage to the Goods arising from any defect of any specialised 
Container, provided that the Carrier shall, before and at the beginning of the Carriage, 
exercise due diligence to maintain the Container in an efficient state” 
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refrigerated container which will exclude liability for latent defects of a container, 
provided however that the carrier has exercised due diligence before and at the 
beginning of the carriage in order to provide suitable seaworthy container.136    
b) Container as equipment 
Even if the container that is supplied by the carrier was not presumed to be part of the 
vessel’s superstructure, it might be deemed part of the carrier’s obligation in exercising 
due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel within the meaning of Article III r.1 (b) 
“Properly man, equip and supply the ship.” Therefore, using an analogy to other 
equipment that is deemed necessary for the vessel’s seaworthiness, i.e. vessel’s 
derrick or cranes, it leads to a conclusion that the carrier has a duty to exercise due 
diligence on containers to provide a seaworthy vessel, and the failure to “properly equip” 
the vessel with suitable containers could amount to a breach of exercising due 
diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel,137 especially if the equipment is not rigidly 
connected to the vessel’s structure and does not form part of the vessel. 138  For 
example, dunnages, shifting-boards or spare parts are often used on board a vessel 
and their presence with correct order and condition is important; however, on the 
contrary, they might account to unseaworthiness of the vessel. Due to the design of the 
vessel, this equipment can be dismantled for maintenance or even to provide more 
space for cargo to be loaded.139 Dunnages, for instance, do not form part of the vessel, 
and are not kept on board the vessel that often unless a specific cargo is to be loaded 
                                               
136 For more information, see Glass, D. Freight Forwarding and Multimodal Transport 
Contracts (Informa, 2002), para. 4. 93 
137 The Kamsar Voyager [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. Failure to supply the proper piston 
for a main engine amounted the vessel to be unseaworthy 
138 In relation to latent defects in containers, see Article IV r.2 (p) of the Hague Visby 
Rules; this exception is most likely to relate to cargo handling gear and equipment 
which is not considered to be part of the vessel such as shore or floating cranes and 
containers. See Bugden, P. and Lamont-Black, S. (2010) Goods in Transit, 2nd edn. 
Sweet & Maxwell at p.375. Margetson argued that the container should not be part of 
the vessel because it might spend more time ashore than on board the vessel 
139  Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines (The Ciechocinek) [1976] QB 893. The plaintiff 
chartered the defendants' ship to carry potatoes from Egypt to England. The ship's 
master considered that although the cargo capacity was 1,400 tonnes, only 1,000 
tonnes of potatoes should be carried and should be ventilated by dunnage. The 
charterparty provided that the stowage and dunnage instructions of the charterer were 
to be carefully followed and be executed under the supervision of the master who was 
to remain responsible for proper stowage and dunnage. The charterer's agent in Egypt, 
notwithstanding the master's advice, insisted that the ship should carry 1,400 tonnes of 
potatoes and expressly stated that the potatoes were so packed as to make dunnage 
unnecessary. The charterer had, by his agent, accepted responsibility for the stowage 
and had thereby relieved the master of the responsibility under the charterparty. See 
also Claude Bouillon et Cie v Lupton (1863) 15 Common Bench Reports (New Series) 
113 
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which by international regulations imposes the shipowner to use them for safe stowage. 
A similar example can be found in The Standale,140 the owner was guilty as the court 
held that the vessel was unseaworthy in terms of it not being adequately fitted for 
carriage of cargo by not using dunnage or shifting-boards.141   
c) Containers owned by the carrier and seaworthiness  
As mentioned above, the carrier most often is the supplier of the container either by 
leasing or owning the container142; either way the carrier is under obligation imposed by 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The carrier, under Article III r.1 is required to make the 
vessel seaworthy by exercising due diligence in properly equipping and supplying the 
vessel, and making the holds, refrigerating systems and cool chambers including the 
entire parts of the vessel in which goods to be carried, fit and safe to carry and 
preserve the contemplated cargo. Tetley143 says that where containers are furnished by 
the carrier, due diligence has been held to extend to them as parts of the vessel’s 
seaworthiness. Also, the authors144 of the recent edition of Goods in Transit comment 
that the seaworthiness of a container ship clearly depends on, inter alia, the condition, 
weight and contents of each container being properly described by the merchant in 
each case. No stowage plan is otherwise reliable to render the vessel seaworthy. 
Indeed, if a tank container carrying a dangerous cargo is damaged, such as having a 
wrong setting safety relieve valve or a cracked shell which may cause an explosion, will 
obviously render the vessel unseaworthy.145 It would be therefore imprudent to exercise 
due diligence on every part of the vessel and single out any container that may 
                                               
140 The Standale (1938) 61 LIL Rep. 223 at p.230 
141 Out of three thousand two hundred tonnes of grain, a portion was stowed in five 
thousand bags without separation. Consequently, the cargo shifted, the vessel 
developed a list and became unmanageable; it sank 
142 According to Article IV 4 of the International Convention for Safe Containers (CSC 
Convention), “every container shall be maintained in a safe condition.” Regulation 2 of 
the Annex I places this obligation on the owner of the container, who must “examine it 
or have it examined in accordance with the procedure prescribed or approved by the 
contracting party concerned, at intervals appropriate to the operating conditions.” 
Annex II deals with safety aspects of the construction and testing of containers 
143  Tetley, W. (2005) Marine Cargo Claim 4th edn. Montreal Canada Ch. 15 
www.mcgill.ca/maritime law 
144  Bugden, P. and Lamont-Black, S. (2010) Goods in Transit, 2nd edn. Sweet & 
Maxwell at p.375 
145 Each time a container is transferred from one carrier to another, or to a storage 
company, a so-called interchange receipt will be drawn up between the two transferring 
parties, by means of a printed drawing on which the location of dents, holes and other 
damages which may render the container unfit for carriage, such as badly functioning 
door mechanisms, can be easily indicated. The number on the containers seal is also 
noted. For further information, see De Wit, R. Multimodal Transport (LLP, 1995) at p. 
10 
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endanger the vessel and life apart from the expected normal perils of the sea. There is 
no doubt that the carrier is not required to exercise due diligence by inspecting and 
opening every container, but it might be made by other framework; for example, 
weighing the container and verifying the shippers’ declarations which extends to the 
security of the container while it is being scanned or x-rayed according to the 
requirements of the ISPS Code. 146  A similar example was found in a case of a 
refrigerated container filled with chocolates and was being shipped from the factory in 
Switzerland to Hong Kong via France. On arrival at France, the handling company 
found that the container’s temperature was 23°C rather than the suitable one of 12°C. 
The cargo was found, when examined, to be damaged due to a latent defect in the 
refrigeration system. The carrier, as a supplier of the container, was found to be liable 
for the defect.147   
The extent of obligation of seaworthiness alters the overall risk allocation between the 
carrier and cargo interests and is totally right. 
First, the checking of the containers cannot be considered to be the consignor’s duty. 
Even a normal thorough investigation of the containers by the consignor would have 
revealed the unfitness148 of the container, but then neither an inspection of the carrier 
would have discovered it. In this regards, the carrier might not be negligent in supplying 
such unfit containers. It is in such cases that an objective liability rule for equipment 
would prove very useful. Second, whether or not the consignor is under the obligation 
to check the container, this cannot be held has an exception against a third party 
holder of a negotiable document who may rely on the carrier for the performance of 
certain essential duties such as the use of fit equipment (cargoworthy container). 
However, the exact nature of the due diligence required by the ship (carrier) in the case 
of container carriage in this respect has never been explored in the cases under the 
English Law; no doubt it would not extend to requiring opening up and checking of 
contents of sealed containers in the ordinary way but it might extend to taking other 
proper steps to verify the shipper’s declarations by checking the declared gross weights 
and the exterior appearance of the containers for defects which involves the security of 
the stow which, in turn, might render the vessel unseaworthy if it has not been carried 
out. 
                                               
146  The ISPS Code imposes security-related responsibilities on governments, port 
authorities and shipping companies. Security of ships and port facilities is seen as a 
risk management activity. See Todd, P. (2005) ISPS clauses in charterparties  JBL 372  
147 Aix-en-Provence, 31 May 1990, BT, 1990. 663 (summary); Paris, 14 November 
1984, DMF 1986, 282. Cited in De Wit, R. (1995) Multimodal Transport, LLP at p.414 
148
 A case where tinned cargo was damaged through ‘microholes’. Versailles, 16 June 
1988, DMF, 1989, 465 with note; BT, 1989, 145 with note  
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If the container is supplied by the shipper, the carrier should still be under an obligation 
to assess the apparent order and condition and, if necessary, insert a reservation to 
that effect in the transport document which, in return, the shipper will replace the 
container. If he did not do so, he will be apparently liable for any future cargo 
damage.149 
 
The need for a new system - the legal position of the container in Rotterdam Rules 
The Rotterdam Rules are structured to be applied to a multimodal transport shipment 
as a contract of carriage involving at least one international sea leg.150 It was said that 
the draft instrument should respond to the new realities of international transport,151 
namely, the increase in door-to-door containerised transport in the liner trade which in 
June 2002, the UNCITRAL Commission approved this suggestion.152 There was the 
development in world trade, technological advancement in the shipping industry owing 
to improved navigational instruments, more efficient steam power and steel during the 
nineteenth century, but there was more development on the way with the 
transshipment of cargo and packages such as containers; these were invented for the 
consolidation of goods. During this period, it was widely recognised that the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules caused confusion and insoluble problems because of their 
deficiencies and insufficient language communication,153 and could not keep up with 
the developments in shipping and commerce, which had not been apparent even 
during the fifth session of the Brussels Diplomatic Conference.154 
The obligation of seaworthiness is contained in Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules: 
 
               Article 14: Specific obligations applicable to the voyage by sea 
  
                                               
149 Which would also be apparent in the container interchange receipt which is normally 
made out upon delivery to a container terminal 
150 Article 1.1 “contract of carriage” means a contract in which a carrier, against the 
payment of freight, undertakes to carry goods from one place to another. The contract 
shall provide for carriage by sea and may provide for carriage by other modes of 
transport in an addition to the sea carriage 
151 Hancock, C. ‘Multimodal transport under the Convention’ as chapter 2 in R. Thomas 
(ed.) A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam Rules 2009, 
Law text 
152 Report of ninth session A/CN.9/510 para 224 
153 Todd, P. Modern Bills of Lading 2nd ed., London 1990 at p.139 
154 Moore, J. C. The Hamburg Rules 10 J. Mar. L. & Com. 1, October 1978, p.3 
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The carrier is bound before, at the beginning of, and during the voyage 
by sea to exercise due diligence to: 
(a) Make and keep the ship seaworthy 
(b) Properly crew, equip and supply the ship and keep the ship so crewed, 
equipped and supplied throughout the voyage 
(c) Make and keep the holds and all other parts of the ship in which the 
goods are carried, and any containers supplied by the carrier in or upon 
which the goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation. 
Article 14 of the Rotterdam Rules sets out fundamental obligations of the carrier in 
terms of the vessel, and now corresponds to the Hague-Visby Rules, Article III. r. 1; in 
addition to further provisions. A general statement, however, preceded Article 14, 
similarly considered in Article III of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, with an additional 
phrase - ‘during’ - that constitutes the general frames of within which the rules on the 
obligation of the carrier is to be continued to the entire period of the voyage. 
Furthermore, they are quoting Article III r. 1 of the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules regarding 
the obligation of seaworthiness on the carrier to exercise due diligence to provide a 
seaworthy vessel; that is to say, a vessel must be prepared in a condition to a vessel 
similar to her kind, and loaded in such a way similar to the way she was loaded in order 
to encounter a peril of a particular area of the sea. 155  In other words, a vessel’s 
seaworthiness is said to be relative to the adventure and not necessarily determined by 
a fixed standard, but will depend on a number of factors in particular: the type, 
characteristics and age of the vessel; the contemplated cargo; the contemplated area 
of globe; the time of year at which the carriage will be effected; and perhaps also, to the 
state of knowledge or development of the industry at the time of the obligation.156 The 
aspect of seaworthiness in Article 14 coincides with the one under Article III r. 1 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. Seaworthiness under Article 14 encompasses three factors 
of seaworthiness: 1) under the provision of Article 14(a) - the vessel’s physical 
                                               
155 Steel v State Line Steamship Co (1877) LR 3 App. Cas. 72 at p.77. See also 
McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 KB 697 at p.706 (Scrutton LJ), setting the classic 
test of whether or not a vessel is in fact seaworthy; a vessel ‘must have that degree of 
fitness which an ordinary careful and prudent owner would require his vessel to have at 
the commencement of her voyage having regard to all the probable circumstances of 
it. … if the defect exists, the question to be put is: “Would a prudent owner have 
required that his hold be made good before sending his ship to sea had he known of it? 
If he would, the ship was not seaworthy within the meaning of the undertaking.” 
156 Eridania SpA (formerly Cereol Italia Srl) v Oetker (The Fjord Wind) [1999] 1 Lloyd’s 
Rep 307 at p.315 (Moore-Bick LJ), approved by Clarke LJ at [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 191 
at p.197 
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condition requires to be fit in terms of her hull plating,157 hatches,158 port holes159  and 
vents, 160  to encounter the expected peril of the sea; 2) under Article 14(b) - the 
shipowner is also required to properly man the vessel. For example, the vessel must be 
supplied with sufficient numbers161 of crew and officers in accordance with national 
manning scales.162 The crew must also be properly qualified, competent163 and well 
instructed and trained to be familiar with their vessel.164 In addition, the shipowner is 
required to properly equip the vessel with all necessary spare parts, 165  up-to-date 
charts, navigational equipment and publications166 in addition to supplying the vessel 
with adequate167 and suitable bunkers to navigate her to the contemplated destination 
                                               
157 The Toledo [1995] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 40 (unseaworthiness due to failure of shell plating 
of the hull on the port side); see also The Christel Vinnen [1924] P 208; (1924) 19 LlL 
Rep 272 (when a missing rivet from the vessel’s hull allowed water to leak into the hull 
and damage the cargo which made the vessel unseaworthy) 
158  Kamilla Hans-Peter Eckhoff KG v AC Oerssleff’s EFTF A/B [2006] EWHC 509 
(Comm) [2006] EWHC 509. (the vessel was found to be unseaworthy when the cargo 
was damaged due to a defected hatch cover, the port authority refused to allow the 
cargo to be discharged) 
159 Steel v State Line (1877) 3 App Cas 72 at pp.90-91(vessel found to be unseaworthy 
as one of the deck portholes was inadequately fastened) 
160 Albert E Reed and Co Ltd v Page, Son and East Ltd (1927) 32 Com. Cas. 243 at p. 
255 CA (Scrutton LJ) 
161 Forshaw v Chabert (1821) 3 Brod & Bing 158 (it was held that the vessel, in order to 
be seaworthy, must have a sufficient number of crew for the whole voyage at the 
commencement thereof); see also Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen 
Kaisha Ltd (The Hong Kong Fir) [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 159 
162 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping 
for Seafarers, 1978 as amended 1995 (STCW 95) 
163 Robin Hood Flour Mills Ltd v N. M. Paterson & Sons Ltd (The Farrandoc) [1967] 1 
Lloyd's Rep. 232 (Thurlow J) (the vessel held to be unseaworthy because the engineer 
was incompetent for not being familiar with this particular vessel) 
164 Standard Oil Company v Clan Line Steamers [1924] AC 100; (1924) SC 1 (the 
vessel was unseaworthy because the owner had failed to instruct the master about the 
information from the shipyard regarding the vessel’s operation); see also Papera 
Traders Co Ltd and Others v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd and Another (The 
Eurasian Dream) (No.1) at pp.740-744. (Cresswell LJ) (incompetent master and crew 
because they were not properly instructed and trained in fire fighting) 
165 Guinomar of Conakry v Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co Ltd (The Kasmar 
Voyager) [2002] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 57 (Dean J) (the vessel was found unseaworthy for 
inadequate spare-parts, i.e. wrong supply of the main engine’s piston) 
166 Rey Banano del Pacifico CA v Transportes Navieros Ecuatorianos SpA (The Isla 
Fernandina) [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 15 at p.40. (The vessel found unseaworthy due to 
inadequate charts and navigation aids and equipment); see also The Marion [1983] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 156 (CA) and [1984] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 1 (HL) 
167 A Turtle Offshore SA v Superior Trading Inc (The A Turtle) [2009] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
177. Although, there is a breach of exercise due diligence to tender the tug at the 
commencement of the voyage in a seaworthy condition by supplying sufficient bunker, 
the fact was that the defendants were protected from liability by Clause 18 (exemption 
clause); see also Northumbrian Shipping Co Ltd v E. Timm & Son Ltd., [1939] AC 397 
at 404 (Wright LJ) 
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or to an agreed convenient bunkering port. 168  Furthermore, the overall legal 
requirement to properly equip and supply includes all the necessary certifications to 
enable the vessel to perform her duty (legally seaworthy);169 and 3) seaworthiness 
under Article 14(c) also relates to the fitness of the vessel in relation to the space and 
all other parts that goods are carried which must be cargoworthy; that is to say, prior to 
the loading operation, holds, tanks and all cargo spaces are to be fit to receive and 
carry the contemplated cargo to the contracted destination safely.170 Therefore, cargo 
holds must be cleaned, fumigated and free from residual of the previous cargo to avoid 
smearing the goods171 or preventing the cargo from being denied to be unloaded at the 
port of unloading.172 Equally, the stowage of cargo must be properly made in the sense 
that it would not shift or break as to endanger the safety of the vessel.173 
One of the most essential aims of the Rotterdam Rules is to provide practical tools to 
update the transport law in order to solve problems174 that are occurring from the fast 
growing industry.175 Thus, unlike the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, the Rotterdam Rules 
take into consideration the usage of containers which was adverted following the 
Hague Conventions. The provision of Article 14(c) also requires that a seaworthy 
                                               
168 Nippon Yusen Kaisha v Alltrans Group of Canada Ltd QBD (Com.Ct.) (Neill J.) 12 
Apr (1984) 116 LMLN 3(3) 
169 Golden Fleece Maritime Inc and Pontian Shipping SA v ST Shipping & Transport Inc 
[2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 224 (vessel held to be unseaworthy due to a change in MARPOL 
regulation which required the vessel to make major modifications to her tanks in order 
to be granted with certification); see also Alfred C Roepfer v Tossa Marine Co Ltd (The 
Derby) [1985] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 325 at p.331. (Lord Kerr) 
170  Queensland National Bank Ltd v Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co 
[1898] 1 QB 567, at p.572 (Collins LJ) (The vessel was found to be unseaworthy 
because the bullion room was not reasonably fit for its purpose to resist thieves) 
171 The Brabant [1965] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 546; see also The Good Friend [1984] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 586 
172  The Fehmarn [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 355. (Sir Jocelyn Simon, P.); see also 
International Ore & Fertilizer Corp v SGS Control Services Inc - US Court of Appeals 
(2nd Circuit) (Van Graafeiland and Winter Ct JJ and Mishler DJ) - 24 October 1994. For 
more information, see Shaw, R. E. Cleaning bulker cargo holds Maritime Risk 
International (2001) May 
173 Onego Shipping & Chartering BV v JSC Arcadia Shipping (The M/V Socol 3) [2010] 
EWHC 777 (comm.) (the vessel found to be unseaworthy due to improper securing of 
the deck cargo, lashing haD broken loose); see also Kopitoff v Wilson (1876) 1 QBD 
377 (Blackburn J).(The cargo of armour plates due to improper stowage broke loose in 
rough weather causing the vessel to sink)  
174 See generally Levinson, M. The Box: How the Shipping Container Made the World 
Smaller and the World Economy Bigger (2006) (discussing the impact of the container 
revolution); Cudahy, B. J. Box Boats: how container ships changed the world (2006) 
175  Sturley, M. F. Transport Law for the twenty-first century: an introduction to the 
preparation, philosophy, and potential impact of the Rotterdam Rules at p.26 as 
Chapter 1 in R. Thomas (ed.) A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - 
The Rotterdam Rules (2009, Law text) 
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container has to be supplied by the carrier for the use of the carriage of goods.176 By 
analogy to the cargo holds and all other parts of the vessel that are required to be 
seaworthy, Article 14(c) so too obliges that all containers supplied by the carrier are to 
be seaworthy in the same way as any hold or part of the vessel. Despite the fact that 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules had made no reference to containers, Article 14(c) 
thereby pertains to the approach of other jurisdictions177 which imposes the carrier to 
exercise due diligence to supply a seaworthy container.178 In other words, the carrier 
will be liable for not exercising due diligence in providing a cargoworthy container if it is 
found that the container was unfit at the reception of, the carrying of and the 
preservation of the contemplated cargo, i.e. if the refrigeration system of the container 
does not work properly, this may cause the cargo to be damaged.179 On the other hand, 
the uncargoworthiness of the container may affect the whole fitness of the vessel if it is 
found that such a container may endanger the whole safety of the vessel and not 
merely the carrying of an unfit cargo.  
As a final note, other mandatory liability regimes (including that of the Multimodal 
Convention) have made it impossible for the parties of a contract to shift the duty of 
inspection, cleaning and maintenance of containers to the consignor rather than the 
carrier as it does not give a freedom of contract to contract out of the regime. Such an 
exemption clause would discharge the carrier of a fundamental duty under the contract 
of carriage. On the contrary, a volume contract180 under the Rotterdam Rules sorts out 
problems of contract freedom for those who see it as more convenient to their business 
                                               
176 If the containers are supplied by the shipper or documentary shipper, then they will 
fall into the definition of the goods (Containers not supplied by or on behalf of the 
carrier’ - Article 1. 24). See also Articles 27 and 33 on the liability of the shipper with 
respect to the condition of the goods 
177 US case for example, see Houlden & Co v The Red Jacket [1977] AMC 1382 at 
pp.1401-1402 (SDNY, 1977), [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300; Netherland case for example, 
see The NDS Provider (SCN 1 February 2008) nr C06/082HR, RvdW 2008, 177 
(Netherland) 
178 See Tetley, W. Marine Cargo Claims (Thompson 2008) Chapter 15 at pp.921-922; 
see also Margetson, N. J. Liability of the carrier under the Hague (Visby) Rules for 
Cargo Damage caused by unseaworthiness of its Containers (2008) 14 JIML 153; see 
also Margetson, N. J. The system of liability of Articles III and IV of the Hague [Visby] 
Rules Paris Legal Publishers, 2008, para. 99 at p.48; also see Bordahandy, P-J. (2005) 
Containers: a conundrum or a concept? 11 JIML, pp.342-371 at p.369 
179 Aix-en-Provence, 31 May 1990, BT, 1990. 663 (summary); Paris, 14 November 
1984, DMF 1986, 282. Cited in De Wit, R. (1995) Multimodal Transport, LLP at p.414. 
also see Houlden & Co v The Red Jacket [1977] AMC 1382 at pp.1401-1402 (SDNY 
1977), [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300 
180 Volume contracts are defined in Article 1.2 as contracts of carriage that provide for 
the carriage of a specified quantity of goods in a series of shipments during an agreed 
period of time. The specification of the quantity may include a minimum, a maximum or 
certain range 
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plan and relationship to keep adhering to the previous regimes,181 i.e. Article III (1) of 
the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, by derogation from most provisions of the Rotterdam 
Rules provided that the preconditions set out in Article 80.2 are fulfilled except, of 
course, the obligation of seaworthiness under Article 14, 182   including other 
provisions.183 The carrier and the shipper (consignor) cannot be contracted out from 
them when they decide to enter into a volume contract. Although the carrier cannot 
contract out of the obligation of seaworthiness, he must exercise due diligence in 
making and keeping the ship so properly crewed, equipped and supplied throughout 
the voyage. However, the parties are allowed to derogate from exercising due diligence 
as under Article 14 (c) in the making and keeping of the holds and all other parts of the 
ship in which the goods are carried, and any containers supplied by the carrier in or 
upon which the goods are carried that are fit and safe for their reception, carriage and 
preservation.184  
It is not necessarily the case that the extension of seaworthiness in light of containers 
will find acceptance by the entire industry.  Thence, contracting in with a volumes 
contract is believed to give some flexibility in retaining some form of business between 
shippers and carrier especially those that are set out over a long relationship based on 
provisions of an older regime or convention. Nonetheless, the ‘uttermost responsibility’ 
provisions of seaworthiness obligation in Article 14 (a) and (b) is believed to relate to 
                                               
181 The parties to a volume contract may derogate from most of the provisions of the 
Rotterdam Rules if the preconditions set out in Article 80.2 are met. The derogation is 
allowed as the parties to volume contracts are deemed to have equal bargaining power 
and, therefore, they are not in need of the mandatory protection of the provisions of the 
Rotterdam Rules 
182 Article 80 (4) paragraph 1 of this article does not apply to rights and obligations 
provided in Article 14, subparagraphs (a) and (b), 29 and 32 or to liability arising from 
the breach thereof, nor does it apply to any liability arising from an act or omission 
referred to in Article 61 
183  Carrier and shipper cannot also derogate from shipper’s obligation to provide 
information, instructions and documents (Article 29), the special rules in dangerous 
goods (Article 32) and the liability arising from the breach thereof, as well as from the 
unlimited liability of the carrier of any of the persons referred to in Article 18, in cases 
where the claimant proves that the loss resulting from the breach of the carrier’s 
obligation under the Rotterdam Rules was attributable to a personal act or omission of 
the person claiming a right to limit done with the intent to cause such loss or recklessly 
and with knowledge that such loss would probably result (Art 61) 
184
 For further information, see Theodora Nikaki, The Obligation of carriers to provide seaworthy 
ships and exercise care, cited as chapter 4 in D Rhidian Thomas, A New Convention for the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea-The Rotterdam Rules, (2009, Lawtext Publishing Limited), at p. 108-
109. 
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maritime safety which should be carefully monitored at all times.185 It should be borne 
in mind that the derogation of provision that corresponds to the cargoworthiness of the 
vessel and containers does not bind third parties or subsequent holders, other than 
shipper, of an ‘electronic transport record or negotiable transport document’ unless they 
receive information that clearly states the derogation of the volume contracts from the 
Rotterdam Rules with their express approval to be bound by such a derogation.186     
Period of seaworthiness 
Despite the similarity in the basis of the obligation between Hague/Hague-Visby Rules 
and Rotterdam Rules in the sense that the obligation of seaworthiness,187 unlike the 
absolute warranty under the common law, it is merely a duty to exercise due diligence 
in providing a seaworthy vessel. But the difference is in the change to the obligation, 
which under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules would require the carrier to exercise due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. This has been extended. Under Article 14, the 
carrier is now under an obligation to exercise due diligence, not only ‘before and at the 
beginning of the voyage’, but also ‘during’ the voyage and not just to ‘make’ but also to 
‘keep’ the vessel seaworthy. The carrier would thence be obliged to not only provide a 
seaworthy vessel merely before and at the beginning of the voyage but also be under 
an obligation to persistently keep the vessel in a seaworthy condition throughout the 
voyage by sea. The provision under Article 14 extends the duration of seaworthiness 
throughout the voyage without setting a clear limit in which the obligation is completely 
fulfilled. Since the case law has defined the duration of the obligation of seaworthiness 
under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules, a hypothetical example to the Rules would give a 
clear picture as to when the obligation is starting. Definition of the words ‘before and at 
the beginning of’ the voyage’ have been construed to correspond with the time starting 
when the vessel is under the ‘orbit’ of the carrier188 to the phase when the loading 
                                               
185 A/CN.9/576 - Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its fifteenth 
session (New York, 18 - 28 April 2005) http://daccess-
ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open& JN= V0584375, para 22 
186 Rotterdam Rules Article 80.5. Provided that their consent is not solely set forth in a 
carrier’s public schedule of prices and services, transport document or electronic 
transport record. 
187 That means that even if the cause of unseaworthiness was not discoverable by due 
diligence, the carrier will still be liable. The Muncaster Castle [1961] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. 
See also Steel v The State Line SS (1877) LR 3 App Cas 72 at p.86 (Blackburn LJ) 
188 Riverstone Meat Co Pty Ltd v Lancashire Shipping Co Ltd (The Muncaster Castle) 
[1961] AC 807 at p.867 (Radcliff LJ). When the new vessel is to be received from the 
shipyard or when the vessel had been repaired and comes under the control of the 
carrier. At p.870 (Keith of Avonholm LJ) see also The Happy Ranger at p.656 (Gloster 
J)  
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begins or until the vessel starts on her voyage.189 The Rotterdam Rules are silent 
regarding how far the obligation should be maintained as the terms ‘during the voyage’ 
bring with it some doubt in the definition of the duration of the obligation and, in 
particular, the time that the seaworthiness obligation is concluded. This would cause 
unnecessary uncertainty in the law if the Rules were ratified. What is required of this 
provision, in practical terms, is that it should clearly define the precise point at which 
the duty of seaworthiness ends. The term ‘during the voyage’ without doubt has not 
clarified the position of whether the seaworthiness undertaken ends when the vessel 
has arrived to the port of discharge or when the completion of the cargo has been 
discharged. An example of how each of these two would happen will assist. On the one 
hand, if the seaworthiness obligation, under the meaning of the context, meant to be at 
the end of the vessel’s arrival then the following propositions are possible and may 
raise a future conflict in regard to the ending of the obligation: 
1. The vessel is possible to be called ‘arrived’ when she is within the geographical 
and legal area of the port in the sense commonly understood by its users. 
Accordingly, the obligation of seaworthiness may end at the time of entering the 
limit of such area. 
2. Even in the above point, the vessel may not enter the port if the port authority 
has ordered her to stay outside this area; this would result in considering her 
‘not arrived’ and the obligation to this time, presumably, should not be ended. 
3. If the vessel is ordered to anchor at a place where vessels usually lie while 
waiting for a berth at that port, the carrier is probably required to keep 
maintaining the obligation of seaworthiness. 
This view is in line with the approach adopted in the case law regarding the meaning of 
the voyage as the term ‘voyage’ covers the whole period from the loading port until the 
arrival of the vessel at its destination.190 
On the other hand, ‘during the voyage by sea’ terms might be interpreted as including 
the discharge of the cargo from the vessel. This would coincide with the purpose of the 
                                               
189 Maxine Footwear Co v Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] Lloyd’s Rep. 
105 at p.113 (Somervell of Harrow LJ). The Privy Council clearly indicates that the 
obligation is not merely to exercise due diligence at the beginning of the loading and at 
the beginning of the voyage, but during the whole period from beginning of loading until 
sailing 
190 The Makedonia [1962] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 316 at pp.329-330. “I see no obligation to read 
into the word ‘voyage’ a doctrine of stages, but a necessity to define the word itself. 
The word does not appear in the earlier Canadian Act of 1910. "Voyage" in this context 
means what it has always meant: the contractual voyage from the port of loading to the 
port of discharge as declared in the appropriate bill of lading 
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Rules as it is to prolong the duration of the obligation to the end of the sea- and port-
venture(s).191   
Justification to the extension of the seaworthiness obligation 
It is worth noting that the principle of exercising due diligence at the commencement of 
the voyage only is, in fact, debatable.192 The principle to that is definitely undesirable 
nowadays since the adoption to improve safety and the environment has made it 
necessary to implement the developed requirements of safety; especially the one that 
was introduced by the International Safety Management Code regarding the safety of 
the vessel and the environmental protection during her operation. In particular, a 
proviso that entails an obligation to exercise due diligence only at the commencement 
of the sea voyage would not, however, been possible to adopt the Safety Management 
System, 193  to state the responsibility of the masters 194  or the maintenance 
procedures195 for the vessel to maintaining her in a seaworthy state during the voyage 
which is required under the International Safety Management System. Thus, such a 
requirement is in clear conflict with the current law on the obligation of seaworthiness 
under the Hague/Hague/Visby Rules 196  whereas, the obligation under Article 14 is 
essential to bring it in line with the ISM Code.197 If in the future, the Rotterdam Rules 
are adopted, the responsibility of the carrier in relation to the continuous duty of 
seaworthiness is not substantially greater than the level of responsibility that carriers 
have been prepared to accept in practice over the recent years; industry has, before 
now, been familiar with the maintenance of seaworthiness during the sea voyage either 
by the means of incorporating the charter’s provisions requiring the vessel to have on-
board certificates and documents required by any applicable law and to comply with all 
                                               
191  See the same concerns expressed by Dr Theodora Nikaki: “The obligations of 
carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care”, as Chapter 4 in D. Thomas A 
New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam Rules, (Law text, 
2009), p.89 at p.107 
192  It was debated in the International Law Association (ILA) in preparation of the 
Hague Rules in 1921. 
193 ISM Code Article 1.4 
194 ISM Code Article 5 
195 ISM Code Article 10 
196 Article III r.1 
197 The view was supported in UNCITRAL Doc A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.21 of 8 January 2002 
‘Transport Law-Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea’ (Ninth 
session New York, 15 - 26 April 2002). 
http://Daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V02/ 
501/49/PDF/v0250149.pdf?OpenElement) Article 5 para 63 
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applicable conventions including198 ISM and ISPS clauses, and if in breach of these the 
carrier will be liable.199    
There was no difficulty in exercising due diligence before and at the beginning of the 
voyage, but the question is: “Does the carrier face an unattainable task in fulfilling the 
obligation of seaworthiness throughout the sea voyage?” 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Furthermore, in light of the recent developments in the sense of new communications 
and tracking systems of vessels, it has been made possible for the ship’s master to be 
aware of all cargoes loaded or to be loaded on the vessel and that information 
regarding all hazardous or dangerous cargoes are given beforehand to the ship’s 
captain to warrant the compliance with the port including the local and international 
regulations, 200  SOLAS regulations (such as the ISPS Code), the IMDG Code 
regulations and the general regulations concerning the correct stowage of all cargoes 
loaded or to be loaded on board the vessel. Contravening these regulations would 
render the vessel unseaworthy.201 It is believed that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules in 
general and Article III r. 1 in particular reflects the business conduct of the early 
twentieth century when the technology standard was not available for vessels to be in 
communication with her owner (carrier) after her sailing.202   
The objection raised is that the carrier cannot fulfil the obligation of seaworthiness 
during the voyage, or in any event cannot do so in the same manner as he could when 
the vessel is in port.203 In fact, the view is more correct to the contrary with a container 
vessel. With a short time spent in port, the quick turn-around for a container vessel 
makes it very difficult for the vessel’s staff to be involved with safe planning or the 
stowage of the containers which may cause a risk of imbalance. This would lead to the 
                                               
198 Golden Fleece Maritime Inc. v St. Shipping & Transport Corp. [2008] EWCA Civ 584. 
Two vessels have been chartered on the Shelltime form for the carriage of petroleum 
product oil. During the course of the charters, revisions to MARPOL Convention 
required all vessels to be double hulled. Although the vessels were both single hulled, 
in the absence of a double certificate, the vessels were not permitted to carry fuel oils. 
The Court of Appeal held that the owners were in breach of seaworthiness obligation 
199 Even in the case of the absence of such a clause, the carrier is liable if he is not 
complying with ISPS and ISM Codes as both are part of SOLAS Convention 
200 ISPS Code Part A, S 8.4. regulate and improve the security of ships and ports                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
201 See Rowbotham, M. Introduction to Marine Cargo Management (Informa,  2008) at 
p.204. see also, B. Soyer, Warranties in Marine Insurance, (2006, Cavendish), at p.62. 
202 The obligations of carriers to provide seaworthy ships and exercise care published 
as Chapter 4 in A New Convention for the Carriage of Goods by Sea - The Rotterdam 
Rules (2009, Law text) pp.89-110 
203  See commentary on Draft Instrument, under Article 5.5, CMI Yearbook 2001, 
Singapore at p.551 
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vessel becoming too heavy, e.g. unstable. Stowing cargo incorrectly would create a risk; 
it’s imperative to ensure that hazardous or dangerous cargoes are isolated from each 
other, especially when two kinds of IMDG Code class cargoes are located adjacent to 
each other. They may endanger the safety of the vessel and render her unseaworthy, 
as explained above. The ISM code has imposed responsibility on the master 
concerning the planning and stowage of the cargo that cannot be made without 
monitoring the seaworthiness of the vessel prior to the vessel’s arrival at the loading 
ports. In the Annabella204 case for example, a short-sea container feeder vessel was 
sailing en route to the port of Helsinki for further loading of containers. She 
encountered heavy seas which resulted in severe rolling. It was found that the 30-foot 
containers stowed lower down had collapsed under the excessive weight of the upper 
containers. At a later stage, it was discovered that no account had been made on the 
stowage of the 30-foot containers. Due to the reliance on the charterer who was in 
charge of the loading plans, the carrier had no interest in receiving or checking the 
plans. By so doing, the master or the chief mate was unable to consult the plan and 
make any alterations necessary to prevent the vessel from being unseaworthy at the 
commencement and during the sea voyage. A report from the Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch (MAIB) had shown that the main cause was the improper stowage 
of containers stacked above a 30-foot container that was only designed to take the 
maximum permissible stack weight of 150 tons, whereas the stacked weight of the 
seven containers above the collapsed container was 225 tons. Another factor that may 
contribute to this incident is believed to be a major problem in the container trading.205 
When planning the weight distribution, dangerous cargo segregation and stability 
factors, they were being prepared by the charterer having full reliance on the computer 
system; but they did not have access to the vessel’s Cargo Security Manual (CSM).206 
When containers are stowed on deck, they must be stowed in accordance with the 
                                               
204 See Chuah, J. Container stowage - a matter of cooperation or liability STL (2008) 01 
June 
205 There have been several accidents involving the collapse of stacks of containers, 
e.g. P&O Nedlloyd Genoa (2006) 
206 The manual, prepared by the shipbuilder for vessels of the same class as Annabella, 
provided details of the container securing arrangements and devices on the vessel as 
well as general information on safety-related aspects of container stowage. Information 
relating to specific lashing requirements for containers in the various stowage bays of 
the vessel was shown on plans annexed to the manual. It is part of the proper loading 
and stowage to have this manual (CSM) cross-referenced with the charterer’s stowage 
plan. On this topic see Draeger, J. and Zhu, B. Complete boxship charterparty solution? 
Loyd’s List (28 Dec. 2005) 
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stack and tier weight limits set out in the Cargo Securing Manual. 207  Therefore, 
stowage of containers must be in accordance with the approved CSM and is part of the 
carrier obligation to exercise due diligence. Notwithstanding, such exercise nowadays 
can only be taken via the new communication technology,208 where ships’ staff are able 
to gain access to the plan prior to the vessel’s arrival at her destination in order to 
identify the problem, i.e. verify the permissibility of the stacking weight and amend the 
stowage plan avoiding the vessel being unseaworthy in terms of not following the 
Safety Management System of the vessel which provides detailed instructions and 
guidance on how the vessel was to be operated and aspects of container stowage. 
Such operations are not time-consuming if it is carried out by feeding the received 
information into the on-board loading system. This is important especially for the feeder 
vessel that had no time for the master to satisfy himself of the safety of the planned 
cargo disposition when the vessel was in port. The report of MAIB stated:209    
“In this environment, where speed of operations is the imperative, the chief officer is 
unlikely to have the necessary influence to be able to stop or slow the operation 
while he makes a detailed check of all aspects of the stowage plan or of individual 
containers. Without such a check, it is inevitable that errors made during the 
planning/loading process will be undetected.”  
Finally, even if stowage and securing is the responsibility of the charterer under the 
charterparty, the master and officers of the vessel have an obligation to exercise due 
diligence to make the vessel seaworthy, which includes ensuring that containers are 
stowed and secured so as to prevent damage to the vessel or to other containers. 
Thereby, this may justify the necessity of the extension of obligation as it is the only 
way to ensure seaworthiness in terms of container stowage plans by using the 
technology of communication while the vessel is in transit to her destination as there 
are practical difficulties in examining the stowage plan at the port of loading.210 
                                               
207 For more information, see Loss Prevention Briefing for North of England Members 
Stowage and Securing of Containers (2008), p.3. Accessed at www.nepia.com 
208 Once the cargo plan had been prepared, it will be sent to as a bay plan/stowage 
plan on an electronic data file to the vessel as an attachment to the vessel’s e-mail. In 
this case, the vessel’s loading computer was wrongly set. Therefore, it did not give 
alarm when the stack weight was exceeded. 
209 Under Section 2.9 of the MAIB report on the investigation of the collapse of cargo 
containers on the Annabella case. Report No 21/2007. http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_ 
resources/Annabella_Report.pdf 
210 Schilling The effect on International Trade of the Implementation of the Hamburg 
Rules from the Point of view of a Shipowner CMI Colloquium on the Hamburg Rules 
(Vienna 1979) p.19 
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The availability of the new technology of communications has justified the importance 
of the extension of seaworthiness throughout the voyage in regards of container 
stowage.  
The Rotterdam Rules have received points of criticism211 relating to the extension of 
seaworthiness obligation to the entire sea voyage; the Rules impose greater 
responsibility on the carrier as compared with the current law of Hague/Hague-Visby 
regime.212  
The question is: “Is it reasonable to extend the obligation of seaworthiness?”  
The carrier’s obligation to exercise due diligence in providing a seaworthy vessel for the 
entire sea voyage should not be understood to impose a heavier and unreasonable 
burden on the carrier, his duty is an obligation merely to act reasonably using the skill 
and the care of an prudent carrier to keep his vessel in a seaworthy situation at all 
times during the sea voyage. This is believed to be reasonable. First, similar to the 
current system, the carrier is still obliged to exercise due diligence before and at the 
beginning of the voyage. By doing so, he is discharging most of the burden of 
seaworthiness prior to sailing, such as the preparation to sail which consists of 
thorough maintenance and repairs to the vessel’s hull, holds and engines. The rest of 
the obligation of seaworthiness consisting of maintaining the vessel’s equipment and 
properly carrying some particular spares for repairs to keep the vessel in a seaworthy 
condition is completed between her leaving the port of loading until her arrival at the 
port of discharge. In transit, the maintenance required must comply with international 
standards, i.e. ISM which regulates the responsibility of the masters, 213  and the 
maintenance procedures 214  under the vessel’s Safety Management System. 215 
Therefore, the carrier from the time the vessel sails to her arrival will be required to 
                                               
211 The point was made by the Executive Vice-President of AP Moller-Mearsk AS. Knud 
Potoppidan when he discussed the final text of the Rotterdam Rules at the CMI’s 
conference in October 2008. A synopsis of comments of national associations on the 
31 May 2001 edition of the Draft Outline Instrument is published in CMI Yearbook 
2001-Singapore II, 383 and, as respects the comments on Article 5, at 433  
212  The current law, under the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules and common law, the 
obligation to provide seaworthy vessel should be exercised before and at the 
commencement of the voyage. See McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 KB 697 at 
p.704. Maxine Footwear Co. Ltd. and Another (Appellants) v Canadian Government 
Merchant Marine Ltd (Respondents) [1959] AC 589. Tattersall v The National 
Steamship Company, Ltd, (1883-84) LR 12 QBD, 297. Compania de Naviera Nedelka 
S.A. v Tradax International S.A., (The Tres Flores), [1973] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 247 
213 ISM Code Article 5 
214 ISM Code Article 10 
215 ISM Code Article 1.4 
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exercise only due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy. Of course, the obligation in 
exercising due diligence during the sea voyage would not impose an absolute duty, as 
under the common law. The required standard is to be measured by applying the 
objective test of a prudent owner 216  who takes into consideration the particular 
circumstances of each case, such as the ability of the carrier to repair his vessel while 
sailing without causing a considerable or unreasonable delay to the vessel, or the type 
of vessel, i.e. coastal or deep sea vessel because the obligation cannot be carried out 
in the same manner as when the vessel is in port,217 so that the compliance thus 
should be assessed with regards to the circumstances occurring at the material time. 
The question would be: “How seaworthiness can be maintained on a continuous basis 
through out the voyage?”  
Fulfilment of extended seaworthiness according to the categories of 
maintenance/repairs 
While the vessel is en route to her destination, it is possible, even if the due diligence 
was exercised before or at the commencement of her voyage, her machineries and 
equipment are subject to failure and breakdown. The sea crew and officers on behalf of 
the carrier might be able to repair the vessel if the spare parts,218 according to the 
vessel’s class, are available on board.219 There is a possibility that it might not be 
possible for the vessel to be made seaworthy until it reaches a port of call. The 
response to that is in the twelfth UNCITRAL session stating that the obligation of 
seaworthiness is not strict and it is only to exercise due diligence in providing a 
seaworthy vessel.220 It should be borne in mind that the obligation is not exclusive to 
have a vessel fitted with sound working machineries that never break. But it is 
                                               
216 F. C. Bradley & Sons Ltd v Federal Steam Navigation Company Ltd (1926) 24 LlLR 
446, 454. The test is: the vessel “must have that degree of fitness which an ordinary 
careful owner would require his vessel to have…having regard to all the probable 
circumstances of it.” (Sumner LJ) 
217  See the same concerns were expressed in Berlingieri, F. Basis of liability and 
Exclusion of Liability [2002] LMCLQ 336 at p.338. Also, see commentary to Draft 
Instrument, under Article. 5.5, CMI Yearbook 2001 - Singapore II, at p.551 
218 Spares and repair equipment must be provided for life-saving appliances, for  their 
components and for other equipment and machineries which are subject to excessive 
wear or consumption and which need to be replaced regularly (Regulation 84(4) OSR; 
no equivalent provision in SPSR) 
219  The vessel is properly equipped and supplied for the expected duration of the 
voyage in terms of a sufficient and competent crew, navigational equipment and 
supplies, stores, provisions and spares, bunker fuel, fresh water etc. Project Asia Line 
Inc v Shone (The Pride of Donegal) [2002] EWHC 24 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 659 at 
p.674. (Andrew Smith J) 
220 Report of the twelfth session of the UNCITRAL. Para. 149 
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important to have an adequate number of spares that support everyday operation, for 
without them the vessel will not be seaworthy.  
a) Repairs by vessel’s crew: available spare parts 
It should be remembered that a vessel at sea has limited manning levels, and although 
they may be competent, they may possess only a limited ability to carry out certain 
types of repairs and/or maintenance. A vessel, therefore, is not likely to be classed as 
unseaworthy if a breakdown is found and that the problem cannot be repaired on board 
because either the required spare parts are not available221 or the fault requires the 
attention of an expert. Nevertheless, if a problem has developed during a voyage which 
may render the vessel to be unseaworthy, the vessel’s crew would attempt to repair the 
problem within a reasonable time and taking reasonable steps. By so doing, the carrier 
has presumed to discharge the burden of due diligence in order to provide a seaworthy 
vessel. Even if her crew have not succeeded in restoring her back to her seaworthy 
status, they have satisfied their obligation.222 This is indeed true as seaworthiness, 
according to Cresswell J, is to be judged “by the standards and practices of the industry 
at the relevant time, at least so long as those standards and practices are 
reasonable.” 223  Furthermore, the Working Group III 224  stated: ”However, it was 
suggested that the degree of diligence would or should depend on the context, to the 
effect that, for example, the duty of the carrier would be different depending on whether 
the vessel was at sea or in port.” Furthermore, it would not be fair to render the carrier 
taking reasonable care in cargo protection liable. Otherwise, he would be compelled to 
exercise extreme and unreasonable diligence 
 On the other hand, if a vessel has begun her voyage and some loss or damage has 
resulted from a problem that was discovered prior to the vessel commencing her 
voyage, e.g. in port, and if the vessel’s staff have attempted to carry out the repair but 
failed, then the carrier would still be liable for the damage that was caused by its 
unseaworthiness.225  In other words, there will be a breach of seaworthiness obligation 
                                               
221 Repair works and maintenance that required specialised personnel to carry it out 
222  Without breaching of the rules set out in the ISM Code or other international 
regulation 
223 Papera Traders Co Ltd v Hyundai Merchant Marine Co Ltd (The Eurasian Dream) 
[2002] EWHC 118 at p.127 [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 719 cited in Dockray, M. Cases & 
Materials on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, (3rd edn.), Routledge Cavendish 
224 A/CN.9/510 - Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth 
session April 2002, p.15 taken from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V02/ 
541/91/PDF/V0254191.pdf?OpenElement, on 17th July 2006 
225 Guinomar of Conakry and Another v Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co (The 
Kamsar Voyager) [2002] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 57 
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if they prove inadequate226 or if, during the voyage, they break down or fail to act owing 
to some initial defect.227  The law can not protect the carrier who did not exercise 
necessary steps to prevent loss or damage although he would be able to avoid it. In 
that case, since the carrier is liable, he would definitely spend less on the protection of 
goods than is required, preferring instead to insure his liability. As he is liable to his 
underwriter and only when he deliberately causes loss or damage attributed from 
unseaworthiness, he might become careless in precluding loss or damage for which 
the insurer cannot claim any reimbursement from him. Furthermore, the shipper would 
most likely avoid exercising due diligence in packing, marking or refurbishing 
containers to avert loss or damage, which the carrier is liable for, in order to relieve 
himself of costs. Liability of this nature thus encourages the carrier to set and maintain 
a reasonably acceptable standard of care.   
Professor Berlingieri commenting on Article 14228  said: 
“[T]he degree of diligence that is ‘due’ must be determined on the basis of the 
circumstances. During the voyage, only the master and the crew are available to 
correct any unseaworthiness that arises during the voyage but does the 
development of communication made it possible to arrange for an expert?” 
 
b) Repairs by experts: unavailable spare parts 
The extension of exercising due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel is justified 
(Article 14) by the developments in the safe shipping requirements. 229  The age of 
information technology and access to information by recent communication methods 
has assisted in this according to the development of maritime conventions, i.e. SOLAS. 
Shipowners are obliged to use advanced communication systems which will allow the 
vessel to be in contact with the shore throughout the voyage including in the deep sea 
should the vessel require maintenance that cannot be made without the spare parts 
and/or an expert. New technology of communication230 has made it so easy to the 
                                               
226 Stanton v Richardson (1875) 3 Asp MLC 23, HL 
227 Maori King (Cargo Owners) v Hughes [1895] 2 QB 550, 8 Asp MLC 65, CA 
228 Article 16(1) UNCITRAL Working Group III 16th session, Vienna 28 Nov - 9 Dec. 
Document in the draft instrument, A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.56, p.19. 
http://daccessdds.un.org/ 
doc/UNDOC/LTD/V05/870/82/PDF/V0587082.pdf?OpenElement. Accessed on 9th May 
2006 
229  UNCITRAL Preliminary draft instrument on the carriage of goods by sea of 8 
January 2002, Article 5 para 61 
230 See Boisson, P. Safety at Sea: Policies, Regulations & International Law (Bureau 
Veritas) at p.518; Zilkiewski, J. and Morazzani, C. “Relationsships, Information 
Technology and the Shipping Industry - An Exploratory Investigation UMIST, cited in 
www.impgroup.org/uploads/papers/4613.pdf 
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extent that the vessel’s staff are able to send/receive information (electronic picture and 
data information) regarding the status of the vessel and the type of repairs or spares 
needed to be delivered to the vessel when arriving at the first port of call. Alternatively, 
an arrangement of a smaller delivery boat could be prepared by an agent through the 
carrier or by a designated person231 to meet the vessel in transit near to a sea service 
zone whilst en route to her destination for the delivery of needed spare parts and/or 
experts to carry out the work. So, as long as the carrier and his servants try their best 
to bring the vessel to her seaworthiness status again, then his obligation to maintain 
the vessel under Article 14 is absolved and would not be liable for any 
consequences.232  
How due diligence should be exercised on containers? 
It has been demonstrated above (see due diligence chapter) that the carrier, pursuant 
to Article 14, is bound to exercised due diligence ‘before, at the beginning of and during 
the voyage by sea.  
Whether, the carrier, if he is the supplier of the container, or a party acting on his behalf 
in carrying out the duty of checking the condition, fitness, maintain and concealing of 
containers must, appropriately, be done prior the consolidate of goods into the 
containers, not when loading the container on to a road vehicle or a vessel. however, 
raises questions; is this incorporated provision, that the parties have added to the 
contract of carriage an extra or independent agreement?  
The legal aspect of supply of container in bills of lading 
Even if one jurisdiction regards the obligation to provide a cargoworthy container as 
part of the obligation of seaworthiness, i.e. as the same as that of providing a 
seaworthy vessel, the prevalence use of the container means that bills of lading, 
especially in liner trade, will commonly contain provisions relating to them that manage 
the rights and obligations of parties.233 In which case, the carrier may not be subject of 
                                               
231 The role of the designated person, mentioned in the ISM Code, would be of great 
importance, as he would be leasing between the ship and the management of the 
shipping company. 
232 A/CN.9/510 - Report of the Working Group on Transport Law on the work of its ninth 
session April 2002, p.15 taken from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V02/ 
541/91/PDF/V0254191.pdf?OpenElement, on 17th July 2006 
233
 It is however often to find that in the short-sea shipments provision or away bill, or other non-
negotionable documents mean that the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules as schedualed to the 
COGBS Act 1971 are no compulsorily applicable to shipments from UK unless incorporated by 
means of a paramount clause within the terms of section 1(6)(b) of the 1971 Act. see for 
example The European Enterprise [1989] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 185, esp. pp. 188 and 191, cf. The 
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binding duties and obligations as the carrier can contract out of possible liability for the 
supply of defective containers; it is common to see in liner bills of lading a clause, for 
specialised transport such as use of a refrigerated container, exclude liability in respect 
of the care of the refrigeration unit when the container is not in the actual possession of 
the carrier. It is not uncommon to find, in the short-sea ferry services, a clause which 
states that the carrier will use its best endeavours to connect any vehicle, trailer or 
container to the vessel supply of steam or electricity and to maintain the supply, but will 
not be liable for the breakdown even if due to negligence.234 For example, the bill of 
lading may provides that “(1) The Carrier shall not be liable for loss of or damage to the 
goods caused…the unsuitability or defective condition of the container, provided that, if 
the Container has been supplied by or on behalf of the carrier, this unsuitability or 
defective condition could have been apparent upon inspection by the merchant at or 
prior to the time when the container was packed.”235 This clause does not place any 
liability on the part of the carrier despite that it did not shift the performance onto the 
part of the shipper, where if it did, responsibility and liability will be on the shipper.  
On the other hand, it is more common to find, where bill of lading issued, a clause 
which incorporate the Hague/Hague-Visby Rules which should be applied.236 In respect 
of the container, the responsibility surrounding its supply may well be viewed as part of 
the complex of duties imposed in respect of the seaworthiness of the vessel. 237 
However, any clause such as the above238 may be nullified by Article 3, r. 8 of the 
Hague/Hague-Visby Rules. The supply of fit container would be a statutory obligation 
which cannot be relieved or lessened by contractial terms.239  However, this is not 
always the case, in a French case,240 it was held that exclusion of liability for supply of 
                                                                                                                                          
Vechscroon [1982] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 301. On this, it was said that it has not been unknow for all 
liability to be completely excluded, including an express exclusion of liability for 
unseaworthiness. See David Glass, Frieght Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts, 
(2004, Informa), at para. 4.88. 
234
 See, further, J. Wong, “Container Transportation and Anomalies in the Law” (1995) 23 
Aus.Bus.Law.Rev. 340. 
235
 Clause 8(1)(c) of P & O Containers Bill. For a similar clause see Clause of Sea-land Service 
Bill. 
236
 Compare David Glass, Frieght Forwarding and Multimodal Transport Contracts, (2004, 
Informa), at para. 4.88 with Frank Stevens, “Liability for defective containers: charting a course 
between seaworthiness, care for the cargo and shipper liabilities”, at p. 2, presented at Eighth 
Annual International Colloquium on Carriage of Goods- Sea Transport and Beyond, 6-7, Sept. 
2012, Swansea University.   
237
 See, e.g. Zim Israel Navigation Ltd v The Israel Phoenix Assurance Company Ltd (1999) 34 
E.T.L. 535, Sup. Ct. of Israel, 1.9.98.  
238
 Clause 8(1)(c) of P & O Containers Bill. For a similar clause see Clause of Sea-land Service 
Bill. 
239
 The Red Jacket [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 300. (US Southern Dist. Ct. NY). 
240
 Cour d’Appel de Rouen, 7.2. 1985, [1987] DMF 510. Cf. Federated Department Stores v 
Brinke, 450 F. 2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1971) 
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unfit container was not null pursuant to Article III, r. 8., where damage did not occur 
during the sea carriage. In the US, the court find another way to exclude the liability of 
the container by treating the container that provided by the carrier as a packing. This is 
demonstrated in Cigna Insurance Company of Puerto Rico v The M/V Skanderborg,241 
where the unfitness of the container supplied by the carrier was treated as a defective 
packing rather than a defective container. The problem of non-liability derived from the 
fact that the container is treated as a package. Even if there could be liability for some 
common law negligence, COGSA imposes no duty on the part of the carrier in regard 
with their packing arrangements with shippers so that liability for it can be excluded.242 
Conclusion 
By way of a postscript, it might be desirable to deem that all containers be 
hypothesised legally as a part of the equipment or structure within the vessel’s hull. On 
that basis, there would be no longer any question regarding the application of the 
common regime which in turn would give an advantage of giving an apparent legal 
solution on issues such as exercising due diligence to supply a seaworthy/cargoworthy 
container by the carrier rather than the shipper or consignor.243 Otherwise, there is a 
need for a new regime to solve all the problems. 
The extension of the carrier’s obligation for the entire sea voyage should not be 
considered a problem as the shipping industry had already adopted such an approach 
which can be seen in some recent charterparties. In fact, the continuous obligation is in 
line with the present and future practice of shipping industries which has had the impact 
of the burgeoning advanced communications and navigation. Common sense says that 
the development of new regulations and conventions, concurrent with the needs of the 
Rotterdam Rules, will promote a tool that is fit for a new era of shipping.            
 
 
 
 
                                               
241
 Cigna Insurance Company of Puerto Rico v The M/V Skanderborg [1996] A.M.C. 600 
(U.S.D.C Puerto Rico 1995) 
242
 It must be said that if the provision of container covers the inland carraiage, it is the COGSA 
and not state law which governs the liability especially when COGSA is extended by the bill of 
ladings to cover the pre and post sea carriage. See Junior Gallery Ltd v NOL Ltd [1999] A.M.C. 
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
243 Or other limitation problems 
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